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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development of the concept of individual and collective self- 
defence as expressed in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In doing so, it will analyse the 
attempts to stretch the scope of the right of self-defence beyond the limits allowed under 
Article 51 and assess whether such attempts have undermined the Charter regime. The 
concept of self-defence is seen as part of a series of evolutionary attempts to limit the 
horrors of war by formulating criteria for the legitimacy of armed force. This study 
looks at the developments from the racial and religiously - motivated medieval concept 
of "Just War", and the "defensive" Islamic concept of Jihad, through arbitration and 
treaty between sovereign states, to the development of the legal doctrine of self-defence, 
subject to the criteria of necessity and proportionality, established in the Caroline case. 
The focus is on the modem development of the concept of self-defence in the UN era, 
has developed within the context of a global collective security system. 
However, the circumstances of its drafting left Article 51 with a number of ambiguities 
and inadequacies, which are explored with reference to illustrative examples from recent 
history. Attention is drawn to the nature and scope of the so-called "inherent right"; the 
difficulties surrounding the definitions of "anned attack" and "aggression" as events 
which activate the sight of self-defence; and the unforeseen burden placed on Article 51 
as a result of the paralysing effect of the Cold War on the collective security system. 
A further development in recent years has been a trend to fit Article 51 to the scope of 
the post-colonial, post-Cold War era, by attempting to enlarge it, both temporally and 
spatially. The former leads to claims for various forms of anticipatory and retrospective 
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defence; the latter to broader conceptions of the people, territory and governance system 
to be defended whereby the legal framework of Article 51 is made subject to political 
and humanitarian considerations. However well-intentioned, such trends would greatly 
increase the number of exceptions to the prohibition in Article 2(4) and open the door to 
misuse of the Article 51 provision thereby increasing the danger of threats to peace and 
security. 
Clearly, the 1945 conception of self-defence is no longer adequate to deal with the 
changing force of international relations. Article 51 must change; the question is 
whether it can do so within the spirit of its nature as an "emergency" response with 
value especially to weaker and third world nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'fhe purpose of this thesis is to examine the development of the concept of individual 
and collective self-defence which finds expression in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In 
doing so, this study will assess how the right of self defence has been treated in 
contemporary international law and what dangers lie ahead when this right is abused and 
undermined. The Char-ter of the UN seeks to maintain a delicate balance between the 
principle of the prohibition on the use of force and the right of states to act in self- 
defence under Article 5 1. This study aims to examine how this delicate balance has been 
maintained or disturbed during the last five decades of UN history. Although war has 
existed as long as human society, numerous attempts have been made, throughout 
history, to limit its horrors by formulating criteria for the legitimacy of the resort to war. 
The first chapter of this thesis traces early efforts in this regard. It is shown how, in the 
Middle Ages, racial and religious supremacy were the main legitimising factors of the 
"Just War" in the West, while in the East, the theory of war focused on the essentially 
defensive Islamic concept of Jihad. The latter concept is reviewed in some detail, in 
terms of its aims, the authority which has the right to declare such a war, and its 
development in modem times. After the Peace of Westphalia, international relations 
were dominated by the concept of the sovereign state. Recourse to war became a matter 
for determination of the sovereign, based on "policy", though some success was 
achieved in averting wars by arbitration and treaty. 
Chapter Two examines the development of efforts to limit the right of war in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, and the concomitant development of self-defence as a legal 
doctrine which could be invoked to justify the use of force, only subject to certain 
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criteria, notably those of necessity and proportionality. In this respect, a review is 
presented of the development of the right of self-defence as a result of the Caroline case 
of 1837. Consideration is also given to the role of the League of Nations and the Pact of 
Paris, and how they treated the use of force. 
The tracing of these developments is followed, in Chapter Three, by a discussion of the 
emergence of the modem understanding of self-defence in the UN era, where it has 
developed within the context of a global collective security system, though the 
motivations to self-defence and security actions differ. 
The drafting of Article 51 of the UN Charter was fraught with political complexity; the 
formula that eventually emerged was an attempt to fit regional security arrangements, 
particularly the inter-American system, into the UN framework, though the Article was 
moved from the chapter on regional security in order to make clear that such 
arrangements would be subject to Security Council control. The political circumstances 
of its drafting left Article 51 with a number of ambiguities and inadequacies which are 
explored in the remaining chapters of the thesis, drawing on illustrative examples from 
recent history. 
Chapter Four considers the nature and scope of the so-called "inherent right" of self- 
defence, with particular reference to the interpretation of Article 51, which 
paradoxically appears both to enlarge and restrict the right of self-defence; and to the 
dilemma surrounding the definitions of "armed attack" and "aggression" as prerequisites 
for determining the point at which the self-defence right is activated. Consideration is 
given to the development of the definition of aggression, from the first attempts at the 
time of the League of Nations, to the General Assembly Resolution (3314) of December 
14,1974. An attempt is made to analyse that resolution, to clarify what constitutes 
aggression, and therefore could invoke the right of self-defence. Moreover, 
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consideration is given to the role of the Security Council, and its relation with Article 
51. 
Although Article 51 can be said to have been fraught with ambiguity from the outset, 
the difficulties were compounded when the stalemate of the Cold War era largely 
paralysed the collective security system, leaving Article 51 as the major avenue through 
which measures intended for collective security might be pursued, and a frequently cited 
basis for actions which, from another perspective, might be deemed aggressive. In 
Chapter Five, the Berlin blockade of 1948, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam 
War are analysed to show how, during the Cold War, the concept of self-defence was 
misused by the superpowers to justify actions taken in their political interest. 
Also of concern are trends in recent years to attempt to enlarge the scope of Article 51, 
in ways which would greatly increase the number of exceptions to the prohibition in 
Article 2(4) and thereby increase the danger of threats to peace and security. These 
include the extension of the self-defence right, fonvard and backward in time, to create 
the concepts of anticipatory and retrospective defence. Chapter Six examines the nature 
of pre-emptive and protective self-defence, showing the tension between the logical 
need, in an age of nuclear weapons, to allow a state to take defensive action before a 
fatal blow is received, and the need to uphold the intention of the Charter, particularly 
when volatile political situations in some parts of the world make questions of intention 
and readiness for aggression very difficult to resolve. 
Chapter Seven considers the possibility of extending the self-defence right backwards in 
time. A distinction is drawn between reprisal and self-defence, and the associated 
dilemma of effectiveness versus proportionality is considered. In consequence of the 
engagement or overlap between the right of self-defence and reprisal, it is easy for any 
state to claim to be exercising the right of self-defence under Article 51, in respect of 
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any military action, although such action may in reality be a reprisal action. This is 
exactly what happened in 1986, when the US launched air raids against Libya, in 
retaliation for attacks which had taken place in Europe. Also discussed are the US 
missile attacks on Iraq in 1993, an American response to the attempt to assassinate the 
fonner US president George Bush, in Kuwait. Another reprisal action was taken 
conducted by the US in 1998, against Afghanistan and Sudan, in response to attacks 
against US embassies in Africa. These reprisal actions are considered to see their 
relation with the right of self-defence. 
in the case of regular self-defence, a distinction is drawn between backward self- 
defence, in respect of an infiingement occurring at a time when the victim state was too 
weak to respond, and remedial self-defence, invoked when the political, social and 
economic situation resulting from a past event is considered so oppressive as to amount 
to an ongoing aggression. 
In Chapter Eight, constitutes an attempt to clarify the aims of self-defence, from 
population, the territory, and finally to the state, together with the logic by which these 
are viewed as values to be defended. In connection with population, it is considered 
whether rescue and humanitarian intervention operations fall within the concept of self- 
defence. The defence of territory, as a fundamental component of statehood, is explored 
with reference to border defence, forward defence, and border problems. The state as an 
object of defence is discussed with reference to the issues of state and government, 
separated states, dispute states, imperial states, and regimes' right in collective self- 
defence. In this regard, important inferences regarding armed attack and collective self- 
defence are drawn from the Nicaragua case. 
The thesis concludes by highlighting some significant themes emerging from the 
analysis and speculating on the future of Article 51 in a multipolar world. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL RESTRAINTS UPON AGGRESSION 
Although war has existed as long as human society, and has often been regarded as an 
inevitable concomitant of human nature, equally there have, since early times, been 
attempts to limit the horrors of war, by restricting the circumstances in which it may 
rightfully be fought, and laying down rules for the conduct of the fighting. In the Middle 
Ages, Christianity and philosophy were invoked to develop a concept of Just War, in 
which racial (Greek) and religious (Christian) supremacy were the main legitimising 
factors. In this chapter, the ideas of the main philosophers in the field of Just War, will 
be reviewed. The second part of the chapter will deal with the Islamic concept of Jihad; 
consideration will be given to its motives; the authority for declaring Jihad; the 
principles of Jihad; Jihad as non-warfare and, finally, the status of Jihad in modem 
times. Subsequently, the period of the beginning of the early modem era, and the 
attempts to control or limit the use of force, especially in the Hague Peace Conference of 
1899,1907 and the Bryan Arbitration Treaties, will be considered. 
Ideas ofJttst War 
Theories of Just War have historically been used to justify warfare on judicial, moral, 
and esPecially religious grounds. Religion has often served to motivate and justify war. 
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Religion and politics were mixed together during the Middle Ages, forming a rather 
distorted model of "Christian" morality and doctrine according to the needs of the 
Church and the European state organisations. 1 In the Christian thought, two types of war 
had been seen as pennissible; the Holy War and the Just War. 2 
The first was fought for religious ideals, supposedly to establish the kingdom of God on 
earth. The Holy War was seen in the Crusades, which were presented within the scope 
of the theocratic view of society as a positive duty during which violence, destruction of 
the enemy, and the use of force were legitimised. The second was, on the other hand, 
fought on public authority for more mundane objectives such as defence of territory, 
persons and rights in an attempt to achieve more concrete political goals. It tended to 
limit the incidence of violence by codes of right conduct and other humanitarian 
restraints both in its terms and under thejus armortim, which were lacking in the Holy 
War. The distinction between them was difficult to draw in theory as well as in practice. 
The concepts of Just and HolY War overlapped and encompassed both religious and 
political goals; in the heart of the war, soldiers became more and more convinced of the 
"holiness" of the war they were fighting. The concept of the Holy War and the Crusades 
was considered as a part of the general medieval debate on the right to war rather than 
an independent phenomenon. 3 
Before going fonvard, one has to point out that the underlying philosophies are in a way 
related to each other. Plato's ideas influenced Saint Augustine and after they were 
rediscovered, the works of Aristotle influenced Saint Thomas Aquinas, in addition, of 
course, to the essence of the Catholic theory of society and the state. Saint Thomas 
. Michael Walzer, Against 'Realism', In: Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just Mar Theory, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), p. 4548. The just war theory has received widespread acceptance both -within Western culture and 
in the international community as a means by which a war may be determined to be justified or not. 2 Joan D. Tooke, The Just Mar in Aquinas and Grothis, (London: S. P. C. K, 1965), p. 1-5. 
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Aquinas fused Aristotle's Politics with the teaching of Saint Augustine's City of God 
and furnished his brother Dominicans with a close and literal translation of Politics into 
Latin, so that Aristotle's thought and books shaped the doctrines of law and politics 
throughout the Middle Ages and aftenvards, that the laxv is the true sovereign and 
governments are servants of law are the main principles that governed the theories of 
Just War. Aristotle was brought to life on the general current of European political 
thought, of which he has always been an ingredient. 4 
The spirit of law is philosophy. Aristotle serves as the best illustration of this claim; his 
5 ideas are still inspiring law scholars and thinkers. His works traced and influenced the 
political thought of almost all the thinkers afterwards. In his age of Hellenic Greece, 
warfare was considered a normal form of conflict between different peoples. It was 
Aristotle who coined the tenn Just War, applying it to wars waged by Hellenes against 
non-Hellenic peoples or barbarians. Just War could mean lawful or fair and equal. 
Justice for him was the establishment of a kind of proportion. Proportion here is to be 
seen as a Platonic tenn opposing the Pythagorean notion of reciprocity. In his book, 
Politics, Aristotle saxv war as a natural forra of acquisition 6, belonging to the nature of 
things, an instance of the nonnal rule of superiors over inferiors, in other words the rule 
that extended the rule of the Hellenes over the barbarians and enslaved them and this 
was seen as naturally just. 
Men should go to war only to prevent their own enslavement, that is, in self-defence. 
Consequently, war was not an end in itself but a means to reach such higher goals as 
3 Frederick H. Russell, The Just Mar In The Middle Ages, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975), p. 131-39. 
4 Ibid. 
5 John Ferguson, Aristotle, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1972), p. 13. 
6 David William Ross, Aristotle, (London: Methuen, 1923), p. 214. 
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peace, glory and strength 7. When defence was justified, any means of defence was licit. 
Wars were based on soldiers' ability to fight and they enjoyed a high position in society, 
they formed a distinct community to secure victory. Superiority of numbers, strength of 
allies and skilful leadership were the key components that could secure victory. The 
soldiers' courage, justice and nobility were the most laudabIC8. War for Aristotle was 
only a means to achieve moral ends of justice and peace; it was destined to fail if it was 
transformed into an end. His concept of Just War was more moral and abstract rather 
than juridical in application. It was not, hence, a subject of demonstration in the court of 
law. For him, war had a mission that consisted of civilising the barbarians and 
preserving the natural social order and enslaving those non-Hellenes to serve as "an 
instrument for the conduct of life", an instrument not of production but of action. 
Slavery was a natural distinction between men to make some strong to work and others 
fit for political life9. Aristotle's views influenced the medieval theories and doctrines 
about politics and society. In the earlier middle ages Aristotle's works were lost to the 
West and thinkers such as Saint Augustine of Hippo relied instead upon Plato. His 
works were preserved, however, in the Arab World and eventually returned to western 
knowledge and heavily influenced, for example, Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
Before tackling Saint Augustine's views on Just War, one has to mention Rome's 
fundamental contribution to the Just War which was the development of the concept of 
Just causes. For Cicero, wars should be won by virtue and courage rather than base, 
infamous or treacherous means. 10 He held that the use of force was justifiable only when 
7 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. by Carnes Lord, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 1,7,1255 
a, 3-1255 b, 3. 
8 Ibid, 7,2,133 1 a, 14-19. 
9 Ross, p. 240-241. 
10 Tullius Cicero, De Officiciis, book III, ed. by Hubert Ashton Holden, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1949), p. 86-87. The Ancient Roman Republic had a law of just war, the Jus Fetiale, 
which may be seen as the earliest judicial expression of such ideas, for all its faults in application. See 
also, G. I. A. D Draper, "The Origins of Just War Traditions, " (New Black-Friars 46,1964-65), p. 82 
the war was declared by an appropriate governmental authority acting within specific 
limits. ' I For Cicero, the ability to wage war rested with the state, and the state alone and 
could be lawfully waged only "after an official demand for satisfaction has been 
submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made. " 12 In addition, 
Cicero also proposed the existence of a universal norm for human behaviour which 
transcended the laws of individual nations and governed their relations with each 
other. 13 Cicero's belief in this universal nonn was grounded in his view that there was a 
huniani generis societas, a "society of mankind [sic] rather than of states.,, 14 This view 
of universal standard of behaviour for nation-states which exists outside of promulgated 
laxv would have a profound impact on later just war theorists, particularly on Hugo 
Grotius. Moreover, Cicero considered faith and honour should be maintained even with 
Romes enemies. His principles of right conduct of warfare were employed by later 
Christian writers. 
Grotius was a 16th century Dutch Protestant who is sometimes referred to as the father 
of international law. 15 Grotius, who lived in the aften-nath of the brutal Thirty-Years 
War in Europe, wrote extensively on the right of nations to use force in self-defence in 
his book Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Rights of War and Peace). 16 It was largely Grotius 
who secularised just war theory, making the theory more acceptable for the age of the 
Enlightenment. For Grotius, a war is just if there basic criteria were met: the danger 
faced by the nation is immediate; the force used is necessary to adequately defend the 
11 See David J. Bederman, "Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius' De Jure 
Belli Ac Pacis, " ( Emory International Law Review 10,1996), p. 1; 31-32 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p. 6-7. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p. 1. 
16 Ibid. 
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nation's interests; and the use of force is proportionate to the threatened danger. 17 
Grotius grounded his agreement with Cicero's notion of the need for a declaration of 
war in the natural law, and also argued that the purpose of just war theory is to provide 
"succor and protection for the sick and wounded in war, combatants and civilians 
alike. "18 For Grotius, it is not necessary to prove just war theory by consulting with any 
of the established laws of the nations of Europe, or their customs. 19 
According to Origen, "Christians should also be fighting as priests and worshippers of 
God, keeping their right hands pure. " Christianity had become the official religion of the 
state in the fourth century, following the so-called "Peace of the Church" under 
Constantine the Great in 312, exercising power and influence through the institution of 
the church. The church paid for this position by compromising the purity of some of her 
ideals, particularly pacifism according to the teaching of Jesus ChriSt. 20 It was Saint 
Augustine, who first established the Christian doctrine with regard to the concept of Just 
War. He gave scant consideration to a war of defence. Presumably he took it for granted 
that such a war was immediately and obviously justifiable and even obligatory. He 
neither seriously doubted the permissibility of war in itself, nor was he shocked by its 
intrinsic evil although he did not ignore its inherent horrors. A Just War of aggression, 
however, must be carried on by authority of the prince and must have both a just cause 
and a right intention. Saint Augustine emphasised that a war inspired by a wrong spirit 
was not really a war but a brigandage. 21 Apart from the direct command of God, an 
injustice or a wrong caused by the enemy is the only sufficient justification of war. One 
17 See Ziyad Motala and David T. ButleRitchie, "Self-Defence In International Law, the United Nations, 
and the Bosnian Conflict, (University ofPittsburgh Law Review 75,1995), p. 10. 
's B ederman, "Reception of the Classical Tradition in International La-%v: Grotius' De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, " 
p. 32. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hilaire McCoubrey, Ideas ofJust Mar in the Christian tradition, chapter 111, unpublished. 
21 De Solages Bruno, La 77ieologie De La Guerre Juste: Genese Et Orientation, (Desclee De Brouwer: 
Paris, 1946), p. 41-2. 
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example of such an injury which Saint Augustine gave was that of the refusal of the 
Amorites to allow free passage through their territory to the Israelites. He accepted 
punishment as an important element in the Just War. However, although the only 
justification of war for Saint Augustine - an injustice or wrong in the part of the enemy - 
would seem to imply the right of punishment, and in spite of Augustine's acceptance of 
war as a means employed by God to chastise and punish the just as well as the unjust, 
this element is not centrally necessary to Augustine and he was more concerned with 
defending and maintaining the objective order of justice than Nvith an analysis of, and 
ruling for, the subjective spiritual issues. The fact that Saint Augustine found a just 
cause of war in the refusal to restore property unjustly stolen and his whole concern for 
love and order appear to prove this. 22 The fact that Saint Augustine certainly insisted on 
war as a means of restoring order and of achieving peace in his writings 23 is due to the 
precise relation between the actual horrors of war and his aim for peace, although his 
frequent references to peace in the midst of war must seem contradictory and unrealistic. 
War is fought for the sake of peace, but there is no recognition of the inherent 
contradictions in such a proposition. 
Saint Augustine combined Roman and Judaeo-Christian elements in a mode of thought 
that was to influence all the theories of war throughout the Middle Ages and onwards. 
The Just War served to reconcile the evangelical precepts of patience and the pacific 
tendencies of the early church with Roman legal notions. 24 Augustine argues in Contra 
Faustum Manichaenz that the real evils in war were not war itself but the love of 
violence and cruelty, greed and dominant libido or lust for rule that so often 
accompanied it. Inspired by the Old Testament, he argued that, by divine judgement, 
22 Robert Willem Regout, La Doctrine De La Guerre Juste De SaintAugusline a Nos Jours: Dapres Les 
77icologiens et Les Cononistes Catholiques, (Paris: A. Pedone 1934), p. 44. 23 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just Mar 77wory, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), p. 11-14. 
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wars pushed peoples for sins and crimes, even those unrelated to the war. When tackling 
the concept of Just War in the light of Saint Augustine's views one has to put in his/her 
mind the Platonic theory that had served as the basic pillar for his analysis; the logic was 
shaped by his postulates on the abstract concept of the City of God or the Heavenly City. 
The frequent references to the Old and the New Testament provided Augustine with a 
means of defeating the doctrinaire pacifism of the Manichean heresy and also with 
guidance to contemporary Christians who still harboured suspicion of war and military 
service. He saw in Moses' wars a just and righteous retribution, and compared the 
punishment of unwilling souls to that of the loving father of his child. He perceived 
"resist not evil" (Matt 5: 39) and the command to "turn the other cheek" (Luke 6: 29) as 
referring to the inward disposition of the heart rather than the outward deed. Patience 
and benevolence did not always contradict with the infliction of physical punishment, 
for when Moses put sinners to death he was motivated not only by cruelty but by love. 
Augustine's distinction between the inward disposition of the heart and the outward acts 
was accepted without serious question in the Middle Ages, as well as his claim to 
reconcile war and the New Testament. Since his ethics and his whole philosophical 
ideas were based on the intention rather than the normative hostile act it was justified 
and motivated by one of the most important touchstones of his thought "charity". 
Warfare had become with Saint Augustine necessary, rather than inherently sinful. 
Saint Augustine denied the use of physical violence to private persons; a private 
Christian could not kill an attacker in self-defence, for that could entail hatred and loss 
of love, one of the basic ideals around which his philosophy pivoted. Saint Augustine, a 
neo-Platonic thinker par excellence had succeeded in colouring Christianity with the 
motive of establishing peace, in which importance was accorded to the right intention: 
24 Regout, p. 38-44. 
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Just War was fought for the sake of peace and carried out with mercy. It was a necessary 
act compatible with love and charity, a war that punishes as well as rewards. 
In the end, Saint Augustine's ideas on Just War were mainly inspired by the Greek 
philosophers' theories that saw war as necessary for defending and preserving peace and 
good order. He was also influenced by the Islamic philosophy, as well as a great 
apologist of the Christian Catholic Church at the time Nvhen it had just allied itself to the 
state and his acceptance and theories of Just War could be considered as a defence 
against the charges that pacific Christianity had been responsible for the downfall of the 
Roman Empire. 
Natural law so permeates the political and ethical thinking of Aquinas that little is to be 
gained from considering what be wrote on war without examining his understanding of 
it. Space forbids a full examination of his legal philosophy, but broadly speaking, he 
believed that ideally man has an innate understanding of moral and divine laws and 
principles which were implicit in his whole make-up and which should govern his 
conduct. These laws were imprinted in his very being and in the very construction of his 
mind and by them he was taught what he ought to do in the personal, social and political 
sectors, God was said to command the whole idea of natural law. 25 
This idea was first expressed explicitly as a doctrine by the Greeks, -particularly by the 
Stoics, and from them it passed into the Roman legal thought. Later it was found in the 
Church Fathers, the Canonists, and the theological writers of the early middle ages. One 
of the most famous statements of the Stoic view of natural law was made by Cicero, 
who wrote: 
"The law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and 
everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands and avert from wrongdoing by its prohibitions"26 
25 Brian Davis, The Thought of 7homas Aquinas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 6-7. 
26 Tullius Cicero, De Republica: De Legibus / trans. by C. W. Keyes, (London: Heinemann, 1928), p. 33. 
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In his book, The Second Division of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas 
dealt with war as one of the sins contrary to charity and peace. In his book, Aquinas was 
putting practical theology in its full theological context in the order to which he 
belonged. 27 He first considered discord an inward sin; secondly he viewed contention as 
a sin of the tongue, and finally those sins which result in actions such as schism, 
quarrelling, war and seduction as sinful. Aquinas discussed war in itself, the 
circumstances under which it can be justifiable, the questions of whether or not clerics 
should fight, if it was lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes in war and, last but not 
least, whether fighting on Holy days was pennissible. Objections against the justice or 
righteousness of war in itself were dealt in the Holy Scripture, in those texts: 
"All who take the sword die by the sword. 9ý28 
"Do not set yourself against the manwho wrongs YOU.,, 29 
"Justice is mine says the Lord, I will repay. ', 30 
Aquinas argued against pacifist interpretations of those three statements or commands 
by quoting Saint Augustine's argument that John the Baptist would have counselled the 
soldiers to throw away their arms and give up soldiering altogether if warfare had been 
essentially against the teaching of the Gospel, instead of recommending them to be 
content with their pay and to do no violence. To formulate a convincing argument 
Aquinas focused his objections in three conditions: 
1. Right authority. 
2. Sufficient cause. 
3. Right intention. 
27 Ibid., p. 155. 
28 Ae New English Bible, New Testament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), Matt. 26.52. 
29 Matt. 5.39. 
30 Rom. 12.19. 
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Here again, he intensively quoted Saint Augustine 31 and echoed his reasoning that to 
take the sword meant only to take it unlawfully but that to use it in obedience to the 
proper and appropriate authority of a sovereign prince was just and not sinful. 32 
Following his argument, which was originally formulated by S. Augustine, even where 
the sword was wrongly taken, the opportunity of repentance may intervene between the 
sin and its punishment, which was the natural death of any such sinners, was not 
necessarily death by a literal sword but spiritual death by a sort of a spiritual sword. The 
right authority was a key condition for Just War. No private person has the right to 
assemble troops and declare a war; a public person can, even without any superior 
human authority, here recourse to the sword if he be truly inspired by a zeal of justice; 
his authority, here, comes from God. Such authority was very limited, and dependent on 
a righteous cause. Thomas Aquinas' definition of Just War was almost identical to that 
of S. Augustine: 
"A just Nvar is Nvont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, Nvhen a nation or a state has to be 
punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what 
Nvas secede unjUStly.,, 33 
Actions of just war were intended to bring about the common good for either the 
community or for those against whom one was fighting and the command of non- 
resistance was not always appropriate and it was not intended by God to be always 
practised. Here, Aquinas also quoted St. Augustine and agreed with him on the fact that 
the Gospel precepts of non-resistance should be obeyed except when they contradict the 
common good. 34 In tackling the concept of peace, he distinguished between true and 
31 Frederick H. Russell, 77ie Just Mar in the MiddleAges. p. 259. 
32 Ibid., p. 260. 
33 Frederick Charles Copleston, Aquinas, (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 22. See also, Aquinas, eds. 
by John Dunn and Ian Harris (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997), p. 61-67. 
34 Ibid., p. 270. 
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false peace and claimed that Jesus Christ came to establish the true peace 35 and war can 
be transformed into peace by the spirit in which it is fought; in the same way, the 
absence of war can be evil under some circumstances. Again, Aquinas' process of 
argument echoed St. Augustine. Wars' horrors can be redeemed by good intention. 
Peace, security, punishment of evildoers, and helping good people, were essential 
preconditions to a just war. A wicked intention can render a just cause unjust. His 
objection against the participation of clerics in warfare was based on his conviction that 
those persons had a particular vocation, a uniquely spiritual mission, such that even the 
urgency of defending one's life did not justify them in fighting. Military activity could 
prevent them from their proper duty at a time when it was proper to pray for victory and 
contemplate God in peace and fight with spiritual weapons. Saint Paul's words, "the 
weapons of our warfare are not carnal but mighty through God", were made to apply 
only to clerics as "no man, being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular 
,, 36 business. 
The word "soldier" was seen as purely metaphorical and clerics were supposed to 
encourage their friends to fight materially by absolving them from their sins, praying for 
victory and using their divine position, as had done the priests of Joshua, who were at 
the forefront of the march only for the purpose of blowing their sacred trumpets (Josh. 6. 
4). Aquinas acknowledged the fact that there is something essentially unchristian in the 
shedding of blood, even in a just war cause, since shedding blood is completely 
incompatible with the administration of the sacrament of Christ's body and blood: "It is 
altogether unlawful for clerics to fight because war is directed to shedding of blood. " 
Aquinas considered whether it was lawful to deceive the enemy by laying ambushes 37 
35 Matt. 10.34. 
36 2 Tim. 2.4. 
37 Russell, p. 271. 
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since deception and lies appear to be opposed to the virtue of faithfulness. Here, 
Aquinas made a distinction between deliberate and explicit deceit expressed in an 
external deed, such as a lie or the breaking of a promise. For him, ambush was nothing 
more than "concealment of plan. " Though he mentioned St. Augustine's reference to the 
command of the Lord to Joshua to lay ambushes, he opted for a more strict view and 
understanding; he followed Jesus' warning that we ought not to give that which is holy 
to dogs. 38 
Fighting on holy days is another issue Aquinas tackled in his book. Objections were 
mainly derived from the old Testament's attitude to the Sabbath. The most obvious 
scriptural evidence against this attitude was that Jesus himself healed a man on the 
Sabbath for the good end of safeguarding the common good; there was no objection to 
that. Monscigneur De Solages criticised Aquinas in the beginning of his book "La 
Theologie De La Guen-e Juste"39 and acknowledged the importance of his book 
"Summa Theologica" with regard to his views on war. I have tried to summarise the 
main points he raised in three points: 
1. War for T. Aquinas related to natural virtue such as justice, rather than to a 
supernatural virtue, such as charity. He did not mention charity, even en passant, but 
mentioned justice thirteen times. 
2. War was seen as an individual, subjective, religious problem in the assumption of a 
clear distinction between objective and social justice and subjective individual morality, 
though Monseigneur De Solages claims that the distinction tends to be vague and dim 
rather than clear and evident. 
38 Matt. 7.6. 
39 De Solages, p. 9-17-18-3 1. 
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3. One of Saint Thomas Aquinas' milestones in the concept of just war is the fulfilment 
of a right intention. Monseigneur De Solages claims that right intention is a relative, 
changing term, and its alteration is possible. 
Another common complaint that applies to all Aquinas' views and ideas is the abstract 
and impersonal style. He never identified nor argued on the nature of the prince's 
authority. He saw it as deriving directly from God, which was, or is not, always the case. 
He never related the question of war to the universe, the world or even Christendom, 
ignoring in a way the church's growing effect to reduce and prevent a war. It is clear that 
Aquinas perceived war from a religious and subjective and social viewpoint. 'To criticise 
Aquinas one has to remember that he was influenced by the idealistic views of the 
Greek metaphysicians and theologians, mainly Aristotle, Plato and Saint Augustine, 
whom he quoted often, without even acknowledgement. 
To assess the theories of just war, we have to see if they have really limited wars more 
than they encouraged them. The jus ad bellum is acknowledged by the three 
philosophers. They are equipped with such penetrating logic as to look for a doctrine of 
preventive war. Despite their platonic background they acknowledged the necessity of 
wars as part of our human nature. This avant garde attitude enabled them to study war 
as a human natural phenomenon rooted in our psyche and soul and to try to limit its 
atrocities, theorising certain preconditions to its inevitability. We should never study 
those philosophers independently from the historical and political era they lived in. War, 
for them, is only necessary if it will secure peace, punish evildoers and protect ideals, 
such as justice, peace, security, democracy against invaders. They all view the defence 
of the patria, the sovereignty of the law, the battle against lust, greed and cruelty 
primary causes for just wars. They wanted to reduce the possibility of waging wars. 
Despite the importance of their ideas in shaping and influencing political and juridical 
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thought and the spirit of modem international law, religious and racial supremacy has 
served as the main legitimising factor for the concept of the Just War. Their judgement 
in this respect could not represent a comprehensive practical political view since Greek 
supremacy or Christian supremacy is only convincing from their angle of thought. I have 
to point out at the end of this part that Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were 
deeply influenced by the Islamic philosophy which was deeply shaped in its turn by the 
Greek one, mainly Plato and Aristotle. The process of legitimising wars comes out of 
necessity. The philosophers of the medieval Europe wanted as part of the political scene 
to defend their territories against the growing threat of the Islamic Army that controlled 
South Europe. 
The Islamic Concept ofJiliad 
By the seventh century, Islam appeared in the Arabian peninsula. The new religion 
spread rapidly throughout the length and breadth of Arabia, persuading many believers 
and gaining manifold adherents. Within a century of its appearance, the faith of Islam 
expanded to cover large areas beyond the boundaries of its own region, forming the 
Islamic Empire which extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 40 A similar concept to 
that of the Christian just war is to be found in the Muslim legal theory of war, the 
"Islande concept of Xhad'. The term Jihad is derived from the verb jahada (abstract 
noun juhd) which means "he exerted himself'; consequently, Jihad literally means 
exertion or striving. Jihad is commonly translated as "Holy or religious war", but this 
translation is far from exact. 41 Jihad in the juridico-religious sense indicates "the 
40 Murad Hofmann, Islam: 77ze Alternative, (Garnet Publishing Reading: Glasgow, 1993), p. 1-5. 
41 See Tofiq Ali Wahib, The Mad in Islam, (Saudi Arabia: Jeddab, 1980), p. 13. 
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)42 exertion of one's power to the utmost of one's capacity in the cause of Allah' , and to 
"spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world" . 
43 
"Jihad in the technology of law is used for expending ability and power in fighting in the 
path of God by means of life, property, tongue and other than these". 44 According to this 
concept, a Muslim "may fulfil his Rhad obligation: by his heart; his tongue; his hand; 
and by sword". 45 It is important to mention here, that the concept of Jihad does not only 
connote a holy or religious war; but the holy war constitutes one of its important 
I elements and is usually carried out as a last resort for the expansion of Islam. 46 Jihad, as 
meaning a resort to holy war in the path of Allah (God), was imposed upon Muslims by 
their Holy book the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the tradition of the Prophet Mohammed). 47 
The Holy Qur'an says: 
"Allah hath purchased of the Believers Their persons and their goods; For theirs (in return) Is the 
Gardan (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, And slay and are slain: A promise binding on Him 
In Truth, through the Torah, The Gospel, and the Qur'an: And who is more faithful To his 
Covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain Which ye have concluded: That is the 
achievement supreme. "48 
The motivation for a Muslim believer in fighting a war of Jihad is the word of God that 
each soldier dying in a Jihad fighting become a Shahid (martyr). A Shahid in the path of 
God is promised a place in heaven. The Our'an says: 
42 See Majid Khadduri, Mar and Peace in the Law qfIslani, (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1955), 
p. 55. The term "jahada" (he exerted himself) and all other terms derived from it, have been mentioned 
forty times in the Holy Qur'an. Reviewing the Holy Qur'an proves that the term "Fi Sabeel Allah" (In the 
way of Allah) has been attached to Jihad or "qitar, (Fighting) thirty two times. The Holy Qur'an says: 
"And strive in His cause As ye ought to strive, (With sincerity and under discipline), The Holy Qur'an: 
Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah: Saudi Arabia (1998), surat: Al-Hajj: 22: 78. And the Qur'an says: "But those 
Nvho are slain In the way of Allah, He will never let Their deeds be lost. See Surat: Mohammed: 47: 4. 43 Ibid. 
44 Mohammed Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct ofState, (Lahore: Pakistan, 1977), p. 150. 
45 Khadduri, p. 56. 
46 Reuven Firestone, Xhad: 77ze Origin ofHoly Mar in Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
13-16. 
47 Sunnah or the Hadilh comprises what the Prophet said, did, or tolerated. 
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"Those xvho believe, and emigrate And strive Nvith might And main, in Allah's cause, With their 
goods and their persons, Have the highest rank In the sight of Allah: They are the people Who Nvill 
achieve (salvation). "49 "Their Lord doth give them Glad tidings of a Mercy From Himself, of His 
good pleasure. And of Gardens for them, Wherein are delights That endure. ', 50 
Also, Jihad as meaning a Holy war was permitted by Muslim Sunnah. In this 
connection, the Prophet Mohammed is reported to have said: 
"Every prophet had some profession (for livehood), and my profession is Jihad; and in fact my 
, 51 means of subsistence are placed under the shadow of my spear. 
A review of the historical development of Islam reveals that Muslims, at the time of the 
Disclosure, had no territorial ambitions outside the Arabian peninsula. Their main desire 
was that Islam would replace Shirk (polytheism) in Arabia. 52 Therefore, Jihad was only 
limited to the exhortation of the Muslims of Arabia to continue the fight against their 
polytheist rivals in that region. 53 After the contest between Islam and polytheism had 
ended in the victory of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic State over Arabia, the 
principle of Jihad, in the sense of a state of war between the Muslims and the 
unbelievers of Arabia, was subject to certain important changes. With the developments 
of the Islamic State, the second stage of Jihad began. A new interpretation of the 
principle of Jihad emerged: as a legitimate weapon for the spreading of Islam outside 
the Arabian peninsula. 54 
Later, the development of the principle of Jihad was influenced by the Mina (Jurist- 
theologians and canon lawyers) who developed a theory whereby the world was divided 
into two regions. The first was the Dar al-Islain (the world of Islam), which included all 
48 The Holy Qur'an, Suart: At-Tauba: 9: 111. 
49 Ibid: 9: 20. 
50 Ibid: 9: 2 1. 
51 Quoted in Hamidullah, p. 9-10. 
52 Charles H. AlexandroNvicz, "Treaty and Diplomatic Relations Between European and South Asian 
PoNvers in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, " (Hague Recited 100,1960-11), p. 236-37. 
53 M. K. NaNvaz, "The Doctrine of 'Jihad' in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice", (Indian Yearbook of 
International Affairs 8,1959), p. 3440. 
54 Ibid, p. 38. 
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territories controlled by Muslims and applied the Islamic Sharia. 55 The second was the 
Dar al-Harb (the world of war), which consisted of enemy territories or communities 
outside the world of Islam. 56 In theory, Dar al-Islam was supposed to be in permanent 
57 
state of war with Dar al-Harb until the latter was transformed into Dar al-Islam. That 
kind of war could not, in practice, imply continuous warfare. 58 Dar al-Islarn was under 
an obligation to invite peacefully neighbouring non-Muslim communities to spread 
Islam in the world. If they accepted and they became adherents, they would retain their 
power and be regarded as a part of Dar al-Islam. But, if they rejected the invitation, then 
59 
they should pay the Jizyah (protection tax). If they refused, to accept either of these 
options, the Khalifah (successor of the Prophet Mohammed, leader of the Islamic State) 
had no choice but to wage a war of Jihad against the other party until either it was 
conquered, defrayed the Jizyah or embraced Islam. 60 That tendency was supported by 
the Qur'an: 
"Fight those who believe not In Allah nor the Last Day, Nor hold that forbidden Which hath been 
forbidden By Allah and His Messenger, Nor acknowledge the Religion Of Truth, from among The 
People of the Book, Until they pay the Jizya With willing submission, And feel themselves 
subdued', . 
61 
From what has been mentioned above, it becomes clear that the main Islamic idea is 
based on the fact that Islam and polytheism cannot be in agreement, although even in 
this respect, Islam asked Muslims not to be aggressive, for the Qur'an says: 
"Fight in the cause of Allah Those Nvho Fight you But do not transgress limits; For Allah loveth not 
transgressors". 62 
55 Tofiq, p. 48-50. 
56 Khadduri, p. 170-1. 
57 lbid, p. 53. 
58 Alexandroxvicz, p. p. 236-7. 
59 NaNvaz, p. 37. 
60 Hamidullah, p. 158-9. 
61 The Holy Qur'an: Surat: At-Taitba: 9: 29. 
62 Ibid, Surat: Al-Baqarah: 2: 190. 
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Under Islamic law, all secular wars are abolished. Only the war of Jihad is acceptable 
because it is waged in the path of God. War between Muslims is completely 
prohibited. 63 Military action against Muslims is justified only by denying them the status 
of Muslims, classifying them as apostates or against legitimate authority. 64 For example, 
when Caliph al-Ma'mun and his brother al-Amin struggled for control of the caliphate 
in 809-13, al-Ma'mun called al-Amin an apostate. 65 Muslim writers use the tennfitna, 
meaning trial or temptation, to describe divisions within the Muslim community. 
Though pre-modem Muslim writers do not say so, fitna became a permanent condition 
after 750, when the political unity of the Muslim community (uninia) came to an end. 
66 The earliest Muslim writer, Mohammed ibn al-Hassan Shaybani, considered the 
Islamic laws of war and peace was formulated only retrospectively, by deriving general 
principles from a situation that no longer existed and would never again exist. 
In effect, the law of Jihad was formulated after the conditions it fitted had passed. The 
jurists then sought to reconcile the division and disorder of later centuries with the 
theory, but they averted their gaze from the ugly reality of intra-Muslim warfare all 
around them. Instead, they primarily sought to establish the legitimacy of authority in 
the absence of an effective caliph ruling a unified Muslim community. Islamic law never 
addressed the reality of political division within the Islamic world. The division of the 
Islamic world did not end its expansion, Jihad in the sense of warfare continued, though 
the Jihad ideal rarely determined the policies of Muslim regimes and almost never 
permitted them to join together against a common non-Muslim foe. Often the term 
63 Tofiq, p. 3944. For more information see Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari, Jihad: Vie Holy War ofIslain 
and Its Legifinzacy in the Qu'ran, trans. by Mohammed Salman TaNvhidi, (Islamic Propagation 
Organisation: Iran, 1985), p. 13-16. 
64 Fred M. Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War, " In: John Kelsay and James Turner 
Johnson, eds. Just Mar and Mad. - Historical and 77ieoretical Perspectives on Mar and Peace in Mestern 
and Islamic Traditions, (New York: Greenwood Press, 199 1), p. 51-52. 65 
Ibid. 
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ghazi, literally raiding, was used as a synonym. The Ottoman Empire is often called the 
empire of the gbazis because success in Jihad was a vital component of Ottoman 
legitimacy. But Rhad was not the sole motivation, or even the sole ideology, for 
Ottoman expansion. Other factors included population pressure, competition with other 
Muslim states, and the lure of border warfare. In addition to the doctrine of Rhad, 
Ottoman political ideology incorporated Turko-Mongol, Iranian, and Byzantine 
elements. A similar combination of ideological and other factors drove Muslim 
expansion in the Indian subcontinent. 67 Moreover, Muslim rulers such as Uzan Hassan 
Aqquynulu, the ruler of western Iran and eastern Anatolia in 1453-78, and the Safavid 
Shah Tamasp (1524-76) participated in Jihad not just for abstract reasons of faith but to 
enhance their legitimacy and acquire booty. 
The main motives for Muslims to wage a war of Jihad, can be classified into the 
following: 
1. Self-defence: It is a type of legitimate defence which is permitted by Al-Islam, to 
repel enemy attacks. Muslims should not fight, unless to defend themselves. This is 
supported by the Qur'an: 
"Fight in the cause of Allah Those who Fight you But do not transgress limits". 68 
"If then any one transgresses The prohibition against you, Transgress ye likewise Against him". 69 
2. Assistance to Muslim People. The Holy Qur'an says: 
"And why should ye not Fight in the cause of Allah And of those who, being weak, Are ill-treated 
(and oppressed)? Men, Women, and children, Whose cry is: "Our Lord! Rescue us from this town. 
Whose people are oppressors; And raise for us from Thee One who will protect". 70 
66 His work is translated into English: Moharm-ned ibn al-Hassan Shaybani, Vie Islamic Law of Nations: 
Shaybani's Siyar, trans by Majid Khadduri (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
67 Richard M. Eaton, 77ie Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), p. 71-77. 
68 The Holy Qur'an: Surat: Al-Baqarah: 2: 190. 
69 lbid: Surat: Al-Baqarah: 2: 194. 
70 Ibid: Surat: Al-An-Nisaa: 4: 75. 
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3. Safeguarding the authority of Islamic state and its sovereign rights to impose iizya 
(protection tax). In this respect the Holy Qur'an says: 
"Fight those who believe not In Allah nor the Last Day, Nor hold that forbidden Which hath been 
forbidden By Allah and his Messenger, Nor acknowledge the Religion Of Truth, from among The 
People of the Book, Until they pay the Jizya With willing submission, And feel themselves 
subdued', . 
71 
4. Punitive, against hypocrisy, apostasy, rebellion, on breaking of a covenant by the 
other party: 
"If then any one transgresses The prohibition against you, Transgress ye likewise Against him. But 
fear Allah, and know That Allah is with those Who restrain themselves". 72 "If thou fearest 
treachery From any group, throw back (Their Covenant) to them, (so as To be) on equal terms: For 
Allah loveth not the treacheroUS,,. 73 
5. Idealistic, a war in the path of God, that is, in the direction of the expansion of Islam 
and for making the Word of God supreme over the world: 
"Fight those who believe not In Allah nor the Last Day, Nor hold that forbidden Which hath been 
forbidden By Allah and His Messenger, Nor acknowledge the Religion Of Truth, from among The 
People of the Book, Until they pay the Jizya With willing submission, And feel themselves 
subdued. 74 
Here, an important point should be clarified, that the verse, does not tell us to fight the 
People of the Book, it tells us to fight only those of them who have no faith in God, or in 
the hereafter, and'who do not abide by the rule of God, allowing what He has forbidden; 
and who are not religious according to the religion of truth. 
71 lbid: Surat: AI-At-Tauba: 9: 29. 
72 lbid, Surat: Al-Baqarah: 2: 194. 
73 lbid, Surat: Al-Anfal: 8: 58. 
74 lbid, Surat: At-Tauba: 9: 29. 
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Declay-ingShad 
Only the Khalifa (Caliph), the heir of the Prophet, as simultaneously religious and 
political leader, could authorise the waging of Jihad by in the Islamic community. 75 so 
long as Mohammed was alive, he fulfilled this job. 76 On his death in 632, leadership of 
the Muslim community was taken up by others in turn, who were known by the title 
77 Khalifa, caliph (which means deputy). Each caliph was also Iniani for the community 
as a whole, though the caliphs were admitted to lack the special divine guidance 
received by Mohammed. They did, however, have the Qur'an as the record of that 
guidance, and they and their supporters employed it to justify the military and political 
actions they took to consolidate their central authority over the extended Muslim 
community. 78 Such actions were necessary immediately, because upon Mohammed's 
death the religion-political community he had formed quickly began to fragment: 
sometimes for political reasons, sometimes for religious reasons, sometimes for both. 79 
The consolidation of caliphal authority was, in its structure, both religious and political. 
It was political in that it established that there would be a single Muslim political 
community with the caliph at its head, not a regression to the pattern of independent 
tribes and cities that had been nonnative in Arabia before Mohammed. 80 It was religious 
in that it established the Qur'an as the ongoing presence of revelatory guidance for that 
political community. This appeal to the Qur'an gave the caliphs a legitimacy as 
75 See Khadduri, Mar and Peace in the Law ofIslam, p. 87-88. 
76 Mohammed Shaltut, Islam: Religion and System, (Dar Al-Qlam: Cairo, 3 ed, 1966), p. 461-63. 
77 Peter Partner, God ofBattles: Holy Mars of Christianity and Islam, (Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 
p. 4143. 
78 Shaltut, p. 463-64. 
79 Adnian Al-Romi and Ali Al-Haz'ei, "Al-Jihad, " (Al-Minar Library: Kuwait (1997), p. 3944. See also 
John L Esposito, 27ze Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic Morld, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Vol. 1,1995), p. 23940. so Abdal Rhman Ali Flah, Islam and Guardianship on Religions, (Dar AI-Gad: Bahrain, 2 ed, 1978), p. 
27-30. 
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successors to Mohammed that they would not otherwise have had, since it compensated 
for the fact that, unlike the Prophet, they lacked direct divine guidance. 81 Among the 
minorities within the Muslim community who, for many reasons, disputed the caliphal 
succession and the nature of caliphal rule, was the group who later came to be known as 
Shi'des. This party attacked caliphal. rule from two directions at once: by claiming that 
the Prophet had in fact designated his successor, and that succession should follow in 
the direct line of blood descent from Mohammed; and by insisting that only persons 
who themselves received direct divine guidance could legitimately exercise leadership 
of the Muslim community. The opposition of this group came to a head during a 
struggle for power between the third caliph, 'Ali, whom they supported as the Prophet's 
designate, and Mu'a,, viyya, the ruler of SyTia. 82 
By 661, five years after Ali's succession to the caliphate, supporters of Mu'awiyya 
killed Ali, and Mu'awiyya gained power as caliph. Ali's supporters rejected him as an 
opportunist and continued to fight, led by the Prophet's Mohammed grandson, Hussein, 
who they regarded as the real caliph. In 680, at the battle of Karbala, Ali's faction were 
defeated and Hussein killed. This effectively ended the military phase of the conflict and 
caused the Shia to concentrate on their religious differences with the caliph and the 
dominant party. 83 The majority of Muslims, however, continued to accept the legitimacy 
of ealiphal rule. The line of religious belief that developed in this context came to be 
known as Sunni from its dependence on the sunna, the "Mohammed custom and 
guidance". A number of distinctive elements in later Sunni Islam follow directly from 
the system set up by the early caliphs. Two important traditions of ruling authority have 
81 Tofiq, p. 39A4. 
82 P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. and Bernard Lewis, 77ze Cambridge History of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), p. 68-72. 
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been developed in the two major divisions of Islam, the Sunni and the Shi 7. Under the 
Sunni concept, the caliphate and its successors represented the union of political and 
religious rule initiated by Mohammed. In practice, however, the caliphs functioned as 
temporal rulers, having recourse to their religious authority as required for state 
purposes. 84 For the Shi Wes, the same was true of the imanz, though in reverse: the iniam 
was held to be the only legitimate heir to both religious and political power, but in 
practice the inianis were restricted to religious leadership of the Shi We community while 
the caliphs and not the imams held actual power in the Islamic community as a whole. 85 
In Sunni tradition the caliph, in his dual religious-political role, can authorise Jihad in 
general. Throughout the caliphate and even until late in the Ottoman empire, the rulers 
used the call to Jihad to mobilise and motivate their armies and secure the support of the 
public. In the ShVite tradition, the right was restricted to wage defensive Jihad only, 
however, they considered it a legitimate right: to protect the basic welfare of the Islamic 
community against those who threatened it. 86 The Shi'm Jurists restricted Jihad for 
defensive purposes only as a result of the absence of the legitimate authority which 
could authorise offensive Jihad after the disappearance of the TNvelfth Imam in 874; for 
them, there would be no just ruler in the world until the Twelfth Imam returned as 
Mahdi: which means the right guided one sent by God to rule the world at the end of 
time. 
87 
From what has been discussed, the declaration of Jihad is linked with the availability of 
religious- political authority, which for ShOh is based on the caliph (or Imam) as the 
83 Abdulaziz Abdul-Hussien Sachedina, 77ie Just Ruler (Al-sultan 41-adil) in Shite Islam: Yhe 
Comprehensive Authority ofthe Jurist in Imamite Jurispnidence, (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 114- 
15. 
84 Flab, p. 31-33. 
85 lbid, p. 105-117. 
86 Afif Abdal Tharei, 7be Spirit of1slam, (Dar Al-Alam: Beirut, 14 ed, 1977), p. 397-98. 
87 Adnian Al-Romi and Ali Al-Haz'ei, p. 58-62. See also Khadduri, p. 66-69. See also Sachedina, p. 120- 
27. 
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leader of the Muslim community; under the Stand tradition, the caliph can declare Rhad 
in general, regardless whether it is defence or offensive Jihad . 
88 But under the Shiih ' 
tradition, Jihad is restricted only to protecting the Islamic state (defensive Jihad). The 
ShOh tradition limits Jihad to defensive purposes as a result of the absence of the 
legitimate authority to declare offensive Jihad. 89 The main point which needs to be 
emphasised, is that in the present time, the political-religious authority to wage Jihad is 
completely absent, since the Islamic institution of the caliphate was abolished on 3rd 
March 1924 by Kamel Attaturk with the deposition of Abdulmecid. 90 
The Main Principles ofJihad 
Thefirst principle, is that Islam in origin appeals to peace, since peace is the main aim 
and object for the Islamic religion and State. 91 The Qur'an says: 
"Allah is He, than Whom There is no other god; The Sovereign, the Holy One The Source of Peace 
(and Perfection) The Guardian of Faith, The Preserver of Safety, The Exalted in Might, The 
Irresistible, the justly Proud Glory to Allah! (High is He) Above the partners They attribute to 
Hinf . 
92 "But Allah doth call To the Home of Peace', . 
93 
The second principle and the important one, concerning Jihad, is linked with the 
existence of a legitimate purpose to wage Jihad. That kind of holy war in Islam is not 
connected with the caprice or emotions of the leader (caliph), but should be based on the 
real need of the Islamic State. Without such a legitimate purpose for Rhad, this kind of 
war will not be holy. 94 
88 Esposito, Vol. 2, p. 371. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid, p. 241. 
91 Mohammed Abd-Al-Issiz Abu-Skalia, Ybe Rides of Xhad in Islam, (Saudi Arabia: Riyadh University 
Press, 1999), p. 99-103. 
92 The Holy Qur'an: Surat: Al-Hashr: 59: 23. 
93 Ibid: Surat: Dams: 10: 25. 
94 Abu- Skalia, p. 104-5. 
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The third principle, is that before they wage the war of Jihad, Muslims should give 
warning and not surprise the enemy, because if they give the enemy time to consider his 
situation, there may not be any need for recourse to war. Traditionally, the Islamic State 
offered three options for the enemy: to enter Islam, to pay Jizyah (protection tax), or 
war. Here, the main idea, is that Islamic tradition prefers to leave a space of time for 
non-Muslims to review their position, since there may not be a need for war. 95 
The fourth principle, is that fighting is restricted to the field of war only, and against 
combatants only; civilians are to be protected. Muslims must not target non-combatants, 
women, children, the old and the infirm or worshippers. 96 
Thefifth principle, is that there must be no treachery: It is a main rule in Islam to respect 
any agreement or treaty even with the enemy. 97 
The sixth principle, is that it is prohibited to tamper with the corpses of the enemy; the 
bodies of slain enemies are to be given to their families. 98 
The seventh principle, is to respect, to help and to take care of the prisoners of war. 99 
The Qur'an says: "And they feed, for the love Of Allah, the indigent, The orphan, and 
the captive". 100 
The eighth principle, is that the war should not depart from the legitimate Jihad (which 
means it should not be aggessive). 101 The Qur'an says: 
"And if ye punish, let your punishment Be proportionate to the Wrong that has been Done to you: 
But ye show patience, That is indeed the best (course) For those who are patienf'. 102 
95 Ibid, p. 105-7. 
96 lbid, p. 107-8,114-15. 
97 lbid, p. 108-9. 
98 Ibid, p. 109. 
99 Ibid, p. 110- 12. 
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The ninth principle and the final one is, that Jihad should not be directed to material 
interest, or waged on account of race, colour, or sex. The Islamic tradition of Jihad 
explicitly denotes the peaceful intention of Islam and its concern for human interactions. 
It indicates that killing for satisfaction, power or dominance should not be practised by 
Muslims. The Prophet Mohammed offered the first Mosque in Islam in Medina to the 
Christians of Najran for Sunday services, to teach all Muslims to respect the temples 
and Churches of other faiths. 103 
Shad as Non-warfare 
Warfare is only one interpretation of the concept of Jihad. The root meaning of effort 
never disappeared. Jihad may be an inward struggle (directed against evil in oneselo or 
an outward one (against injustice). A Hadith (reports on the sayings and acts of the 
prophet), defines this understanding of the term. It recounts how Mohammed, after a 
battle, said "We have retumed from the lesser jihad (al-jiliad al-asghar) to the greater 
jihad (al-jiliad al-akbar). " When asked "What is the greater jihad?, " he replied "It is the 
struggle against oneself"104 Although this Hadith does not appear in any of the 
authoritative collections, it has had enormous influence in Islamic mysticism (Sitfism). 
Sufis understand the greater Jihad as an inner war, primarily a struggle against the base 
instincts of the body but also resistance to the temptation of polytheism. Some Sufi 
writers assert that Satan organises the temptation of the body and the world to corrupt 
the soul. Abu Hamid Mohammed at-Ghazali describes the body as a city, govemed by 
103 Tbarei, p. 389-92. 
104 Ali Than Usman Al-Jullabi Al-Hujwiri, 77ze KashfAl-Malyub: 77ie Oldest Persian Treatise on Stifism, 
trans, by Reynold A. Nicholson, (London: Luzac, 1976), p. 200-202. 
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the soul, and besieged by the lower self Withdrawal from the world to mystical pursuits 
constitutes an advance in the greater Jihad. 105 
Conversely, the greater Jihad is a necessary part of the process of gaining spiritual 
insight. By the eleventh century Sufism had become an extremely influential, and 
perhaps even the dominant, form of Islamic spirituality. Until this time, many Muslims 
conceive of Jihad as a personal rather than a political struggle. But Sufism provoked 
opposition, most importantly from Ibn Taymiya (a famous Islamic thinker), who 
condemned many aspects of Sufism which he believed contradicted the Sharia law. 
Also, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Ja,, vziya explicitly condemned the doctrine of greater Jihad, 
discarding as a deliberate fabrication the Hadith that originates this concept. 106 
Jihad in Modem Times 
Perhaps the earliest perspective on Jihad, developed among Indian Muslims in the 
aftermath of the 1857 uprising (the so-called Mutiny). Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
others argued that Jihad meant only defensive war and could not justify further 
resistance to British rule as long as the British did not actively interfere with the practice 
of Islam. Sir Sayyid treated Islam as a private religion rather than a public force, and 
presented it as virtually a pacifist creed. 107 Modernist writers, seeking to reconcile Islam 
with Western ways, looked to the Qur'an to find an Islamic model to guide Muslim 
states. They sought a ftindamentally defensive vision of Jihad, and toward this end 
argued that all the wars waged by the prophet and the first four caliphs were defensive. 
105 John Renard, "At-Jihad At-Ak-bar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality, " (Muslim World 78, 
1988), p. 225-240. 106 Ibid. 
107 For more debate, see Maulavi Ali Cheragh, 4 Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Whad ' (Karachi: 
Karimsons, Pakistan, 1977). Maulavi tried to show that all the wars of Prophet Mohammed were 
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Contending that the Qur'an requires Muslims to make peace if their adversaries wish to 
do so, they include a Dar al-Sulh (Abode of Peace), in their model of the world. Peace 
treaties may be permanent and Muslims may be neutral in international conflicts. 108 The 
modernists also work to reconcile Islamic law with international law. 
Thus, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, an umbrella organisation that includes 
as members most Muslim states, expressed an interest in establishing an international 
court to reconcile the Sharia laiv with international public law. Similarly, Mohammed 
Shaltut, a f6nner President of the AI-Azhar University in Cairo, contends that the 
Shari'a emphasis on international peace and the legitimate right of self-defence 
prefigures the principles of the United Nations. 109 Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, an Indian and 
later a Pakistani thinker, was the first Islamist writer to approach Jihad systematically. 
He presents it not merely as warfare to expand Islamic political dominance, but also to 
establish a just rule. Jihad for Mawdudi was akin to a war of liberation; Islamic rule 
means freedom and justice, even for non-Muslims. He argues that: 
"Islam wants to employ all the forces and means that can be employed for bringing about a 
universal, all-embracing revolution. It will spare no efforts for the achievement of this supreme 
objective. This far-reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all forces employment of all 
possible means are called Jihad. "' 10 
Other Islamist thinkers such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb followed Mawadudi's 
emphasis on its role in establishing a truly Islamic government. For them, as for Ibn 
Tayrniya, Jihad includes the overthrow of governments that fail to enforce the 
defensive, and that aggressive war, or compulsory conversion, is not allowed in Islam, and the word Jihad 
does not exegetically mean 'warfare'. 
log Mustansir Mir, 'Thad in Islam, " in Hadia DaJani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier, eds., 77je Xhad and 
Its Pines, (Ann Arbor: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1991), 
p. 119-122. 
109 Flah, Islam and Guardianship oil Religions, p. 31-32. 
110 Abu'l A'la Al-Mawdudi, Al-Jihadfz Sabil Illah (Beirut: Dar'Alfiker 'Al-Hadith, 1967), p. 14 1, see also 
p. 142-45. 
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Sliari'a. 111 Moreover, two groups of contemporary Muslims have articulated doctrines 
of peaceful Jihad. Modernists may see the concept as central to the religion but see it as 
encompassing all forms of political and social action to establish justice. Fazlur 
Rahman, a Pakistani scholar, argued that it had to exist to accomplish Islam's social and 
political agenda. "There is no doubt that the Qur'an wanted Muslims to establish a 
political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order. 
Jihad is the instrument for doing So.,, 112 In this spirit, President Habib Bourguiba of 
Tunisia used "Jihad" to describe the struggle for economic development in Tunisia, 
much as Lyndon Johnson spoke of a "War of poverty. "' 13 
The Sufi doctrine of greater Rhad remains alive. Though less influential than Islamism 
in the political realm, it may have more impact on the spiritual life of Muslims, at least 
in some Muslim states such as Egypt, where one writer contends that the number of 
Egyptians active in Sufism may well exceed the number of Islamists. 114 But, the concept 
of Rhad as a moral struggle touches the daily lives of many Muslims, and not only Sufis. 
Jihad as warfare has had enormous consequences. But it has never mobilised Muslims 
en masse or transcended the ethnic and political divisions within the Muslim world. Few 
Muslim governments, and few individual Muslims, have acted in accord with doctrine. 
The conception of Jihad as warfare in defence of the Dar al-Islam did not produce a Pan- 
Islamic resistance to colonialism. The many movements that arose to resist European 
expansion or occupation were regional or local, tied to a specific leader, or regime. At 
no time did a Rhad movement arise which united Muslims with geographic, sectarian, 
111 Emmanual Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1990), p. 114-16. 
112 Fazlur Rahman, Major flienies ofthe Qur'an, (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994), p. 63-64. 
113 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islani (Princeton, N. J: Markus Weiner, 1996), p. 116- 
17. 
114 Valerie J. Hoffman, Sitfism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1995), p. 196-200. 
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or political differences. In most cases, Jihad against colonialism formed a part of 
programme of religious reform and renewal. 
The most systematic attempt to mobilise Muslims against the West, the Ottoman 
declaration of Jihad against the Allies in 1914, failed entirely. With its declaration of 
war, the Ottoman regime simultaneously published a fativa (ruling according to the 
Shari'a) calling the war a Jihad that every Muslim had to participate in - including the 
Muslim subjects of Russia, France, and Great Britain. To secure the widest possible 
circulation, the fativa was published in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Turkish. But the 
fativa did not cause significant Muslim defections from the Allied cause, nor did it 
prevent the Arab revolt against the Ottoman regime. ' 15 More recent invocations of Jihad 
have been equally ineffective. Frequent calls for Rhad against Israel have not overcome 
division among Israel's opponents or produced an effective mobilisation of their 
capability against Israel. Saddam Hussein's call for Jihad against the United States, part 
of an overall effort to Islamise the image of his secular regime, may have resonated 
among Islamists but it did not affect the outcome of the crisis. The same applies to the 
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei's similar designation of war against 
the US as Jihad. But, neither pronouncement had significant political or military results. 
Even in Afghanistan, where resistance fighters went by the title nutiahidin, the idea of 
Rhad had surprisingly little power. The Afghan cause did attract considerable support 
from the rest of the Islamic world, but only some Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and Iran, actually allocated significant resources to the nnýahidin. Moreover, 
the concept of Jihad did not unite the Afghan resistance, which remained divided by 
social, political, ethnic, and ideological differences. Although the resistance groups all 
considered themselves nuýahidin, they perceived different paths of God and sought to 
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produce different results in human terms. These groups did not co-operate effectively 
and often fought each other rather than the Soviets. The concept of Jihad had little direct 
influence on the course of the Afghan war. 116 After the Soviets' withdrawal and the 
establishment of a new goverrarient, they continue to fight each other. 117 
Jihad, like Article 51 of the UN Charter, has a defensive nature; Jihad can not be 
practised without the real authority in the caliphate; the right of self-defence also can not 
be invoked without the occurrence of armed attack, and remains active until the Security 
Council have be taken measures to protect international peace and security. 
Rhad now cannot mean dividing people into Muslims and non-Muslims and starting to 
kill the latter; this is far from the real Islam, the religion of mercy and forgiveness. In 
these days, many Muslims fanatic groups invoke Islam and Jihad for political purposes, 
to gain public sympathy and financial support. As a consequence of the unavailability of 
the real authority, which is founded on the caliph only (as a political - religious leader) 
to wage Rhad, true Jihad at this time is difficult to declare. 
The beginning of the early mode"i era 
The "just war" principle was advocated by scholarly consideration until the seventeenth 
century but was abandoned by the positivist writers in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 118 The new tendency reflected the emergence of nation-states and the 
115 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: Ae Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1979), p. 90-94. 
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118 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the use of Force by States, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), p. 5-13. 
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formulation of the concepts of state sovereignty and the balance of power' 19 in the 
period after the end of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. At that time, state sovereignty 
was characterised as perfect and exhaustive in character. The society of European States 
was subject to no legal superior and sovereign states were only bound by the law which 
they could make themselves. Thus, resort to war was a matter lying with the sovereign 
right of each state and was effected whenever it seemed appropriate to do so. A further 
result of this eventuality was that war was considered "just" and lawful on both sides. 
The emergence and development of the law of Neutrality in the routine of states 
explains this tendency. The European balance of power split on two events during the 
period of 1648-1918, as a result of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 
1792-1815 and the World War of 1914-1918. 
The European settlement of 1814 and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 
re-established the concept of public order and balance of power in Europe and the new 
state of affairs that emerged after the Napoleonic wars was marked by a presumption 
against unilateral changes in the status quo of Europe emanating either from national 
revolutionary movements within the European states or from the unilateral policy of a 
European power. 120 The intervention undertaken by the Holy Alliance to suppress a 
revolution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is a pertinent illustration of the former 
presumption whereas the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which was signed not merely by the 
belligerents, and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which revised the Treaty of San Stefano 
of the same year, illustrate the latter. Furthermore, another characteristic of this period 
was the unlimited right of states to resort to war and the total abandonment of the theory 
of just and unjust wars. The creation of nation states and the concept of state sovereignty 
119 This means that will be no state will attempt to expand its political interests at the expense of the 
interests of other states, which means in my view a peaceffil coexistence. 
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had the result that there was no international authority similar to the Pope or Holy 
Roman Emperor to apply it. 12 1 Hall confirmed that: 
"international law has no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as 
a relation which the parties to it may set up, if they choose, and busy itself only in regulating the 
effects of the relation. " 122 
Therefore, the right to resort to war was based either on morality and policy outside the 
sphere of law or on its being a means of change aiding the evolution of international 
society or on the lack of a central authority on the international level for the enforcement 
of rights, the obtaining redress for wrongs done and the infliction of sanctions. 123 
According to Oppenheim, the two latter reasons justifying resort to war were open to 
juridical objections, due to the fact that they were satisfactorily met only by the denial of 
the legal nature of international law or by an assertion of its weakness as a system of 
law. He elaborated on the above contradiction by arguing that: 
"as an instrument for the vindication of the law, war signified a legally inadmissible identification 
of victorious power wielded by the interested state with a legal right" and "as a means of changing 
the law it constituted a radical break in the continuity of the system of international law since by 
waging war a state would release itself from all the obligations of international law except those 
appertaining to the conduct of war. "' 24 
A new development of the period under consideration was an attempt to end resort to 
war by the use of the institution of arbitration for the pacific settlement of disputes 
between states and the conclusion of various treaties providing for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. More important was the fact that disputes including Great 
Powers were in some cases successftilly settled by arbitration. 125 
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The Rague Peace Conferences of 1899,1907 
and The Bryan Arbitration Treaties 
The First Peace Conference included three conventions, three declarations and final act. 
It was held in the interests of a general and lasting peace and "for limiting the 
progressive development of existing armaments". 126 Even though the Conference failed 
to effect its original purpose, as the larger powers were unwilling to agree to a limitation 
or reduction of annaments, its first Convention for the "Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes" side by side with the other two Conventions were negotiated. 
The important value of the Hague Conference of 1899 was that it opened the door for 
another Conference. Eight years later, the Second Conference was held, in which more 
than forty-four States were represented at the Hague on June 15,1907. In this 
Conference the Conventions of 1899 were revised and some ten new ones adopted. The 
Conference consisted of thirteen conventions, a declaration and a final act. 
Convention I of the Second Peace Conference of 1907 was concerned with the pacific 
settlement of international disputes. Article I of the convention reads: 
"With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between states, the 
contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international 
differences". 127 
To achieve that purpose, the contracting Powers agreed to use mediation of fiiendly 
powers, before resorting to force. 128 In International disputes not involving honour or 
vital interests arising from differences of opinion between the parties, which diplomacy 
failed to solve, the contracting Powers considered it desirable, so far as circumstances 
126 Russian Circular Note Proposing The First Peace Conference. See James Brown Scott, The Hague 
Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 15. 
127 Article I of Convention I for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. See Scott, "The Hague 
Convention and Declaration of 1899 and 1907", Scott, p. 42-3. 
128 Ibid, Article 2, p. 43 
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allowed, that the parties concerned should institute an international commission of 
inquiry to investigate the case and find a solution. 129 These international commissions of 
inquiry were constituted by a special agreement between disputants. 130 
Also, arbitration was recognised by the contracting States, as the most effective and 
equitable means of settling international disputes which diplomatic efforts had failed to 
settle'31 , and in any case where a serious matter arose between two or more parties, the 
contracting Powers declared it their duty to remind the conflicting powers in a peaceful 
way that the Permanent Court was open to them. 132 
In Convention 11 of the Second Peace Conference "Respecting the Limitation of the 
Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts", which was signed at the 
Hague, October 18,1907, clear attempts were made to limit the right of war and 
resorting to armed force. Article I of the Convention reads: 
"The contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract 
debts claimed from the Government of the country by the Government of another country as being 
due to its nationals. 
This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply to 
an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromise from being agreed 
on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award". 133 
At that conference, many suggestions were made for compulsory arbitration. As a result, 
the final act of the conference included a declaration that the conference agreed: 
1. In admitting the principle of compulsory arbitration. 
2. In declaring that certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpretation and application 
of the provisions of international agreements, may be submitted to obligatory arbitration without 
any restriction". ' 34 
129 Ibid, Article 9, p. 45-6. 
130 Ibid, Article 10, p. 46. 
131 Ibid, Article 38, p. 55. It is important to notice here that, although the parties to the Convention 
understood arbitration as the most effective means of settling international differences, the Convention 
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Another attempt to limit the right of war was made at Convention III of the Second 
Peace Conference of 1907 (Relative to the Opening of Hostilities). 135 The aim of this 
Convention was the maintenance of pacific relations between States. The contracting 
Powers decided that use of force or hostilities in general between them should not take 
place without previous warning. Article I of the Convention reads that: 
"The contracting PoNvers recognise that hostilities between themselves must not commence "ithout 
previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an 
ultimaturnwith conditional declaration of Nvar". 136 
As an outcome, none of these conventions made war totally illegal; war only became 
illegal under certain conditions. No distinction between offensive or defensive wars was 
made. 137 Consequently, these conventions had little influence to hinder States from 
begin war. 
As a result of the movement for outlawing war, an important development was the 
conclusion by the United States in 1913 and 1914 of a series of "Treaties for the 
Advancement of Peace", also known as the Bryan Arbitration Treaties, with a great 
number of States. 138 The treaties established a Permanent Commission of Inquirywhich 
had as its task to investigate and report on any dispute arising between the contracting 
Parties and they became known as "The Bryan Cooling-off Treaties". 139 In these treaties 
the contracting States agreed not to resort to force or begin hostilities in case of any 
dispute arising among two or more of them, which diplomatic offers failed to settle, 
134 See the Final Act of the Second Peace Conference, Scott, p. 27. 
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before bringing it to the Permanent Commission of Inquiry for investigation and 
report. 140 The Commission might, by unanimous agreement, offer its help in a dispute, 
even before the parties were compelled by failure of diplomatic negotiation to resort to 
it. 141 In the Bryan Treaty between the United States and Guatemala, September 20, 
1913, Article I read that the Parties "agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during 
such investigation and report". 142 In the Bryan Treaty between the United States and 
France, September 15,1914, Article I read that the Parties "agree not to resort, with 
respect to each other, to any act of force during the investigation to be made by the 
commission and before its report is handed in". 143 That report should be ready and 
submitted by the Permanent Commission of Inquiry to the parties concerned within one 
year, unless the period had been limited or extended by mutual agreement between the 
parties. During this period the disputing parties were under an obligation not to resort to 
force until the report was received by them. However, the report was not binding on 
disputing parties and, after receiving it, they were free to follow what had been decided 
in the report or not. The validity of these treaties was for period of five years; however, 
at the end of this time they were to continue in operation during the following twelve 
months unless either of the parties to the treaties decided to withdraw by giving notice 
of withdrawal to the other party. 144 The Bryan Treaties represented important 
developments from the provisions of Hague Convention I of 1907 which was concerned 
with the Pacific Settlement of International disputes; those improvements: first, no 
140 The Permanent Commissions of Inquiry were to be composed of five members. Each of the parties 
chooses one of its subjects and a subject of third state; the fifth member is also a subject of a third state 
chosen by common agreement between the two parties. See Oppenheim (11), p. 15. 141 Ibid. 
142 Similar provisions are contained in similar treaties concluded between the United States and some 
other thirty-two states. Treaties listed in (Anierican Joumal ofInternational Law 33,1939), Suppl, p. 86 1. 
143 Identical provisions are contained in similar treaties between the United States and other seven states. 
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with some other states. Some of these treaties are printed in (Anierican Journal of International Law 23, 
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disputes affecting honour and vital interests were ruled out; second, the Commission of 
Inquiry under the Bryan treaties was a pennanent one constituted in advance of any 
dispute that might arise among the parties, while the Commission of Inquiry under the 
Hague Convention I was to be formed ad hoc by a special agreement between the parties 
when required; third, the principle of "moratorium" appeared in the undertaking not to 
resort to force before the report was submitted by the Commission. 
As this chapter has shown, the attempt to restrain aggression has a long history. In the 
Middle Ages, the justification and limitation of warfare in the Western world was based 
on the concepts of Holy War and Just War. Aristotle, , Cicero, St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas saw war as a natural human phenomenon but sought to limit its 
atrocities by limiting it to cases where it is necessary to secure peace, punish evil-doers, 
and protect ideals such as justice, security and democracy. The use of force at that 
period was still connected with the right authority and intention; on the grounds that the 
resort to religion gave good ground for the recourse to force. 
The Islamic concept of Jihad has a defensive nature rather than an offensive one. Today, 
Rhad does not mean only the use of force or invasion of other non-Muslims nations, but 
it has become a public power to develop the lives of Muslims Rhad can be waged, for 
example, against poverty, disease, and illiteracy, from which many Muslim states suffer. 
The rejection of the just war principle which became more clear during the period after 
the European nations reached a general agreement in the Peace of Westphalia, which led 
in the early modem era, to the inclination of European nations limit the resort to war 
through treaties and international Conferences. 
144 See Oppenheim (11), p. 15. 
46 
CHAPTER TWO 
Self-Defence Before 1945 
A basic dilemma facing international law in the 19th and early 20th centuries concerned 
the right of self-defence. Whilst it was widely held that such a right existed, attempts to 
limit the right of war required that the concept be defined and formalised; otherwise it 
could be used as a mere political excuse for aggression. This chapter examines the 
development of the legal doctrine of self-defence, from the Caroline incident of 1837, 
through the efforts made under the League of Nations, to the Pact of Paris in 1928. The 
Caroline case led to the formulation of specific conditions, namely, immediacy, 
necessity and proportionality, to justify a plea of self-defence. 
The establishment of the League reflected the general revulsion against war induced by 
the unprecedented losses of the 1914-1918 conflicts. Article 10 of the League's 
Covenant appeared to place members under an obligation not to resort to war except in 
self-defence, although the ambiguity of the Covenant's provisions undermine its 
effectiveness as a peace-keeping instrument. Various treaties and protocols concluded 
during the League era, however, attempted further to prohibit war, subject to certain 
explicit exceptions, and in the case of the Locamo Agreements of 1925, create a system 
of collective self-defence. Ambiguity remained, however, regarding the admissibility of 
forcible measures short of war. The 1928 Pact of Paris attempted to improve the regime 
of the Covenant by binding parties to renounce war as an instrument of national policy 
and seeking settlement of disputes by pacific means. In the absence of the political will 
to made these measures effective, however, the world was in 1939 plunged into another 
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total war, and the League system collapsed, ushering in a new era, in the development of 
understandings and mechanisms in relation to international peace and security. 
Before 1945, little attention was devoted to defining defence. The existence of a Just 
War Doctrine within Christendom exerted minimal restraint on the actual purposes and 
practice of warfare. With the emergence of polities resembling the modem state, jurists, 
scholars and propagandists alike, who often enough were one and the same, simply 
adapted the categories of just war to suit the needs of the secular. 145 Distinctions 
between defence and offence never figured prominently in this enterprise, and states 
were generally free to pursue a wide array of political ends with military means up to the 
end of the nineteenth century. 
It was as a result of the Caroline incident of 1837 "that self-defence was changed from a 
political excuse to a legal doctrine. "146 The Caroline was an American merchant ship 
that had been hired by Canadian rebels to carry arms and supplies from the American 
side of the border to Canada. The Caroline was attacked by the British, and sent over 
the Niagara Falls, and one American at least have been killed. The British destruction of 
that ship, was justified by the British Ambassador to Washington on the grounds of 
"self-defence and self-preservation". 147 In his response, the United States Secretary of 
State required that the British Government, as conditions of self-defence, should show: 
(1) The existence of "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation". 
145 Schwarzenberger considered that thinkers like Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes and jurists such as 
Vitoria, Ayala and Suarez, were not just scholars, but "men of the world", Nvho wanted their ideas and 
inspirations to be translated into state policy. See George Schwarzenberger, "Jus Pacis Ac Belli? 
Prolegomena to a Sociology of International Law, " (, 4merican Journal ofInternational Law 37,1943), p. 
461. 
146 Robert Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases, " (American Journal of International Law 32, 
1938), p. 82. 147 lbid, p. 85. 
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(2) "That the local authorities ... did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within. " 148 After extending on for several years, the case was finally settled by 
diplomatic means. 149 Webster was attempting to subject self-defence to the constraints 
of necessity. His aim, according to Jennings, was to distinguish an arena of legitimate 
defence from older, "Naturalist notions of an absolute primordial right of self- 
preservation". 150 The Caroline Doctrine has been called "the locits classicus of the law 
of self-defonce"15 1 and has been applied to many events during the twentieth-century. 152 
Webster's formula of "necessity", however, has some defects. He describes a situation 
so urgent that it sounds almost like the "absolute primordial" terms of self-preservation 
which he presumably sought to avoid andwhich Brierly describes as more "an instinct" 
than a legal right. 153 It is also hard to accept that in an actual conflict, the defending state 
would only consider responding once a threat became "instanf' and "overwhelming", 
leaving it neither "choice" nor "moment for deliberation". 
After Webster, self-defence retired to the legal backstage until the end of the First World 
War. In the midst of soul searching in the Nvar's aftennath, the distinction between just 
and unjust causes of war began to cohere around the distinction between defence and 
aggression. Nardin attributes this to the common sentiment among the victors that this 
Great War had resulted from the single cause of German aggression, to which the only 
148 lbid, p. 89, see also, D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2ed., 
1998), p. 894-95. 
149 In the Webster- Ashburton Treaty of 1842, by which also, at the same time, many other British- 
American problems were settled. 
150 Jennings, p. 92. 
15 1 This is Jennings' description, p. 92. 
152 Japan invoked the "Caroline Doctrine" after it occupied Manchuria. Also Israel in 1976 justified its 
raid on the airport at Entebbe, on the grounds of the Caroline Doctrine. See Kenneth R. Stevens, Border 
Diplomacy: 77ze Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1837-1842, 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), p. 167-68 . 153 James L. Brierly, 77ie Law of Nations. - An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 319. See also 315-21. 
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response could have been self-defence. 154 This interpretation of the War's origin was 
written into the Treaty of Versailles and inspired interwar efforts to restrain the 
incidence of armed conflict, beginning with the League of Nations. 
The League of Nations was established in 1919 by the conclusion of its constitution, the 
Covenant'55, which was incorporated in the peace treaties of 1919-1920 between the 
victorious Allies and the defeated Central Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The 
establishment of the League reflected a general feeling of revulsion against war, because 
the World War of 1914-18 was the first total war; it was not only the armed forces of the 
disputants, but their entire populations and national economic resources that were 
affected. Moreover, the unprecedented scale of human losses prompted a strong desire 
to ensure that a disaster of such magnitude would never be repeated. 156 Thus, it is not 
surprising that one of the two purposes of the League of Nations, according to the 
preamble of the Covenant, was to " ... achieve international peace and security" by 
means of " ... the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war. " The League of Nations 
aspired to be an organisation that would police the aggressive and render the need for 
arms minimal among the innocent. In theory, states would need to resort to use of force 
only where the League has failed to take action, or find a solution. In this case, the 
League's Covenant gave to Members "the right to take such action as they shall consider 
necessary for the maintenance of right and justice". Therefore, the Covenant crudely 
foreshadowed the United Nations Charter, which would pennit states to act in self- 
defence only when United Nations failed to materialise. The League appeared to permit 
a range of aims beyond defence, including, as it did, the notions of "right and justice". It 
also spoke of maintenance of these, rather than their establishment, which indicates a 
154 Terry Nardin, "Law, Morality and the Relations of States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), p. 282-3. 
155 Text of the Covenant of the League of Nations in UK Treaty Series (1919), No. 4. 
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predisposition toward whoever rights or whatever's justice was embedded in the status 
quo. 
The provisions of the Covenant relevant to international peace and security were set out 
in Articles 10- 17. Article 10 stipulated that: 
"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any 
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advice upon 
the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. " 
In reality, the aim of Article 10 was to guarantee the territorial statits quo in the post- 
world war period, but since the United States refused to join the League, this purpose 
was unachievable. However, Article 10 has been interpreted as having imposed a legal 
obligation on member states. 157 Article 10 seemed to introduce a total prohibition of war 
except in self-defence and as such, to be a significant innovation in the Covenant. 158 But 
at the same time, that Article was attacked on the grounds of constituting a moral 
obligation and on the vagueness of its tenns, especially the definitions of "territorial 
integrity" and "political independence" 159 . Further criticism of Article 10 was 
focused 
on its relationship with other provisions in the Covenant dealing with dispute settlement 
and the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 10 was not related to 
either Articles 11-15 or Article 16 of the Covenant. 160 Article 10 appeared to conflict 
with Article 15(7) which permitted resort to war in certain circumstances. 161 This 
ambiguity led to different opinions being adopted by scholars, in an effort to create a 
match between Article 10 and subsequent provisions of the Covenant. One idea put 
156 Frederick Samuel Northedge, Ae League ofNalions. (Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1986), p. 1-3. 
157 Ian Brownlie. International Law and the Use offorce hy States. p. 62. 
158 Ibid., p. 63,65. 
159 Ibid., p. 62. 
160 Waldock, p. 469. 
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forward was that Article 10 was subordinate to the articles on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and that it applied only to wars that were unlawful under Article 15.162 Another 
suggestion was that wars under Article 15(7) would not contravene Article 10, provided 
that no action was taken by the lawful belligerent which would pen-nanently affect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of its opponent. 163 
Lastly the 4th Assembly of the League in interpreting Article 10 argued that member 
states had complete freedom of choice regarding measures to implement the Article's 
guarantec, 'which significantly reduced its applicability. 164 However, Article 10 was 
invoked on various occasions by disputing states having recourse to the League of 
Nations, for example, by Bulgaria following the invasion of Bulgarian territory by the 
Greek army in 1925 (Graeco-Bulgarian dispute). 165 Also, China appealed to the Council 
of the League under Articles 10 and II after the "Mukden Incident" of Sept. 18,1931 
(Sino-Japanese conflict). 166 And Nvhen Italy invaded and later annexed Albania in 1939, 
the latter used Article 10 as the ground of its appeal to the League of Nations. 167 
Nevertheless, Article 10 was not consistently referred to by either the Council or the 
Assembly of the League of Nations, apart from the appeal addressed on Feb. 16,1922, 
by the members of the Council, to the Japanese Government under Article 10168 , and of 
the resolutions of the League Council concerning foreign intervention in the Spanish 
civil war. 169 The League Council and the member states were more inclined to refer to 
Article II concerning preventive action by the Council, mainly in the context of an end 
16 1 Especially in the case of the Council of the League failing to reach a unanimous agreement in respect 
of a conflict between two member states. See Brovvnlie, p. 62-3. 162 Emile Giraud, "La Theorie de La Legitime Defence, " (Hague Reciteil 49,1934-111), p. 695. 
163 Brownlie, p. 63. 
164 Ibid., p. 64. 
165 League ofNations Qfficial Journal, 1925, p. 1696. 
166 Ibid., 193 1, p. 2453. 
167 Ibid., 1939, p. 246. 
168 Text in (American Jounial ofInteniational Law 27,1933), p. 13 1. 
169 League ofNations Official Journal, 193 7, p. 18. 
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to hostilities. Nevertheless, the progress represented by Article 10 was not entirely lost, 
as it provided the legal basis for the adoption by the League of the Stimson doctrine of 
non-recognition, 170 which some scholars viewed as implying that Article 10 involved 
mutual guarantees only against loss of territory or independence. 17 1 Article II did not 
suffer from such controversy as Article 10. 
It provided that: 
'T Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or 
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any 
action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such 
emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any member of the League 
summon a meeting of the Council. 
2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention 
of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations 
which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
which peace depends". 
This article introduced a new development, whereby any war, actual or threatened, was 
considered for the first time to be a matter of concern to the entire membership, 
irrespective whether any of the individual members were directly affected by it. 
Moreover, the League would take any action that appeared prudent and effective to 
safeguard the peace of nations. ' 72 Article II gave the Council discretion not to settle the 
dispute per se, but to take preventive and preliminary steps, e. g. to request the cessation 
of hostilities or set-up a commission to observe the execution of a cease-fire, in order to 
avoid escalation of the dispute. This discretion encouraged the frequent use of the article 
by member states. For example, in the Graeco-Bulgarian dispute of 1925, which arose 
out of the invasion of the Bulgarian territory by the Greek anny following a frontier 
incident between the two states' armies, the Council of the League met in an 
extraordinary session and the Acting President called on both parties to cease military 
170 Waldock, p. 470. 171 Ibid., p. 469. 
172 To some degree, Article II of the Covenant is reminiscent of Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations 
Charter. 
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action and to withdraw their troops to their own territories until the dispute had been 
considered by the Council. 173 It was also made clear by A. Briand, the President of the 
Council, that the Council's primary concern was the cessation of hostilities, rather than 
the merits of the dispute. 174 The appeal of the Council succeeded and its 
recommendations were implemented by both Greece and Bulgaria. The same was not 
true, however, in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria. Although 
the Council appealed for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Japanese troops, 
its request was virtually evaded and ultimately ignored by Japan. 175 
Under the Covenant, war was Prohibited only under definite conditions which did not 
affect the right to resort to a counter war in self-defence against an illegal war. 176 
Consequently, it was agreed that resort to war in self-defence was not restricted by the 
Covenant. 177 This conclusion is confirmed by the statement of the first Committee in its 
report to the Assembly in 193 1: 
"One point appears beyond dispute-namely, that ... 
in the Covenant of the League in its present 
form 
... the prohibition of recourse to war [does not] exclude the right of legitimate self- 
defence". 178 
The Covenant did not characterise resort to war in breach of its provisions as a crime, 
but it spelt out the conditions under which war was forbidden. Also, the sanctions of the 
Covenant were penal in character rather than remedial of the wrong done to the victim 
of aggression. 179 
173 League ofKalions Official Journal, (1925 11), p. 169 6. 
174 Ibid., p. 1698. 
175 Ibid., 193 1, p. 2265. 
176 See Hans Kelsen, Principles ofInternational Law, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 2ed, 1966), 
p. 61. 177 Waldock, p. 476. 
178 League ofNations Official Journal (193 1). Report to the Assembly by the First Committee, Records of 
the Twelfth Assembly, 193 1, Meetings of Committees, Minutes of the first Committee, p. 146, Annex IS, 
point 5 of the report. 
179 See Article 16, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Also see Waldock, p. 479. 
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Now let us consider the efforts made along with the Covenant to restrict war, and 
regulate the use of force. In the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923,180 Article I 
declared that aggressive war was an international crime and imposed upon the parties 
the obligation not to commit such a crime. 18 1 The treaty was intended as an extension of 
the Covenant and aimed to facilitate the application of Article 10 and Article 16.182 If 
one or more of the member states became involved in hostilities, the Council would 
decide, within four days of the receipt of notification by the Security Council, which 
party was the victim of aggression and whether it was entitled to claim assistance under 
the Treaty. 183 This raised the question of how to define aggression and so detennine the 
aggressor. No definition was incorporated in the treaty itself, but it was forwarded to the 
Govemment with a commentary which attempted to clarify the subject by citing 
illustrative examples of situations 184 where the use of force would be considered legal 
and necessary as self-defence. Neither the Commentary nor the draft Treaty, however, 
contained any specific reference to a right of self-defence. 185 
In 1924, the Assembly discussed the draft of a Protocol for the Paciji'c Settlenzent of 
International Disputes, ' 86 which represented an attempt to link the prohibition of war 
with a more comprehensive system of pacific settlement than was provided in the 
180 The Draft treaty failed to be adopted. See The League of Nations, Ten Years of Morld Co-operation, 
ed. By Eric Drummond, (London: Hazel], 1930), p. 64-5. 
181 League of Nations Official Journal (1923). Records of the Fourth Assembly 1923, Meetings of 
Committees, Minutes of the Third Committee, p. 200-3. 
182 Ibid., p. 203. 
183 League ofNations Official Journal (1923). Article 4, Records of the Fourth Assembly 1923, Meetings 
of Committees, Minutes of the Third Committee, p. 203. 
184 League of Nations Qfflicial Journal (1923). Commentary on the Definition of a Case of Aggression, 
Records of the Fourth Assembly, 1923, Meeting of Committees, Minutes of the Third Committee, p. 206- 
8. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International disputes, adopted by the Fifth Assembly on 
October 2,1924. Records of the Fifth Assembly 1924, Meeting of Committees, Minutes of the First 
Committee, p. 13640. For more information about Geneva Protocol, see James W. Garner, "The Geneva 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, " (Anierican Journal of International Law 
19,1925), p. 123-133. See Philip Marshall Brown, "The Interpretation of the General Pact For the 
Renunciation of War, " (Anierican Journal of International Law 23,1929), p. 373-79. Also see David 
Hunter Miller, The Geneia Protocol, (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 660-6 1. 
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Covenant. The drafters sought in particular to close the "loop-hole" left by Article 15(7), 
of the Covenant. 187 The Protocol made clear the obligation of states to assist each other 
in case of aggression and also to deal with threats of war. 188 Also, the Protocol 
condemned aggression. The central provision of the Protocol was Article 2, whereby the 
state members agreed "in no case to resort to war", except in resistance to aggression or 
with the consent of the League's Council or Assembly. 189 In the exercise of the right of 
self-defence, the victim state was, under Article II of the Protocol, assured of the 
assistance of the other signatory states in accordance with Article 16(3) of the Covenant, 
thus providing for a system of collective security based on collective self-defence. 190 A 
significant problem with the Protocol in relation with the right of self-defence, however, 
was the use of the tenn, ccwae'. 
The failure of the Draft Treaty and Geneva Protocol prompted the creation of the 
Locarno Agreeinents, 191 which achieved many important developments: (1) The 
Locarno Agreements referred not only to war but also to attack and invasion. Germany 
and Belgium and Germany and France agreed "that they will in no case attack or invade 
187 Waldock, p. 483. See also Ten Years of Co-operation, p. 68. 
188 Ten Years of Morld Co-operation, p. 68. 
189 The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Article 2 reads: "The signatory states 
agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a state which, if the occasion arises, 
accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when 
acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the 
provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol. " 
190 Ibid., Article 11. Collective security is a broader concept than collective defence in so far as it refers to 
the general maintenance of international peace and security rather than to focused response to imminent or 
actual armed attack. The latter is, however, a sub-element of the former. 
191 The Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was initialled at Locarno on October 16,1925, but signed in 
London, in December 1,1925. The member states to the treaty were Belgium, France, Germany, Great 
Britain an Italy. Under the treaty there were obligations not to attack or invade each other and to settle 
disputes by peaceful means were under-taken between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. 
Great Britain and Italy undertook the obligations of guarantors of the threat. At the same arbitration 
conventions were concluded between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France and arbitration 
treaties were concluded between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia. Also treaties of 
mutual guarantee were concluded between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia. See 
Charles G. Fenwick, "Legal Significance of the Locarno Agreements, " (American Journal of 
International Law 20,1926), p. 108-111. See also Charles G. Fenwick, "The Progress of Co-operation 
Defence, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 24,1930), p. 118-122. 
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each other or resort to war against each other". 192 (2) There were several explicit 
exceptions: (a) legitimate defence; (b) action authorised by the League of Nations; (c) 
action in the absence of a decision to settle the conflict or stop an aggressor. 193 
The important point about Article 2, was that it defined as legitimate defence "resistance 
to violation of the undertaking" not to attack or invade each other., or resistance to "a 
flagrant breach" of the demilitarisation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (Articles 
42 and 43), "if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reasons 
of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is 
necessary". 194 Te Locarno Agreements also created a system similar to one of 
collective self-defence. Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Belgium and France undertook 
the obligation to "collectively and severally guarantee ... the maintenance of the 
territorial statits quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and 
between Gennany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by" the 
Treaty of Vei-sailles. 195 The parties to the Locarno Agreements agreed to "come 
immediately to the assistance" and also to "come to help" of the victim. 196 The Locarno 
Agreements led to the emergence of two trends. First, the prohibition of war was 
expanded to cover acts of aggression and also to cover cases of use of force which did 
not necessarily have to possess the character of war. Second, the right of a state to act in 
self-defence was made to some degree and under some circumstances dependent on a 
decision or a finding by the Council. Before the Locarno Agreements, it had been 
unclear whether a state could act independently of the Council in the exercise of the 
right of self-defence. The Locarno Agreements allowed independent action in "flagrant" 
192 Locamo Treaty, Article 2, the text of the Treaty. Reprinted in Friedrick Joseph Berber, Locarno: A 
Colleclion ofDoctiments, (London: W. Hodge, 1936), p. 48-54. 
193 Ibid., 
194 Ibid., 
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cases but in all other cases imposed restraint until the Council had reached its 
decision. 197 In this respect the Locamo agreements were an important indicator, despite 
their narrow "Versailles" context. 
Since the restrictions of the Covenant applied to war, rather than the use of force in 
general, it remained uncertain whether measures short of war were allowed as a means 
of self-defence. 198 As a result of this loophole, it could be argued that hostilities short of 
war were included in the provisions of the Covenant. This ambiguity as regards the 
effect of the Covenant in cases of use of force "short of war" was reflected in the Corfti 
Incident in 1923. When the Italian Chairman of the Greek Albanian boundary 
commission was murdered in Greece, Italy issued an ultimatum to Greece. Greece 
conceded most of the Italian demands would not allow Italian participation in the 
inquiry and asserted that no compensation would be paid unless the inquiry found 
Greece to be culpable. Italy retaliated by occupying the Greek Island of Corfu after a 
brief bombardment, in which a number of people killed and wounded. 199 The Council of 
the League appointed a Commission of Jurists, to determine whether coercive measures, 
lacking the character of war, were consistent with the Covenant, when taken without 
prior recourse to arbitration, judicial settlement or conciliation. The Commission 
produced what was referred to as a "delphic". 200 It answered that "coercive measures 
which are not intended to constitute acts of war may or may not be consistent with the 
provisions of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant ...,, 
20 1 The Commission suggested that 
195 Ibid., Article 1. See George A. Finch, "A Pact of Non-Aggression, " (, 4nzerican Journal of 
InternationalLaw 27,1933), p. 725,728-29. 
196 Locarno Treaty, Article 4(2) and Article 3. 
197 Bowett., p. 129. 
198 Hersch Lauterpacht and Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 2, p. 152. 
199 Francis Paul. Walters, A History of the League ofNations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol. (1), 
1952), p. 244-55. 
200 Waldock, p. 475. 
201 Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Session Of the Council, Sixth Meeting, March 13,1924, (League of 
Nations OjjicialJournal, 1924) p. 523. 
58 
the Council should decide in each particular case "whether it should recommend the 
,, 202 maintenance or the withdrawal of such measures. Thus, although the Commission 
failed to suggest a criterion, it indicated that certain forceful measures short of war 
might be incompatible with the Covenant. 203 The general view of the members of the 
League was that such use of anned force short of war without prior recourse to pacific 
settlement was a violation of the Covenant. 204 So far as the Corfii incident was 
concerned it might reasonably be thought that bombardment followed by military 
occupation was, in fact, little if at all short of war. 
The League of Nations, in the many incidents in which it was involved, was at least 
relatively successful in fulfilling one of its main duties, the pacific settlement of 
international disputes. International security was the League's main endeavour. The 
League worked as an international body to settle disputes and maintain peace and 
security and in so doing it strengthened and developed methods and established its 
authority. To this extent, the years of the League could be judged as successful and 
extremely important for the future with regard to international relations and international 
law. The outbreak of the Second World War, 21 years after the end of the "war to end 
war" again plunged the world into global conflict and is seen by some scholars as 
reflecting the total ineffectiveness of the League. It should be noted, however, that 
contrary to some elements of so-called "realist" thought, the failure of the League was 
not an inevitable product of its legal structure and mechanisms so much as a failure of 
the political will to make those institutions work - displayed finally at the Munich 
202 Ibid. See also Quincy Wright, "Opinion of the Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair, " 
(American Journal ofInternational Law 18,1924), p. 53 644. 
203 Herbert Whittaker Briggs, The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes, (London: Stevens, 
1952), p. 962. 
204 Ibid. 
59 
Agreement between Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler which permitted the unlawful 
partition of Czechoslovakia. 205 
The Pact of Paris or Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed in Paris on August 27,1928, can be 
seen as an attempt to improve the regime of the Covenant with regard to the regulation 
of the use of force and the maintenance of international peace and security. Until the 
Pact of Paris, this had taken the form of condemnation of war of aggression as a 
criminal breach of international peace. 206 The Pact of Paris became binding on sixty four 
states, virtually the whole international community, and because it was concluded 
outside the framework of the League of Nations, it remained in force after the League 
collapsed. 207 The Pact of Paris is concise and brief in its provisions. The key principles 
of the Pact are embodied in the preamble and the first two of its three Articles, which 
read as follows: 
"The High Contracting Parties persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war 
as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly 
relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; Convinced that all the changes in 
their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a 
peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote 
its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty. " 
Article I 
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they 
condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations xvith one another. " 
205 See Hilaire McCoubrey and J C. Morris, "International Law, International Relations and the 
Development of European Collective Security, " (Journal ofArnied Conflict Law 4,1999), p. 198-202. 
206 James L. Brierly, "Some Implications of the Pact of Paris, " (The British Year Book of International 
Law 10,1929), p. 208. 
207 M J. BoNvman and D J. Harris, Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current Status, (London: Buttenvorths, 
1984), p. 75-6. 
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Article 11 
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or the solution of all the disputes or 
conflicts of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought 
except by pacific means. "208 
The Pact was originally proposed by the French Foreign Minister, A. Briand, as a 
bilateral treaty between France and the United States. In reply, the US Secretary of State, 
Mr F. Kellogg, suggested that a greater contribution to world peace would be achieved if 
the principal world Powers could be bound to a declaration renouncing war as an 
instrument of national policy. This proposal was eventually accepted by France. A long 
diplomatic correspondence then followed which is of the highest importance for the 
interpretation of the Pact of Paris. An initial French proposal that only "wars of 
aggression" should be renounced was opposed by the American side; in his reply to the 
French Govenunent on Feb. 27,1928, Mr Kellogg asserted that an unqualified 
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy was compatible with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and would also avoid the problem of defining the 
aggressor. The French Government in its reply of March 30,1928, sought assurances 
that the renunciation of war would not remove the right of legitimate defence, or affect 
her obligations under the Covenant of the League as well as under the treaties of 
Locarno and the various agreements of neutrality and guarantee to which she was a 
party 
Mr Kellogg replied that the right of self-defence would be unaffected by the 
renunciation of war. He assured, in a speech meant to remove fears to the contrary: 
"That right is inherent in every sovereign State and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free 
at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territories from attack or invasion and it 
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence". 
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Kellogg went on to explain, in what one could see as either semantic defeatism or a 
sensible absence of illusions, that this right would not be explicitly recognised in the 
treaty, since 
"no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defence. It is not in the interest of peace that 
a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defence, since it is far too easy for the 
unscrupulous to mould events to accord Nvith an agreed definition', . 
209 
Therefore, France emphasised "that the renunciation of war, thus proclaimed, would not 
deprive the signatories of the right of legitimate defence". 2 10 At the same time, Britain 
maintained a right to defend its colonies: 
"[flhere are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and 
vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it 
clear in the past that interference with these regimes cannot be suffered. Their protection against 
attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His 
Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it 
does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respece,. 211 
The United States, on its part, did not enter a reservation to the Pact, but made a public 
statement in its Senate. The Pact should be seen as "a voluntary pledge upon the part of 
each nation that it will not have recourse to war except it self-defence". This necessarily 
involvcd a mutual 
"understanding that the right of self-defence is in no Nvay curtailed or impaired by the terms or 
conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to 
defend itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defence and the necessity 
and extent of the same. 
The "extent" of self-defence for the United States was defined by the Monroe Doctrine. 
20S International Treatyfor the Renunciation of Mar as an Instrument of National Policy, (Paris, 1928, 
Cmd. 34 10, London H. M. SO., 1928). See also, D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 
861. 
209 He specially aimed these remarks to French anxiety about the scope of the pact. See his speech before 
the American International Law Association on April 1928, Documents on International Affairs 1928, ed. 
by John W. Wheeler-Bennett, (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 3. 
210 In a series of letters between French Ambassador Paul Claudel and Kellogg. See United States No. I 
(1928): Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the United States Proposal for the 
Renunciation of War", Cmd. 3109, (Accounts and Papers 1928 14,1928), London; see especially letter 
dated 26 March 1928. 
21 1 Letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain to United States Ambassador Houghton, 19 May 1928, in Cmd, 
3109 as above. 
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The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as part of its national security and defence. Under 
the right of self-defence allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the 
Monroe Doctrine which is a part of our system of national defence,,. 212 
The Monroe Doctrine "rests upon the right of self-protection", and it is well understood 
. may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the State exercising it". 213 
Eventually both the French and the US Governments severally submitted Notes and 
drafts of the proposed treaty to the British, German, Italian, and Japanese Goverm-nents. 
Finally on June 23,1928, the treaty was presented by the US Government to fourteen 
states. The parties signed the treaty, on condition that the right of self-defence and the 
other undertakings under the Covenant and Locarno treaties would not be impaired. 214 
Some jurists have questioned the legal character of the Pact on the grounds of the 
generality and vagueness of its tenns which, in their view, gave it no more than moral 
value; of the lack of explicit qualification with regard to the renunciation of war; of the 
existence of reservations to it and the absence of any provision for sanctions in the 
nature of mutual assistance and armed action to suppress any violation of the Pact. 215 
Most authors have not doubted the character of the Pact as a legal instrument, but the 
lack of sanctions or a collective security system under the Pact of Paris seems to be self- 
defeating because it is not unusual for international treaties to provide for no sanctions 
in case of violation of their terms. 216 
212 Report of the United States Committee on Foreign Relations, (14 January 1929, in Documents on 
InternationalAffairs 1928), p. 5-6. 
213 Ibid. 
214 For more information about the diplomatic background of the Pact of Paris see Frank B. Kellogg, "The 
War Prevention Policy of the United States, " (Anierican Journal ofInternational Law 22,1928), p. 253- 
61 . 215 See Roland S. Morris, "The Pact of Paris For the Renunciation of War: Its Meaning and Effect In 
International Law, " (Proceedings oftheAnierican Society ofInternational Law 23,1929), p. 8 8-108. 216 See Q. Wright, "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, " (American Journal of International Law 27, 
1933), p. 41. 
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A very interesting issue regarding the interpretation of the Pact lies with the so-called 
reservations submitted by the signatories during the negotiations. Apart from the 
declaration of the British Government which created most of the controversy and 
expressions of concern by some states, there is general agreement that the declarations 
expressed during the diplomatic correspondence preceding the conclusion of the Pact 
constitute an integral part of the latter, in that they are conclusive of the intention of the 
parties and form the most authoritative interpretation of the treaty. 217 These statements 
were simply a restatement of Mr Kellogg's clarifications in the Note of June 23,1928, 
and they led to the undertaking of the same obligations as would have been the case they 
had been part of the text of the Pact, as in fact was the case with the French draft. Nor 
did they conflict with the US Note by offering contradictory explanations which would 
have limited or modified of the effect of the treaty with regard to its application as 
between the reserving party and the signatories . 
21 8 These were reservations only in the 
sense that they were conditions for the acceptance of the treaty as it was proposed by the 
US Government; they did not affect the essential context of the declarations, which were 
in accordance with the US proposal. The most important issue raised by the Pact of 
Paris is the degree to which it regulated unilateral resort to force by states. The treaty 
parties in Article I condemned recourse to war as a means of dealing with international 
disputes and renounced it as an instrument of national policy. Furthermore, under 
Article II they undertook to settle all the disputes or conflicts of any kind, which might 
arise among them, only by peaceful means. 
There are two possible interpretations as to the scope of the Pact of Paris in relation to 
the use of force by states: 
217 Brownfie, p. 84. 
218 Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 158. 
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(A) The first one would rely on the fact that the wording of the Pact only explicitly 
condemned and renounced war, and war under the customary law at that time was 
understood in the restrictive sense of a state of war. Consequently, measures like 
reprisals and intervention would not be contraventions of the Pact, nor would they be 
contrary to Article 11 about the employment of pacific means for the settlement of 
disputes, because reprisals were considered to be pacific in character. This interpretation 
could be supported by the controversy created by the reply of the Committee of Jurists 
in the aftermath of the Corfti incident with regard to the effect of the League of Nations 
Covenant on the use of force short of war. 219 
(B) The second possible interpretation with reference to the effect of the Pact of Paris on 
the use of force would be that the General Treaty outlawed not only war but also the use 
of armed force short of war. This matter is quite controversial, in vieNv of the differences 
of opinion over the term war in the Covenant and the fact that the preparatory works of 
the Pact offer little guidance on this point. 220 
Nevertheless, if "preparatory work" is taken to mean only the preceding diplomatic 
correspondence, one may deduce from then the explicit express declarations of the 
signatories with regard to the right of self-defence (that subsisted under the Treaty), 
defensive action was the only instance of unilateral resort to force short of war that was 
actually envisaged. If the signatories considered the customary law of the 19th century 
to be still applicable in 1928, there would have been no need for their anxiety to clarify 
the exceptional status of self-defence action. It is also noteworthy that the declarations 
referred to a "right of legitimate defence" without linking it to the term "war", for 
instance, "war" in self-defence. Considering reprisals as a pacific means for the 
settlement of disputes suggested a rather strange understanding of the term pacific. What 
219 Waldock, p. 473-4 
65 
was important in this view was not the nature of the measures applied to deal with a 
dispute, but the fact that they did not disrupt the state of peace by bringing about a state 
of war. This view might have been compatible with the Pact of Paris except that the 
Preamble noted " ... that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought 
only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process... ". This 
insistence on an "orderly process" would seem to rule out the use of force short of war 
between the signatories of the Pact for the settlement of their disputes. 221 
It may be argued that the Pact applied only to the change in relations and not the 
enforcement of existing legal relations, 222 but that view ignores the stipulation of Article 
2 that the settlement of all disputes, of whatever origin, should be sought only pacific 
means only, as well as the statement in the Preamble that war is renounced as an 
instrument of national policy "to the end that the peaceftil and friendly relations now 
existing between their peoples may be perpetuated". That goal could hardly be achieved 
if reprisals and generally the use of force short of war were to be allowed. Although the 
use of armed force by way of reprisals was not considered under customary international 
law to break the state of peace, between states, due to their inherently hostile character it 
was doubtful whether this view would be taken by the states, as a whole, against which 
they were directed. It has been suggested that to accept that reprisals were legitimate as 
46pacific means" for the settlement of disputes under the Pact of Paris would "approach 
the bounds of credibility", because the phrase "pacific means" in the Pact "has a 
comprehensive character indicated by its reference to all disputes or conflicts of 
whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be". 223 This view is supported by the 
210 Oppenheim, International Laiv: A Treatise. 184. 
221 James L Brierly, "International Law and Resort to Armed Force, " (Cambridge Law Jounial 4,1930- 
32), p. 314. 
222 Oppenheim, p. 184. 
223 Brownlie, p. 86. 
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declarations made by some states on joining the Pact and a view responses of members 
to such declarations. When Switzerland signed the Pact of Paris, the Swiss Federal 
Council stated in the accession document that pacific means were to be understood as 
those which were usually employed in the peaceful settlement of disputes such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and the other signatories did not oppose this 
view. 224 In 1933, Mr Litvinov, the Soviet delegate at the Disarmament Conference, 
expressed the view that renunciation of war meant not only renunciation of the right to 
declare or Wage war in the formal sense but also renunciation of all military operations 
and all acts of violence against another state. 225 
Moreover, the Pact of Paris was invoked with regard to acts of force short of war, by 
signatories thereto both outside and within the League of Nations, in the latter case in 
their capacity as members of the League's organs. 
In 1937 when Japan invaded China without any declaration of war 226 , the Assembly 
approved the Report of the Advisory Far Eastern Committee stating that the action of 
Japan was not justified on the basis of either existing legal instrument or the right of 
self-defence and that it was contrary to Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty 
of 1922 and the Pact of Paris. 227 Similarly, the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 was 
held by the Assembly to constitute recourse to war in violation of the Covenant and that 
as a result, the Soviet Union had placed itself outside the League. It was found that the 
USSR had contravened Article 12 of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. 228 During the 
conflict in Manchuria, the United States Secretary of State, Stimson, made the following 
declaration to both Japan and China: 
224 Ibid., p. 87-8. 
225 See Political Committee s6ance du 15 Fevrier 1933, Proces verbaux, p. 2. Reference in Ian Broxvnlie, 
Inteniational Law and the Use ofForce by States. p. 88. 
226 For more information about the war in China see Francis Paul Walters, A History of the League of 
Nations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952, Vol. 2), p. 731-38. 
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"[The United States] does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be 
,, 229 brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris. 
Also the members of the Council of the League of Nations issued a warning to Japan, 
highlighting the guarantee against aggression in Article 10 of the Covenant and 
concluding that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the 
political independence of any member ... ought to be recognised as valid and effectual". 
The Assembly subsequently issued a resolution that it was "incumbent on members not 
to . recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary" to the 
Covenant or the Pact of Paris. 230 The doctrine was not, for political reasons, made use of 
in the Italo-Ethiopian incident, 23 1 but it was applied by 19 American States in the Gran 
Chaco incident between Bolivia and Paraguay, 232 by the United States in regard to the 
action of Peru in Leticia, 233 by the United States, France and the Soviet Union in regard 
to Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia and by the United States in regard to the 
USSR aggression in Finland. 234 
Undoubtedly, the repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy in the Pact of 
Paris required that anything having the same effects as such a war could not be regarded 
as valid. In view of the broad claims of self-defence and the lack of a practical 
distinction between war and armed attack short of war, continued attempts were made to 
define aggression. A Soviet-proposed definition of aggression was endorsed by a League 
227 Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, Vol. II, p. 152-53. 
228 Briggs, p. 964. 
229 Quincy Wright, "The Stimson Note of January 7,1932, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 26, 
1932), p. 342. 230 lbid, p. 343. 231 Waldock, p. 480. 
232 Lester H. Woolsey, "The Chaco Dispute, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 26,1932), p. 796- 
801. 
233 See L. H. Woolsey, "The Leticia Dispute Between Colombia and Peru, " (American Journal of 
InternationalLaw 27), 1933, p. 525-27. 234 Waldock, p. 480. 
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235 Disarmament Committee in 1933. According to this definition, adopted by the USSR 
in non-aggression treatieS236 the aggressor was defined as the first state to commit anY of 
the following acts against another state: (1) declaration of war; (2) armed invasion, with 
or without a declaration of war; (3) anned attack on its territory, navy or air force; (4) 
naval blockade; (5) aid to armed bands formed on its own territory and invading another 
state or refusal, despite demands, to take all possible measures to deprive the armed 
bands of aid and protection. 237 According to Article 3 of the definition, no military 
consideration could excuse striking the first blow. 238 The Soviet definition was criticised 
because it was considered that automatically to blame as the aggressor the party striking 
the first blow "takes no account of self-defence" and consequently the definition, it was 
thought, could become a "trap for the innocent". 239 In 1933, when an anti-aggression 
treaty, the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, was signed in Latin 
America, whilst it condemned war of aggression and required parties to settle their 
disputes only by pacific means, 240 it was explicitly stated in the treaty that the right of 
self-defence was unaffected, since it was inalienable. 241 
The importance of defining aggression increased with the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal for the prosecution of the Nazi War Criminals. 242 Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter defined as a crime against peace within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
235 Briggs, p. 969-970. 
236 Ibid, p. 969. 
237 Ibid, p. 970. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Waldock, p. 484. 
240 See (American Journal ofInternational Law 28 Supplement, 1934), p. 79. 
241 Brownlie, p. 96. 
242 Agreement for Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed 
at London, August 8,1945. Reprinted in (American Journal ofInternational Law 39 Supplement, 1945), 
p. 257-264. 
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, 243 common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing' . The 
Tribunal found that "already at the outbreak of the war, resort to aggressive war was an 
international crime" and relied "in the first place" on the Pact of Paris which was, in 
1939, binding on 63 nations, including Gen-nany, Italy and Japan. 244 The Tribunal stated 
that: 
"In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy 
necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those 
who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are conunitting a 
crime in so doing". 245 
The Nuremberg Charter did not, itself, contain any definition of aggression or self- 
defence. Initially, the United States had proposed a definition of aggression which 
considered as legitimate self-defence resistance to an act of aggression or action to assist 
a state subjected to aggression, and stated explicitly that action in self-defence as 
defined did not constitute an act of aggression. In the event, neither a definition nor an 
express reservation of self-defence found a place in the Charter, but the existence of the 
right of self-defence was never doubted and was relied upon by defence counsel at 
Nuremberg. With regard to the actions at the Allied forces, the Tribunal took the view 
that "since the Allied belligerency was in resistance to aggression, and taken either by 
the actual victims of their aggression or by states coming to their aid, that belligerency 
was in self-defence or collective self-defence. 246 In 1946 the United Nations General 
Assembly affirmed by unanimous resolution the principles of International law 
243 Ibid. 
244 George A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, " (Anierican Journal of International 
Law 41,1947), p. 29-30. 
245 Peter Calvocoressi, Nuremberg, 77ie Facts, the Law, and the Consequences, (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1947), p. 36. 246 Bowett, p. 1394 1. 
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recognised in the Nuremberg Charter and also in the Judgement of the Tribunal. 247 The 
International Law Commission, at the request of the General Assembly, drafted and 
adopted a formulation of the Nuremberg Principles in which crimes against peace were 
defined as: 
(1) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurance. 
(2) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
acts mentioned under. 
248 
As this chapter has shown, the Caroline case, was important because it created the main 
principles of the right of self-defence, such as necessity and proportionality, which are 
still today regarded as essential in the consideration of any claim of use of force under 
the right of self-defence. Moreover, the attempts to restrict the resort to war after World 
War I, through the establishment the League of Nations, and later in the 1928 Pact of 
Paris, made successful contributions in the long term to controlling the use of force, in 
spite of, their defects. In my view the main problem was not the measures themselves, 
but the politieal intransigenee of the powerful states at that time, whose only concern 
was for their own national interests, at the expense of international peace and security. 
247 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 95(1) of December 11,1946. Reprinted in United 
Nations Resolutions, ed. by Dusan J. Djonovich, (Series I, General Assembly, Vol. 1,194648, New York: 
Oceana Publications), p. 175. See also II (Yearbook ofInteniational Law Commission 11,1950), p. 188. 
249 lbid, p. 193,195. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Self-DEFENCE, SECURITY AND THE BIRTH OF THE UN 
The modem understanding of self-defence emerged historically from the pre-modem 
phase of international legal development but has been recast radically in the UN era. 
This has developed within the context of a global collective security system. A system 
of collective security may be defined as one which makes provision for mutual support 
and aversion of conflict, whilst a system of collective defence makes provision for 
specific joint military response against acts of aggression. This chapter will consider the 
hopes for a new world, especially after World War 11, which were expressed in the 
London Declaration of 1941 and the Atlantic Charter of the same year. Also, in 1944, a 
Conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington, to prepare a first draft of a 
World Peace Organisation, in preparation for the San Francisco Conference. Finally, 
Article 51 was drafted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. These topics will all be. 
examined in this chapter. 
The Birth ofthe New Organisation 
The failure of the League of Nations and the ordeal of World War II, rendered necessary 
a major reshaping of the international security system. Amongst the main difficulties 
confronting the League of Nations experiment, were the United States' refusal to 
become a member and the weakness of the League Council and Assembly as means of 
effective crisis management. That the League was intended as a genuine collective 
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security system is made clear by Article 16 of the League Covenant. The problem in the 
1930s was less one of concept than of political will in implementation. The 
international economic collapse of the late twenties and the early thirties, the rise of 
anti-democratic and militaristic regimes, especially those of Italian Fascism, Gern-ian 
Nazism and Japanese Militarism, resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the 
249 League system . 
The end of World War 11 revived the hopes for a new World which would be controlled 
by a new system for the maintenance of international Peace and security, through a new 
organisation. By that time it had become clear that the system of security of the League 
of Nations, having failed in 1939, could not survive into the new era which would come 
after the War. There was, of course, some contrast between the Old and the New Orders 
, as Inish Claude remarks: 
"The UN could be described ... as a revised version of the League. Many of it features were indicative of conscious effort to avoid the deficiencies of the previous World Organisation ... in , 250 both negative and positive fashion the old order influenced the creation of the new' 
The aim, thus, was to establish not so much a conceptually new security order as one 
which was mere practically collective. The process of development commenced early in 
the war when in June 1941, during the peak of the Axis victories with nearly all Europe 
under Axis rule, a meeting was held which many historians consider to be the 
foundation of the United Nations. The representatives of Britain, Canada, Australia, 
249 Evan Luard, A History Of Yhe United Nations, Vol. I: 77ze Years of Mestern Doinination , 1945-55, 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 3-16. 
The League's record shows a few successes in its very early years : It resolved a frontier dispute between 
Finland and Sweden ; defended the sovereignty of infant Albania when she was threatened by Greek 
forces from Bulgaria in 1925 and the payment of compensation by Greece after an incident between the 
two countries ; and resolved a territorial dispute between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul. 
250 Inish Lothair Claude, Sivords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International 
Organisation, 4 ed , (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), p. 60-61 
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New Zealand and South Africa and the exiled Governments of Greece, Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and of 
General de Gaulle of France, met at St. James's Palace, London, and agreed upon the 
London Declaration, which read in part as follows : 
"The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing co-operation of free peoples in a world in 
which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; It is our 
intention to work together, and with other free peoples both in war and peace, to this end , 25 1. 
Exactly three months after the London Declaration the next step was taken with a joint 
declarýtion issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill , known as the 
Atlantic Charter. This Charter affirmed, 
66certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on 
, 252 which they based their hopes for a better future for the world' 
The sixth clause read: 
"After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will 
afford to all nations the means of divelling in safety within their own boundaries , and which will 
afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and 
253 ivant" 
The seventh clause stated: 
"that such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas without hindrance , 254 
And the eighth concluded the document with this outline of peace organisation: 
"They believe that all of the nations of the world , for realistic as well as spiritual reasons , must 
come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea 
or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten , or may threaten , aggression 
outside of their frontiers , they believe , pending the establishment of a wider and permanent 
system of general security , that the disarmament of such nations 
is essential . They will likewise 
aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will tighten for peace-loving peoples the 
crushing burden of armaments"255 . 
25 ' Guide to the Charter Of 77ie United Nations, Published By United Nations Department Of Public 
Information, 4 ed. (New York: United Nations, 1955), p. I. 
252 Leland M Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter ofthe United Nations: Conunentary and Documents, 
(London: Stevens, 1949) ,p . 3-5 . 253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
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The Atlantic Charter was signed on September 24 by the USSR and the ten 
Governments of occupied Europe 256 and rapidly received widespread international 
support. 
On New Year's Day 1942, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Maxim 
Litvinov of the USSR, and T. V. Soong of China signed a document which, though 
short, had significant influence in fixing and firmly establishing a policy for the post- 
war system with respect to peace and security which would be afforded to all nations 257 . 
Later, only those states which had declared war on Germany and Japan and subscribed 
to the United Nations Declaration were invited to take part in the San Francisco 
Conference 258. In October 19-30,1943, an important meeting took place in MOSCOW259, 
at which the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union 
recognised 
"the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation, 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership 
by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security", 
and they continued that: 
"for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of 
law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security" 
they would consult 
"with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view 
to joint action on behalf of the community of nations" and that they would "confer and co-operate 
with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable 
, 260 general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period' 
256 Guide to the Charter ofthe United Nations, p. 1-3 . 257 Evan Luard, A History ofthe United Nations, p. 17 - 27. 258 The United Nations Declaration reads that the nations which take part had : "subscribed to a common 
program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom dated August 14,1941, known as the Atlantic 
Charter. " 
259 No substantial statement of United Nations policy with respect to the establishment of the new 
organisation to maintain peace and security was made until the Moscow Conference . 260 Evan Luard, A History ofthe United Nations, Vol. (1), p. 17-23 . 
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At Tehran, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met, for the first time, and declared that they 
would work for a decisive triumph over the Axis. As to peace, the Declaration read: 
"We are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace . 
We recognise fully the supreme 
responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the 
goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror 
, 261 of war for many generations' 
The most crucial stage before the San Francisco Conference was the double conference 
of Dumbarton Oaks near Washington DC in 1944. This Conference was to prepare a 
first draft of a World Peace Organisation. The discussions were in two stages. The first 
stage was between the representatives of the Governments of the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and United States. The second stage was between the representatives 
of the Governments of China, the United Kingdom and the United States 262 . 
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals stated in Chapter I the aims of the new International 
Organisation. These included the following: 
1. "To maintain intemational peace and security". 
2. "To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace". 0 
3. "To achieve intemational co-operation in the solution of intemational economic, social and other 
humanitarian problems". 
4. "To afford a centre for harmonising the action of nations in the achievement of these common 
ends". 263 
During that gathering there were wide consultations with a view to the elaboration of a 
plan which would take into account the experience of the past 264. After six weeks, they 
produced a number of "tentative proposals". 
The recommendations mainly concerned defining the framework of the new 
international organisation, and the responsibilities and obligations of the members of 
that international gathering. It gave to the Security Council enforcement powers which 
26 1 Guide To The UnitedNations Charter, p. 5-6. 
262 The division into two Conferences Nvas due to the fact that the USSR did not recognise the Government 
of Chiang Kai-Shek as the legitimate Government of the Republic of China. 
263 Maurice FanshaNve, The Charter Explained, (London: United Nations Association, 1946), p. 5-11. 
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the League Council never had. At the same time the Security Council was even at this 
early stage assuming the shape of a body which, in pre-Cold War theory, had the clear 
backing of the great Powers - meaning the victorious World War II, and thus a potential 
efficacy largely denied to the League. It attempted at the same time to give the General 
Assembly the primary responsibility for essential matters dealing with the general 
welfare 265 . At Yalta there was a turning point between the preparations for the Charter 
of the United Nations and the founding conference at San Francisco. By that same time, 
the Dumbarton Oaks plan had been published and was the object of deep controversy 
and intensive public discussion. A unique compromise formula was produced by the big 
three at Yalta after difficult disagreement between the United Kingdom and the United 
States on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. The agreement provided that 
"all decisions on questions of procedure should be taken by a majority of seven votes, 
and that decisions on other questions should be taken by a like majority, with the added 
requirement of unanimity of the pen-nanent members". At the same time there was a 
disagreement concerning crucial issues dealing with the great powers and whether they 
were to be allowed to exercise their veto rights in cases in which they were involved in a 
diSpUtC266 
The Drafting of Article 51: The San Francisco Conference 
In preparation for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference the Soviet Union, China, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States drafted proposals including as a general principle the 
prohibition of the use of force, except for preventive or enforcement action undertaken 
264 Ibid. 
265 Leland M Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of The United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents, p. 6-10. 266 Ibid. 
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by the organisation itself No reference was made in these proposals to self-defence. 267 
The fon-nula agreed upon in Dumbarton Oaks was very similar to what eventually 
became Article 2(4) of the Charter, placing a general ban on the use and threat of 
force. 268 Because the prohibition of war under the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and under the Pact of Paris had never been taken to exclude the right of self-defence, it 
is not surprising that in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals similarlY, it was not deemed 
necessary to include explicit reservation of the right of self-defence. 269 The ban on the 
threat or use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation" 
was not considered to prevent the exercise of this right, which was regarded as inherent 
in the proposals. 270 That this was so, was made clear when the issue of self-defence was 
raised by the Chinese delegation in the context of the powers of the future Security 
Council. They requested assurances that the right of self-defence had not been removed 
and that the use of force in self-defence would not be considered inconsistent with the 
purposes of the organisation. It seemed satisfied by the explanation that the ban applied 
to the unilateral use of force without approval by the Security Council, other than in the 
cases of legitimate self-defence . 
271 The Chinese delegation's query as to who would 
judge whether a state's use of force was consistent with the purposes and principles of 
the organisation, particularly if it claimed to be acting in self-defence, met with a 
267 See United States Plan for the Establishment of an International Organisation for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security, December 29,1943, in Ruth B. Russell, A History of The United 
Nations Charter: The Role of the United States (1940-1945), (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958), 
p. 990-95. 
268 Chapter II, Principles, paragraph, 4 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals read: "All members of the 
Organisation shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the organisation. " Russell, p. 1019. 
269 See Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation in Foreign Relations of the 
United states, (1944), p. 890-900. 
270 Geoffrey L Goodwin, Britain And Yhe United Nations, (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 
1957), p. 32-3. 
271 For more information see Foreign Relations of the United States, (1944), p. 862. 
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consensual reply that the Security Council was the body which would make such a 
decision. 272 
When the United States delegation, in preparation for the San Francisco Conference 
examined the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, item by item, once again the question arose 
whether Chapter VIII should contain an express reservation of the right of self-defence 
in the context of the maintenance of peace and security provisions. Despite the general 
agreement that this was an inherent right, there was no real objection on the principle. 273 
When, at the San Francisco Conference, Committee Fl, deliberated the provision 
containing the prohibition of the threat or use of force, it concluded that the "use of anus 
in legitimate self-defence remains admitted and unimpaired. , 274 Some countries thought 
that an express provision in the Charter asserting the right of self-defence in response to 
an attack by another state would be useful. 275 Others proposed that a collective 
obligation be undertaken by members "to resist every act of aggression against any 
member. ', 276 Nevertheless, none of the amendments proposed at the San Francisco 
Conference on the provision that later became Article 2(4), of the Charter referred 
directly to self-defence, 277 with the single exception of a Panamanian proposal whereby 
"subject to immediate reference to and approval by the competent agency" of the 
organisation, "a state may oppose by force an unauthorised use of force made against it 
272 Russell, p. 465-66. 273 Ibid., p. 599. 
274 See Report of the Rapporteur of Committee I/1 to Commission I, Doculnents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, (Published in Co-operation with the Library of 
Congress, London & New York, 1945, Vol. 6), p. 459. 
275 See for example the statement of Turkey, Docunients of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation, Vol. 4, p. 675. 
276 Proposal of New Zealand, Docutnents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation, Vol. 3, p. 486-87; Vol. 6, p. 34243. 277 Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 557-64. 
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by another state. , 278 Evidently, the general inclination was to restrict the pennission to 
use force and to focus on prohibition rather than permission. 279 
The source of Article 51 is to be found in the discussions of Committee 111/4 which dealt 
with the problem of harmonising existing regional security arrangements with proposed 
Charter of the United Nations, and in so doing faced the problem of preserving some 
freedom of action in self-defence. 280 
Originally, what was at issue was the freedom of regional organisations to take 
enforcement action. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had provided that, where 
appropriate, use could be made by the Security Council of regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action, but that no enforcement action should be taken under 
such arrangements or by such agencies without the Council's authorisation. 281 The 
statement of the four Sponsoring Powers made it clear that for the Security Council to 
give such authorisation would require the unanimous agreement of the permanent 
members. 282 Thus, a permanent member could make use to its veto power, to prevent a 
regional organisation from taking forceful action. 283 Although the United States 
delegation was satisfied with this provision 284 , the Latin American countries which had 
recently concluded a regional arrangement, the Act of Chapultepec, 285 feared that the 
Act of Chapultepec could be found to be in contradiction with the Charter, that action in 
self-defence under regional arrangements could be subject to the veto in the Security 
278 Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 565. 
279 Ian Broxvnlie, International Law And 77te Use ofForce By States, p. 270-7 1. 
2so Boxvett W. Derek, Self-Defence in International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1958), p. 182. 
28 1 Russell, p. 1026. 
282 Text of the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in 
the Security Council, June 7,1945, in Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation, Vol. 11, p. 7 10. 
283 BoXvett' P. 183. 
284 Russell, p. 693. 
285 The Act of Chapultepec provided for collective measures, including the use of armed force, to meet 
threats or acts of aggression against an American state. For more information see Leland Goodrich and 
Edvard Hambro, Charter of1he United Nations: Commentary and Documents, p. 176. 
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Counei1286, or that action under the Act might be blocked as a result of the Security 
Council's being impeded from action by the exercise of the veto. 287 The discussion of 
the demand for autonomy of the inter-American security system was merged with the 
consideration of two proposals to exempt security arrangements against aggression by 
enemy states from the requirement of Security Council authorisation. 288 One was a 
proposal by France to make an exception to the Security Council's authorisation "in the 
case of the application of measures of an urgent nature provided for in treaties of 
assistance concluded between members of the Organisation and of which the Security 
Council has been advised . "289 The other was a proposal by the Soviet Union for a 
similar exception in the case of regional arrangements "directed against renewal of a 
policy of aggression on the part of the aggressor-states in this war. ', 290 The United States 
had no objections to either of these specific exceptions. 29 1 The Latin American 
representatives, however, were of the opinion that the Soviet Union proposal would 
reduce the inter-American organisation's role and they pressed for a similar exemption 
under the Act of Chapultepec. 292 The United States' advisers drafted an amendment on 
self-defence which they suggested should be added to Section B of Chapter VIII of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (on action against aggression), rather than to Section C (on 
regional arrangements). It referred to regional arrangements as an example of self- 
defence against attack, rather than as an exception to the general rule that regional 
286 See Foreign Relations of The United States (1945), Vol. 4, p. 595. 
287 Josef Kunz, "Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, " (Atnerican Journal ofInternational Law 45,195 1), 
p. 528,530. 
288 Leland Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Simons, Charter ofthe United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents, 3d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 343. 
289 Documents ofthe United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Vol. 3, p. 3 87. 290 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 60 1. 
29 1 Foreign Relations of the United States (1945), Vol, 4, p. 596. 
292 Ibid., p. 659. 
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enforcement action required Council authority, thus distinguishing between regional 
enforcement action (which it did not deal with) and regional action of self-defence. 293 
The characterisation of regional arrangements as self-defence, however, would still 
permit them to be invoked without the sanction of the Security Council. The permanent 
members had reservations about this. It was noted that the right of self-defence was 
reserved, but the procedure implied good faith not to take action except in self- 
defence. 294 The United States' view, in general, was that it should retain the ability to 
veto action in parts of the world outside the Western hemisphere and it was concerned 
that the regional right to take defensive action without Council authority should not be 
made general. The approach favoured by the United Kingdom and France was for a right 
of individual action, only in case of the Council's failure to act. The United States' 
proposal was therefore reworded to make clear that the regional arrangements should 
operate independently only in self-defence and only in the event of failure of the 
Council to act. The final text of the United States suggestion read: 
"Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and should aggression occur by 
any state against any member state, such member state possesses the inherent right to take 
necessary measures for self-defence. The right to take such measures for self-defence against 
armed attack shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of 
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against any 
one of them as an attack against all of them. The taking of such measures shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any Nvay affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under this Charter to take at any such time such action as it may deem 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security,,. 295 
Neither the United Kingdom nor the Soviet Union accepted this proposal, however. 
Their fear was that it left the door open for a series of regional organisations, acting 
independently of the world institution. 296 The United Kingdom proposed a revised text: 
"Nothin- in this Charter should invalidate the right of self-defence against armed attack, either 
individual or collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary measures 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any Nvay affect the authority 
293 Ibid., p. 674. 
294 Ibid., p. 592. 
295 Ibid., p. 685-86. 
296 Ibid., p. 691-98 and 698-706. 
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and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it 
may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security, . 
297 
The Soviet delegation proposed a similar idea, though differently worded, beginning 
with the phrase "Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-defence, either 
individual or collective", followed by a provision that in the event of failure to maintain 
peace and security on the part of the Security Council, the countries would have the 
right "to take measures of self-defence up to the time the necessary measures by the 
Security Council [were] being taken .,, 
298 The United States delegation had the same 
understanding: that "the right of self-defence continued until the Security Council took 
adequate measures"299 and redrafted the proposal to state this expliCitly. 
300 While this 
proposal seemed acceptable to the permanent members, 
301 the Latin American 
delegations still feared that the inter-American system might be pronounced inconsistent 
with the Charter. In order to win them over, it was necessary for the United States to 
guarantee the continued validity of the intcr-American system and to promise its 
integration with the general organisation and the implementation by treaty of the Act of 
Chapultepec. 302 The United States also suggested adding appropriate references to 
"resort to regional agencies or arrangements" among the approved methods of dispute 
settlement in order to strengthen the role of regional agencies and arrangements in this 
regard. 303 The new proposals were explained in a press release, which announced that 
the new provision recognised the inherent right of self-defence but in no way detracted 
from the ultimate authority of the Security Council as the main instrument of world 
297 Ibid., p. 704. 
29ý Ibid., p. 812. 299 Ibid., p. 817. 300 Ibid., p. 819. 
301 Ibid., p. 823-25. The United States agreed to exclude from the text the specific reference to the Act of 
Chapultepec. 
302 Ibid., p. 73 1. 303 Ibid., p. 737-39. 
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enforcement action. 304 After the Latin American delegations informally gave their 
approval and the proposal was submitted to and approved by the five permanent 
members, it was formally presented in this final form: 
"Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right 
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any Nvay 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time 
such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
securi ty.,, 305 
This provision, with minor drafting changes, became Article 51 of the Charter. 306 To 
emphasise that the provisions of the article referred to the exercise of a reserved right of 
members and did not imply that regional arrangements were exempted from Security 
Council authority, it was also agreed that the new proposal should be included in the 
chapter on threats and breaches of peace and acts of aggression instead of in the chapter 
on regional arrangements. 307 Moreover, Article 51 have been mentioned the right of 
collective self-defence. 
The exPression "collective self-defence" is not defined in the Charter. The interpretation 
expressed, during a discussion of the issue within the United States delegation was that 
"if more than one state acts ... that is to be interpreted as 'collectively' 
008 
. The 
Colombian delegate at the San Francisco conference stated his understanding of the 
concept as follows: 
In the case of the American states, an aggression against one American state constitutes an 
aggression against all the American states, and all of them exercise their right of legitimate defence 
by giving support to the state attacked, in order to repel such aggression. This is what is meant by 
the right of colleclitv seIr-defence. 309 
304 Ibid., p. 831-37. 
305 Documents ofthe United Nations Conference on International Organisations, Vol. 12, p. 680. 
306 Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 188. 
307 Brownlie, p. 274. 
308 Foreign Relations of the United States (1945), Vol. 4, p. 679. 
309 Documents ofthe United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Vol. 12, p. 687. 
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The main issue was the scope of the action which the Charter intended that individual 
states or groups of states should be allowed to take without the prior pennission of the 
Security Council .3 
10 The question was whether the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defence demands(a) the existence of a regional arrangement; (b) the existence of a 
bilateral mutual assistance treaty; or (c) is permitted even in the absence of any previous 
arrangements or treaty obligation. It was clearly for the purpose of fitting regional 
arrangements, especially the inter-American security system, into the general 
international organisation, that Article 51 was added at San Francisco. Also it was clear 
that at San Francisco the expression "collective self-defence" was used to cover action 
not only by members of regional arrangements, but also by parties to bilateral treaties 
governing their joint security, and also assistance by one state to another without any 
treaty obligation. Article 51 was deliberately transferred at the San Francisco 
Conference from Chapter VIII to Chapter VII which means that the right of collective 
self-defence had become "entirely independent of the existence of regional 
arrangements .,, 
31 1 But also, any member of the United Nations is permitted under the 
Charter to use anned force to assist an attacked state, whether or not there has been any 
previous arrangement. 312 The right of collective self-defence can also be exercised by 
and with non-members of the United Nations, for two reasons: because the purpose of 
Article 51 is to reserve a right of self-defence inherent in all states, 313 and because, 
under Article 2(6) the prohibition against the use of force applies equally to non- 
member states, the right of self-defence cannot be denied to them. 
Perhaps one of the main consequences of the World War 11, was the general tendency 
among states to regulate the practice of the use of force. This control over the use of 
3 10 Bowett, p. 130. 
311 Waldock, p. 504. 
312 Dinstein, 234. 
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force could be achieved only under an powerful organisation, whose main aim would be 
to protect international peace and security. On this basis, the United Nations appeared to 
avoid the mistakes of the League of Nations. The control over the use of force came by 
the balancing between Articles 2(4), and 51 from the UN Charter - in which perhaps a 
main aim of the UN Charter's drafters was to give small states a sense of greater 
security against more powerful ones. 
313 Waldock and Brierly, p. 419. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NATURE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT 
Integral to the UN security system is the notion of self-defence, which is the only 
permitted exception to the prohibition of force under Article 2(4). What is less clear, 
however, is exactly what is the nature of the inherent right of self-defence, and in what 
circumstances it may be invoked; Article 51 leaves many questions unanswered. The 
UN Charter generally intended to reserve armed force primarily for the UN and its 
agents. The reservation of a right of self-defence was a pragmatic measure, leaving room 
for unilateral action which would be inevitable and necessary in the event of any failure 
of fon-nal multilateralism. This chapter explores the debate on the nature of self-defence 
under the UN Charter. It remained unclear, however, what sort of action in the modem 
strategic and technological environment, constitutes "armed attack" sufficient to give 
rise to a right in self-defence; a question highlighted by the Nicaraguan assistance to El 
Salvador's FMLN resistance movement and the subsequent mining of Nicaraguan , 
harbours with US assistance. Further ambiguities revolve around anticipatory self- 
defence and collective self-defence. The word "inherent" applied to the self-defence 
right is confiising, as it implies that the right is the same customary right which existed 
before the creating of the UN; though the explicit authorisation of collective self- 
defence enlarges that right. 
These difficulties raise also the question of definition of aggression, even though this 
term is not used in the Charter in specific relation to self-defence. Therefore, 
consideration will be given to the development of the definition of aggression, from the 
period of the League of Nations, to the General Assembly Resolution (3314) 14, 
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December 1974. That resolution will be analysed in an attempt to clarify what 
aggression mean and what could provoke the right of self-defence. The chapter begins 
with a general discussion of self-defence under the Charter, and highlights the 
ambiguities raised. There follows a consideration of interpretation of the scope of 
Article 51. Finally, the role of the Security Council in relation to self-defence is 
considered. 
UN Charter and Sel6defence 
The UN Charter treats self-defence more coherently than the Covenant of the League of 
the Nations and Kellogg-Briand Pact, although it retains their sense that defence is 
essential and prior. Whereas the Covenant gave little guidance in the event that the 
whole League system broke down, the Charter accepted the likelihood as well as the 
legitimacy of unilateral, or extra-UN, action. The Charter restricted the range of that 
action, however, to occasions of self-defence rather than to a wider array of 
circumstances in which the organisation might fail to meet the needs of member states. 
In turn, the Charter departs from Kel logg-Bri and's string of ad hoc exceptions. Instead, 
those who drafted the Charter made self-defence integral to the system, effecting a more 
systematic balance between the rule and the exception than either interwar effort. 
Overall, the Charter was intended to shepherd an international order in which armed 
force was primarily reserved for the UN and its agents to protect the values and interests 
of a global community. In its aspirations to secure the world from the "scourge of war", 
it banned not only the use of anned force but force in general. Axticle 2(4) states: 
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. " 
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Any previous freedom to go to war or use of force was meant to be rcndered 
"antiquated" at least on paper. 314 The sole extra-UN exception to Article 2(4) was the 
' 
right to self-defence. 315 The experience of the 1930s and the Second World War offered 
raw evidence that the peace envisioned for the post-war world was unlikely to be either 
perpetual or total. Some states would certainly violate the ban on force at some stage. 
Although the UN was intended to step in to resist aggression, it was conceivable that it 
might fail to do so or, at least, be unable to act quickly enough to protect victim states 
from immediate damage. Either possibility left room for unilateral action, which implies 
that a right to such had to be guaranteed. That this guarantee came in the forin, of a 
permission to act in self-defence made immediate historical sense. Gennan and Italian 
efforts to "modify" the Versailles arrangement through military conquest had alerted 
international observers to the need for timely resistance against aggression, perhaps in 
advance of multilateral consensus. Moreover, immediate post-war developments 
conduced to the "increasingly approved" position that defence wars were equivalent to 
just wars. 
316 
The Charter of the United Nations implied that preparation for self-defence was 
inevitable and war in self-defence lawftil. It recognised in the first section of Article 51 
that any state under attack, with no prospect of UN intervention on its behalf, was 
permitted to act in its own military defence. In its second section, the Article made the 
right of self-defence subject to the authority and responsibility of the Security Council. 
Article 51 provided a crucial escape hatch. While it did not restore fully the pre-Charter 
licence to self-defence, it stood as a fairly open invitation to return to the old way of 
doing things should the new order not materialise. Were formal multilateralism to fail, 
314 Yoram Dinstein, Mar, Aggression and SeIr-Defence, (Cambridge: Grotius, 1988), p. 9 1. 
3 15 Authorised enforcement action under Article 42 would, of course, be clearlywithin the UN remit. 
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any state or states could take their security into their o-vvn hands, or more accurately, into 
their own anns. Significantly, this exemption was formalised in the name of self- 
defence, a right viewed as unequivocal. 
Not surprisingly, Article 51 left many terms undefined and questions unanswered. That 
a right to self-defence existed was undebatable; what it involved was far less so. Some 
writers have expressed doubt that interpreters of Article 51 will ever be able to agree on 
a definition beyond the skeletal, that self-defence amounts to a "legitimate use of 
counter-force. 017 However vain the effort, the interpretation of Charter language and 
intent has largely been viewed as a legal issue, both academically and practically. A first 
set of questions revolves around the notion of anned attack. What actions sufficiently 
constitute armed attack that self-defence becomes an acceptable response? Defining 
armed attack has been a particular challenge for the post-1945 experience of guerrilla 
warfare and low-intensity conflict, third-party support for insurgencies and indirect 
aggression, terrorism and extortion, and various forms of economic and political, but 
unarmed, coercion. Where are we to locate armed attack along a continuum of conflict 
which ranges from tank invasion to hostile radio propaganda? As one writer commented 
at the height of the Vietnam War, short of total invasion, the Charter is silent on the 
rights of victims of "loss trespass. ' 318 
The ambiguity of Article 2(4) does not help. Suppose that one state provides weapons 
and logistical support to an anti-government movement in another but displays no 
obvious interest in acquiring any of that state's territory or usurping its political 
independence. Assuming inaction by the Security Council, is this a sufficient 
316 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality And 7lie Relations of States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), p. 282. 
3 17 Dinstein, p. 200. 
318 Thomas M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 2(4)? Changing Governing The Use of Force By States, " 
(Anzerican Journal ofInternational Law 64,1970), p. 8 13-14. 
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provocation to justify anned self-defence against the first state by the one battling anti- 
government forces, or friendly states acting on the basis of "collective self-defence"? 
The International Court of Justice decided in the 1986 Nicaragua case that such a 
situation did not license self-defence under Article 51.319 In this case, the "scale and 
effects" of Nicaraguan assistance to El Salvador's FMLN resistance movement were too 
small to be considered "armed attack", and closer in kind to "a mere frontier incident" 
and were of insufficient gravity to justify the mining of Nicaraguan harbours that had 
been carried out with US assistance. 320 
Another set of questions concern whether self-defence can anticipate an aggression. To 
read "if an armed attack occurs" as meaning that in all cases a victim state should wait 
for bombs to drop before responding appears to be unrealistic, especially in an age of 
nuclear, biological, chemical, and massively destructive conventional weapons. At the 
same time, as an impact of this massive progress in all types of weapons, to determine 
"who fired the first shot" also seems too simple, since attacks can begin without actual 
shots. Pertinent questions arise about how states should be entitled to respond to the 
threat of attack . 
32 1 This puzzlement gave many the impression that Article 51 affirms the 
legitimacy of anticipatory self-defence and at the same time forbids it. 322 Others propose 
that it is difficult to determine when the assault begins to give endorsement for pre- 
3 19 Dinstein, p. 181-83. The decision of the International Court of Justice is a clear example of how 
counter-measures could to some point be allowed. 
320 Nicaragua iý United States of America. International Court of Justice, (Merits Judgement, 27 June 
1986), p. 1034. The problem for the United States was that it could not verify the gravity of the cross- 
border assaults from Nicaragua. As the Court said "An armed attack must be understood as including not 
merely action ... across an 
international border, but also ... acts of armed 
force against another state of 
such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. " The Court's 
vie-%v, was that the situation in this case was not classified as an armed attack. 
32 1 Goodrich and Harnbro, Charter of Yhe United Nations: Commentary and Documents, p. 347. 
322 Myres S. McDougal and Florentine P. Feliciano, "Resort to Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defence in 
Policy Perspective, " In: Laiv And Minimum Morld Public Order: 77ie Legal Regulation of International 
Coercion, (New Haven, NY: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 234. Bowett perceived Article 51 as 
admitting anticipatory self-defence. 
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emptive self-defence. 323 Dinstein considered Article 51 to be flexible and at the same 
time incompatible with the way which the Charter was drafted. In particular, he pointed 
to the massive loss that would result from waiting until bombs were dropped before 
being able to act in self-defence. He suggested a more extensive authority to act in a 
defensive way to face an initial assault, but within carefully defined boundaries only. 324 
Another group of issues revolves around collective self-defence. It is unquestionable 
that a gathering of states, united in the same principles and threatened by a strong 
enemy, may claim the right of collective self-defence. The Alliance against Iraq in the 
Second Gulf War is an apparent example. The dilemma is what the notion of collective 
self-defence includes. Collective self-defence involves a complex connection between 
Article 51 and regional security arrangements. The history of Article 51 gives clear 
evidence that collective self-defence has become an instrument of compromise between 
those who demand extensive authority over the use of force in the United Nations and 
others who claim that regional organisations should have some authority to act 
unilaterally. 325 Article 51, in fact, emanated to fix the controversy about the "Regional 
Arrangements" in Articles 52 to 54 (Chapter VIII). Article 53, in particular, contained 
an "authorisation" clause which requires any regional enforcement action to have the 
permission of the Security Council of the United Nations. The objective of this, was to 
make the UN more effective in resolving international disputes. But that power for the 
Security Council was confronted with the objection of the American states. Ahead of the 
San Francisco Conference they agreed under the Act of Chapultepec to link regional 
security with inter-American security programmes. 326 They agreed that the League of 
323 This was the view of Brownlie. 
324 Dinstein, p. 175,178-80. 325 Thomas M. Franck, p. 824. 
326 John W. Halderman, Yhe United Nations And 7lie Rule of Law: Charter Developtnent Through The 
Handling ofInternational Disputes And Situations, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1966), p. 42-3. 
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Nations had accepted restrictions in its authority for the advantage of some areas or 
states and they claimed that they should have the same privilege. The European states, 
from their side, were afraid of a German revival and they wanted to have the right to act 
immediately against any possible German aggression. In cases of instant danger, 
Belgium, Turkey and Czechoslovakia proposed to allow individual response. The USSR 
demanded the freedom of collective action against the former Axis Powers. 327 
Meanwhile, China sought a centralised system for the new international gathering to 
protect Chinese interests. The UK, for its part, recognised the regional controversy, but 
at the same time did not like to ruin the United Nations plan from the beginning. 328 San 
Francisco examined many settlement steps, to which were attached some rights and 
exemptions. The US delegation proposed an umbrella article, which would reassert an 
"inherenf' right of self-defence, to be enjoyed by any state or group, to act individually 
in the absence of Security Council measures. The UK delegation suggested that the 
article should read: 
"Nothing in this Charter shall invalidate the right of self-defence against armed attack, either 
individual or collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary steps to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. " 
Generally, the idea was agreed that self-defence was only an interim measure until the 
Security Council took the measures necessary for international peace and security, and 
this was the origin of Article 51.329 
327 Arnold Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 185. 
328 Evan Luard, A History of The United Nations: 77ie Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, p. 52-3. 
329 Ibid., p. 534. 
93 
Inteipretation ofArticle 51 
The subject of self-defence was raised at the San Francisco Conference in relation to the 
problem of harmonising existing regional arrangements with the proposed Charter of the 
United Nations. The text of Article 51 refers to the "inherent right" which remains 
unimpaired by the Charter. Consequently, Article 51 recognises a right of self-defence 
"established independently of the Charter by natural law. , 330 This view finds support in 
the statement of the Rapporteur of Committee 1/1 at the San Francisco Conference that 
the "use of arms in legitimate self-defence remains admitted and unimpaired. 1)331 
Therefore, the right of self-defence "has no other content than the one determined by 
Article 5 p9332 and the right of self-defence as existing under Article 51 is the right 
conferred upon the member states. 333 This raises the question whether Article 51 
recognises the existence of a customary right of self-defence. If the aim of the Charter 
had been to leave the scope of the right of self-defence unimpaired it would have taken 
the approach of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, i. e. making no explicit reservation of 
self-defence. 334 In contrast, the approach adopted by the Charter of drawing a clear 
reservation of self-defence testifies that the right of self-defence continues to exist. 
Under Article 51 the right of self-defence may be exercised until the Security Council 
330 Hans Kelsen, Recent Trends in theLaw of the United Nations, (London: Stevens, 1961), p. 913-14. 
33 1 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1/1 to Commission 1, in (Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, Vol. 6), p. 459. 
332 Kelsen, p. 914. 
333 Hans Kelsen, 77ze Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, 
(London: Stevens, 195 1), p. 792. 
334 Brownlie, p. 273. 
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has taken the measures determined in Article 51.335 Thus, the main purpose of Article 
336 51 is to remove possible doubts as to the impact of the Security Council's powers. 
Article 51 enlarged the right of self-defence by explicitly authorising collective as well 
as individual self-defence. 337 Therefore, whether Article 51 extended the right of self- 
defence in one respect and limited it in another 338 , or Article 51 reflected customary law 
339 as it had evolved and existed as of 1945 , the right of self-defence was developed 
under the Charter in three areas: (1) it was extended to include collective as well as 
individual self-defence ; (2) to avoid any abuse of this right as an excuse for illegal use 
of force, it was limited to cases where an "anned attack" occurs against a member of the 
United Nations ; (3) it was regarded as a temporary right to be used only as the need 
arose "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. " The important issue here, which needs elaboration, is 
what is meant by the term arnzed attack. The term "armed attack" did not appear in 
neither the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the Pact of Paris. It was aggression 
that had been considered the opposite of self-defence and that the Draft Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol had attempted to define. The designers of 
the Charter deliberately decided not to attempt to define aggression, but to leave to the 
Security Council to decide in each case whether a particular act constitutes a threat to 
the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It was reported at the San 
Francisco Conference that: 
335 Derek W Bowett, "Collective Self-Defence Under the Charter of the United Nations, " (The British 
Year Book ofInternational Law 32,1955-56), p. 130-3 1. 
336 Humphrey Waldock and James L. Brierly, Re Laiv of Nations, 6nd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p. 417-19. 
337 Lauterpacht and Oppenheim, International lait,: A Treatise, p. 155. 
338 Kelsen, 77ie Law ofthe United Nations, p. 792. 
339 Brownlie, p. 274. 
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"It ... became clear ... that a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the possibilities of 
this Conference and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique of modem warfare 
renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. ... The list of such cases being 
necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a tendency to consider of less importance the acts 
not mentioned therein; these omissions would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or 
might delay action by the Council. Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the 
Council might bring about a premature application of enforcement measures. The Committee 
therefore decided ... to leave to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to 
peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. , 340 
Moreover, under Article 39, the Security Council does not even have to determine the 
presence of aggression. To decide that there exists a threat to the peace or a breach of 
the peace is enough. Nor was there any definition of the expression "anned attack" in 
the files of San Francisco, because the expression was not regarded as ambiguous. 341 
Many believe that for the right of self-defence to be invoked under Article 51, an attack 
should be so serious as to threaten the integrity of the attacked state. 342 Others, however, 
contend that "a single rifle shot ... fired by an armed soldier across the 
border" 
suffices. 
343 Still, the phrase "armed attack" opens the door to the question whether 
Article 51 precluded the exercise of self-defence against illegal use of force which fell 
short of an armed attack and also whether Article 51 precluded the exercise of self- 
defence against a threat to use force. 344 
To answer these questions is difficult, because no real answers can be found in the 
drafting history of Article 51. The Americans at San Francisco discussed what could be 
considered "attack", but it seems that the idea was ambiguous. 345 It was indicated that 
the right of self-defence "is an inherent right and is not restricted to the case of a direct 
340 Report of Rapportcur of Conunittee 111/3 to Commission III on Chapter VIII, Section B in (Documents 
of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Vol. 12), p. 502,505. See also Leland. 
Goodrich and Hambro, Charter ofthe United Nations: Commentary and Documents, p. 178. 
34 1 Brownlie, p. 278. 
342 Josef Mrazek, "Prohibition of the Use and Threat of Force: Self-Defence and Self-Help In International 
Law, " (Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law 27,1989), p. 109. 
343 Dinstein, p. 182. 
344 Waldock, p. 496-97. 
345 Foreign Relations of the United States (1945), Vol. 4, p. 670. 
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attack" and that the "concept is much broader' )346 .A major question concerned the 
distinction between an "attack" and an "anned attack", but no conclusion was 
reached. 347 Ultimately, the inclination was to focus solely on "armed attack". However, 
since armed attack was not defined, what constituted an armed attack would be 
determined by the states involved in the process of self-defence up to the point where 
the Security Council takes the measures necessary to restore peace and security. At this 
point, "the competence to interpret the term "armed attack" and to ascertain whether an 
,, 348 "armed attack" exists in a concrete case, is transferred to the Council . An important 
question is whether an imminent threat is enough to create an immediate right to 
recourse to force in self-defence. Generally, Article 51 limits the right of self-defence to 
the actual occurrence of an "aimed attack" by one state against another. This suggests 
that the wording "if an armed attack occurs" is intended to mean "after an armed attack 
occurred. 5349 
A further implication would be that the range of self-defence under Article 51 was 
different from that of the customary right of self-defence. 350 According to Judge 
Schwebel, there are two possible interpretations of Article 51. One is that Article 51 
prevents anticipatory self-defence. This view is based on the arguments that: (a) the 
ordinary meaning of the text of Article 51 indicates so; (b) the discussion at San 
Francisco assumed that any permission for the use of force would be exceptional, and 
that exception should be narrowly construed; (c) Article 51 to was intended restrict and 
did restrict the of self-defence enjoyed by states under customary international law; (d) 
346 Ibid., p. 667. 347 Ibid., p. 678. 
348 Kelsen, p. 792. The International Court of Justice has interpreted the phrase "armed attack" and made 
judgement on whether "anned attack" available or not. For more information see Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States, Judgement of 27 June 
1986, Merits), 1986 ICJ Reports 14, p. 1024, paragraphs, 193-95; p. 110, paragraph, 211; p. 120, 
paragraph, 232; p. 127, paragraph, 249. 
349 Kelsen, Recent Trends, p. 914-15. 
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and as a result the use of force in Article 51 should be interpreted in an limited way. The 
second interpretation is that Article 51 does not ban anticipatory self-defence because: a) 
it was accepted in customary international law; (b) the purpose of Article 51 was not to 
restrict the right of self-defence but to ensure that regional organisations could act in 
self-defence under the UN Charter. 351 It is important to mention that the final judgement 
on whether an armed attack under Article 51 has taken place will be made by the state 
concerned, which will have to prove the gravity and imminence of such an attack in 
order to justify an action of self-defence before the Security Council. 
Armed Attack andAggression 
The Covenant of the League of Nations referred to war and external aggression; it did 
not use the terms "use of force" or "armed attack". Aggression was considered as the act 
which triggered the right of self-defence. Although continued efforts to define 
aggression were made after the foundation of the League of Nations, they were 
unsuccessful. 352 Article 10 of the Covenant of the Leaguelof Nations was composed to 
help to detennine the aggressor, which mean, any act of force, or threat of using force, 
against the territorial integrity or the existing political independence of any of the 
Members of the League, is an illegal act of aggression, which the Members had agreed 
not to commit. Also, it is the duty of the Council to determine upon the means by which 
this aggression can be prevented. 353 Article 11, considered war that no more had a 
350 Brownlie, p. 276. 
351 Stephen M. Schwebel, "Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modem International Law, " 
(Hague Reciteil 136,1972-11), p. 479-8 1. 
352 For more information see Quincy Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression, " (American Journal of 
InternationalLaw 50,1956), p. 514,519-22. See also Brownlie, p. 351-55. 
353 Bengt Broms, "Definition of Aggression, " (Hague Reciteil 154,1974), p. 305-307. 
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private aspect, but it is a matter of concern to the interriational. community. 354 Article 11 
announced that "any war or threat of war" to be a matter of concern to the whole League 
which required the League to take effective action to safeguard the peace of nations. 355 
In Article 12 under "Disputes to be Submitted for Settlement" the Members of the 
League agreed to submit any dispute that might arise between them to arbitral 
jurisdiction and judicial settlement or to the inquiry of the Council. War in no case to 
permission to until three months had gone by after the arbitral or judicial decision, or 
after the report of the Council. 356 Also, under this Article recourse to war is not 
forbidden but made dependent on failure of some procedures of peaceful settlement. 
Here, it is clear that the Covenant depended on the supposition that the effect of time on 
the disputing parties would help to defuse the tension. 357 In Article 13 the Members of 
the League agreed to submit to arbitration or judicial settlement any conflict arising 
between them, which could not be satisfactory settled by diplomacy. 358 In this particular, 
the decision of the arbitrator is obligatory and the dispute cannot be settled by resorting 
to war against a Member state which has complied with the arbitral. decision . 
359 Article 
15 demanded an obligation on the Members states to submit disputes, not decided by 
arbitration in accordance with Article 13, to the Council of the League of Nations for 
consideration and examination. 360 Having a conummication with the parties and 
received their statements about the case, "the Council shall endeavour to effect a 
settlement of the dispute". 361 But, if the Council reached a end about the case under 
354 Brownlie, p. 57. 
355 Article I1 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
356 lbid, Article 12 (1). 
357 John Fischer Williams, Some 4spects of the Covenant of the League of Nations, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1934), p. 137-8. 
358 Article 13 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
359 Ibid, Article 13 (4). 
360 lbid, Article 15 (1). 
361 Ibid, Article 15 (2-3). 
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investigation, which is accepted unanimously by the Members, 362 then by virtue of 
Article 15 (6), war cannot be waged against the party complying with the 
recommendation of the report. 363 But, when the Council failed to arrive at a harmonious 
report, " the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action 
as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice". 364 The 
problem here, that this paragraph, in its reference to "right and justice" which is unclear 
and vague, include an express reservation of freedom of action for Member stateS365' 
create a gap in the Covenant whereby any war, however aggressive, could be resorted to 
within the limitations of legality included in paragraph 7 of Article 15. 
As a result the Covenant of the League is command by the idea that war between its 
Members should not be regarded as prohibited except in definite cases. War was 
prohibited: 
(1) before the submission of dispute to arbitral jurisdiction and judicial settlement or to 
the examination of the Council (Article 12 (1)). 
(2) until three months after an arbitral award or judicial decision or report by the 
Council (Article 12 (1)). 
(3) against a Member of the League who complies with an ward or judicial decision 
(Article 13 (4)). 
(4) with any party to a dispute that complies with the recommendations of a unanimous 
report by the Council (Article 15 (6)). But, on the other hand, war was not prohibited: 
(1) if the procedures and delays required by Article 12 had been followed; 
(2) if the Council had failed to reach a unanimous report under Article 15; 
362 Ibid, Article 15 (6). 
363 Here, the Council arbitrates only as a mediator. The parties have the freedom to accept or refilse the 
report. 
364 Article 15 (7) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
365 See Brownlie, p. 61. 
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(3) and if war were waged against a state which had accepted the unanimous report of 
the Council. 
In implementing Article 8 of the Covenant, which was concerned with the declining of 
armaments, it was conceived among the various technical bodies of the League that any 
effort to attain disarmament should be combined with a system of guarantee and 
substantial protection against aggression. 366 Therefore, on September 27,1922, the 
Third Assembly of the League of Nations proposed the creation of a General Treaty of 
Mutual Guarantee. 367 The Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of 
Armaments, established by the League's Council on February 25,1921, was assigned 
the task of preparing such a treaty. In relation with the Assembly's proposal for the 
creation of a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the Permanent Advisory Commission, which 
met in Geneva from April 16 to 23,1923, submitted a report including opinions on the 
definition of aggression in the proposed treaty. 368 The Commission in its report 
illustrated that "the difficulties inherent in any attempt to define the expression 'cases of 
aggression"', and also the "doubt as to the possibility of accurately defining this 
expression a priori in a treaty, from the military point of view, especially as the question 
is often invested with a political charactee '. 369 The report made clear that the definition 
of aggression as the traditional mobilisation of anned forces or the violation of a 
frontier, had lost its value with the new methods of warfare. 370 
However, under "Signs which Betoken an Impeding Aggression", the Commission's 
report stated: 
366 See United Nations, War Crimes Commission, History ofthe United Nations Mar Crimes Commission 
and the development of the Lmvs of Mar, (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1948), p. 54-5. 
367 See Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, League of Nations Qjjlcial Journal, Assembly 
Resolutions, (Spec. Suppl. N. 9,1922) p. 27; See also, Ferencz, (I) p. 70. 
368 League ofNation Qjjicial JournaL, (Spec. Suppl., no. 16,1923), p. 114-124; See also, Ferencz, (1), p. 
70-6. 
369 lbid, p. 117. 370 Ibid, p. 116. 
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But, even supposing that we have defined the circumstances which constitute aggression, the 
existence of a case of aggression must be definitely established. It may be taken that the signs 
would appear in the following order: 
(1) Organisation on paper of industrial mobilisation 
(2) Actual organisation of industrial mobilisation. 
(3) Collection of stocks of raw materials. 
(4) Setting on foot of war industries. 
(5) Preparation for military mobilisation. 
(6) Actual military mobilisation. 
(7) HostilitieS. 371 
On June 8,1923, the Commission completed its work on the Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance. The treaty, although it, did not include any definition of aggression, gave the 
Council of the League the power to decide the existence of "a menace of aggression". 372 
Under Article I of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, aggressive war was declared as an 
"international crime", which none of the parties to the treaty should be guilty of 
committing. 373 In describing aggressive war, this Article stated that a war would not be a 
war of aggression if it were undertaken by a state which had accepted the unanimous 
recommendation of the Council, the verdict of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice or by arbitration. Similarly, a war waged against a state refusing to comply with 
such recommendation or judgement was not a war of aggression. A provision was also 
attached that the party resorting to war should not have the intention to violate either the 
political independence or the territorial integrity of its rival. Otherwise, it would 
considered a war of aggression. 374 
Also, Article 11 asked the parties to give every assistance and help to any party to the 
treaty which it is under attack or an action of aggression. 375 "The Commentary on the 
Definition of a Case of Aggression" drawn up by the "Special Committee of the 
371 Ibid, p. 177. 
372 See Article III of the Treaty qfMutual Assistance. 
373 Ibid, Article 1 (1). 
374 Ibid, Article 1 (2). 
375 Article 11 reads that: "The High Contracting Parties, jointly and severally, undertake to filmish 
assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Present Treaty, to any one of their number should the 
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Temporary Mixed Commission", was to some degree critical of the definition of 
aggression. 376 The report provided similar views and remarks to those of the Permanent 
Advisory Commission. It indicated that "it is still conceivable that in many cases the 
invasion of a territory constitutes an act of aggression and, in any case, it is important to 
determine which state had violated the frontier". 377 Recognising the difficulties of 
deciding in the new methods of warfare, which of the conflicting parties had first used 
force or crossed a border, the report emphasised that: 
"In conclusion it may be pointed out that in the case of a surprise attack it would be relatively easy 
to decide on the aggressor, but that in the general case, where aggression is preceded by a period of 
political tension and general mobilisation, the determination of the aggressor and the moment at 
which aggression occurred would prove very difficult', . 
378 
The report went on to reach the finding that: 
"It is clear, therefore, that no simple definition of aggression can be drawn up, and that no simple 
test of when an act of aggression has actually taken place can be devised. It is therefore clearly 
necessary to leave the Council complete discretion in the matter ...... 
A new effort was made to develop the concept of aggression by the adoption of the 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes by the League Assembly on 
October 2,1924 . 
379 This Protocol, mainly, concerned the outlawing of aggressive 
warfare through the development of a system of pacific settlement of disputes, 
guarantees for the security of states and disannament. 380 Article 10 of the Protocol dealt 
with aggression and a standard to decide the aggressor was provided. The Article 
indicated that "every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings 
latter be the object of a war of aggression, provided that it has conformed to the provisions of the present 
Treaty regarding the reduction or limitation of armaments". 
376 League ofNations OJJJcial Jounial, (Spec. Suppl. No. 16,1923), p. 183-5. 
377 lbid, p. 183. 
378 Ibid, p. 185, 
379 This Protocol also known as Geneva Protocol. See Hunter David Miller, Vie Geneva Protocol, (New 
York: Macmillan, 1929); See also, James W. Garner, "The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, " (American Journal ofInteniational Law 19,1925), p. 123. 380 See Ferencz (I), p. 132-7. 
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contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressot', 381 Also, the Article 
provided that any "violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held 
equivalent to resort to war". 382 The Protocol stated, that in case beginning hostilities, 
any state would be automatically considered to be an aggressor with a special decision 
from the Council, unless a majority decision to the contrary was taken by the Council. 
383 Here, the Council would consider the cases when hostilities had begun and a state 
refused to submit the dispute to pacific settlement or refused to accept a judicial or 
arbitral decision or, the Council's majority recommendation, or refused or violated 
384 
provisional measures enjoined by the Council. But , if the Council could not 
determine the aggressor, it was bound to enjoin an armistice upon the belligerents. If a 
belligerent refused to accept the armistice or violated its conditions, it was to be 
considered the aggressor. '8' In general, the Protocol did not provide for obligatory 
assistance, but its articles on mutual assistance were more specific than those available 
in the Covenant. 
In 1925, an important development was reached by the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 
between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy at Locarno on October 16, 
1925.386 The aim of this treaty was the maintenance and guarantee of territorial status 
quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and 
France, which were fixed in the Treaty of Versailles. 387 The states members in the treaty 
agreed to refrain from aggressive acts and not to resort to war against each other. Under 
Article 2, "Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake 
that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each 
38 'Article 10 (1) from the Protocolfor the Pacific SettlenientofInternatioiialDispittes. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Article 10 (2). 
384 Ibid. 
385 Article 10 (4). 
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other". 388 Use of force could only be exercised in the following cases: (1) The exercise 
of the right of self-defence. (2) Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant; (3) 1 
Action as a result of a decision taken by the Assembly or the Council of the League of 
Nations or in pursuance of Article 15 (7) of the Covenant, directed against a state which 
was the first to attack. 389 In the Locamo Agreements, not much attention was given to 
the question of defining aggression. 
In 1928, the Pact of Paris went much further than the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. Whereas the former had prohibited all wars of aggression, and distinguished 
only between legal and illegal wars, the Pact completely outlawed war. However, the 
matter of defining aggression was not much advanced by the Pact of Paris. 390 
At the Disarmament Conference in 1933, an important contribution was made by the 
Soviet Union in connection with the issue of defending aggression . The Soviet 
representative to the Conference, Mr. Litvinoff, referring to the French Plan for General 
Disarmament and the Organisation of Peace, 391 stated that the latter proposal in its 
reference to international sanctions gave rise to the questions: "How is the aggressor to 
be determined, and who is to detennine the aggressor? , 392 Also, Litvinoff expressed his 
wishes to have aggression and war defined and aggression distinguished from 
defence. 393 Later, he presented to the General Commission of the Disarmament 
Conference a comprehensive draft proposal for the definition of aggression. The Soviet 
proposal reads: 
386 See (, 4niericaiiJotirnalofIiiteritatiaiialLcnv2O, l926), Suppl., p. 21. 
387 Article 1. 
388 Article 2 (1). 
389 Article 2 (2) sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3). 
390 See in general Bengt Broms, "The Definintion of Aggression", (Hague Recited 154,1977), p. 308-309. 
391 For more information about the French proposal see Benjain B Ferencz, Defining International 
Aggression: Die Search for Morld Peace: A Docuntentary History and Analysis, Vol. 1, (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1975), p. 28. 
392 Ibid, p. 201. 
393 Ibid. 
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"L The aggressor in an international conflict shall be considered that State which is the first to take 
any of the following actions: 
(a) Declaration of war against another State; 
(b) The invasion by its armed forces of the territory of another State without declaration of 
war; 
(c) Bombarding the territory of another State by its land, naval, or air forces or knowingly 
attacking the naval or air forces of another State; 
(d) The landing in, or introduction within the frontiers of another State of land, naval or air 
forces without the permission of the government of such a State, or the infringement of the 
condition of such permission, particularly as regards the duration of sojourn or extension of 
area; 
(e) The establishment of a naval blockade of the coast or ports of another State. 
2. No consideration whatsoever of a political, strategical, or economic nature, including the desire 
to exploit natural riches or to obtain any sort advantages or privileges on the territory of another 
State, no references to considerable capital investments or other special interests in a given State, 
or to the alleged absence of certain attributes of State organisation in the case of a given country, 
shall be accepted as justification of aggression as defined in Clause 1. 
In particular, justification for attack cannot be based upon: 
A. The internal situation in a given State, as for instance: 
(a) Political, economic or cultural backwardness of a given country; 
(b) Alleged maladministration; 
(c) Possible danger to life or property of foreign residents; 
(d) Revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, civil war, disorders or strikes; 
(e) The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or social order. 
B. Any acts, laws or regulations of a given State, as for instance: 
(a) The infiingement of international agreements; 
(b) The infringement of commercial, concessional or other economic rights or interests of a 
given State or its citizens; 
(c) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; 
(d) Economic or financial boycott; 
(e) Repudiation of debts; 
(f) Non-admission or limitation of immigration, or restriction of rights or privileges of 
foreign residents; 
(g) The infiingement of privileges of official representatives of other States; 
(h) The refiisal to allow armed forces transit to the territory of third State; 
(I) Religious or anti-religious measures; 
, 094 Frontier incidents. 
It is easily recognised that the Soviet draft dealt with only one form of aggression, 
namely, armed aggression. During the consideration of the proposal in the political 
commission, various views were expressed. Whereas the representatives of China, 
Norway, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and many other states, supported the 
Soviet plan, at the same time, other states different views and attitudes. 395 The 
representative of the United Kingdom, Mr Eden, maintained that "the possibility of 
394 For the text of the Soviet draft proposal for the definition of aggression see (Ferencz, Vol. 1), p. 202- 
204. 
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defining the aggressor had been ftilly discussed in the past, and the conclusion had 
always been that it was impossible to lay down any such rigid criteria of universal 
application, since it was impossible to foretell how they would work in particular sets of 
circumstances, and there was serious risk that their application might result, ... in the 
aggressee being pronounced to be the aggressor. , 396 Also, Mr Westman, the 
representative of Sweden, announced that his government's desire "to confer on the 
Council more extensive powers with regard to all decisions to be taken with a view to 
disclosing the aggressor State and in order to place world public opinion in a position to 
,, 397 make its influence felt. The outcome was that the Soviet proposal never gained 
general acceptance. 398 A different draft was espoused in the Convention for the 
definition of Aggression completed between the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Estonia, 
Latvia, Iran, Poland, Romania and Turkey on July 5,1933.399 Under Article II of the 
Convention "the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in 
force between the Parties to the dispute, be considered to be that state which is the first 
to commit any of the following actions: 
(1) Declaration of war upon another State; 
(2) Invasion by its anned forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of 
another State; 
(3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, without a declaration of war, on the territory, 
vessels or aircraft of another State; 
(4) Naval block of the coasts or ports of another State; 
39' For more information see Document 10 (Eighth Meeting), the "General Discussion" on the draft 
declaration on the definition of Aggression proposed by the Soviet Union, Ferncz, Vol. 1, p. 205 at 49-51; 
55. 
396 lbid, p. 53. 
397 lbid, p. 54. 
398 See Broms, "The Definition of Aggression, " p. 309-10. 
399 See the text in Ferencz ( Document 14 ), p. 255. 
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(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the 
territory of another State, or refusal, not withstanding the request of the invaded State, to 
take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all 
assistance or protection. " 
On the other hand, Article III emphasised that "no political, military, economic or other 
considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in 
Article ll. " An annex relating to Article III was attached to the Convention. It was 
divided into two parts, each provided with grounds which, inter alia, could not be used 
as justification of an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 111. In the first part 
(A), in regard to "the internal condition of a State", it named as examples, "its political, 
economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to 
strike, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war. " In the second part (B), in regard to 
"the international conduct of a State", it named as examples, "the violation or threatened 
violation of the material or moral rights or interests of foreign State or its nationals; the 
rupture of diplomatic or economic relation; economic or financial boycotts; disputes 
relating to economic, financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier 
incidents not fonning any these cases of aggression specified in Article. " However, the 
High Contracting Parties determined "that the present Convention can never legitimate 
any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised 
in the above list. " The enumerative principle was adopted by listing five cases classified 
as aggressive. The question of deciding who the aggressor is, was to be answered 
according to the priority principle, that is to say, the first state to commit any of the five 
acts listed in Article 11 of the present Convention. 400 
400 Broms, p. 309-11. 
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In the treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union on January 21,1932 '401 aggression 
was defined in Article I as, "any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability 
of the territory or the political independence of the other High Contracting Party .... even 
if it is committed without a declaration of war and avoids warlike manifestations. ', 402 
The Treaty of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow 
on July 25,1932,403 contained a general definition of aggression in Article 1. The Article 
confinned that: "The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have 
renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally 
undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory 
,, 404 of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers. Moreover, 
Article I confirmed that any act of violence aimed at attacking the integrity and 
inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the State, committed by one 
contracting Party against another, would be regarded as contrary to the undertakings 
contained in the present article, even if the acts in question were committed without 
declaration of war and avoided all warlike manifestations as far as possible. 405 
At the San Francisco Conference, the work in the role of deciding the standard of 
aggression was refreshed. The rise of the phrase "acts of aggression" in Dumbarton 
Oaks ProposalS, 406 as an act that the proposed organisation primarily had to prevent and 
put down, and also the wide power which was given to the Security Council in this 
respect, stimulated many states to inquire what expressly was meant by the "acts of 
aggression"? When the issue was considered by the Third Committee of the Third 
401 See 157 L. N. T. S. (1935), p. 395. See also the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Latvia and the 
Soviet Union, signed on February 1932, (148 L. N. T. S., p. 122). And the Treaty of Non-Aggression 
between Estonia and the Soviet Union, signed on May 4,1932 (131 L. N. T. S., p. 304). 
402 See also Broms, p. 313. 
403 See 136 L. N. T. S., p. 38. 
404 Article 1 (1). 
405 ArtiCle 1 (2). 
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Commission, many states defended the idea of listing a definition of aggression in the 
Charter's articles; whilst other delegations took an influential position by submitting 
definitions as examples to be used, if agreed upon. Other delegations, however, were 
opposed to any such definition. 407 Czechoslovakia was in favour of a clarification of 
what constitutes an act of aggression within the Charter's provisions. 408 Also, 
Czechoslovakia considered the complete freedom given to the Security Council to 
deten-nine the existence of acts of aggression and to decide upon measures, is desirable 
to enable the Council to adapt its action to any situation, it is still very general, vague 
and imprecise. Also, the Czechoslovak delegation wondered "whether this absence of 
any rule of conduct will still be of advantage when the case seems absolutely clear, and 
when only application of previously defined rules would seem to guarantee action 
sufficiently swift to prevent an unscrupulous aggressor from creating, in his own favour, 
a situation the redress of which may prove very lengthy and very difficult. '409 
Czechoslovak went further, and requested that a definition of what constitutes an act of 
aggression should be reached as a guidance to the council in making its decision. In this 
connection they referred to Article 11 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression 
of 1933 as a model which might help in this respect. 410 In general, however, the 
Czechoslovak proposal did not add anything new to the issue of defining aggression , 
than was known from the League efforts. 
Beside the Czechoslovak efforts to propose a definition of aggression, there were also 
efforts from Bolivia and the Philippines in this respect. The main concern for Bolivia 
was to insert a definition of aggession in the Charter's provisions. A draft definition of 
406 See the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General Organisation, see Ferencz, Vol. 1, p. 285- 
306. 
407 See, Broms, p. 315-16. 
408 See the Observation of the Czechoslovak Government on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals ( The United 
Nations Conference on International Organisation, Document 17 (b) ) in Ferencz, Vol. 1, p. 307-12. 
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aggression was proposed, which was motivated by the idea, that the security of the 
world is founded on the principle that aggression is a policy that contradicts the good 
will, which states should have after the tragedies of World War I and 11.411 A 
consideration of the Bolivian proposal for aggression, makes clear, that not only was a 
definition of aggression submitted, but also an immediate collective action against the 
aggressor state was required. 412 
The Philippines proposal for defining aggression, 413 suggested that any nation should be 
considered the aggressor, when it committed any of these actions: 
(1) To declare war against another nation; 
(2) To invade or attack, with or without declaration of war, the territory, public vessel, or public 
aircraft of another nation; 
(3) To subject another nation to a naval, land or air blockade; 
(4) To interfere with the internal affairs of another nation by supplying arms, ammunition, money 
or other forms of aid to any armed band, faction or group, or by establishing agencies in that nation 
to conduct propaganda subversive of the institutions of that nation. 414 
That proposal did not require a collective action to be taken immediately against the 
aggressor. The new development was that, an important addition was included for the 
first time in a definition of what constitutes an act of aggression, that is, the interference 
with the internal affairs of another nation by supplying arms, ammunition, money or 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
411 See the Proposal of the Delegation of The Republic of Bolivia for the Organisation of A System of 
Peace and Security ( The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Document 17 (c) ), in 
Ferencz, Vol. 1, p. 313-21. 
412 From the Bolivian perspective, the aggressor state was that which committed any of these acts against 
another state: 
(a) Invasion of another state's territory by armed forces; 
(b) Declaration of war; 
(c) Attack by land, sea, or air forces, with or without declaration of war, on another State's territory, 
shipping, or conflict; 
(d) Support given to armed bands for the purpose of invasion; 
(e) Intervention in another State's internal or foreign affairs; 
(f) Refusal to submit the matter which has caused a dispute to the peaceful means provided for its 
settlement; 
(g) Reffisal to comply with a judicial decision lawfully pronounced by an International Court. See 
Ferencz, Vol. 1, p. 319. 
413 See the Proposed Amendments to The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted By The Philippine 
Delegation (The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Document 17 (d) ) in Ferencz, 
p. 322-27. 
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other fonns of aid, or by establishing agencies in that nation to conduct propaganda 
subversive of the institutions of that nation. It is important to mention, however, the 
Philippines proposal did not clarify whether the activities of these agencies included 
ideological or economic interference as a mode of aggression. 
As a result of these debates, it was decided not to define aggression in the Charter and to 
adopt the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which does not specify acts of 
aggression, but gives the Security Council total discretion in detennining what 
constitutes an act of aggression, when it has taken place, and what measures to be taken 
for its aggression. 415 After all, the question appear here, how the Articles of the United 
Nations Charter dealing with "the acts of aggression"? 
Article 1 (1) of the United Nations Charter states that it is the purpose of the 
organisation "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, ... ." Thus, 
Article 1, suggests that suppression of acts of aggression is the chief role of the new 
international organisation and affirms the principle of effective collective measures in 
the fulfilment of this aim. 416 Article 2(4) maintained that: "All members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity 
or political independence ... ... Here, a question arises concerning the "threat or use of 
force, " referred to in Article 2 (4) and whether it refers only to armed force, or to both 
anned and non-armed force, such as political or economic demands. There was a 
tendency to consider the term "force" in Article 2 (4) to be interpreted to mean both 
414 lbid, p. 326. 
415 See Broms, "The Definition of Aggression, " p. 315-18. 
416 For more information see Goodrich and Hambro, p. 22-3; 25-9. 
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armed and non-armed use of force. 417 But, others have interpreted Article 2 (4) as only 
prohibiting the threat or use of military or armed force in international relations. 418 In 
support of this view, Waldock has indicated that: 
"... the word 'force' in Article 2 (4) undoubtedly covers only armed or physical force. This Nvas the 
meaning given to it at San Francisco and the Preamble to the Charter states the aim of the United 
Nations to be "to ensure by the acceptance of principles, and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used save in common interest". There seems to be general agreement on this 
point. ' 419 
That restricted reading of Article 2 (4) is, however is supported by the practice of the 
United NationS, 420 although views on the scope of the prohibition imposed by Article 2 
(4) upon member states, the views different between writers. For example, Stone states 
that what is prohibited by Article 2 (4) "is not use of force as such, but as used against 
the 'territorial integrity or political independence of any state', or 'in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"'. 42 1 He suggests that a "threat or 
use of force employed consistently with these purposes, and not directed against the 
'territorial integrity or political independence of any state', may be commendable rather 
than necessarily forbidden by the Charter. 422 Stone goes on to conclude that "there is, at 
any rate, no clear legal warrant for reading the Charter and the travauxpreparatoires, as 
is sometimes done, as if Article 2 (4) excluded all resort to force except in self-defence 
, 423 
or under the authority of the United Nations, thus excluding these other possibilities. 
417 See Hans Kelsen, "General International Law and the Law of the United Nations, " In: 7lie United 
Nations: Ten Years Legal Progress (The Hague, 1956), p. 4-6. 
418 Goodrich and Harabro, p. 49; Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, p. 148. See also, D. J. Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 862-66. 
419 Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, " p. 492. 
420 Goodrich and Hambro, p. 48-50. Also, it is worth mentioning here, that during the San Francisco 
Conference, the Brazilian delegation demanded that Article 2 (4) should be adjusted to read as follows: 
"... from the threat or use of force and from the threat or use of economic measures in any manner 
inconsistent ... ... But this proposal proved 
fi7uitless. See for more information, 6 United Nations 
Conference of International Organisation Docs., p. 334-559. 
421 Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order. - A Critique of United Nations 7lieories of Aggression, 
(London: Stevens, 1958), p. 43. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid. 
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Oppenheim treated the question of interpretation of Article 2 (4) in a different manner. 
In his view, that the obligation not to resort to force or threat of force in international 
relations, recommended by Article 2 (4), should be taken as meaning that states shall 
refrain from such action against each other, that the article does not apply where the 
state uses force for the suppression of a revolt or a civil strife that arises within its own 
territory. 424 He also argued that this obligation, is not limited by the words "against the 
territorial. integrity or political independence of any state. A25 Hence, a state employing 
force against another state, even if without seeking territorial gains, violates the Charter 
and its peace enforcement provisions. 426 Consequently, "the prohibition of paragraph 4 
is absolute except with regard to the use of force in falfilment of the obligations to give 
effect to the Charter or in pursuance of action in self-defence consistently with the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter ... ... 
427 
Article 39 of the Charter offered an alternative approach to defining aggression, as it 
was stated that: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. " 
By giving the Security Council the power to determine acts of aggression and to make 
decisions regarding the measures to be taken in such cases, the article seems to render 
the system of security to be more effective than that of the Covenant, especially when 
Article 39 is viewed together with Article 25 of the Charter, which requested state 
members to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council ... ... But, the 
problem in the Security Council's task is, that in some cases, when the Council's action 
under Article 39 is undermined by the right of veto given to the Permanent Members of 
424 See Lassa F. L. OPpenheim, Inteniational Law, Vol. 2 (London: Longman, 1952), p. 153-55. 
425 Ibid. 
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the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter. This suggests, that it may be 
useless for the Security Council to determine the aggressor under Article 39, if there is 
no agreement between Permanent Members. 428 
Article 51 of the Charter maintained that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations . ... ... The right of self-defence included in 
Article 51 is usually discussed in connection with aggression. Although Article 51 does 
not include any reference to aggression, the words "anned attack" are used to indicate 
anned aggression . 
429 However, since the concept of aggression was developing during 
the Second World War to include forms other than armed force, especially, economic 
and ideological aggression, it seems that the expression "armed attack" has been used 
intentionally in drafting Article 51 to limit the scope of self-defence to armed 
aggression. Thus, according to the wording of Article 51 the right of self-defence is not 
to be used unless an act of aggression in the form of an armed attack has occurred, 430 
and allegations of economic or ideological aggression cannot be used as a plea or excuse 
for action in self-defence. 431 On the other hand, considering the fact that the 
determination of an act of armed aggression, under Article 51, belongs in the first 
instance to the attacked state until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
the drafters of the Charter may have preferred to avoid the use of the term aggression, 
which caused a hot debate at San Francisco in connection with its meaning, in Article 
5 1. Nevertheless, the expression "armed attack7 was no happier than "armed 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Goodrich and Hanbro, p. 342-53. 
429 Broms, p. 326-27; 3 1. 
430 Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force, p. 496-7. 
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aggression". In connection with the expression "armed attack" a question was raised as 
to what constitutes an an-ned attack, and whether its actual occurrence is a precondition 
to the exercise of the right of self-defence or whether a threat of such an attack is a 
sufficient excuse for measures of self-defence. 
In regard to the characteristic of an "armed attack" , such an attack must be of a serious 
nature that threatens the inviolability of the attacked state. 432 Therefore, small border 
incidents do not evoke Article 51, if there is no certain intention of attack. 433 In 
connection with the questions whether an armed attack is a precondition to action in 
self-defence or whether an imminent attack may create the use of such a right, there are 
many views concerning that matter. Some scholars read Article 51 in a restrictive way; 
an imminent threat of an armed attack is not an adequate excuse for forcible measures of 
self-defence. 434 Kunz, representing this school of thought, emphasises: 
"Arnied attack as the only condition of the right of self-defence under Article 51 may, in 
conceivable circumstances, mean too little. For this right does not exist against any form of 
aggression which does not constitute 'armed attack'. Secondly this term means something that has 
taken place. Article 51 prohibits 'preventive war'. The 'threat of aggression' does not justify self- 
defence under Article 51. Now in municipal law self-defence is justified only against an actual 
danger, but it is sufficient that the danger is imniinent. The 'imminent' armed attack does not 
suffice under Article 5 1.,, 435 
On other hand, many writers understand the right of self-defence in Article 51 to have a 
wide scope; Waldock supporting that wide interpretation of Article 5 1, confinned that: 
"The Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defence. The Charter obliges Members to 
submit to the Council or Assembly any dispute dangerous to peace which they cannot settle. 
Members have therefore an imperative duty to invoke the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
whenever a grave menace to their security develops carrying the probability of armed attack. But, 
if the action of the United Nations is obstructed, delayed or inadequate and the armed attack 
becomes manifestly imminent, then it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel 
a defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. If an armed attack 
431 See Q. Wright, "United States Intervention in the Lebanon, " (American Journal of International Lmv 
53,1959), p. 124. 
432 Broms, p. 330-31. 
433 See Josef Laurenz Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 41,1947), p. 878. 
434 Hans Kelsen, The Law of Yhe United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, 
(London: Stevens, 1951), p. 797-99. 435 Kunz, p. 878. 
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is imminent within the strict doctrine of Caroline, then it would seem to bring the case within 
Article 5 1. To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke. ' 436 
In reality, it is difficult however, to accept that a state should in all cases delay recourse 
to measures of self-defence until an armed attack has taken place even when the danger 
of such an attack is present and imminent. Here, the expression 'armed attack', as a 
condition for exercising the right of self-defence in Article 51, should be interpreted in 
both ways restrictively and widely. It is restrictively interpreted, to mean only the use of 
armed force (which means here, that no other kinds of aggression, such as economic, 
political and ideological aggression will be covered by Article 51). On the other hand, it 
is important that it should be defined widely enough to include also imminent attacks. 
These attacks which are "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment of deliberation. 437 Hence, if the danger of an armed attack is grave and 
imminent, the target state would be warranted, by Article 51, in exercising its inherent 
right of self-defence to prevent such an attack from taking place. 438 Nevertheless, this is 
a matter to be considered, in the first instance, by the state who finds itself in such a 
situation and the final judgement will be made by the Security Council. Therefore, when 
a state resorts to force in face of an anticipated armed attack, it would seem necessary, 
on its part, to prove the gravity and imminence of such attack in order to justify its 
action, as one of legitimate self-defence, before the Security Council when the latter 
determines who was the aggressor and who was the defender. 
Under that wide interpretation of the expression "if an armed attack occurs" to include 
not only an actual attack but also a threat of an imminent attack, it may be observed that 
the principle of proportionality should be considered by the state resorting to measures 
436 Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force, p. 498. 
437 See R. Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and Mcleod Case, " (American Journal of International Law 32, 
1938), p. 89. 
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of self-defence against an armed attack. Hence, measures exceeding the proper reaction 
to the unlawful attack may be considered as additional aggressive measures by the 
defendant state. 439 Consequently, the occupation of foreign territory, even if it resulted 
from an act ofjustifiable self-defence, would constitute by itself an act of armed attack. 
Attempts to define aggression, however, continued after the adoption of the Charter and 
29 years after its foundation the United Nations General Assembly adopted a definition 
of aggression. 440 Before 1974, discussions on the definition of aggression were 
concerned with whether to create a general, comprehensive or limited definition, and 
with the relationship between aggression and armed attack. Many proposals considered 
that aggression should be defined in terms of an an-ned attack 44 1 but the problem with 
that approach was that it would merely transfer the discussion on the definition of armed 
attack to the discussion on the definition of aggression. The equation of aggression and 
armed attack in all instances was also problematic. 442 A second group of proposals 
defined aggression as illegal use of force, and since the use or threat of force is allowed 
only in self-defence, this would mean that every other use of force should be considered 
aggression. The problem with these proposals, is their failure to recognise that not every 
unlawful use of force is necessarily aggression. 443 Other, more specific proposals, 
considered aggression as direct or indirect use of force. The final group of proposals 
covered actions defined as "indirect aggression" including "economic aggessiolf' and 
"ideological aggression', 444 . However, the 
broad scope of this approach met with 
438 Goodrich and Hambro, p. 347. 
439 Brownfie, International Law and the Use ofForce by States, p. 368. 
440 Definition of Aggression, Res. 3314 (XXIX) of December 14,1974. For more information see 
Benjamin B. Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 15-19. 
441 See the USSR Proposal, UN A/C. 1/ 608; 5 GAOR, Annex 2, Item 72,1950, p. 4-5. 
442 Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Yheories of Aggression, 
(London: Stevens, 1958), p. 72-77. 
443 Ibid., p. 73,94. 
444 Julius Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, " (Anzerican Journal of 
International Law 71,1977), p. 224,230-3 1. 
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objections because the insertion of such acts in the definition of Aggression would 
increase the possibility of use of force as a response to ideological conflict or economic 
threat, with the claim that such action was legitimate self-defence against aggression. 445 
The need to define armed attack independently of aggression was first recognised in 
1956, when the Netherlands submitted a proposed definition of armed attack in the light 
of Article 51.446 Many states participating in the debate did not view aggression and 
armed attack as synonymous and were concerned that a broader definition of aggression 
could be interpreted as expanding the scope of the right of self-defence. Also, a number 
of states considered armed attack as the most serious kind of aggression. 447 
Other proposals, suggesting a broader scope for the tenn aggression, specified that self- 
defence should remain restricted to cases of armed attack. In 1956 the USSR presented a 
draft definition to the second Special Committee, which concerned armed aggression, 
indirect aggression, economic and ideological aggression. 448 The Russians maintained 
that self-defence was limited to armed attack, as the most dangerous type of breach of 
the peace. In their view, the definition of anned attack was the principal task of the 
definition of aggression. 449 The Sixth Comnlittee considered cases of aggression which 
did not justify military action in self-defence and discussed the qualification of armed 
attack as a special form of aggression. The proposals of Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Uruguay restricted the definition of aggression to "direct aggression". In their view, 
"exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 
445 See the Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, (24 August - 21 
September 1953,9 GAOR, Suppl. No. 11, UN Doc. A/2638), p. 8-10. 
446 Report of the Special Comri-tittee on the Question of Defining Aggression, (12 GAOR, Suppl. No. 16, 
UN Doc. A/3574), p. 24-5. 447 Schxvebel, p. 449-50. 
448 UN Doc. A/AC. 77/ L. 4, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 
(12 GAOR, Supplement. No. 16, UN Doc. A/3574, Annex II), p. 30-1. 
449 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, (12 GAOR, Suppl. No. 16, 
UN Doc. A/3574), p. 17. 
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of the Charter, is justified solely in the case of an armed attack (armed aggression). 450 In 
the Fourth Special Committee, a draft resolution was proposed by thirteen states, which 
defined aggression as "the use of armed force by a state against another state" unless 
when in self-defence or under the authority of the Security Council, which would mean 
that the right of self-defence could only be exercised in case of an arined attack . 
45 1 The 
result was that the definition of aggression was restricted to the use of armed force. 452 
Here, it is important to analyse the definition of Aggression under the General Assembly 
Resolution (3314) of December 14,1974. 
The General Assembly declared its deep confidence that "the adoption of the Definition 
of Aggression would contribute to the strengthening of international peace and 
security. '053 After declaring its gratitude to the Special Committee for its Nvork on the 
question of defining aggression, the General Assembly requested states "to refrain from 
all acts of aggression and other uses of force contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United 
, 454 Nations. The Assembly then called the Security Council's attention to the definition 
of aggression and recommended it to "take account of that definition as guidance in 
determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression. ', 455 
The perambulatory part of the definition included ten paragraphs. It was first stressed 
that the hard work carried out by the General Assembly towards defining aggression was 
450 UN Doc. A/AC. 134/L. 4 /Rev. 1 and Corr. 1, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression, (23 GAOR, UN Doc. A/ 7185), p. 3-7. 
451 UN Doc. A/AC. 134/ L. 16 and Add. I and 2, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression, (24 GAOR, Suppl. No. 20, UN Doc. A/ 7620), p. 6-8. 
452 Definition of Aggression, (Res. 3314 (XXIX) of December 14,1974), Article 1. Reprinted in United 
Nations Resolutions, ed. by Dusan J. Djonovich, (Series 1, General Assembly, Vol. XV, 1974-76), P. 392- 
94. 
453 lbid, Paragraph 2. 
454 lbid, Paragraph 2 (3). 
455 Ibid, Paragraph 2 (4). 
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based on the Charter of the United Nations and its main purposes. In this connection, the 
text of Article 1 (1) of the Charter, on the purposes of the United Nations, was used. 
Thus in paragraph I of the Preamble it was confirmed that the General Assembly, in 
adopting a definition, had based itself "on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes 
of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. "456 
The role of the Security Council was laid down in paragraph 2; it was maintained that in 
pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council "shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. '457 It was 
also emphasised that the states should, according to the United Nations Charter, "settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means in order not to endanger international 
peace, security and justice. '458 In paragraph 4, it was highlighted, as usual, that nothing 
in the definition "shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the provisions of the 
Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations. 459 
In the following paragraph, aggression was considered as the most serious and 
dangerous fonn of the illegal use of force which has catastrophic consequences; and the 
need was asserted for a definition of what constitutes aggression at the present stage. 460 
In this connection, states were reminded of their crucial duty "not to use armed force to 
456 lbid, Paragraph I of the preamble. See also, Broms, "Definition of Aggression, " p. 336. 
437 Paragraph 2 of the preamble. See also, Broms, "Definition of Aggression, " p. 336-37. 
458 Paragraph 3 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 337. 
459 Paragraph 4 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 337-38. 
460 Paragraph 5 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 338. 
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deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence, or to 
disrupt territorial integrity. 'r461 
Despite the affirmation laid down in paragraph 6, special attention was paid to the 
territory of the state in the following paragraph. In this paragraph it was emphasised that 
"the territory of a state shall not be violated by being the object, even temporarily, of 
military occupation or other measures of force taken by another state in contravention of 
the Charter, and that it shall not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting 
from such measures or the threat thereof. i. A62 It was also declared that the "Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, " is an essential 
instrument that should be highly considered in association with the definition of 
aggression. 463 The value of the definition was laid down in paragraph 9, where it was 
stated that "the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of 
deterring a potential aggressor, ', 464 and it was added that it would "simplify the 
deten-nination of acts of aggression and the implementation of the rights and lawful 
interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim. ' 465 Finally, it was established 
that, while it was acknowledged that the determination of the aggressor should be 
considered in the light of the events and circumstances of each particular case, it is 
nevertheless desirable that the principal elements of the act be formulated as guidance 
for such deten-nination. 466 
Overall, the Preamble was composed in a way that gives weight to certain basic 
principles which should be considered in connection with the definition of aggression 
461 Paragraph 6 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 338-39. 
462 Paragraph 7 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 339. 
463 Paragraph 8 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 339AO. 
464 Paragraph 9 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 340. 
465 Paragraph 9 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 340. 
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and its legal effect. First, it was emphasised in the Preamble that the whole enterprise is 
based on the United Nations Charter and its ftindamental and basic purposes and 
principles laid down in Articles I and 2. This would mean in the first place that the 
definition does not imply any amendment of the Charter's provisions, which was 
thought about during the work on defining aggression, and was held by some members 
of the Special Committee and the Assembly's Sixth Committee. In the second place, any 
interpretation of the provisions of the present definition should be held within the 
meaning and scope of the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, three of the 
purposes of the United Nations and two of its principles were given considerable 
weight. 
The whole work on the definition was grounded on the principal purposes of the United 
Nations, such as the maintenance of international peace and security by the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, contained in Article 1 (1) of the Char-ter. To that end, the member 
states were assumed, in relation with aggression, to behave according to the well- 
established principles of the United Nations by settling their international disputes by 
peaceful means, and refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force. Within the scope of the total and complete prohibition of the threat or use of force 
provided in Article 2 (4) of the Charter, two particular cases were given special attention 
with regard to the definition. The first was that armed force should not be used to 
deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence. The 
second is the non-violability of the territory of the state through military occupation, 
even temporarily, or by other measures of force in contravention of the Charter; and that 
the territory of the state should not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting 
466 Paragraph 10 of the preamble. See also, Broms, p. 340-341. 
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from such measures. Second, it was clearly put forward in the Preamble that the 
authority of the Security Council in determining the aggressor under Article 39 of the 
Charter was retained unimpaired. That means that, under the present definition, the 
Security Council is still the only competent organ to have the authority to determine the 
aggressor in an international conflict and make recommendations or decide upon the 
appropriate measures which should be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. In this regard, the definition does 
not limit the authority of the Security Council, but it will stand as a helpful and guiding 
instrument to the latter in its deten-nination of the aggressor. 467 Article 1 defined 
aggression in general terms as "the use of anned force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition. " Article 
I of the definition was largely based on Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. The 
word "threat, " however, was deleted in formulating Article 1 of the definition. That 
would mean that aggression could only exist when an actual armed force was used by a 
state against another state. Thus, mere provocation or even a declaration of war does not 
amount to aggression. The article also implies that political, economic, cultural, or 
ideological fonns of pressure or interference which do not involve the use of anned 
force are not covered by its text and hence do not constitute aggression. 
An explanatory note was attached to Article 1 specifying the meaning of the term 
"State" as used in this article, and in the entire definition as well. First, it was explained 
that the term "state" "is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether 
a State is a Member of the United Nations., 468 This statement would make the definition 
applicable to both members states of the United Nations and to non-member states as 
467 Ibid. For more discussion see Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 19-26. 
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well, whether they are recognised or not by the international community as sovereign 
states. Within this meaning, Article 1 in particular and the definition in general do not 
apply to political entities which do not constitute a state in the legal sense of this term. 
Second, it was explained that the that the tenn "State" "includes the concept of a 'group 
of States' where appropriatc. ', 469 
Article 2 was considered the core of the definition. It dealt with the most complicated 
and sensitive issues faced by the drafters, such as the principle of priority and the 
aggressive intent. According to the text of this article, "the first use of anned force by a 
State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression. " A statement, however, was added to the effect that "the Security Council 
may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of 
aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant 
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not 
of sufficient gravity. , 470 By this additional statement, the discretionary power of the 
Security Council was safeguarded and it was provided with flexible rather than rigid 
authority. The article in this regard maintained the possibility that the Security Council 
might discharge the state which first used anned force. This part of the article, dealing 
with the aggressive intent of the attacker, restricted the authority of the Security Council 
in rebutting the prima facie evidence as provided in the first of that article in certain 
objective limits. 
First, the exculpation or discharge of the party which first used anned force should, 
according to Article 2, be in confonnity with the Charter and according to its provisions. 
Second, the decision of the Security Council, in this regard, should be reached in the 
468 Article I of the definition, Explanatory note (a). 
469 Article I of the definition, Explanatory note (b). On Article I of the definition, see Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 
27-30. 
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light of other relevant circumstances refutable to theprimajacie evidence of aggression, 
such as the first use of anned force. Third, and as an exceptional case, the Security 
Council might not consider the state which first used force as an aggressor if it realised 
that the acts committed or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity to be branded 
as aggressive. In connection with the first restriction, the reference to the Charter was 
addressed to the Security Council, which solely according to its discretionary power 
would examine the case in the light of the Charter's provisions and make its final 
decision. As to the second restriction, the exculpation of the prinia facie aggressor 
should be based on relevant circumstances and sufficient objective evidence to the 
contrary. In both cases, the Security Council, in order to change presumptions, had to 
reach another decision which would only differ in character but not in substance. If, 
however, the Council were unable to reach such a decision, the prinia facie presumption 
of aggression would therefore remain applicable. 471 In connection with the third 
exceptional case, where the Security Council would not consider the act of force 
committed as aggressive one, certain facts should be taken into account. As a general 
rule, the only cases in which armed force may be used are those which an explicit 
authorisation is given by the United Nations. Hence, any use of force contrary to this 
rule is an act of aggression. Some minor exceptions to this general rule are, nevertheless, 
conceivable. The use of force, contrary to this rule, which might not amount to 
aggression in the legal sense of this term, should be of insufficient gravity to meet the 
criteria of an act of aggression. Examples of these kinds of acts include small frontier 
incidents, which lack the intention of attack, the attack on another state's military 
aircraft or warships by honest mistake followed by an apology, or generally the very 
limited objectives of an attack resulting from a provocation on the side of the attacked 
470 Ibid, p. 30-3 1. See also Broms, "Definition of Aggression, " p. 34447. 
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state. In these cases, the Security Council may decide the prinia facie evidence of 
aggression, resulting from application of the first principle of Article 2 of the definition, 
is not of sufficient gravity, and thus does not constitute an act of aggression but either a 
breach of the peace or a threat to the peace. 472 In this connection the Security Council 
should take into account Article 3 of the definition where a number of clear-cut cases of 
aggression were listed. From the foregoing, it may be said that Article 2 as it was 
formulated reflected the way in which the Security Council was supposed to carry out its 
responsibilities in detennining the aggressor in an international conflict. As a general 
rule, as set forth in this article, the first use of force is the most important element in 
determining the aggressor. However, while the first use of force constitutes an important 
and essential piece of evidence, it is not the sole element of such a determination. It 
would conclusively establish aggression unless, in an exceptional case, more concrete 
evidence to the contrary were proved. 473 In the latter case, the burden of proof lies in the 
hands of the state that first used force. In this connection, the evidence produced to the 
contrary should be sufficient and convincing enough to negate the prima facie 
presumption of aggression. 474 
It should also be emphasised that in all cases in which force has been used, the Security 
Council should detennine the aggressor party. 
475 The exceptional cases in which the 
Security Council may not nominate an aggressor, when armed force was used, should be 
kept very limited. This would prevent any misuse of the article and would affirm the 
general and unqualified prohibition of the use of force provided by in the Charter of the 
United Nations and the present definition. Finally, it may be said that Article 2, which 
471 Ibid. 
472 For discussion about Article 2 of the definition of Aggression, see Julius Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes 
in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, " p. 228-23 1. 473 Broms, p. 34447. 474 Ibid. 
127 
cautiously balanced between anteriority and aggressive intent, was based on a very 
delicate compromise and should be read carefully in order to avoid any imperfection in 
its interpretation. As a two-edged sword, Article 2 might be interpreted as providing the 
Security Council with flexibility in order to determine the actual aggressor; it might also 
be used as a loop-hole in the definition if it is to be interpreted as providing the Security 
Council with the ability to refrain from making any finding. The latter interpretation 
should be excluded. Since the article refers to the authority of the Security Council, it 
should not be used by the latter as a means of wavering in its powers, that is, refraining 
from making a concrete decision on who was the aggressor party, if the definition is to 
have any legal and practical value. 476 
Article 3 of the definition, listing seven specific cases of the use of anned force, stated 
that any of these acts, "regardless of a declaration of war, shall subject to, and in 
accordance with, the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression. " The first 
of these acts is "the invasion or attack by the an-ned forces of a state of the territory of 
another state, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another state 
or part thereof'477 In this sub-paragraph, two separate acts of aggression, closely 
connected to each other, were dealt with. On the one hand, any invasion or attack by the 
armed force of a state against the territory of another state is an act of aggression. Since 
such an invasion or attack may or may not result in the occupation of the territory which 
has been subjected to military operations, these acts by themselves constitute aggression 
as soon as they take place. On the other hand, any military occupation, even temporary, 
or any annexation of the territory of one state or part of it by the anned forces of another 
475 Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes in the Definition of Aggression, " p. 229-230. 
476 Broms, p. 344-47. See also Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 30-33. 
477 Article 3 (a). See also Broms, p. 34748. 
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state, were also deemed as acts of aggression. The military occupation of foreign 
territory may take place as a result of an act of aggression in the form of invasion or 
attack, or as a result of an act of counter-attack of legitimate defence. To be more 
specific, the invasion or attack of the territory of one state by the armed forces of 
another state followed by an immediate and complete withdrawal of these forces from 
the territory of the victim state is an act of aggression according to the provision of 
Article 3 (a) of the definition. 
If, however, the state which committed the act of aggression by its invasion or attack of 
another state's territory continued its presence in this territory by military occupation, its 
latter act would constitute another and additional act of aggression. In this case, the 
occupation of foreign territory resulting from an act of aggression by the use of armed 
force is, to adopt a new term, a twofold aggression. But if the occupation of foreign 
territories was a result of an act of legitimate defence, the defendant state by occupying 
the territory of the aggressor or part of it, would become an aggressor itself. Under such 
circumstances the latter state would have committed an act of aggression exceeding 
defence. 478 In both the above-mentioned cases of aggression by occupation of foreign 
territory, whether two-fold or by exceeding defence, temporary or permanent, the 
aggression is continuous until the circumstances in question cease to exist. Continuous 
aggression would cease to exist only by the withdrawal of the military forces of the 
aggressor from the occupied territory. Such a withdrawal might take place by one of the 
following arrangements: (a) the withdrawal from the occupied territory concurrent with 
a resolution by a competent organ of the United Nations; (b) the conclusion of a peace 
treaty between the parties coneemed for the withdrawal from the oecupied territories 
478 See the Opinion of the United Kingdom at the Twenty-Ninth Session, Supp. No. 19, A/9619, Report of 
Special Committee, In Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 31-32. 
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and the termination of the state of hostilities among them; (c) the recapture of the 
territory under occupation by the armed forces of the victim state. 479 
If the military occupation (the continuous aggression) took the status of annexation of 
all or part of the occupied territory, it would become permanent aggression. Such an 
aggression would cease to exist if any of the above-mentioned arrangements took place, 
or if the people belonging to these territories, according to the principle of self- 
detennination, agreed and accepted freely and by their own will such a new status. In 
sum, the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the territory of another state 
is an act of aggression. The military occupation of a foreign territory, however short- 
lived, is an act of aggression. If the aggression by invasion or attack resulted in a 
military occupation of the attacked or invaded territory, such military occupation 
together with its initiatory act will constitute a twofold aggression. In the twofold 
aggression, the military occupation of the victim state's territory, in whole or in part, 
however temporary, is an aggravating circumstance to the first act. If, as a result of a 
successful counter-act of force of legitimate defence, the defendant state occupied, in 
whole or in part, the territory of the other state, however temporarily, its legitimate 
action would become one of aggression, exceeding defence. If such an aggression 
ftirther exceeded the limits of its temporary presence without an immediate and 
complete withdrawal from the occupied territory, it would become continuous 
aggression. 
The annexation of all or part of the occupied territory constitutes an act of pennanent 
aggression. In general, it is to be stated that any aggression in the form of military 
occupation or annexation of foreign territory, whether twofold or exceeding defence, 
temporary or permanent, is continuous aggression of the utmost gravity, since it 
479 Broms, p. 348. 
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signifies the continuing aggressive intent of the occupying power. In sub-paragraph (b) 
of Article 3 of the definition, the "bombardment by the armed forces of a State against 
the territory of another state" was deemed an act of aggression. 480 In connection with 
this paragraph the Special Committee on the question of defining aggression included in 
its report to the General Assembly an explanatory note to the effect that " the expression 
4any weapons' is used without making a distinction between conventional weapons, 
weapons of mass destruction and many other kinds of weapon .,, 
481 In sub-paragraph (c), 
"the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State, " a 
number of delegations in the Sixth Committee stated that the concept of blockade as 
described therein should also cover the un ustified denial of access to and from the sea i 
to land-locked countries. They argued that the consequences of the latter are as serious 
as those of the blockade of ports or coasts, and such acts should be branded as acts of 
aggression. Consequently, on November 21,1974, prior to the approval of the draft 
definition, the Sixth Committee decided to include in its report to the General Assembly 
a statement to the effect that "nothing in the Definition of Aggression, and in particular 
article 3 (c), shall be construed as a justification for a State to block, contrary to 
international law, the routes of free access of a landlocked country to and from the 
sea. ' 
482 
In sub-paragraph (d), the "attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State, " was condemned as an act of 
aggression. The provision of this sub-paragraph caused discussion in both the Special 
Committee and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. In the Special 
Committee the representative of Ecuador asserted that the expression "marine and air 
6 
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid) 34849. See also, A/9619 in Ferencz, Vol. 2, p, 9. 
482 See Broms, p. 350. See also Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 35. 
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fleets, " included in Article 3 (d) "should be deleted since it was unprecedented in all 
previous instruments of international law could give rise to unnecessary disputes in the 
future. "483 He also maintained that "it was a legitimate exercise of national sovereignty 
for a country to detain and impose penalties upon any foreign vessel or aircraft engaged 
in unlawful activities within its territorial waters or airspace. 484 In the Sixth 
Committee, many delegations were concerned with the wording of Article 3 (d) of the 
definition. They felt that the way in which this provision was fon-nulated did not observe 
the right of the coastal state to protect the resources and shield the marine environment 
of a broad zone off its coasts. They also maintained that the protection of these 
resources, which is recognised by the current development of the law of the sea, may in 
some cases procure the use of force as preventive measures against illegal acts; the use 
of such measures of force, however legally authorised to preserve order and apply law 
over an area under the national jurisdiction of the state, might be considered, according 
to the vague formula of Article 3 (d), an act of aggression. Consequently, in avoiding 
any future controversy in regard to the meaning and effect of this sub-paragraph, it was 
decided by the Sixth Committee that its report to the General Assembly should include a 
statement preserving that "nothing in the Definition of Aggression, and in particular 
Article 3 (d), 5hall be construed as in any way prejudicing the authority of a State to 
exercise its rights within its national jurisdiction, provided such exercise is not 
, 485 inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
In sub-Paragraph (e) of Article 3, the military bases on foreign territory were dealt with. 
In this connection it was stated that "the use of anned forces of one State which are 
within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in 
483 See A/9619, in Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 15. 
484 Ibid. 
485 See Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 36-7. 
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contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement, " is an act of 
aggression. 
486 
In sub-paragraphs (D and (g), two examples of indirect aggression were dealt with. In 
sub-paragraph (f) "the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State, " was deemed to constitute an act of aggression. 
According to this provision, the State which assists the aggressor State in performing its 
action would commit an act of aggression. Hence, as a general rule provided by this sub- 
paragraph, rendering assistance to an aggressor by allowing it territorial facilities or 
advantages is an act of indirect aggression, even if the State concerned not participated 
in the actual aggression by the use of armed force. The main concern of this sub- 
paragraph is to affirm that the support of an aggressor by affording it any territorial 
advantages is illegal and would be categorised as akin to the principal act itself, i. e. the 
act of direct armed aggression. 487 
In sub-paragraph (g), another act of indirect aggression was "the sending by or on behalf 
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, 
or its substantial involvement therein. " A substantial element in this act is that the 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries carried out the act they had been ordered 
to perfon-n. The preparatory stages which preceded the dispatching of these acts do not 
amount in themselves to an act of aggression. Hence, until an actual use of armed force 
against another State has been attributed to these bands, their acts having been initiated 
from the territory of another State, no act of aggression has occurred. 
486 lbid, p. 36-7. 
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it should also be noted that, in the first place, this article should not be construed as 
depriving peoples of their right to fight for their self-determination, freedom and 
independence, or the right of other States to give assistance to those peoples in order to 
support their legitimate and just struggle. Hence, guerrilla warfare or resistance 
movements or any other kind of recognised activities which might be resorted to by 
people fighting for self-detennination or freedom and independence would not be 
considered as constituting acts of aggression, nor would the action of the other States 
supporting those peoples by military equipment or offering them any kind of territorial 
facilities or advantages. Nevertheless, an important element - that the cause of those 
peoples is lawful and just - should be observed with regarded to the supporting State, in 
order to keep itself out of this provision. It is the United Nations, and not the supporting 
State individually, which has the authority to decide upon the lawfulness and justness of 
that cause. In the second place, Article 3 (g) should in no way be interpreted as adding 
new circumstances in which the right of self-defence as provided by the Charter may be 
invoked. This means that Article 3 (g) should not be construed in a way which might 
lead to the consideration of a minor incident as an act of aggression. Thus, it is to be 
stressed that if a State uses force against another State in reply to an act of subversion or 
terrorism committed in its territory by armed bands acting from within the latter State's 
territory, its act would be illegal and in contravention of both the present definition and 
Article 51 of the Charter. This is to be understood from the conditional phrase included 
in the provision of sub-paragraph (g) that the act in question should be "of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. " 
Since acts of subversion or terrorism do not amount to any of the acts of aggression 
included in Article 3 (a-f), their occurrence is not a sufficient excuse for an act of armed 
487 Ibid, p. 38. 
134 
force in self-defence. 488 An important point should be carefully regarded when applying 
Article 3 (g), namely, that the participation of the State, from which the acts in question 
were initiated, was fully established and its involvement in these acts was beyond doubt. 
Othenvise, the definition of aggression, instead of standing as an instrument for the 
prohibition and condemnation of the use of force, would become a means of 
legitimising it. 489 
Article 4 of the definition stated that "the acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and 
the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the 
provisions of the Charter. " This provision was interpreted by some representatives at the 
Sixth Committee as flexible enough to make it possible for the Security Council to 
extend this list to include other forms of aggression not involving the use of force. 490 
Article 5 of the definition consisted of three paragraphs, the first of which presented a 
safeguard against misuse of the definition by observing the inadmissibility of any 
justification whatsoever to an illicit use of anned force. Thus, in connection with Article 
2 which maintained the possibility that the Security Council might exculpate the State 
which first used force from the charge of aggression, it was observed in Article 5 that 
"no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or 
otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression. "491 According to this provision, it 
is inadmissible for the State which first used force justify its act by any internal or 
external policy of the victim State. In the report of the Special Committee on the 
question of defining aggression of 1974, an explanatory note concerning the first 
paragraph of Article 5 stated that "the Committee had in mind, in particular, the 
principle contained in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
488 See the Mexican opinion on Article 3 (g), A/9619, in Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 39. 
489 lbid, p. 3941. See also Broms, p. 351-54. 490 Ibid, p. 354-55. 
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Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations according to which 'No State or group of States has the right to 
intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. , 492 The second paragraph of Article 5, dealing with the legal 
consequences of aggression, followed the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunals after 
World War 11. In this regard it was stated that "a war of aggression is a crime against 
international peace, " and that "aggression gives rise to international responsibility., -A93 
In this provision, a distinction was made between a war of aggression and an act of 
aggression from the point of view of international responsibility. Accordingly, a war of 
aggression, which is an act of aggression in its utmost gravity, is a crime against peace 
that gives rise to international criminal responsibility; while an act of aggression, which 
was not part of an aggressive war or which did not result in a -war of aggression, might 
not be defined as a crime but gives rise to international responsibility. 
In the third paragraph of Article 5, it was stated that "no territorial acquisition or special 
advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognised as lawful. , 494 Such a 
declaratory provision restated the Stimson Doctrine and the relevant principles of the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations. It also reaffirmed the principle laid down in 
paragraph 7 of the Preamble and Article 3 (a). An explanatory note to sub-paragraph 3 
of Article 5 was set forth in the Special Committee's report whereby it was observed 
that "this paragraph should not be construed so as to prejudice the established principles 
of international law relating to the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition resulting 
from the threat or use of force. ', 495 
491 lbid, p. 355-56. See also Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 42-3. 
492 See A/9619, in Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 9. 
493 Broms, p. 356-57. See also Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 43-5. 
494 See Broms, p. 358. See also Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 45. 
495 See A/9619, in Ferencz, Vol. 2, p. 9. 
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Articles 6 and 7 of the definition did not create rights or duties but they provided 
affirmation to certain rules and principles of international law not being specifically 
dealt with in the definition but were set forth and established by other instruments of 
legal significance. Article 6 insisted that the Charter of the United Nations was the only 
legal basis for the draft definition of aggression, and stressed the fact that the purpose of 
the definition was to focus on certain types of State conduct which might constitute 
aggression, rather than to deal with circumstances in which resort to armed force might 
be lawful. Along with this meaning, it was stated in Article 6 that "nothing in this 
definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the 
Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful. " 
In accordance with this article, the only cases in which force might be lawfully resorted 
to are in action of legitimate defence as provided by in Article 51 of the Charter or by 
explicit authorisation of the competent organs of the United Nations as provided in 
Article 53 of the Charter. 496 
In Article 7 of the definition, an explicit reference was made to the right of self- 
determination. In this connection the article indicated that "nothing in this Definition, 
and in particular Article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-detennination, 
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of 
that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or 
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end 
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in 
496 lbid, p. 45-6. 
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, A97 conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration. Many States at the Special 
Committee maintained that peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of 
alien domination had the right to struggle for their self-determination, freedom and 
independence by all means at their disposal. Consequently, they considered that Article 
7 recognised that the anned struggle of such people was an instance of the legal use of 
force. They maintained as a result that the action of a State in aiding and providing those 
people with any kind of support was just as legal. 498 
Article 8 of the definition observed that "in their interpretation and application, the 
above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context 
of the other provision. "499 Moreover, the definition should be read together with the 
relevant articles of the United Nations Charter and the "Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. " 
The Role of the Security Council 
According to Article 51 of the Charter, the Security Council is the final arbiter of 
whether there has been an anned attack and whether the use of force by a state could be 
justified on the basis of self-defence. The Security Council has frequently been 
prevented by the Veto from reaching a formal decision on the validity of claims of self- 
defence. The fact that a Security Council vote has not determined the existence of an 
armed attack and the legitimacy of a claim of self-defence, does not, however, mean that 
an an-ned attack does not exist. Actions based in self-defence, therefore, do not have to 
497 Article 7 of the definition. See also Ferencz, p. 47-9. 
498 Ibid, A/9619, p. 15-26; 3240. See also, Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, "p. 233-37; Broms, p. 358-360. 
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be abandoned, until the Security Council adopts a resolution demanding the cessation of 
the defensive action. 500 Article 51 contains the legal obligation to report immediately 
any forcible measures taken in self-defence to the Security Council, 501 but that 
requirement has not always been observed. 502 Also, the failure to report will not prevent 
the Security Council from considering and passing judgements on the substantive issues 
of claims of self-defence. 503 Reporting to the Security Council is only one of several 
elements to be considered in relation to the legitimacy of a state's claim to self-defence 
and a failure by the state resorting to force to invoke self-defence should not be fatal, 
provided that the substantive conditions for the exercise of this right are met. 504 Dinstein 
expressed that it "would be a gross misinterpretation of Article 51 for the Council to 
repudiate self-defence, thus condoning an armed attack, only because no report has been 
put on record. "505 
During the Cold War, many claimed that the Security Council could not fulfil its first 
and primary responsibility of ensuring international Security. The end of the Cold War 
and the reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991 were viewed as reviving the 
Council's role in collective security. The early 1990s brought fears from some quarters 
that the United Nations was acquiescing too readily in US uses of force, at times, 
unwisely, or merely constituting a multilateral veneer for unilateral action. At other 
times, critics claimed that forceful action was being taken in the name of the United 
Nations that had not really been authorised by the Security Council. It was clear that the 
499 Ibid, p. 3 60-6 1. See also, Ferencz, p. 49-50. 
500 Kelsen, Yhe Law ofthe United Nations, p. 8034. 
50 1 The International Court of Justice referred it as "the reporting obligation enshrined in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. " Nicaragua case, p. 12 1, paragraph, 23 5. 
502 Oscar Schachter, "Self-Defence and the Rule of Law, " (American Journal of International Law 83, 
1989), p. 263. 
503 Jean Combacau, "The Exception of Self-Defence In UN Practice, " In: Antonio Cassese, ed., The 
Current Legal Regulation ofthe Use ofForce, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 16-18. 
504 Dinstein, p. 199. 505 Ibid., 
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use of force from the NATO's side during the Kosovo Crisis, have been bypassing of 
the Security Council authority, in the grounds that "the absence of such authorisation, 
military coercion ... constitutes a breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. , 
506 The world 
needs a Security Council which is powerful enough and sufficiently unified to authorise 
strong countermeasures against aggressors or genocidal regimes; not a mere multilateral 
rubber stamp for unilateral decision making. 
Whilst, overall, the UN Charter aimed to prevent recourse to force, except that 
undertaken by the UN and its agents to protect global interests and values, it recognised 
the possibility of a failure of multilateralism and reserved to states an unequivocal right 
of self-defence. What is important, and what I wish to emphasise, is that Article I of the 
Definition of Aggression, has declared clearly and in obvious way, that aggression can 
only exist when real armed force is used; since political, economic, cultural or 
ideological kinds of pressure or interference do not involve the use of force, they do not 
constitute aggression. This is important in my view, because it gives the world the 
chance to avoid unnecessary wars or use of force. 
506 See Bruno Sinima, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, " (European Jounial of 
international Law 10,1999), p. 5. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COLD WAR AND SELF-DEFENCE 
This Chapter will deal with the main events in the Cold War, in an attempt to examine 
the development of the right of self-defence during the Cold War. During that period 
there was a struggle between conflicting universal values. The Western states believed 
in the ideas of free market economy and a multi-party political system. In the East, the 
political life was completely controlled by a single party system and a command 
administrative economy. For nearly 40 years the world was under permanent threat of 
nuclear war between the West and the USSR. The Cold War was crowded by many 
507 
crises. The main landmarks in the period of the Cold War were the Berlin blockade in 
June of 1948, regional security arrangements, such as NATO, the Korean War, the 
Cuban missile crisis and finally the Vietnamese War. 
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 
This crisis is regarded by many as the first struggle between the USSR and the Western 
Powers after the defeat of Nazism in Germany. This conflict, or power struggle, brought 
into view matters relating to collective action in self-defence, even before the 
establishment of the NATO and Warsaw treaties. The Western Power forces, after the 
occupation of Berlin, had the right of access to it by road, air and rail, by virtue of 
507 See Thomas S. Arms, Encyclopaedia of the Cold Mar (New York: Facts On File, 1994), p. 1-4. See 
also Stephen Ashton, 7he Cold Mar (London: Batsford, 1990), p. 34. 
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special arrangements with the USSR. 508 But by March 30,1948, the Soviets had decided 
to change the arrangements concerning West Berlin, and also they changed their policy 
and imposed many restrictions on the traffic between the Western Zones and Berlin. 509 
In June 24,1948, all land and water traffic to and from the Western part of Berlin was 
closed by the Soviet forces. Only air traffic, which the Soviets could not prevent, 
connected West Berlin with the West. 510 When the negotiations over the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin proved fruitless, the blockade was referred to the Security Council as 
a threat to international peace and security under chapter VII of the Charter. The United 
States, Britain and France considered the Russian restrictions as a real threat of force in 
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter which was intended to prevent them from 
exercising their legitimate rights and responsibilities. However, the adoption of a 
511 
resolution by the UN was thwarted by the Russian veto. 
As a result of the threat of force from the Soviets, the Western Powers regarded 
themselves as in confrontation with an actual use of force from the Soviet side. This 
gave them the option of responding with the use of force. Therefore, the use of force by 
anned convoys was deliberately investigated, but in the end found not to be a good 
option, because the anned conveys could easily be blocked. 5 12 The use of force in 
response to the blockade was questionable, based on the consideration that neither the 
territorial integrity nor the political independence of the Western powers were 
threatened in the blockade, but rather, rights based only on agreements which had been 
severely infringed. Because of this, it would be hard to claim the legitimacy of self- 
508 Lawrence Scheinman, "The Berlin Blockade, " In: Lawrence Scheim-nan and David Wilkinson, 
International Law and Political Crisis: An Analytical Casebook-, (Boston: Massachusetts 1968), p. I, 4. 
509 See generally United States Department of State, The Berlin Crisis: A report on the Moscow 
Discussions (1948), p. 1-5. The USSR at that time, claimed that its restrictions and limitations on the 
traffic to and from Berlin, were as a result of problems in border and customs control measures. 
510 Scheinman, p. 8-9. 
511 See Repertoire ofthe Practice ofthe Security Council (1946-195 1), p. 354; 44142. 
512 Scheinman, p. 15-17. 
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defence. The Western Powers reserved their right of self-defence and noted that 
although they could have used force against the unlawftil blockade, they were abstaining 
from doing so. Consequently, they responded to the blockade by flying over it, which 
was not regarded as a use of force. S13 The use by the Western Powers of airlift to access 
West Berlin, broke the blockade peacefully. This left Moscow wondering whether to use 
force to stop the airlift, but it did not do so. By the April of 1949, the Soviets understood 
that the West would never leave or abandon West Berlin, and as a result of the Western 
embargo against East Germany, imposed by the West in retaliation, which had a more 
serious impact on East Germany than the Soviet embargo on West Gen-nany, the Four 
514 Powers agreed on May 4,1949, to move all restrictions imposed since March 1,1948. 
RegionalArrangenzents (NA TO) 
It is useful to consider regional arrangements, since Article 51 was introduced into the 
Charter as a result of direct pressure from the Latin American states, which to some 
'degree preferred to have their own security system. Article 51 was not a part of Chapter 
VIII, which put all regional arrangements under Security Council authority, which 
prohibited any use of force without its pennission .5 
15 However, it allowed the use of 
force in self-defence to be exercised individually, separate from any regional 
agreements, and it did not need any authorisation from the Security Council. On this 
point, Waldock stated that: 
513 lbid, p. 16,27 and 38. 
514 Ibid, p. 35-37. 
515 United Nations Charter, Article 53 (1). 
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"Article 51 was deliberately transferred at the San Francisco Conference from Chapter VIII to 
Chapter VII with the result that the right of collective self-defence is entirely independent of the 
existence of a regional arrangement"516 . 
Certainly, states' right to prepare in advance through multi-agreements (collective self- 
defence treaties), is clear in Article 51, from their right to use force in a collective 
way. 517 Therefore, many states, for the purpose of having the right of collective self- 
defence, have resorted to bilateral and multilateral treaties. 518 Mrazek considered that 
these treaties "supplement the right of collective self-defence with the duty of collective 
self-defence; every aggression becomes a matter for the whole international community 
and its prevention is a "common interest", a "common defence" or "self-defence" 
against the aggressor". 519 This makes the use of force a matter of concern for all States 
members in the treaty, because the procedure of responding against aggression is also a 
matter of their concern. Such arrangements can be considered as both regional 
arrangements and collective self-defence treaties. 520 The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) 
516 Waldock. "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law", p. 509. For 
more information about regional arrangements and collective self-defence see Kelsen. Recent Trends in 
the Law ofthe United Nations, p. 918-20. 
517 Kelsen, p. 913-16. See also, Hersch Lauterpacht and Oppenheim, International Laiv: 4 Treatise, p. 
157; Brownlie, p. 328-3 1. 
5 18 Among the main such treaties were the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of September 
2,1947; the Brussels Treaty of March 17,1948 (Belgium, France, Luxembourg; the Netherlands; the 
United Kingdom), modified by the protocol signed at Paris, October 23,1954, by which Germany and 
Italy became members; the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4,1949; the Mutual Defence Treaty between 
the United States and the Philippines of August 30,1951; the Security Treaty between Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States of September 1,195 1; the Security Treaty between the United States and 
Japan of September 8,1951, later modified by a treaty of January 20,1960; the Mutual Defence treaty 
between the United States and Korea of October 1,1953; the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United 
States and the Republic of China of December 2,1954; the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty of 
September 8,1954 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Pakistan); the Baghdad Pact of February 24,1955 (Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Iran 
and Pakistan); the Pact of the Arab League States of March 22,1945, and Treaty of Joint Defence and 
Economic Co-operation between the States of the Arab League of June 17,1950; the Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Treaty), signed May 14,1955, which entered into force 
June 5,1955. See generally Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Coninientary 
and Documents, p. 349-50. See also W. Kulski. "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared 
with the Western System". (Atnerican Journal ofInternational Law 44,1950), p 453-76. 
519 Josef Mrazek, "Prohibition of the Use of Force and Threat of Force: Self-Defence and Self-Help in 
International Law", p. 93. 
520 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p. 350. 
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44clearly creates a collective system for exercising the right of self-defence"521 , and at the 
same time, the NATO Treaty can be regarded as a regional arrangement. 522 But in 
reality, it makes no difference whether Article 51 or Chapter VIII is implemented, 
because what is important is not which treaty has been practised, but the nature of the 
action taken on the basis of the treaty: regional enforcement under Chapter VIII (after 
the Security Council has given its permission), or action on the basis of collective self- 
defence in case of armed attack. This matter was considered deeply by the United States 
Senate CoMmittee on Foreign Relations, in its report on the North Atlantic Treatywhich 
confinned that the North Atlantic Treaty should not be read restrictively either as a 
regional arrangement or as a collective self-defence treaty, since the treaty is "intended 
primarily to establish a collective defence arrangement under article 51" while on the 
other hand being "utilised as a regional arrangement under chapter V11,95523 
Therefore, the "controversy arises from an attempt to characterise organisation by form 
rather than by function". As a result, the main question here is not "What sort of 
organisation is this? " but it should be "What function is it exercisin ?,, 524 Generally, any 9. 
agreements for collective self-defence usually try to limit the scope of military action to 
the geographical areas of states members in that collection, while admitting the Security 
Council's right to protect international peace and security. 525 Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty (NATO), recommended that: 
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, Nvill assist the party or Parties so 
521 Waldock, p. 504. 522 Kelsen, p. 920-25. 
523 United States Senate, 83 Congress, 2d Session, Doc. No. 87, Subcommittee on the United States 
Charter. Review ofthe United Nations Charter: A Colleclion ofDocitnients, (Washington, 1954), p. 159. 
524 Bowett, p. 222. See also Dinstein, p. 235-36. 
525 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p. 350. 
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attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert Nvith the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to 
the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and securiV, 526. 
Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads: 
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and 
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
securi ty. 527,, 
Consequently, Article 5 would be exercised only if a state member has been the object 
of an armed attack, and every state's help or assistance will depend on the location, 
nature and importance of the attack, and will also depend on the situation on the 
ground. 528 The NATO treaty does not require immediate action from states members, or 
that they take military measures in collective self-defence. Other treaties depended 
directly on the armed attack for the right of collective self-defence to be exercised, and 
all such arrangements or treaties confirmed that the Security Council has the main role 
to protect international peace and security, and any measures of collective self-defence 
should stop when the Security Council has taken action to protect international peace. 
and security. 529 The same applies to the Warsaw Pact, which designates its area of 
application by the geographical location of states members, and recognises the Security 
Council's role in protecting international peace and security. 530 It is worth noting, 
526 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Article 5. The report of the Senate Committee on foreign Relations 
noted that "from a legal point of view article 5 of the treaty is solidly based on the inherent right of self- 
defence recognised in article 51 of the United Nations Charter", Review of the United Nations Charter, p. 
150. 
527 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Article 7. 
528 Review of the United Nations Charter, p. 150-5 1. 
529 See Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, Articles 4 and 5; Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article 3; Brussels Treaty, Articles 4 and 5. See generally, 
Bowett, p. 141-50; Bowett, p. 220-48. See Hans Kelsen, Vie Law of the United Nations: A Critical 
Analysis ofIls Fundaniental Problems, p. 791-800. 
530 See Warsaw Treaty, Article 4. 
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however, that many consider collective self-defence treaties to have been misused for 
political reasons. Combacau described that: 
"Regional military alliances no doubt pay lip service to the universal organisation and the system 
of collective security they Nvere created to enforce, but the "collective self-defence" they claim to 
guarantee is in fact a cloak to operations of partial collective security, which are a far cry from 
logic of universal collective security as intended by the Charter, 531 
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 
During that crisis, the main argument was whether the use of force is acceptable, when 
there is a threat of anned attack, especially if that attack will be by developed 
technological weapons, such as nuclear missiles. In general, the United States at that 
time did not focus on the right of self-defence. In the end of 1962, the Americans 
declared that the Soviets had established nuclear missiles in Cuba and that such missiles 
had been shipped to Cuba by Soviet ships. Therefore, the United States announced that 
all ships bound for Cuba would be searched and any ship found to be carrying such 
weapons would not be allowed to pass to Cuba. Also, the United States referred the 
situation to the Security Council, emphasising that such offensive weapons posed too 
great a danger to international peace and security. The United States, when exercising 
the blockade against Cuba, was practising anticipatory self-defence or self-defence in 
general, but it highlighted and focused on Article 52 of the Charter and the provisions of 
the Rio Treaty, which covered not only cases of armed attack, but also threats to the 
peace other than armed attack. 532 The American action against Cuba, whatever its basis 
531 Jean Combacau, "The Exception of Self-Defence In UN Practice, " In: Antonio Cassese, ed., Ille 
Current Legal Regulation ofthe Use ofForce, p. 3 1. 
532 See United States Letter to the Security Council of October 22,1962, UN Doe. S/5181,17 Security 
Council Official Records, Supplement for October - December, 1962, p. 14648. See also Resolution of 
the Council of the Organisation of American States of October 23,1962,47 Department of State Bulletin, 
1962, p. 722-23. This resolution referred to Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and noted that the situation where 
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or grounds, in Higgins' view, raised arguments about the "complex legal question of 
whether blockade without a declaration of war is permissible" and also whether the 
American action was acceptable under Article 51.533 Cuba declared that it regarded the 
American action as an act of war and aggression. 534 
The Soviets, for their part, justified their missiles supplies to Cuba on the grounds that it 
535 
was constantly under threat and pressure from the United States. In those 
circumstances, an important question arose, whether the presence of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba could be justified by a lawful claim of self-defence on the part of Cuba, since 
Cuba had recently been victim of invasion from the United States. 536 Also, there was 
debate about whether these missiles should be considered as defensive or offensive 
weapons. 537 To many writers, the fact that the United States did not focus on Article 51 
as the basis for its actions against Cuba was clear "evidence of recognition of the 
dangers inherent in relying upon a claim to the right of self-defence going beyond the 
Charter texf'538 . Others noted that the "nuclear balance at the time made a Soviet 
attack on the United States unthinkable", and also "a use of force falling within reach of 
"the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any 
American state" is "affected by an aggression which not an armed attacle' and which necessitates that "the 
member states ... take all measures, individually and collectively, 
including the use of armed force". This 
was taken to justify measures, to guarantee that Cuba would not amass dangerous weapons and not be "an 
active threat to the peace and security of the Continent". See also the Presidential Proclamation No. 3504 
an Interdiction of the Delivery of offensive Weapons to Cuba, October 23,1962, (Anierican Journal of 
International Law Supplenzent, Vol. 57,1963), p. 512-13. 
533 Rosalyn Higgins, The Developinent of International Lmv 77irough the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 202. See also Anthony D'Amato, "Israel's Air Strike 
Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor". (Anierican Journal ofInternational Law 77,1983), p. 588. 
534 See for more information the letter of Cuba to the Security Council of October 22,1962, UN Doc. 
S/5183,17 Security Council Official Records, Supplements for October - December, 1962, p. 148. 
535 See the Statement of the Soviet Government, 23 October 1962, UN Doc. S/5186, October 23,1962,17 
Security Council Official Records, Supplement for October - December, 1962, p. 149-54. 
536 Higgins, p. 203. Many who supported the quarantine against Cuba, admitted that Cuba had a complete 
right to ask the USSR for help and military assistance, especially with the failed attempt against Castro's 
regime by the Bay of Pigs invasion. Rostow noted that "Cuba had a legal right to request Soviet assistance 
in defending itself against possible attacle'. See Eugene V. Rostow, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in 
International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self- 
defence? " (Ainerican Journal ofInternational Law 85,199 1), p. 515. 
537 See Anthony Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 
Charter Paradigni, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 75-76. 
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Article 51" was to some point acceptable because there was "coercive pressure on the 
539 American system of security" , which made the idea of imminent attack go beyond the 
540 dimensions of Article 51. 
Osgood and Tucker agreed that the USSR had provided weapons in full agreement and 
co-operation, and that any state under international law has the right to receive military 
weapons from another state nor is there any rule under international law to prohibit a 
state from giving weapons to another state or from establishing military bases in the 
other state's territory with that other state's consent. They stated that the United States' 
action "affords a striking example of the claim to take measures of self-defence against 
acts that are not at least prinzafacie unlawful', 541 . Also, it is possible to read the United 
States' action as "defensive measures not involving military action", which would make 
it acceptable against an action "less than 'armed attack',, 542 . The United States claimed 
that the nuclear weapons in Cuba had significantly changed the situation on the 
groun . 
543 This action, in the American view, had changed the balance of power, since 
those missiles could reach the United States in a few minutes, in contrast to Soviet 
launched missiles which would have to cross the North Pole. 544 Consequently, the 
538 See Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p. 345. 
539 Eugene V. Rostow, "Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of Self-defence, " In: Lori F. Damrosch, 77ze 
International Court ofAstice at a Crossroad, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1987), 
p. 275. 
540 President Kennedy indicated that the quarantine was specifically designed "to ensure that the 
Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military and related supplies 
which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent. " Cited in Romana Sadurska, "Threats of 
Force, " p. 260. 
541 See Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, Force, Order and Justice, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967), 
p. 298. 
542 Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine, " (Anierican Journal ofInternational Law 57,1963), p. 563. 
543 See Repertoire ofthe Practice ofthe Security Council (1966-1968), p. 218. 
544 Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective, " In: John Plank, Cuba and the United States: Long - 
Range Perspectives, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 200,213-14. 
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deployment of the missiles in Cuba was considered too risky. Quarantine alone was not 
enough; an attack on those missiles to destroy them was acceptable and necessary. 545 
It is important to note here, that the enlargement of the range of self-defence has a clear 
danger, since the use of threat to the balance of power as an excuse for legitimate use of 
force may have inconsiderable and unknown results. At that time there was considerable 
debate about the legitimacy of the American missiles in Europe, and especially in 
Turkey. Clearly the enlargement of the basis on which the right of self-defence could be 
acceptable, was very dangerous and would increase the danger of a nuclear clash 
between the East and the WeSt. 546 Many viewed the claim of a shift in the balance of 
power to the Soviet benefit as exaggerated, since the USSR could easily have achieved 
that aim by miss - firing submarines, and also by launching sites for solid - fuelled 
ICBM's in the Soviet Union. 547 And many who supported the American claim of self- 
defence in that crisis, agreed that there had been no armed attack or even a threat of 
anned attack directed against the United States, since the US nuclear capability was in 
advance of that of the Soviets; therefore, any ideas of a Russian nuclear attack against 
the United States would be unconvincing. 548 As a conclusion, the deployment of 
Russian nuclear missiles in Cuba was a real threat to the national security for the United 
States and the Latin American states, but it is difficult to say that these missiles 
constituted grounds for military response in self-defence. The real argument, is not 
whether a state should wait until it becomes the victim of a nuclear attack and later use 
military force in self-defence to stop that attack or aggression. The real argument should 
545 On October 22,1962, the United States put it military force at the basis of ready to fight. The Soviet in 
the next day put their force in the basis of ready to fight. And at that time the world was under pressure of 
nuclear war. See David L. Larson, The Cuban Crisis of 1962: Selected Documents, Chronology and 
Bibliography, (London: University of America, 1986), p. 343. 546 Brownlie, p. 276. 547 Baldwin, p. 214. 
548 Rostow, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Until What? 
Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence? " p. 515. 
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be when, or at what point, the state which is under a threat of nuclear attack can use 
force to defend itself against that threat. In this regard, Gardner noted that it is 
dangerous to accept "unilateral uses of force simply because there were some 
deployment of weapons or modernisation of weapons"549 . 
Vietnam War 
Generally, the US involvement in Vietnam was a clearly argued claim of collective self- 
defence. The military actions between France and Vietnam were ended on July 20,1954 
550 by the three Geneva Agreements, in relation to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The 
agreement which concerned Vietnam was explicitly clear, that the Vietnamese military 
forces should withdraw to the north and the French troops to the South. Each part would 
have its own civil administration, and general elections would be held to determine the 
future and the unification of the two zones of Vietnam. 55 1 Also, the Geneva Agreements 
were connected with the final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, in which it was 
clearly declared "that the demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be 
interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary"552 . Later, the United States 
made its policy clear, that it would not threaten or use force to undermine the Geneva 
Agreements. 553 By September 8,1954, the United States, France and other states had 
signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. Under Article VI of that treaty, 
549 Richard N Gardner, "Commentary on the Law of Self-Defence, " In: Lori F. Damrosch and David J. 
Scheffer, Law and Force in the New International Order, (Boulder: Westview Press, 199 1). 
550 For more information see Agreement on the end of military activities in Vietnam, July 20,1954, in 
United States Department of State, 4merican Foreign Policy (1950-1955), (Washington, 1957), p. 750- 
67; Agreement on the end of military activities in Cambodia, July 20,1954, p. 767-75; Agreement on the 
end of military activities in Laos, July 20,1954, p. 775-85. See also Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The 
Settlement ofthe Indo-Chinese Mar, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 389408. 
551 American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, p. 750-67. 
552 Randle, p. 413. 
553 American Foreign Policy (1950-1955), p. 787-88. 
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each party would consider the "armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties 
or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may here 
after designate, would endanger its own peace and safety" and would act "to meet the 
common danger', 554 . Later, the parties of the treaty agreed by a protocol attached to the 
treaty to include for the purposes of Article VI the territories of Cambodia and Laos and 
the "free territory under the jurisdiction of the state of Vietnam"555 
As a result of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, the United States Congress declared in 
a resolution that "in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty, the United States is ... prepared ... to take all necessary steps, 
including 
the use of armed force, to assist any member of the treaty requesting assistance in 
556 defence of its freedom" . When the US began military activities against 
North 
Vietnam, its main claim to justify that action was that it was exercising the right of 
collective self-defence, for the purpose of weakening the military forces of North 
Vietnam. 557 The United States employed many claims to support its intervention in 
Vietnam. The first was to accuse the North of using new methods of warfare, such as 
infiltration of thousands of armed rebels, munitions and other military supplies. The 
second was that South Vietnam was a legitimate political entity, recognised by many 
states, and this gave it the right to protect itself through the right of self-defence. Also, 
the temporary borders between the North and South were based on an international 
agreement, which prohibited use of force between them. The third, was that the 
554 Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty it is includes: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The 
Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, itkvas signed at Manila on September 
8,1954, and entered into force on February 19,1955. See generally Collective Defence In South East 
Asia: The Manila Treaty and Its Implications: A Report By a Chatham House Study Group, (The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London; New York, 1956), 1-14. 
555 Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, signed at Manila on September 8,1954, 
which entered into force on February 19,1955. 
556 See United States, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to 
Southeast Asia and Vietnam, (Washington: DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 235. 
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legitimate Government of South Vietnam had requested help and assistance from the 
United States. The fourth, was that the United States was exercising its right of 
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Also, the United 
States could exercise the right of collective self-defence under the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty. Just as the United States had considered its participation in 
the Korean war as a legitimate model to protect divided states, it claimed its purpose 
558 
was to defend South Vietnam against the Communist North. The real arguments in 
that conflict were whether the conflict was between two different entities or -whether it 
was a traditional civil war in one community, and also whether the infiltration across the 
borders of weapons and rebels from the North to the South would give an excuse to 
exercise the right of collective self-defence under the Southeast Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty. 559 
The general evaluation about the war in Vietnam was to consider it as a civil war 
between one nation and in one entity or community, 560 since the separation of Vietnam 
was temporary, depending as it did on the Geneva Agreements. These included a clear 
provision for elections in two years from the signing of the Geneva Agreements, which 
the Communists strongly believed that they would win easily, with the aim of unifying 
557 Ruth B. Russell, 77ie United Nations and United States Security Policy, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1968), p. 325. 
558 See John N. Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, in Richard A. 
Falk, Ae Vietnam Mar and International Law, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 237, 
358478. See also Eliot Hawkins, An Approach to Issues of International Law Raised by United States 
Actions in Vietnam, in Richard A. Falk, Vie Vietnain Mar and International Law, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 136. See also as a comparison point, Pravda Article Justifying the USSR 
Intervention in Czechoslovakia, September 25,1968, translation in (International Legal Materials 7, 
1968), p. 1323-25. 
559 The US Government had faced a real problem, when it was want to exercise the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty, because both France and Pakistan were against the US intervention in 
Vietnam. For more information see Wolfgang Freidman, "Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A 
Comment, " In: Richard A. Falk, Yhe Hein= Mar and International Law, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 292,300. 
560 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation, " In: Richard A. Falk, Yhe Vietnam Mar and 
International Law, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 271,277-80. See also Quincy 
Wright, "Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation, " (Anierican Journal ofInternational Law 60,1966), p. 
752-53 and 756-59. 
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of Vietnam peacefUlly. 561 There have been many claims that the North's activities 
against the South did not amount to an armed attack. Wright noted that "there seems to 
be no evidence that organised contingents of the North Vietnamese army crossed the 
cease - fire line, until after the United States bombing attacks began in February, 
, 562 1965' . Comparing the Vietnam war with the Korean war, it appears that the two 
situations were completely different, as Falk indicated that the Korean war was a "direct 
and massive use of military force by one entity across a frontier of another", and also 
whether or not the United States established its intervention in a struggle to end a civil 
war, at the same time the use of force from the North did not come to the point of armed 
attack, which means that the US claim of collective self-defence had weak grounds or 
no basis. 563 It is clear there was no legitimacy for the American action to extend the 
bombing to North Vietnamese territory, which at the same time gave North Vietnam the 
legal basis and claim to respond to the US bombing. 564 
The use of force during the Cold War was connected with the power struggle between 
the United States and the USSR, because both sides bad the desire to demonstrate power 
and to gain influence places. One of the aims of the Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union 
was to demonstrate the Soviet's new power, which the Red An-ny had gained after the 
defeat of the Nazi Germany; also the Soviet wished at that time to disturb the West, 
especially at the time when the US sought through the Marshall Plan to avoid Europe 
falling into the hands of communism. Neither side of the crisis, wished to enter a war, 
and if the Western Powers used force, this practice of force would come under deep 
questioning, on the basis that, the territorial integrity and political independence of the 
561 Ralph K, White, "Misperception of Aggression In Vietnam, " In: Richard A. Falk, The Vietnam Mar 
and International Law, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 523,529-3 1. 562 Wright, p. 287. 
563 Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Vietnam War, in Richard A. Falk, 
Yhe Vietnam Mar andInternational Law, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 362; 366; 377. 
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Western Power was not harmed, but only some agreements had been violated; therefore, 
the use of force under the right of self-defence would be unlawful. Moreover, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), is a defensive organisation, whose main aim is to 
protect its member states from any aggression, which means that the use of force is 
restricted to the geographical areas of states members. Therefore, the use of force 
outside that limited area by NATO in the Kosovo Crisis is completely inappropriate. 
From another perspective, the use of force by NATO in that crisis was a clear bypassing 
the authority of the Security Council, which has the fundamental responsibility to 
protect international peace and security. 
In the Cuban missile Crisis of 1962, there was a real threat to the national security of the 
United States; consequently the US conduct could be to some extent justified, especially 
with the threat of the nuclear attack. In the Vietnam War, whether the US intervention, 
was based on the concept of collective self-defence was unclear, in the sense that the 
conflict was a conflict between the United States and the USSR, both of which were at 
that time at the peak of their rivalry in the Cold War. In my view, that war was simply a 
civil war between the North and the South, but the intervention of the great powers 
escalated this conflict into a big war and made it become one of the main landmarks of 
the Cold War. 
564 Ibid, p. 398. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SELF-DEFENCE BEFORE THE BLOW 
The first and obvious questions which arise when a conflict breaks out between two 
states, are in Michael Walzer's words, "Who started the shooting? Who sent troops 
across the border? 95565 Many observers of conflict, like Dinstein, consider that the first 
action or blow is the crucial factor in assigning responsibility for the aggression and that 
for this purpose'it is necessary to "pinpoint the exact moment at which armed attack 
begins, " this being the qualifying moment "when forcible counter-measures become 
legitimate as self-defence. ', 566 The UN Charter identifies a right to individual and 
collective self-defence "if an armed attack occurs, " and many thus consider that self- 
567 defence is admissible only after the actual eventuality of an armed attack. In the 
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice affirmed this view with its majority 
opinion that anned attack is a necessary forerunner to justifiable self-defence. 568 The 
point of first military attack has the advantage of being a clearly discernible Rubicon, 
which can provide evidence of assault and is an indicator of intent. In this respect, 
Aristide Briand said : "A cannon shot is a cannon shot; you can hear it and it often 
,, 569 leaves traces. Walzer comments on "the importance of the shift from diplomacy to 
565 Walzer Michael, Just and Unjust Mars: A Moral Argunient with Historical Illustrations, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1997), p. 74. 
566 Dinstein, Mar, Aggression and Self-defence, p. 176. 
567 This was the view of Schachter, Kelsen, Kunz, Brownlie and Henkin, who interpret the UN Charter in 
a restrictive manner. 
568 The International Court of Justice resolution -was that collective self-defence would only apply if 
Nicaragua had attacked El Salvador, which in reality it had not. The US, when it mined Nicaragua's ports, 
had invoked the notion of collective self-defence in the face of the Nicaraguan government's assistance to 
Salvadoran rebels. See Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D White, International Law and Armed Conflict, 
(Brookield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992), p. 94. 
569 Briand cited in Norman Menachem Feder, "Reading the United Nations Charter Connotatively: 
Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack, " (New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 19,1987), p. 412. In this connection, the first attack had an important legal and historical setting. 
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force" and "the problem that killing and being killed poses .,, 
570 This importance of the 
first attack motivated Combacau to say, "nothing now appears less admissible than to be 
the first to use force. 071 This feeling was highlighted just before the Six Day War, when 
both the US and the Soviet Union warned their respective protegees against being the 
first to act. 572 This way of dealing with the right of self-defence places a considerable 
responsibility upon the shoulders of the victim state. A stipulation that it is the 
beginning of the aggression that opens the door to the right of self-defence could work 
to the advantage of the aggressor, especially in the light of the hugely and immediately 
destructive potential of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. A first 
strike using such weapons could so effectively cripple its target, that the right to self- 
defence is effectively rendered irrelevant. Therefore, this chapter examines the concepts 
of pre-emptive and protective self-defence, with illustrative examples from the Arab- 
Israeli conflicts. 
Pre-emptive Defence 
The issue of pre-emptive defence has usually depended upon the interpretation of such 
criteria as "imminence" and "necessity" along with a need for "proportionality" which 
means that defensive action should be at a level consistent with the dimensions of the 
Britain for a long time rejected the "principle of priority" or the "principle of the initial act". This view 
was supported by the USSR, but Britainwished the matter to depend basically upon the "circumstances. " 
Cited in McDougal, Myres S. and Florentino P. Feliciano, "Resort to Coercion: Aggression and Self- 
defence in Policy Perspective, " In: Law and Minimum World Public Order: Yhe Legal Regulation of 
International Coercion, p. 168. 
570 Michael, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 79. 
571 Jean. Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in UN Practice, In 77ie Current Legal Regulation of 
the Use offorce, p. 20. 
572 See Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Six Day War, In: 77ie Vantage point: Perspective of the Presidency 
1963-1969, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 293-94. Also, see Walter Laqueur, Yhe Road to 
Mar. - 77ie Origins and, 4fterniath of the, 4rab-Israeli Conflict 1967-68, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970), 
p. 124. 
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aggression. The first condition will easily weaken any primary right to pre-emptive 
defence. The second one raises the problem of how to decide necessity, because it is in. 
reality an extensive field, which can easily be deceptive. As for "proportionality", this 
raises the dilemma of limitation as against instrumentality. 
,, 573 Walzer added another criterion, which is that of "sufficient threat . He considered 
anticipatory military action to be legitimate under three conditions: first, an "intent to 
injure" which is obvious but need not amount to a plan for a specific assault; second, the 
military means to make that injury "tangible"; and third, a time period in which waiting 
would impose an unreasonably costly burden. 574 Walzer's formulation, however, suffers 
from a clear defect, because it allows a pre-emptive blow in the presence of hostile 
intent alone, without any plans to do specific injury. 575 This will erode the significant 
distinction between pre-emption and prevention. Pre-emptive defence should not have 
to depend for legitimacy on time only, because waiting to practise pre-emptive defence 
while the danger escalates could lead to disaster. Moreover, pre-emptive defence should 
be connected with inevitability, which eases the relinquishment of responsibility for 
military action by the aggressor and the victim. But, this does not imply that the military 
action should be taken as soon as possible. It only suggests that defensible actions 
become admissible. There is a possibility of modifying Walzer's formulation concerning 
"sufficient threat" by combining the first and second categories and annulling the third 
one. In this case, pre-emptive defence will be legitimate on the basis of presence of 
intent to do specific injury, and effective readiness to attack. Here, it is important to 
distinguish between intent and "motive. " Intention personifies external relationships 
573 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 8 1. 
574 Ibid., 75. 
575 This "means that aggression can be made out not only in the absence of a military attack or invasion 
but in the (probable)absence of any immediate intention to launch such an attack or invasion" (Walzer, 
Just and Unjust wars, p. 85). 
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with the world. Intent can easily invite a dangerous subjective interpretation which all 
too readily cases the narrow bounders between pre-emptive defence and central 
aggression. Intention, these days, is connected with technologies and better infonnation 
systems, which can in many cases easily recognise a hostile plan before its initiation. 576 
One may, however, note the serious British misinterpretation of Argentine intentions in 
the period leading up to the 1982 Falklands conflict. This points up the importance of 
military intelligence and the problems associated therewith. Ceadel regarded intention as 
a substantial element. His view was: 
"Pre-emptive defence occurs when a defender surprises with a first strike an aggressor who has 
already formed an intention to attack but has simply not got round to carrying it out. It is 
legitimately defensive because, although it involves the first use of force, it does not involve the 
first intention to use it.,, 577 
Grotius, too, had depended on intention Nvhen defining the criterion of imminence. He 
believed that "danger ... must be immediate and imminent 
in point of time" but 
regarding legitimisation of military response, said: "I admit, to be sure, that if the 
assailant seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest, the crime can 
be forestalled; for in morals as in material things a point is not to be found which does 
not have a certain breadth. ý9578 Moreover, readiness needs both physical power and 
estimations of it. Readiness resides especially in the field of "material things" rather 
than "morals". Readiness includes a number of characteristics, because in some 
instances there are attacks in the absence of any readiness for an effective fight. The 
aggressor must meet both conditions before its assault becomes imminent. Lack of 
imminence will weaken the pre-emptor's credibility, because he needs to justify his 
defensive action. The element of imminence will to some extent prove both the intent 
576 This was the view of Bunn. See George Bunn, "International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: 
Do US Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, " (Alaial Mar College Review, 1986): p. 74. 
577 Martin Ceadel, 77iink-ing About Peace and War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 82. 
578 Grotius cited in Walzer, Just and Utyust Wars, p. 340-41. 
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and the extent of readiness. Therefore, imminence will clarify whether the conditions for 
legitimate pre-emptive defence are available. But it is important to understand that 
imminence is not the sole prerequisite for an act of pre-emptive defence. Imminence 
should be considered in relation to intent and capacity, but the concept is nonetheless 
integral to consideration of any claims to legitimate pre-emptive self-defence. 579 
The connection between pre-emptive defence and the idea of imminence can be traced 
back to the days of Daniel Webster in 1841. He understood that the relationship was 
clear in contemporary legal opinion. More recently, Schachter rejected the idea of pre- 
emptive defence, but at the same time he left the door open by accepting that some 
situations may exist where the threat of assault was "so immediate and massive" that it 
would be "absurd to demand that the target state await the actual attack. 95580 McCoubrey 
and White distinguish between the beginning of the attack and the occurrence of that 
attack, suggesting that in the period in between, pre-emption actions become lawful. 581 
This view is similar to Dinstein's "miraculously early defence", in which pre-emptive 
defence became legitimate. 582 Bunn regards imminence as an unfair requirement, 
because it will give the defending state more time to "take the first hit. " He quotes 
Webster's idea of legitimate pre-emption: "a truck bomber driving at full speed towards 
,, 583 a Marine barracks, or a kamikaze aircraft diving on a ship. According to Webster, 
there must be a "necessity of self-defence, instant, ovenvhelming, leaving no choice of 
means and no moment of deliberation. ', 584 But the problem is that this concept is too 
579 Ceadel's stress on intent was obvious. 
580 Oscar Schachter, "In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force, " (University of Chicago Laiv 
Review 53,1986): p. 136-37. 
581 McCoubrey and White, International Laiv and Armed Conflict. p. 94. 
582 Dinstein, WarAggression and Se6r-defence, p. 180. 
583 Bunn, p. 74. 
584 Kenneth R. Stevens, Border Diploniacy: 7be Caroline and AfcLeod Affairs in Anglo-American- 
Canadian Relations, 1837-1842, (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), p. 35. The American 
Minister to the Court of St. James, Andrew Stevenson, insisted that the danger of a defensive situation 
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limited. Moreover, there is a theoretical link between this concept and the legacy of the 
Cai-oline case. The Caroline was an American ship that was being used to supply anus 
and food to rebels against the British government in Canada. The British attacked the 
ship and burned it, claiming that they were acting in self-defence (pre-emptive defence). 
The revolution's supply lines and stronghold were inside the American border; 585 and 
the British held that they were "fully justified in attacking the vessel as they did" as a 
result of "a necessity of self-defence and self-preservation. ' 586 Lord Ashburton raised 
the question, "How long could a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting 
its own people, be reasonably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to 
expect? 3587 The result of that problem was that the US prohibited any ships from using 
its waters to give help to the rebellion in Canada. At the same time the US government 
claimed that the ship in reality was a "piratical" one, and this would to some extent case 
588 
the accountability of the United States. Webster criticised the British actions, without 
imposing harsh limits on the beginning of self-defence. The Caroline incident did not, 
he said, pose an "immediate" threat, but this did not prohibit the British response, since 
they were acting in anticipatory self-defence, as a result of the fact that the ship and its 
crew were planning to pass weapons to the benefit of the rebellion. The problem with 
Webster's argument is that it is unclear whether immediate and overwhelming threat is a 
condition for self-defence in general or only in the case of pre-emptive defence. "It must 
be shown, " he said in his paragaph, 
must be distinguished by the criteria of immediacy and imminence, and this will not happen until the 
enemy has both the intent and the ability to attack. 
5'5 The situation of Britain was similar to South Africa's when it attacked ANC bases in Lesotho and 
Zambia in 1982 and 1986, and Israel's when it invaded Lebanon in 1982. 
586 Henry S. Fox, the British Ambassador to Washington, cited in Stevens, p. 24-25. 
587 Ashburton cited in Robert Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases, " (American Journal of 
International Law 32,193 8), p. 90. 
588 Jennings, p. 87,85. 
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"that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would 
have been unavailing; it must be shown that day-light could not be waited for; that there could be no 
attempt at discrimination between the innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to 
seize and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her in 
the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board, 
killing some and wounding others and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her 
on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the 
living with the dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for 
,, 589 all this, the Government of the United States cannot believe to have existed. 
Here, Webster is dealing with complicated issues, which go far beyond self-defence, for 
instance, the difference between combatants and non-combatants, without considering 
how this is related to the right of self-defence. The weakness of Webster's analysis can 
be argued to arise from a misrepresentation of the real context(s) in which international 
590 
conflicts occur. Walzer indicated that "there is often plenty of time for deliberation, 
agonizing hours, days, even weeks of deliberation, when one doubts that war can be 
avoided and wonders whether or not to strike first. " On this basis, Walzer supposes that 
it is hard to ask a nation to do " little more than respond to an attack once we had seen it 
coming but before we had felt its impact. " This inflexibility will to some degree 
diminish pre-emptive defence to a "reflex action, a throwing up of one's arms at the 
very last minute. " Of course, proceeds Walzer, "once one has stated the restrictions, it is 
no longer clear whether the right has any substance at all. 5591 On the other hand, focusing 
on intent will lead us to a moral problem instead of a behavioural one. Through intent, 
usually, many options and decisions take place. Conversely any exercise of such options 
will help us to analyse actions and to judge intent. Some have debated that the only 
reasonable way to define intent is to go back in time, and to study the development of 
the events. In this respect, Bunn identifies "hostile intent" as existing only when one has 
589 Webster's Paragraph of 24 April 1841, cited in Jennings, p. 89. 
590 The paragraph of Webster's in general marking the transformation of the concept of self-defence from 
"political" principle to "legal" principle (Jennings p. 82). This was clear Nvhen the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, refused the Germany's claims, that its aggression against Nonvay was in pre- 
emption defence (McCoubrey & White p. 92). 
591 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 74-5. 
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hit the point of "imminent threat of armed attack. "592 But, looking at the issue of intent 
from a military perspective, intent to attack will precede the start of the programmed 
assault, because time is needed for planning and preparation. The victim should have the 
right to act Nvhcn the prospect of attack becomes immediate. Thus, the problem of intent 
will lead us to evaluate the right of self-defence on the basis of judgement, rather than 
on simple observation. The practical moves were well demonstrated by the experience 
of the Six Day War. 
"Israeli-Egyptian Battle Erupts " 
Each Side Accuses Other ofMaking First Assault , 593 
594 The "third Arab-Israeli War" began on June 5, and ended on June 12,1967. This war 
was marked by an escalation of aggression and tension between the two sides, months 
before the start of the military actions. Walzer views the Six Day War as an example of 
"legitimate anticipation" on the part of Israel, which began the attack, but did not initiate 
the hostility. 595 Israel made during that period many excuses and claims for the purpose 
of strengthening its international position. However, the concept of self-defence in that 
war was surrounded by ambiguity. The borders were not stable, there was constant 
struggle and there was no stable status quo, indeed no "peace" had been established, 
beyond a fragile "cease fire" from the second Arab-Israeli war. 
Israel emphasised that it was surrounded by unfriendly states. The important element 
which pushed the Israelis to feel unsafe was that the Egyptians carried out many 
provocative acts before the military activities started. Firstly President Nasser on May 
592 Bunn, p. 74. 
593 Headline, (New York Times, 5 June 1967), p. 1. 
594 Draper's phrase cited in Amos Shapira, "The Six Day War and the Right of Self-defence, " (Israel Law 
Review 6,197 1), p. 68. 
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16 asked UN forces to withdraw from the Suez Canal zone and the Gaza Strip, where 
they had been placed since the Suez Crisis in 1956. Secondly, on May 22 he closed the 
Canal to all Israeli ships. From the Israeli viewpoint, this was a clearly provocative 
action, because Israel had many times declared that any intervention or ban against its 
shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba would be regarded as a declaration of war. The whole 
Israeli government was united in their reaction to this action, which they viewed as "an 
act of warfare' that would leave to Israel the right to choose when and how to 
respond. 5)596 After the beginning of the maritime blockade, the Israeli goverm-nent 
launched an international diplomatic campaign under the supervision of Mr. Eban, for 
the purpose of gaining international support for the Israeli situation and recognition for 
any (defensive) action might Israel take. The Israeli point was that the UAR had already 
undertaken the first aggressive act, when the Egyptian government declared the 
blockade, and that this gave the Israeli reaction the legitimacy of self-defence. The 
Israeli Prime Minister infon-ned the Knesset on 28 May: 
"The Government of Israel expresses the opinion that the closing of the Tiran Straits to Israeli 
shipping is tantamount to an act of aggression against Israel. We shall defend ourselves against this 
in the hour of need, in virtue of the right of self-defence to which every state is entitled. "597 
Eban, meanwhile, invoked an old Soviet draft on the definition of aggression which 
included "naval blockade", and declared his view that Israeli was entitled to view any 
"interference, by armed force, with the ships of the Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage 
in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran .... as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to take all such 
measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships". 
595 NValzer, Just and Ui! just Wars, p. 81. To some degree, that war motivated his ideas of pre-emptive 
defence. 
596 Abba Eban, My Country: Yhe Story of Modern Israel, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), p. 
208. 
597 Speech of May 28,1967, in Laqueur, p. 83. 
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He later said of President Nasser that he "did not recoil from an active state of war. " 
That blockade "would take Israel to a point of no return. " He continued that 
"there is no difference in civil law between murdering a man by slow strangulation or killing him 
by a shot in the head. From the moment at which the blockade was imposed, active hostilities had 
commenced and Israel owed Egypt nothing of her Charter rights. 598 If a foreign power sought to 
close Odessa, or Copenhagen, or Marseilles, or New York Harbour by the use of force, what would 
happen? Would there be any discussion about who had fired the first shot? Would anyone ask 
whether aggression had begun? "599 
But this strategy did not bring Israel the support that its leaders expected. Eban 
expressed his anger about this when he said that the international community would do 
nothing if they saw "Arab annies in Tel Aviv. "600 Thus, there was a change in Israeli 
policy, especially in the international arena. The Foreign Minister began to adopt a new 
approach to Israel's problem, claiming that aggression against it had been planned and 
was imminent. 601 The evidence for imminent attack was at best ambiguous at that time. 
Both Israeli and US intelligence assessed that no Arab state was in a position to attack 
soon. On the other hand, Israel could still claim that the Arab states had decided to 
attack, at some point. When war began on 5 June, Israel asked its UN representatives to 
discuss its case before the Security Council and "unfold the design of Egyptian 
aggression and report on Israel's resistance. , 602 
Eban told the Israeli Knesset that "beyond all honest doubt, between 4 and 5 June, Arab 
governments led and directed by President Nasser, methodically prepared and mounted 
an aggressive assault designed to bring about Israel's immediate and total 
,, 603 destruction. In 1972, looking back on that period, he said that "everything in Arab 
utterance and posture confirmed our impression that our physical survival was at 
598 This raises a significant inquiry concerning whether the defender, in exercising self-defence, should 
adopt peacetime or wartime rules. 
599 Eban, My Country, p. 215. 
600 Ibid., p. 216. . 601 Lenczowski, George, "The Johnson Presidency, " In: American Presidents and the Middle East, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 108. 
602 Eban, My Country, p. 220. 
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stake. ', 604 Arab political speeches at that time prompted the Israeli fear that Egypt 
already had an "aggressive design of encirclement and blockade. , 605 Nasser, for 
example, told his soldiers at an air base in Sinai that: 
"We are in confrontation with Israel. ... We are face to face with Israel. Our armed forces have 
occupied Sharm At-Sheikh. We shall on no account allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf 
of Aqaba. The Jews threatened to make war. I reply 'Ahlan Wasahlan: welcome, we are ready for 
war, thewater is ours. "606 
Egyptian Radio, meanwhile, reported a "definite plan. " It was claimed that Egyptian 
forces are "ready for war, " and this would give Israel "no alternative" so that it "must 
resort to arms. " On the same lines, Nasser expressed that an "anned clash between the 
UAR and Israel is inevitable. , 607 The sense of Arabic imminent attack was tangible, but 
without any clear or unequivocal significance. The Israeli leaders knew that if they 
struck first, they would lose international support, especially from the United States, 608 
and Israel confirmed that it would not act first. This was made clear when the Israeli 
Prime Minister pledged that Israel "will not attack any country which does not first 
launch an attack against us. " On the same day, Eshkol announced to the Knesset, "we 
shall not attack any state so long as it does not wage war against us. But anyone 
attacking us will meet with our full power of self-defence and our capacity to defeat his 
,, 609 forces. 
In the meantime, the situation in Israel was building to a sense of imminent catastrophe. 
As Walzer describes it, 
"rumours of coming disasters were endlessly repeated; frightened men and women raided food 
shops, buying up their entire stock, despite government announcements that there were ample 
603 Eban quoted in Laqueur, p. 418-9. 
604 Abba Eban, An Autobiography, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), p. 395. 
605 Ibid., p. 399. 
606 Cited in Eban, Aly Country, p. 205. 
607 Cited in Eban, My Country, p. 24 1. 
608 Eban, An Autobiography, p. 385,421-22. 
609 Ibid., p. 406,409. 
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reserves; thousands of graves Nvere dug in the military cemeteries; Israel's political and military 
leaders lived on the edge of nervous exhaustion. ', 610 
Eban expressed his fear that Israel faced "drastic-slow strangulation or rapid solitary 
death . 39611 It seems, then, that Israel's position here to some extent meets our criteria for 
pre-emption, because the Arab states had indicated their hostile intent. On the other 
hand, it was clear to Israel that the Arab states were far from ready for immediately 
effective attack. Israeli intelligence had information that Egyptian troops, in particular in 
Sinai, were in complete "disorder. , 612 There was reason to believe that the Egyptian 
provocation was'only a political manoeuvre for domestic consumption with the purpose 
of increasing Nasser's popularity in Egypt and also in the wider Arab World. The use of 
the "Israel" card to manipulate inter-Arab relations is by no means a past phenomenon 
and was seen, for example, in some aspects of Iraqi policy statements in the 1990-91 
Gulf Conflict. 
In 1967, the Arab states were unorganised and divided, which reduced any threat of 
planned attack on their part. The Israeli aim of self-defence was connected with the 
strategy that Israel should attack when it was the strongest and the Arab armies were 
weakest, and as a result of that policy, Israel began the war. 613 Later, Eban in his 
autobiography said that the reason "was not Egypt's immediate movement alone, but the 
outrage inherent in her aggressive design of encirclement and blockade. ', 614 Eban 
decided that Israel had to "make a total response to the next encroachment, " since this 
encroachment was thought to threaten substantial interests for Israel, which would 
damage its preventive ability. He continued that, "there was no issue in which Israel had 
610 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 84. 
61 1 Eban, My Country, p. 205. 
612 Eban, An A utobiography, p. 37 1. 
613 This was to some point stimulated Walzer to create the third requirement of a "time period in which the 
risks of waiting are too high. " 
614 Eban, An Autobiography, p. 399. 
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pledged its honour in more irrevocable terms. " If the blockade had succeeded it would 
have meant the "collapse of Israel's deterrent power. ', 615 When Israel declared its power, 
this would give its enemies an open message that Jerusalem would not tolerate any 
threat to its security, or any possible aggression. That was the view of Eban when he 
wrote: 
"A nation which could not protect its basic and vital maritime interests would presumably find 
reasons for not repelling other assaults on its rights. Unless a stand were made here, nobody in the 
Arab World, and few people beyond it, would ever again believe in Israel's power to resist, and 
therefore to survive. ' 616 
These comments of Eban's about the circumstances of the Six Day War make it clear 
that Israel's aims from that war exceeded the limits of pre-emptive defence. Her main 
aim was to alter the regional balance of power in Israel's favour and to undermine any 
future potential for aggression. Therefore, the Israeli actions or activities in that war 
were not pre-emptive, but preventive defence. Its basic idea was that fighting a small 
war at the present time would be better than launching a big war in the future, the 
outcome of which was uncertain. In spite of this, many researchers on the Six Day War 
have considered it as an example of pre-emptive defence. 617 Personally, I find it closer 
to preventive defence. The problem in the Middle East is that the boundaries are not 
well-established and settled. For this reason, it is difficult to apply pre-emptive defence 
or any other kind of defence. 
Preventive Defence 
Any effort to distinguish between pre-emptive and preventive defence will be difficult, 
because the two tenninologies are often used interchangeably, particularly in the 
615 Eban, My Country, p. 204. 
616 Ibid. 
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political dimension. 618 For instance, when the US forces landed in Grenada in 1983, 
Dominica considered that action as "a matter of preventing Marxist revolution from 
spreading to all the islands" and described the operation as "a pre-emptive strike ... to 
remove a dangerous threat to peace and security'619 Some scholars oppose any 
distinction between the two. Indeed, Hare and Joynt came to the point of refusing any 
anticipatory defence . 
620 This, unfortunately, leads to a gap in analysis of many 
controversial events and episodes, such as the German war against Russia, and that of 
Israel against the Arab states in 1956 and 1967. Generally, pre-emptive defence is 
similar to preventive action, though with an increased gap between the defensive action 
and the attack . 
62 1 This range can only be measured in terms of certainty or reasonable 
expectation that the assault will happen. But, if we broaden the range more, we will 
exceed the limit of preventive defence and enter the range of prevention actions. 
Prevention 
If any state takes part in a military action to prevent a possible aggression, this means 
that the action is a prevention action, whether against an attack or "conditions which, if 
allowed to develop, might become in time a source of danger. , 622 The idea of prevention 
617 This was the view of Walzer from a moral philosophical point, as it was from a legal one for Beres. 
See Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Force, and International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defence, " (77ie 
Jentsalem Journal ofInternational Relations 13,199 1), p. 3-5. 
61 8 This was the position of Ceadel, Nvho notes the ambiguity between these terms in general. Ceadel, 
Thinking About Peace and Mar, p. 83. 
619 Wil D. Venvey, "Humanitarian Intervention' 'In: 77ie Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 
ed. A. Cassese, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 70. 
620 Both Hare and Joynt protest, that these cases are connected with the concept of "inevitability", which is 
never perfect, especially at this risky time of the nuclear age. For more information see J. Hare, and Carey 
Joynt, Ethics and International Affairs, (London: Macmillan Press, 19 82), p. 79. 
621 During the Six Day War, that distance existed, but was small. 
622 Charles Ghequiere Fenwick, "The Right of National Existence: Self-defence and Co-operative 
Defence, " In: International Law, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 231. McDougal and 
Feliciano depend on Fenwick in their discussion of prevention. They see prevention as consisting mainly 
of non-military activities. 
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is related to the concept of the "balance of power, " on the basis of which many 
prevention wars take place. Prevention happens usually before the aggressor state shapes 
its aggressive intent and even before it gains the means to practise the aggression. 
Walzer, in connection with prevention, commented that states "stare into temporal as 
well as geographic distance as they watch the growth of their neighbour's power. , 623 
The logic behind prevention is that, if the defender state ignores the increases in the 
power of. aggression state, that will leave scope for it to exercise that power 
aggressively. Generally, early prevention is better than late prevention, because the 
element of time will make the task tougher and the aggressor more powerful. 624 
Walzer cites both Bacon and Vattel as supporters of prevention. Bacon sounded the 
alarm bell, when he asked statesmen to watch out for neighbour states who "overgrow" 
by any means, such as increasing territory, or controlling trade or by any other means so 
that they "become more able to annoy them, than they were. "625 He "shall make it 
plaine, " Bacon said, "that Warres Preventive upon Just Feares, are true Defensives, as 
,, 626 well as upon Actual Invasions. Vattel, later, mentioned the "juncture" at which an 
adversary state "is on the point of receiving a fon-nidable augmentation of power. " At 
this stage, "securities may be asked, and on its making any difficulty to give them, its 
,, 627 designs may be prevented by force of arms. Walzer, however, denies the assumption 
that preventive war can be legitimate, since in his opinion, gain of power need not 
indicate any aggressive intent. 628 Walzer said that, 
623 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 77. 
624 Walzer makes the same point, Ibid, p. 77. 
625 Cited in Walzer, lbid, p. 78. 
626 Cited in James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of Mar. - Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 90. Johnson said that the Bacon 
plan, aimed at "changing the acceptance of defensive war in the just war tradition by broadening the 
category of what might justly be defended against. " 627 Cited in Walzer, p. 78. 
628 There is a complication, in Walzer's dealing with intent, because he explores adverse intention from 
such a liberal range of circumstances, so that he sometimes includes many preventive activities. 
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" there is a great difference between killing and being killed by soldiers who can plausibly be 
described as the present instruments of an aggressive intention, and killing and being killed by 
soldiers who may or may not represent a distant danger to our country. In the first case, we 
confront an army recognisably hostile, ready for war, fixed in a posture of attack. In the second, the 
hostility is prospective and imaginary, and it will always be a charge against us that we have made 
war upon soldiers who were themselves engaged in entirely legitimate (non-threatening) activities. 
Hence the moral necessity of rejecting any attack that is merely preventive in character, that does 
not wait upon and respond to the wilful acts of an adversary. ', 629 
On the other hand, Walzer again decides that the logic of prevention relies on the 
advantage (utility) consideration, which will diminish the moral side, which can easily 
be avoided unless the options of the war are made in an immediate attack . 
630 Advantage 
will continue to be the basis of many wars and conflicts. Those who rely on the cold 
consideration of advantage "radically underestimate the importance of the shift from 
diplomacy to force. They don't recognise the problem that killing and being killed 
PoSeS.,, 
631 Our "uneasiness" over preventive war is a result of the fact that "we don't 
want to fight until we are threatened, because only then can we rightly fight. " He 
considered this as a moral security problem. He argued that the standard should not be 
fear only, 632 because this may grow and become an imaginary fear, which will increase 
the feeling of danger. 
633 
629 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 80. 
630 He supposes that preventive defence "has nothing to do with the immediate security of boundaries. " 
631 Walzer, Just Unjust Mars, p. 79. 
632 Bacon refers to the phrase "just fear, " which it is only important capability for fear. Walzer, Just and 
Uiýust Mars, p. 78. 
633 Ibid., 
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Prevention in theAttendance of Threat 
The distinction between preventive defence and prevention in general is quite 
important. 634 For some people, the difference between them is limited and slight. Some 
may claim that there is no difference, and even if there is, it is unimportant. 
In the case of preventive defence, a threat must be offered immediately to the 
threatened; which cannot begin aggression. The threat must be tangible and "wilful" as 
Walzer said. The potential aggressor should be given the chance to illustrate, by words 
and actions, that it means no han-n. 635 Preventive defence does not require that the threat 
come near the stage of intention to attack. Sufficient threat may sometimes be the taking 
of unconsidered action. The aggressive intention in preventive defence is a primitive 
one, unlike pre-emptive defence, in which the aggressive intention has cohered into an 
organised plan for attack. Commonly, preventive defence takes place before aggression 
reaches the stage of readiness, or even, sometimes, before it comes into view. The result 
here, is that readiness is potential, in contrast to pre-emption, where the readiness is 
real. 
636 
In fact, the possession of potential military power will strengthen and support preventive 
defence, when threatening conduct occurs, but at the same time no specific intention to 
attack exists. That power is usually gained by obtaining the necessary military 
equipment and modem military technology. It may, sometimes, include strategic 
resources and territorial buffers. Goldmann recommended that prevention can only be 
634 "A preventive strike is launched to destroy the potential threat of the enemy, " Wrote Efraim Inbar in 
1989, whereas "a pre-emptive strike is a launch in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression. " See 
Beres, p. 10. 
635 This connects with Vattel's statement that "securities may be asked" but that armed force activities will 
be authorised upon an enemy's "making any difficulty to give them. " 
636 The longer time-period in the case of preventive defence comes from the dissimilarity in both intent 
and readiness. 
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considered sufficiently defensive when the criterion of geographical proximity is met. 137 
However, that proposal is impractical, because it does not mention anything about 
neighbouring countries whose relationship is not limited by geography. 638 The criterion 
of geographical proximity is not consistent with preventive defence, especially in areas 
of intensive conflicts, such as the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula or the Balkans, in 
which the balance of emerging powers is in the process of formation. The right to 
preventive defence is usually supported by researchers who reject what Webster 
recommended about imminent or overwhelming threat, while looking to Article 51 from 
a liberal view of point. McDougal, Waldock and Stone read and understand the sentence 
"If an anned attack occurs" as an open right instead of a restriction of the right of self- 
defence. 639 
They inferred from the word "inherent" that Artiele 51 was designed to recognise the 
right of self-defence which existed in customary law before the UN Charter, rather than 
to present a new, and restricted right. 640 McDougal considered the new technology in 
modem weapons to be an extra reason to permit defensive action ahead of assault, 
because to ask a state in the nuclear age to be calm and wait until it is under attack will 
force this state to receive with open arms a potentially all-destructive first blow, which 
is not in the interest of its people. As a result of that, he considered defensive first hits to 
be permissible when a state in a situation "regards itself as intolerably threatened by the 
637 Kjell Goldmann, International Nonns and Mar Between States, (Stockholm: Laromedelsforlagen, 
197 1), p. 112. 
638 Goldmann used proximity as the criterion to distinguish the US motivations in the Vietnam war from 
those of South Korea against North Korea. Both of them exercised power with the aim of preventing 
Communism becoming more dynamic and acquiring strong roots, which could to some extent, encourage 
it to more aggressive activities. He considered that the fear of South Korea was greater than of that the 
US, because Seoul is near Pyongyang. 
639 Concerning Stone's understanding of Articles 2(4) and 51, Walzler notes that it "significantly 
influenced" his thinking (Just and Unjust Wars, p. 340). 
640 McCormack examined in an article, the groundwork of the United Nations Charter, which appeared in 
1945, and argued that the Charter framers in reality designed a wider interpretation for the Charter 
articles. But, as a fact of history, the framers' intention was to strengthen restrict interpretations. For more 
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activities of another. 441 McDougal and many writers found support in Vattel's ideas. 
He indicated that any state has not only a right but a duty to protect itself. In 
consequence of that fact, a state has "a right to everything that can secure it from such a 
threatening danger, and to keep at a distance whatever is capable of causing its ruin. , 642 
For states, "the safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the 
right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other 
just means of resistance against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's design. " 
This right, in Vattel's opinion, places on the state's shoulders an important 
responsibility of care; a duty "not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions lest it run 
the risk of becoming itself the aggressor. ', 643 In addition to what has been said, 
concerning proportionality, it is difficult to determine, before any action or event, if 
there is harmony, because the matter of when and how to begin a preventive action 
depends more upon the consideration of the preventer than on the aggressor's actions. 
Therefore, the idea of the balance of power and its contrivances becomes relevant It may 
again be remarked that through the Cold War years, the UN was in effect a mixed 
"collective security" and "balance of power" system, with the latter in effect the 
predominant element as between US and the Soviet Union. It is easy to suppose that the 
general domain of the concept of power-balancing can be "defensive. " The main 
impulse behind the balance of power is the maintenance of an existing stability of 
powers. This appears to be Ceadel's understanding of preventive defence. 644 Sometimes, 
information see Timothy L. H. McCormack, "Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Legislative History of the 
United Nations Charter, " (Israel Law Review 25,199 1), p. 142. 
641 McDougal cited in Thomas M. Frank, "Who Killed Article 2(4) ? Changing Governing the Use of 
Force by States, " p. 82 1. McDougal's debate here is the contrary of Hare and Joynt's. 
642 Vattel cited in Stevens, p. 25. 
643 Vattel cited in Beres, p. 3. 
644 In Ceadel's view, "preventive defence" happens Aen an "enemy state has yet to form even an 
intention to attack, " but "unless prevented by war the potential adversary will find itself in so 
preponderant a position that, according to basic defencist assumptions, it will soon be tempted to form an 
aggressive intention. " Ceadel goes further to put two strategies. First a state goes for a small war now to 
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there are some actions considered in the field of "preventive defence, " though the 
motivation is still unclear, so that they could equally be considered to fall within the 
sphere of prevention. It is important to note that preventive defence is not identical with 
the concept of prevention, which Walzer considered to concern the balance of power. 
The balance of power is usually shaped by somewhat opaque interactions which do not 
necessity conform to any technical doctrines of either international law or international 
relations.. Along the same line, preventive defence should not melt into the idea of pre- 
emptive defence, in line with Walzer's supposition that his type of legitimate 
anticipatory defence is a kind of pre-emptive and preventive defence. Finally, preventive 
defence may be considered as a reaction to a possible aggression, preceding the 
formation of the aggressor's intent and military readiness. The point may be made by 
reference to the Israeli assault upon Iraqi nuclear plants in 198 1. 
"Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi A tomic Reactor " 
"Attack Condemned by US and Arab Nations -645 
On Sunday, June 7,1981, Israel launched an aerial attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at 
Osirak outside Baghdad. The attack ruined the reactor, and killed three Iraqis and one 
French technician. The next day, Israel released a statement that its action against Iraq 
was one of legitimate anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 646 
The international community, including Israel's long-time fhends, generally condemned 
avoid a bigger war in the future, whose results uncertain his example for that were the Six Day War, and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second, a state invades or annexes a buffer state, for defensive reasons. His 
example for that was the USSR's partition of Poland with Germany. Ceadel, p. 83. 
645 Headline, (New York Times, 9 June 1981), p. L 
646 W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, "The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7,1981, Upon The 
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defence? " (Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 15, 
1982): p. 418. 
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the Israeli raid. 647 Israel considered its action as an act of anticipatory self-defence. "In 
destroying the Osirak reactor, Israel performed an elementary act of self-preservation, 
both morally and legally, " explained Yehuda Blum, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN 
"In so doing, Israel was exercising its inherent right of self-defence as understood in 
general international law and as preserved in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
,, 648 Nations. In support of his stance, Blum mentioned many legal sources, among them 
Waldock, the President of the International Court of Justice. "It would be a travesty of 
the purposes of the Charter, to compel a defending state to allow its assailant to deliver 
the first and perhaps fatal blow To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the 
aggressor's right to the first strike, " Blum read from Waldock. 
At that time, Israel still regarded Iraq as an enemy state, because the Iraqi Government 
had declared itself "in a state of war with Israel since 1948, " and refused to sign the 
armistice agreement between the Arab states and Israel . 
649 "A threat of nuclear 
obliteration was being developed against Israel by Iraq, " and the "simple, basic fact" 
was that "Iraq's nuclear programme has, beyond a shadow of doubt, just one aim - to 
acquire nuclear weapons and delivery for them. , 650 Israeli intelligence had evidence that 
the Iraqi reactor would be ready some time between I July and I September. 651 
However, the Israeli government did not openly accuse Iraq of obtaining nuclear 
weapons, at the time, nor did it accuse Iraq of having any plans to attack it. This period 
of two months left Israel "with an agonizing dilemma, " and when the Iraqi reactor 
647 On 19 June the UN Security Council unanimously approved Res. 487 which recognised the 
"inalienable sovereign right of Iraq" and asked Israel to put its nuclear activities under IAEA supervision. 
However, the Security Council did not punish Israel under Ch. VII, and did not ask other countries to stop 
supplying Israel with military technology. 
648 UN SCOR, 36th Year, 2280th mtg. (12 June 198 1), paragraph, 58. 649 Ibid, paragraphs, 63-67. 
650 Ibid, paragraphs, 59,85. 
651 Uri Shoham, "The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self-Defence, " 
(Military Law Rei, ieiv 109,1985), p. 219. 
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became "hot", any Israeli hit on the reactor would result in widespread radioactive 
fallout in Iraq. 652 
"In plain terms, Iraq was creating a mortal danger to the people and the State of Israel. It had 
embarked on ramified programmes to acquire nuclear weapons. It had acquired the necessary 
facilities and fuel. Osirak was about to go critical, in a matter of weeks. "653 
The "precious time" during which the Israeli government made every effort to terminate 
the problem diplomatically passed in vain. 654 If Jerusalem waited "until the eleventh 
,, 655 hour after the diplomatic clock had run out, " Israel faced a "stark prospect. If the 
Iraqi project succeeded and they gained nuclear capability, this would mean that Israel 
would lose its right of pre-emptive defence. Israel found itself facing two important 
dilemmas: whether or not the event or the operation reached the standard of the right of 
self-defence, as Israel alleged, and how widely this right should be interpreted to begin 
with. In reality, Israel's case was critical. Nevertheless, at issue here is an argument 
about strategy. From the legal point of view, a right to anticipatory defence is approved, 
but limited to pre-emption. The Iraqi Government Ambassador to the UN referred to 
Waldock's remarks from which Israel had taken its excuse (the words quoted by Blum 
are italicised): 
"if the action of the United Nations is obstructed, delayed or inadequate and the armed attack 
becomes manifestly imminent, then it would be a travesty ofthepurposes of the Charter to compel 
a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. If an armed 
attack is imminent within the strict doctrine of the Caroline, then it would seem to bring the case 
within Article 5 1. To read Article 51 o1henvise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first 
Stroke. , 656 
The situation clearly, even in Israeli's own estimation, did not meet these important 
requirements, because no Iraqi assault was immediately imminent. Israel, for its part, 
reiterated its claims that it was acting in self-defence. Blum rejected the idea of any 
652 UN SCOR, 2280th mtg., paragraph, 95. 
653 Ibid, paragraph, 92. 
654 Ibid. paragraph, 95. 
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parallel between that incident and the Caroline case, especially in the nuclear age. The 
Caroline case happened, he said, "precisely 108 years before Hiroshima. " Even, "to 
assert the applicability of the Caroline principles to a State confronted with the threat of 
nuclear destruction would be an emasculation of that State's inherent and natural right 
of self-defence. ' 657 Moreover "the concept of a State's right to self-defence has not 
changed throughout recorded history, " he argued. If anything, "the concept took on new 
and far wider application with the advent of the nuclear era. ', 658 Israel's aim from its hit 
was "to eliminate the nuclear danger to Israel and to defend its physical existence. , 659 
There was little further concern expressed about the Israeli action, perhaps because of 
660 the political sensitivity involved in any discuss of Israel. 
D'Amato, on the other hand, rejected the Israeli claim to have exercised that 
anticipatory self-defence. He considered that the UN Charter in Article 51 pennits the 
right of self-defence only in the event of an anned attack . 
66 1 However, D'Amato gave 
Israel another choice, The UN Charter is against any threat or use of force against the 
"territorial integrity and political independence" of states members. The Israeli action, 
considered from his view, did not target Iraq's territorial integrity. Moreover, Israel did 
its best not to cause excessive of loss in property and in human life. As D'Amato argues, 
"it is open to serious question whether Israel's strike was a use of force against either Iraq's 
territorial integrity or its political independence. ... 
A use of the territory-namely, to construct a 
,, 662 nuclear reactor-was interfered vvith, but the territory itself remained integral. 
655 Ibid, paragraphs, 102,95. 
656 UN SCOR, 2288th mtg. (19 June 1981), paragraph, 200. 
657 Ibid., paragraph, 80. 
658 Ibid., paragraph, 85. 
659 Shoham, p. 219. 
660 This is exactly what Anthony D'Amato observed in 1983 in "Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear 
Reactor, " (American Journal ofIntenwtional Law 77,1983), p. 584-88. 
66 1 D'Amato also criticism the US enlarging of Article 51, when the Americans imposed the quarantine of 
Cuba. 
662 D'Amato, p. 585. 
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Such a state has the power to develop civil nuclear energy if it so desires. Finally, 
D'Amato suggested that the Israeli action could be viewed as "profoundly 
conservative, " because Israel's first aim was to protect its population and existing 
borders. 663 There was an important development in that case, because it highlighted the 
problem that will face the international community, if an irresponsible government gains 
nuclear technology. 664 D'Amato concluded that "if Israel's unilateral, military, and self- 
interested aerial attack on the Iraqi reactor is hardly a peaceftil or desirable precedent for 
the purposes of non-proliferation, it is possible to surmise that the community of nations 
breathed a little easier after the deed was done. ' 665 
In my view, Israel at that time was encircled by many hostile states, still in a state of war 
with Israel, which would give Israel, to some extent, the right of military defensive 
activities as a fundamental right. As Walzer describes it: "self-defence seems the 
primary and indisputable right of any political community, merely because it is there and 
,, 666 whatever the circumstances under which it achieved statehood. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli operation in Iraq in 1981, on the nuclear reactor, had increased 
the fears and at the same time raised the alarm about the real desire not to transfer the 
right of self-defence to a means or instrument of aggression. The essence and intention 
of Article 51 of the Charter must be upheld. It is important that when the right in 
question is exercised, there exists a real necessity for defence, and not only claims. At 
the same time, there must be harmony between the dimensions of the defence and the 
aggression. It is useful to remember the statement of the US Secretary of State, Daniel 
Webster, regarding the conditions which should be considered, in the case of exercise of 
the right of self-defence: Firstly, the requirement of necessity which should be "instant, 
663 
Ibid., p. 586. 664 Shoham, p. 219. 665 D'Amato, p. 586-87. 
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ovenvhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberations. " 
Secondly, the requirement of proportionality, which was expressed by the formula, 
"nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the acts justified by a necessity of self- 
defence must be limited to that necessity and kept within it.,, 
667 
The main point which needs attention, is that we should be more careful in giving 
legitimacy to the use of force under the umbrella of anticipatory self-defence on the 
grounds that it is a dangerous kind of use of force, because many states use that claim to 
give their military action a source of legitimacy. Personally, I support the idea, proposed 
by McCoubrey and White, that there is a distinction to be made between the outset of 
the attack and the occurrence of that attack, and that in the period in between, pre- 
emptive use of force becomes lawful. 
666 Walzer, Just and Unjust JVars, p. 82. 
667 David John Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 656. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEFENCE AFTER THE BLOW 
The issue of pre-emptive and preventive defence usually raises much controversy and 
disagreement, but there is a general understanding that at a minimum, aggression gives 
the victim the right to protect itself, by practising the right of self-defence. This concept 
or understanding of the right of self-defence is common among states and scholars, 
whether they recognise the right of self-defence as a restrictive right, or whether they 
consider it from a more liberal perspective. But the notion that defence should always 
come after the act of aggression is only the simplest form of this right. When Nazi 
Germany invaded Poland, in 1939, the right of Poland to act in self-defence was 
obvious, as was that of the Western states to give their help and assistance. 
Therefore, this chapter deal with the matter of the use of force on the basis of 
punishment. In many situations, the right of self-defence overlaps with reprisal use of 
force; many reprisal actions have been claimed to be acts of self-defence on the basis of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this connection, it is relevant to review the US air 
strikes against Libya in 1986, responding to the claimed Libyan involvement in a 
terrorist attacks occurred in Europe; the US missile strikes against Iraq on the grounds 
of an alleged attempt to assassinate former president George Bush, of which the US 
Goverranent accused the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and his intelligence service; 
and the US missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan, which the US administration 
considered as legitimate response, after the attacks on its embassies in Africa. Also, in 
this chapter will be considered to the idea, which many have claimed, that the right of 
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self defence is a continuing right do not change by time or conditions. The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 was claimed to be an example of that kind of defence. 
"Punishment " Defence 
Reprisals, as forcible actions, are taken by a state in order to secure redress of illegal 
acts committed by another state, without belligerent intent. 668 The question has been 
raised as to the legality of such measures under International law. Because of this it is 
useful to consider the status of the reprisal in the period before the creation of the UN 
Charter, and also to study reprisals under the Charter. 
Before the creation of the League of Nations, the Great Powers frequently resorted to 
certain measures defined as measures "short of war" against weaker states. These 
measures were taken to indicate that the states were not resorting to an act of war, and 
their actions were justified as being legitimate reprisals for international defects 
committed by other states, in order to secure the enforcement of alleged international 
legal rights, that is to say, a self-help remedy through armed force. The traditional 
international law, in general, did not include a method for controlling such a resort to 
coercion, nor any standard by which it could be said that a certain coercion was 
admissible or not. Traditional international law, in a case where violence arose, was 
only interested in the regulation and humanisation of such violence. 669 A point of 
present significance is that at that period, the acts of reprisal taken by states became war 
if the other party chose to regard them so. In fact, Oppenheim considered the acts as: 
668 See Briggs, The Law ofNations: Cases, Documents and Notes, p. 958. 
669 See Myres S. McDougal and Florentine P. Feliciano, "Resort to Coercion: Aggression and Self- 
Defence in Policy Perspective, " p. 135. 
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44unilateral acts of war, they are not Nvars in themselves as long as they are not answered by similar 
hostile acts by the other side, or at least by a declaration of the other side that it considers them to 
be acts of war. ' 670 
Westlake considers reprisals as "acts of war in fact, though not in intention" because it 
was left for the state affected to detennine for itself "whether the relation of war is set 
up between them or not. If it elects to regard them as doing so, the outbreak of war is 
thrown back by the expression of its choice to the moment at which the reprisals were 
made. ', 671 
A conditional prohibition of major coercion was established by the covenant of the 
League of Nations. Thus, according to the provisions of Articles 12,13 and 15, a state 
member to the League may not declare a war against another state except in very special 
circumstances, namely, "prior submission of dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement 
or to inquiry by the Council of the League.,, 
672 Therefore, under the Covenant was 
established a standard through which a test of permissible coercion was the fulfilment of 
the requirement of the prior recourse to non-violent procedures. 673 
As far as reprisals were concerned, there was no mention of them in any article, and 
there has been confusion as to the meaning of the phrase "resort to war", where the 
question is directed to the legitimacy of the force or the violence if the participants did 
not use the word "war" and instead used other verbal symbols such as "reprisal" or 
"intervention" or other measures "short of war", in expressing that exercise of 
670 Oppenheim cited in Arnold McNair, "The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation to Reprisals, " 
(Transactions ofthe Grotius Society 11,1962), p. 34. 
671 lbid p. 36. See also Professor Holland's opinion. He considered that the reprisals are "acts hostile in 
character but done without warlike intention"Ibid, p. 38. 
672 The relevant portion of Article 12 of the covenant reads: "if a dispute should arise between them, likely 
to lead to a rupture, they Nvill submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial or inquiry by the Council- 
as cited in S. Maccoby, "Reprisal as a Measure of Redress Short of War, " (Canibridge Law Journal 2, 
1926), p. 72. 673 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, p. 139. 
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coercion. 674 Also the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) retained the term "war". As a 
matter of fact, this Pact did not answer the question of the permissibility of the measures 
taken as measures "short of war". Since the problem was not expressly solved, a 
solution can only be found in the practice of states, especially in the Council of the 
League. This practice was clearly expressed in the Corfu Incident in 1923. It was 
occasioned by the occupation of the Greek Island of Corfu by an Italian cruiser, after the 
refusal of the Greek Government to agree to Italian demands, following the 
assassination of an Italian General by Greek citizens on Greek soil. After the 
occupation, the Italian Government sent the Greek Govenunent a note stating that the 
occupation was of a temporary character and there was no intention of an act of war. 675 
After the subject was referred to the Council of the League, it in turn, requested an 
advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice. The question was, 
"are measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute acts of war consistent with 
the terms of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant when they are taken by one member of 
the League of Nations against another member of the League without prior recourse to 
the procedure laid down in those articles? , 676 The Court replied that the consistency of 
such measures with the Covenant would depend on "all circumstances of the case. ', 677 
The point of present emphasis is that neither the Council nor the jurists considered that 
the taking of anned. reprisals was necessarily outside the scope of the articles of the 
Covenant, even if they were not regarded as a recourse to war; instead, the standard of 
the prior recourse to non-violent procedures was still the test. For example, it can be 
considered that certain measures "short of war" could be inconsistent with the 
674 Madorie Millace Whiteman, "Legal Regulation of Use of Force; Measures of Redress; Peacekeeping 
Machinery; and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, " (Digest ofInternational Law 12,197 1), p. 5-6. 
675 F. X. De Lima, Intenention in International Law with Reference to the Organisation of American 
States, (Den Haag: Uitgeverij Pax Nederland, 197 1), p. 3 1. 
676 H. Briggs, p. 961. 
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provisions of the Covenant. 678 Further discussions followed wherein the representative 
of Uruguay in the Council considered that forcible reprisal by one state "should be 
excluded without taking account of the description of these measures given by the states 
applying them. ', 679 Ultimately the Italian occupation was ended through international 
pressure, an interesting contrast with the later failure of the League effectively to 
respond to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. 
The important point is that the League of Nations brought into existence the prior 
recourse to non-violent procedures as a standard before the recourse to war, and that 
reprisals, as measures of short war, were included in this standard, which was developed 
by the practice of the Council and the PCIJ. 
The reprisal issue was re-examined in the award given in the Naidilaa Arbitration in 
1928. This arbitration is generally considered to be the most authoritative statement 
reflecting customary international law upon reprisals. This arbitration arose after the 
killing of three Genuans at a Portuguese colonial frontier post when they were entering 
Portuguese territory. This provoked the Gennans to take reprisals, and they invaded the 
Portuguese territory. The Gennan-Portuguese Arbitration Tribunal laid down the 
requirements for reprisals to be legal. The first requirement is a prior illegal act by a 
state. Secondly, prior to the recourse to reprisals, the state must have made an adequate 
attempt to obtain redress for the illegal act which was committed by that state, a 
requirement which reflects the standard which was generated by the Covenant. Thirdly, 
the reprisal should not be excessive. 680 The UN Charter did not include in its provision 
either the word "reprisal" or "retaliation. " In the light of this fact, it would be necessary 
to study its legality relying on the implied meaning in the Charter, supported by state 
677 Ibid., p. 962. 
678 F. De lima, p. 32. 
679 H. Briggs, p. 962. 
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practice, and the opinions ofjurists and tribunals. A point of present emphasis is that the 
United Nations Charter was drafted with the intention of improving upon the League 
Covenant and practice with particular reference to the failures of the 1930s. 
Accordingly, the wording of its articles is important in this respect and should be 
examined with care, to verify whether reprisals were prohibited within the meaning of 
the general prohibition upon aggressive resort to force in Article 2(4) of the Charter. The 
first point observed is that the Charter discarded the phrase "resort to war" as used in the 
League Covenant and employed instead the phrase "the threat or use of force. " In other 
articles it has used the phrases "threat to peace ... .. breach of the peace" and "act of 
aggression. " Consequently, the Charter did not only mean "war" as the highest degree of 
hostility, but also measures "short of war", thus including measures of self-help. 681 
The second point to be considered is that the coercion should not be directed against 
"the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. " The phrase territorial integrity 
means the effective control of state officials over certain geographic bases, and the 
people there located. 682 Other states are required not to curtail such sovereignty. The 
phrase "political independence" means the freedom of decision-making. 683 So, other 
states are required not to impair the decision-making capacity of the state. That is, the 
state must not be coerced through the threat or use of force to take any action which it 
would not otherwise take. Regarding the phrase, "or in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations", these are stated in Article I (I) of the Charter as being 
680 jUjiUS Stone, Legal Controls ofInternational Conflict, (New York: Garland, 1973), p. 290. 
681 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, p. 143. See also Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United 
Nations, p. 104. In the post Second World War era the term "war" has severely been abandoned in favour 
of "armed conflict". See also McCoubrey and White, International Laiv and Armed Conflict, p. 190-95. 
See also Christopher Greenwood, "The Concept of War in Modem International Law, " (International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 36,1987), p. 285. 
682 Ibid., p. 177. 
683 Ibid. 
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"to maintain international peace and security; to take collective measures for the 
prevention and the removal of threat of peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of peace. ', 684 It might be argued that the use of force which 
is not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state is not 
contrary to the obligation of Article 2(4) by adopting a strictly literal interpretation. 
Following the discussion at San Francisco, however, it would be clear that these phrases 
were introduced at the insistence of the smaller states as a specific guarantee that force 
should not be used by the strong states in violation of the "territorial integrity and 
political independence" of the weaker states. 685 The UN Charter has created a 
centralised system by giving the Security Council the authority to determine the 
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Art. 39), on 
the one hand. It is also authorised to decide the measures that should be taken to prevent 
an "aggravation of the situation" (Art. 40,41 and 42). These enforcement actions have 
the character of sanctions. In this way, it must seem that the power of sanctions no 
longer belongs to the state. It is only for the Security Council to deten-nine and to take or 
authorise the appropriate measures. Because of this, many writers have accepted the 
illegality of reprisals in international law. 686 
The important question which now comes to mind is, does the right of self-defence 
include reprisal actions? The classic reply is that self-defence does not include 
retaliation. But at the same time, there is a minority who believe that the victim state 
could take reprisal actions, with the proviso that such actions should be limited and 
fulfil certain conditions. There is, in the classic view, a great difference between self- 
defence and retaliation, but under the liberal interpretation, there is in fact little or no 
684 Ian. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 3. 
685 Goodrich and E. Hambro, Charter ofthe United Nations. p. 103. 
681, Ian. Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofForce by States, p. 268. 
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difference. If we limit the right of self-defence as a response to attack, this gives us two 
options; reprisal or defensive war. Again, if we reject reprisals, and we set limits and 
conditions such as proportionality, on the right of self-defence, this may be argued 
dangerously to weaken legitimate responses to aggression. The problem here, is that 
reprisal is ultimately difficult to separate from the right of self-defence, on the basis that 
reprisal is at least closely linked with it. It is recognised that reprisals include acts of 
retaliation on the part of the state as a response to prior unlawful action from another 
state. Because of this, it includes some limited answer on the basis of an aggression or 
fault which has already happened. This, to some degree, reflects the traditional lex 
talionis principle - "an eye for an eye. " In the area of peaceful dispute resolution this 
retains real point, for example, in "tit for tat" trade sanctions. Reprisals are not intended 
here to fix or repair that which has already been attacked or faced aggression, because 
such endeavours fall manifestly within the remit of Security Council action under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. In the legal meaning, reprisal is an illegal act, carried out to 
punish the aggressorwho began this aggression. The International Law Commission has 
drawn a line between anned reprisals and self-defence on the basis of the concept that 
the aim of reprisals is always punitive rather than defensive 687 , and they take place "after 
the event and when the ham-i has already been inflicted". 688 
Generally, reprisal should be an extraordinary and isolated action. Moreover, reprisal 
does not give the victim state the right to launch a full scale military attack - which 
would clearly violate article 2(4) of the Charter. The important idea about reprisal, that 
must be understood, is that reprisal has strict limits and it comes as a response to a prior 
hostile action. Walzer' explained its nature thus: 
687 Report of the International Law Commission, 32nd Session, (Yearbook of the Intenlational Law 
Commission, 198041) p. 1,53-4. 
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"Soldiers engaged in a reprisal raid Nvill cross an international boundary, but they Nvill quickly cross 
back; they will act destructively, but only up to a point; they Nvill violate sovereignty, but they will 
also respect it. "689 
Reprisals occur in both peacetime and wartime. Reprisals, armed conflict, which can be 
characterised as "first of all an act violating one or another of the laws of war, ', 690 may 
be legitimated, as a result of unlawful action by the other side, although not to the point 
of violating basic humanitarian norms. 69 1 Thus, the right of reprisal may be abused, for 
example by targeting civilians by bombardment and mistreatment of war prisoners. As a 
result of this, the use of reprisal in wartime is in reality a use of force as a punishment 
for the violation of wartime rules. 692 Of more concern for the present purpose is 
peacetime reprisal. Reprisal in peacetime may sometimes include military attack, short 
term occupation of territory, economic embargo, blockade, seizure of property and 
harassment or expulsion of foreign nationals. 693 
Reprisal usually comes after prior conduct which is considered as an act of aggression 
by accepted rules. The main aim of the state which puts reprisal into practice should be 
punishment to deter any future aggression. The response to the aggression is intended to 
give a long-life lesson. It is clear that reprisal has a warning role "to induce a delinquent 
688 Derek W Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, " (American Journal ofInternational 
Law 66,1972), p. 3. 
689 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 22 1. 
690 Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 197 1), p. 367. 
691 See Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 13-14. 
692 Kalshoven took a more extreme approach, Nvhen he considered that belligerent reprisals ought to be 
seen as mechanisms of law-enforcement. His view was that the reprisal state can change the laws of war. 
See Kalshoven p. 367-8. 
693 Robert A. Friedlander, "Retaliation as an Anti-Terrorist Weapon : The Israeli Lebanon Incursion and 
International Law, " (Israeli Yearbook on Hunian Rights 81,1978), p. 71. From his side Onuf considered 
that reprisals do not need the use of force, but in reality they usually use force in international conflicts. 
See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Reprisals: Ritual, Rules, Rationales, " (Research Monograph No. 41, 
Princeton, NJ: Centre for International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, July 1974), p. 6. 
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state to abide by the law in the flature. ' 694 Because of this, there is a connection with the 
aggressor through its punishment and, at the same time, it is an open message to any 
future aggressor, as to what the result of its actions will be. The role which reprisal has 
as an element of deterrence or prevention, makes it a legitimate weapon, as Walzer 
argued, though at the same time he refused to accept that the main aim of reprisal is 
punishment. 695 Many other writers consider that the punishment element in reprisal 
action is not limited to the purpose of deterrence only. Ceadel recognises reprisal action 
as a controversial and disputed area, because the retaliatory action appears "to place the 
punishment of an aggressor before the ostensible first priority of a defensive 
operation. "696 During wartime, sometimes, the role of reprisal does not appear, because 
it is difficult to separate it from the general war effort. From a historical point of view, 
reprisal can be considered as a legitimate instrument in state hands, as a kind of self- 
help in response to any kind of aggression short of declaring war. 697 The right of reprisal 
is usually "granted on the grounds of necessity, to take the law into one's own hand. "698 
Reprisal is used to recover seized goods, to obtain compensation for damage to people, 
property and reputation. The result is that reprisal has become a legitimate instrument to 
achieve requests and demands through "law enforcement" in a decentralised 
international system. 699 Tucker considered capability to enforce the law, as the basis on 
which the legality of reprisal action should be evaluated. He commented that, "more 
often than not the independent use of force by states has served the purposes of law 
694 Robert W Tucker, "Reprisals and Self-Defence: The Customary Law, " (American Journal of 
International Law 66,1972), p. 59 1. 
695 Walzer's conception that reprisal action is not punishment gives to the view that it is legitimate. But it 
is unclear that they only experiential or none-punishment. 
696 That priority in Ceadel's view is: "the restoration of the status quo and the discouragement of future 
aggression7' Ceadel p. 8 1. 
697 Goodrich, Simons and Patricia. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, p. 348. 
698 Johannes de Legnano, Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello, 1360, cited in Joachim Von 
Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, " (American Journal of 
International Laiv 33,193 9), p. 673. 
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. ý)700 During the Arab-Israeli conflict, there were many reprisal actions, especially as the 
nature of that dispute led to retaliation actions. The Middle East had already suffered 
many events from wars to civil wars, but reprisal prevented the area from achieving 
peace or at least security settlement or measures. The situation in the Middle East is not 
a continuing military operation, but an intermediate position between peace and war, 
which Walzer called a "demi-monde" between peace and war, and what later became 
known as a "status mixtus". 701 Exactly the same thing applies to the Korean problem, 
because the situation there, from 1950 to the present, has been between peace and war. 
The main difference, is that North Korea uses long-range missile technologies to gain 
political and economic assistance, mainly from Japan and South Korea. In this case, 
reprisal is used for political blackmail. 
However, it is important to note that there is an overlap between reprisal and the right of 
self-defence. Both of them have the same construction. Both must be a response to an 
prior attack, and in both cases, attempts should be made to mend the damage before 
resorting to the use of force. 702 Moreover, both, traditionally are controlled by the same 
standards of necessity and proportionality. In the case of connecting the standard of 
necessity with a proposed right of self-defence, it is usually connected with the tenns 
imminence or immediacy, because it is here more a expressive standard than a real one. 
On the other hand, in the case of linking the standard of necessity with reprisal, firstly 
this requires the repriser to try to remedy the damage, and to set a limited time for such 
efforts before resorting to force. 703 The standard of proportionality is not very helpful, 
699 This was the view of Kelsen. 
70() Tucker cited in Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 22 1. 
701 The traditional view considers that there is no inten-nediary position between peace and war. In the 
middle of the twentieth century, many states reconsidered this division. For more information see Philip C. 
Jessup, "Should International Law Recognise As Intermediate status between Peace and War?, " 
(Anzerican Join-nal ofInternational Law 48,1954), p. 98-102. 
702 Bowett, "Reprisals", p. 3. 
703 Dinstein, Mar, Aggression and Sej(-Defence, p. 207. 
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because both the right of self-defence and reprisal are susceptible to ambiguities in this 
regard, and it is important to mention that some terms such as "reprisal self-defence" 
and "defensive retaliation. " increase that ambigUitYI04 Many authorities focus on the 
time at which the action happened, to decide whether it was a defensive act or reprisal. 
From a traditional view, reprisal is not the same as defence, because it comes after prior 
damage, which means that "harm has already been inflicted. 705 
After World War II the main tendency was to consider reprisal or retaliation actions 
illegal . 
706 It iS important to remember again that the UN Charter did not in any way 
mention reprisal. The mainstream view concerning reprisal considers it from the 
perspective of the general prohibition of Article 2(4). 707 Holders of this view regard 
enforcement actions authorised under article 42 and exercise of the right of self-defence 
in Article 51 as the only exceptions to Article 2(4). They argue that if the right to 
reprisal is permitted, this right should be explicit in the Charter. From this viewpoint, 
self-defence is legitimate but reprisal is not. Indeed, many Security Council resolutions 
frankly denounced some reprisal actions which the Council examined. The General 
Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States maintained that "states have a duty to refrain 
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. ', 708 
Moreover, the International Law Commission in 1980 made a distinction between 
reprisal and the right of self-defence on the basis that reprisals are disciplinary and not 
defensive. 709 In the Beirut raid in 1968, Israel claimed that its action was a retaliation for 
704 In discussing the legality of reprisals, Schachter relinquishes the first term for the second; See Oscar 41 Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force, " (Michigan Law Review 82,1984) p. 163 8. 
705 Bowett, "Reprisals, " p. 3. 
706 Ibid, p. 2. 
707 Ibid, p. 2. 
708 Res. 2625, adopted 24 October 1970. Reprinted in United Nations Resolutions, ed. by Dusan J. 
Donovich, (Series I, General Assembly, Vol. XIII, 1970-72), p. 338. 
709 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Sel(-Defence, p. 207. 
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an attack by two Arabs, two days earlier, on December 26, upon an El Al passenger 
plane at Athens Airport. 710 Israel regarded its reprisal action as legitimate, because it 
saw Lebanon as having given freedom of movement in Lebanon to the Palestinian 
Popular Front, of which the aggressors at Athens Airport were members, and they came 
from Lebanon. Therefore Israel held Lebanon culpable of participation in that terrorist 
aet. 
711 
Theoretically, the right of self-defence comes as a response, and after a prior aggression. 
Because of this, the restricted interpretation of Article 51 allows military action and 
recognises it as legal and legitimate only if it comes as a response to a prior attack. This 
association between the right of self-defence or reprisal and time, however, is complex 
because as Ceadel argues, it is difficult to find a defensive weapon to act in "pure 
interception", especially in these days, with the spread of mass-destruction weapons. 
Ceadel also recognises as defensive actions "counter-attacks or retaliations carried out 
,, 712 as soon as possible aftenvards. For example in 1964 the British Government claimed 
that its attack on barracks in Yemen, "was not a retaliation or reprisal" because there 
was: 
4$a clear distinction to be drawn between two forms of self-help. One, which is of a retributive or 
punitive nature, is termed 'retaliation' or 'reprisals'; the other, which is expressedly contemplated 
and authorised by the Charter, is self-defence against armed attack. The term 'counter-attack' has 
perhaps led to some misunderstanding. But it is clear that the use of armed force to repel or prevent 
an attack-i. e. legitimate action of a defensive nature-may sometimes have to take the form of a 
counter-attack. ' M3 
But, unfortunately most of the attempts to distinguish between the right of self-defence 
and reprisal are based on misapprehension. Generally, the right of self-defence in law, in 
literature or common life, is recognised as an essential right, to achieve aims and 
710 Richard A Falk, "The Beirut Raid And The International Law of Retaliation, " (American Journal of 
International Lcnv 63,1969), p. 416. 
711 Ibid., p. 420-21. 
712 Ceadel, p. 8 1. 
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interests on behalf of which one is always allowed to fight. Reprisal, on the other hand, 
is a private type of fight, and the aim here is different from the aim which self-defence 
tries to achieve. It is relevant here to consider the pragmatist theory. Pragmatists demand 
that reprisal should viewed from the perspective that, in many cases, reprisal actions 
have been overlooked or, at least, subject to minimal criticism. In their view, this 
indicates that reprisals have some justification or even legality. Reprisal, from this point 
of view, should be considered as a significant instrument to protect interests, to which 
the international security arrangements did not give enough security. From this point of 
view, these pragmatics propose abandoning the unproductive effort to distinguish 
between self-defence and reprisal, and instead emphasising the distinction between 
reprisal actions that are defensive and therefore legitimate, and those that are not. 714 
This, however, needs a flexible concept of the right of self-defence, which includes 
reprisal within it. 715 This interface between the right of self-defence and reprisal does 
not necessarily lead to approval of reprisal, because it will lead to increased suspicion 
about the right of self-defence. The main way to distinguish defensive action from 
reprisal, relies on the objective. Punitive reprisal aims to prohibit any future attacks, 
while illegal reprisal's purpose is to punish past infringements. 716 The main element 
which unites both those who support and those to criticise reprisal action, is their refusal 
to consider revenge as a lawful goal. Ceadel mentions the punishment character which 
reprisals have, on the grounds that it is a source of disagreement, and he means here the 
surplus injury or harm which exceeds the limit of what is necessary to deter future 
aggression. Bowett, Falk and Tucker considered prevention and also deterrence as 
713 Statements of the UK Representative, UN, SCOR, 19th Year, 1109th mtg. 7 April 1964, para 26. 
714 Bowett, Falk, Schachter and Tucker all of them had begunwith this approach. 
7 15 Bowett has a different view from Tucker and Schachter. He favours considering the right of self- 
defence and reprisal as independently separate, and he argues that self-defence should not become over- 
flexible. 
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legitimate means of reprisal and different from pure punishment. Walzer keenly 
supported the use of reprisal in international relations, because he considered that 
reprisal eventually would achieve "deterrence without retribution. ', 717 
It is clear that these writers deal with the positive side of reprisal, and view the 
employment of a military action as a quantifiable one. However, the intention of reprisal 
is difficult to confirm, and to separate from military actions. The success of defensive 
action does not prevent achieving revenge, and the existence of a reprisal intention only 
does not mean that the action is non-defensive. Reprisal for punishment has been 
criticised by many, and military action cannot fix or restore damage which has already 
occurred, such as lives or property that have already been destroyed. Moreover, its 
objective is not to prevent or deter future aggression. As a result of this, punishment 
reprisal is considered as an inexcusable and extreme use of force. The problem is how to 
separate the necessity from the use of force. During the Cold War in nearly all reprisal 
incidents, the main claim made in justification of these actions was that they were 
undertaken to prevent future aggression. If legitimacy is given to reprisal action on the 
basis of defensive reasons, the question then arises, how much and what type of force is 
necessary to prevent or deter future aggression. The amount of power which should be 
applied usually depends on the idea of proportionality. The general view is that the 
action should be limited to what is necessary for accomplishment of the basic security 
aims or objectives, without any gratuitous han-n. Defensive reprisal is different, because 
no future threat exists; in consequence, its only aim is revenge. Defensive action applies 
to a threat which is present, but not manifest in attack. However, many reprisal actions 
after World War 11 exceeded the limits of proportionality with the prior attack, to the 
716 BoNvett, "Reprisals, " p. 3. Also see Robert W Tucker, "Reprisals and Self-Defence: The Customary 
Law, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 66,1972), p. 589. 
717 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 209. 
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stage of inflicting gratuitous hann. The important question which needs to be answered 
here, is whether it is possible, through the proportionality measure, to determine the 
relationship between reprisal and the threat posed by the attacker. This difficulty arises, 
718 in both peacetime and wartime reprisal. The attempt to connect reprisal with the prior 
attack through harmony or proportionality, may limit the effectiveness of reprisal to 
deter future aggression. On the other hand, the link between reprisal and future threat, is 
likely to result in toleration of reprisal in excess of the prior attack. 719 
Generally, many things about reprisal are unclear; for example, the possibility and the 
nature of future threat, the efficacy of deterrence and also the expected behaviour of a 
particular enemy in response to modest or dramatic displays of force, and the reaction of 
allies and so on. 
"US bombers 'kill 100'in Libya raids "720 
In April 1986, two terrorist attacks occurred in Europe, which further damaged the 
relationship between the US and Libya. The first attack, on 2 April, was against a TWA 
acroplane, and resulted in four deaths. The second attack was against a night club in 
West Berlin, in which two American soldiers were killed, among many other casualties. 
In both attacks, allegations were made that Libya was responsible. 721 It is important to 
7 18 Both Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff understand proportionality to have two identities. First, they 
regard proportionality as a state's standard response to an aggression outside wartime. Second, it connects 
the actions of repriser (the victim) actions whether to its enemy's actions or to the anticipated value of its 
own action. See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Introduction by the Editors: In Documents oil the 
Laws of Mars, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 5. 
7 19 This logic has a background in the Christian theories of Just War. For more infon-nation see Judith Gail 
Gardam, "Proportionality and force in International Law, " (American Journal of International Law 87, 
1993), p. 391413. 
720 Headline, (Yhe Times, 16 April 1986), p. 1 
72 1 Anthony D'Amato, "Editorial Comment: The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising 
from The US Air Raid On Libya, " (American Journal of International Law 84,1990), p. 705. See also, 
for more discussion Stanmir A. Alexandrov, Sel(-Defence Against the Use of Force in International Law 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 184-86. 
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mention here, that the US Administration under the leadership of President Ronald 
Reagan, from the first moment he assumed office, in 1981, looked forward to a new 
development in American foreign policy, with regard to use of force, because until that 
time the US had been suffering from "Vietnam trauma. " This does not mean that the US 
Administration wanted to enter new wars or conflicts, but it believed in the utility of 
limited military force as an integral part of a coercive diplomatic strategy for bringing 
political pressure to bear on America's actual and perceived adversaries. 722 As a result 
of that clash with Libya, the US Administration achieved its desire to demonstrate 
through robust action its willingness forcefully to protect its interests. The Libyan 
Government threatened an outbreak of a retaliatory actions in Europe and in the United 
States. At the same time, the Libyan authorities placed foreign employees into the 
utilities or areas which it anticiPated that US would strike. 723 President Reagan accused 
Colonel Qaddafl, as he had already announced a war against the United States, and as a 
result of that Reagan continued, "We're going to defend ourselves and we're certainly 
going to take action in the face of specific terrorist threats. 9,724 What is significant here is 
that the US considered its policy against Libya as an "exercise of its right of self- 
defence. ', 725 In respect of the US right of self-defence, President Reagan asserted, "Self- 
defence is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission 
undertaken tonight -a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter. , 
726 
Reagan recalled his promise to fight terrorism when he presented each US hit as "a 
722 Jentleson W. Bruce, "The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than 
Remarking Governments, " (Political Science Quarterly 106,199 1), p. 57. 
723 Edward Schumacher, "Libya to Put Foreigners in Army Bases, " (New York Tinies, 13 April 1986), 
p. 18. In the event of armed conflict this Nvould have amounted to an unlawful "human shield" policy, 
equivalent to that of Iraq in 1990-91. 
724 See President Reagan News Conference, (New York Tinies, 10 April 198 6), p. 22. 
725 "American Bombers Targets in Libya, " (Alew York Tinies, 15 April 1986), p. 10. 
726 See "Transcript of Address by Reagan on Libya, " (New York Times, 15 April 1986), p. 10. See also, D. 
J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 913. 
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single engagement in a long battle against terrorism. ', 727 Later Reagan said on T. V. "Our 
evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable. , 728 
The US claimed that its aim in its clash with Libya was to paralyse or stunt the Libyan 
Government's activity in supporting and financing terrorist movements. Because of this, 
the US Government considered its action as necessary and proportional to the Libyan 
aggression. The Americans knew that their options against Libya were limited. US 
aeroplanes could not damage Libyan oil fields or the oil refineries, since South 
European countries needed oil from Libya, and also, US Arab allies in the Middle East, 
and even the US public opinion, would not accept an invasion of Libyan tenitory. 729 
Some preferred to view the US raids against Libya as having a deterrent influence on 
any future terrorist attacks; othenvise, the raids would be pure reprisal. But Walzer 
disagreed with this, because he considered that a clear oppression of the victim was part 
of a prior attack. 
"The ground of reprisal is not its overall effectiveness, it is the right, in the difficult conditions of 
the demi-monde, to seek certain effects. So long as the conditions exist, the right must also exist, 
even if those same conditions ... make 
it unlikely that rightfiil action will have entirely satisfactory 
consequences ... whenever there 
is some substantial chance of success, it is the legitimate resort of 
,, 730 a victim state; for no state can be required passively to endure attacks upon its citizens. 
Also he argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not "suggest that peacetime reprisals 
make for peace, it also doesn't point to any alternative response to illegitimate 
attacks. )731 It is clear that Walzer preferred that the criterion of deterrence effect should 
be removed from any legal or moral judgement of reprisal action. 732 Therefore, Walzer 
defined the cases in which reprisal can be taken, when he said, 
727 See Bernard Weinraub, "Qaddafi is Warned, " (New York- Times, 16 April 1986), p. 1 
728 The 'Irrefutable Evidence, (7he Times, 16 April, 1986), p. 7. 
729 See (77ie Times, 16 April 1986), transcript of President Reagan's broadcast, p. 6. 
730 Walzer, Just and Utýusl Mars, p. 22 1. 
731 Ibid., p. 217. 
732 It is clear that Walzer attempted try to please critics when he used the expression, "chance of success" 
rather than a real judgement. Ibid, p. 207-22. 
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Reprisals are limited xvith reference to previous crime, not xvith reference to the crimes they are 
designed to deter (not Nvith reference to their effects or their hoped - for effectS).,, 
733 
In the case of focusing on past crimes only, the deterrence element in this case will be 
weak but when the element of prevention or deterrence is powerful, the defensive spirit 
will be high. After the US raids, doubts were raised about the legitimacy of those air 
raids, whether they were consistent with international law or even met the requirements 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter. This was clear, when Owen commented that, 
"there is considerable doubt whether the US was acting within both the spirit and the letter of 
international la%v. There has been far too much talk from President Reagan and others of retaliation, 
reprisal and revenge for this action to be convincingly described as one of self-defence under 
Article 5 1.034 
The point which needs highlighting, although we dealt with it at the end of Chapter Six, 
is the point of proportionality or harmony between the reaction (self-defence or reprisal), 
with the prior aggression. That reaction should not go beyond the level of the original 
aggression, and not be transformed itself into aggression, which is a formula that a huge 
state such as the United States can accept and does not go beyond. The US 
Administration, for example, depended on top secret sources, regarding the involvement 
of the Libyan government in terrorist attacks, which it is difficult to examine. 735 Tbe 
question should be, how it is possible for defensive reprisal not to exceed its liMitS? 
736 
Basically, there are two ways of considering proportionality. The first one is the 
restricted concept which judges reprisal action only against the prior aggression. It is, as 
Walzer called it, "backward-looking. " The essence of this trend is that the reaction does 
not go beyond the prior attack, and does not create excessive casualties. Falk supported 
this trend. He mentioned, as an example, the Arab-Israeli conflict, when Israeli forces 
733 Ibid., p. 211. BoNvett had the same understanding. Because sometimes reprisal actions enlarge the 
conflict, this Nvill not affect the legitimacy of the retaliation action. 
734 See David ONven, "Bombing is not the answer, " (77ie Times, 16 April 1986), p. 12. 
735 The "Irreftitable Evidence, " emphasis added. 
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destroyed 13 Arab aeroplanes: in Beirut Airport as a reprisal for the attack on its plane in 
Athens airport. Falk considered that attack to have badly damaged the Israeli case and 
supported the grounds of the Palestinian fighting groups. 737 The second tendency is the 
flexible concept, which seeks harmony between reprisal and the overall threat. This 
concept or line strengthens the position of open reprisal which need not be restricted by 
the scope of the prior attack. That means reprisal is transferred, in contrast to the lex 
talionis, from the eye to the rest of the body. Many support the view that the right of self 
-defence mayjustify that intensity of response. 
For example, if the Israeli raid is considered retaliation to the indirect Lebanese 
participation in the Athens attack, it was definitely disproportionate. But the Israeli raid 
could be considered as a response to Lebanon's permitting the forces of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine to use its territory and headquarters. The PFLP had, 
after the Athens incident, claimed the responsibility for that attack. It was also clear for 
a long time that this Palestinian group's first and last objective was to destroy the state 
of Israel, and establish a Palestinian state instead. 738 Moreover, history shows that the 
Israeli response did not hann civilians, and was carried out on empty planes; because of 
739 
this, it is possible to argue that this response was both understandable and limited. 
Some support for this flexible tendency may be found in academic writing. For example, 
Ago calls for respect and understanding of military necessities, which sometimes require 
that the response go beyond the limit of the prior attack. This was clear from his 
comment that 
"it would be mistaken ... to think that there must be proportionality 
between the conduct 
constituting the anned attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse the 
736 See Onuf considered proportionality as the main element of reprisal construction. 
737 See Falk, "The Beirut Raid And The International Law of Retaliation", p. 438-39. 
738 Ibid,. p. 433-34. 
739 After the Independence of State of Israel in 1948, the clashes between Arabs and Israelis were nearly 
daily, which contain or include small attacks, and the Israeli reprisal from the same seize, unless in some 
cases, such as the Qibya Raid of October 1953, and the Gaza Raid of February 1955. 
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attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. ... Its lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for achieving the desired result. "740 
Dinstein considered that the defensive response, by nature, need not be in precise 
harmony with the prior attack. The victim state should not be inhibited from using 
additional force, when or if the aggression was serious, or posed an exceptional 
danger. 74 1 But in reality, the issue of proportionality is still a matter of disagreement. 
Barboza, for instance, suggests that the concept of proportionality "means that the 
defensive action must not go beyond what is necessary in order to defeat the purpose of 
attack. "742 "An aggressor State may lose its appetite for continuing with the hostilities, 
but the defending State need not be so accommodating. "743 For example, Israel for a 
long time depended on the right of self-defence to justify use of force, which was in 
many cases refused by the Security Council of the UN and her actions were 
condemned. 744 Israel's defensive philosophy considered that the equilibrium of power in 
the Middle East depended basically on its continuing to justify its military actions on the 
basis of self-defence, because its existence as a state and nation were in serious danger. 
"Therefore ... all its military actions are essentially in the nature of self-defence. ', 
745 
Others developed an argument which mainly depends on the accumulation of the 
numbers of attacks; what is known as the explosion concept or the "accumulation of 
events" theory. 746 
740 Roberto Ago, "Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, " (Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Vol. 2,1980), p. 69. He continues that: "In fact, the requirement of the "necessity" and 
"proportionality" of the action taken in self-defence can simply be described as txvo sides of the same 
coin. " 
74 1 Dinstein War, Aggression and Set(ldefence, p. 217,219. 
742 Julio Barboza, "Necessity in International Law, " In: Essays in International Law in Honour ofJudge 
Manfred Lachs, ed. by J Makarczyk. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhaff Publishers, 19 84), p. 34. 743 Ibid. 
744 But other small reprisal actions by Israel Nvere not condemned by the Security Council. 
745 Bowett, "Reprisal, " p. 7. 746 Ibid, p. 10. 
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This concept is built on the basis of occurrence of a series of small assaults, individually 
not dangerous enough to warrant anned response. but reaching the stage of a "final and 
unforgivable needle prick, " which ultimately impels the victim to make a defensive 
reprisal' response. In this case, the hannony between the reprisal action and the prior 
aggression should be on the basis, overall, of these "individual minor infTactionS.,, 747 
The same idea was used in an attempt to support the American blockade against 
Nicaragua. 
Judge Schwebel. claimed that the Nicaraguan Government had supported small and 
individual activities by the El Salvador rebels and as a result, these actions in its total 
were "cumulatively tantamount to armed attack upon El Salvador. ', 748 In general, the 
concept of the "accumulation of events" theory could accomplish many aims. The first 
one is that it allows the repriser the right of disproportionality in response to the 
particular acts which pose a risk to its national security. The second is that the repriser 
state arguably gains a claim to act in exercise of the right of self-defence. Indeed, Ceadel 
states that many self-defence activities are in reality reprisal actions. Also, we can add 
Miller's comment, that "in reality, all exercises of self-defence consist in a pre-emptive 
strike. ', 749 Because of this, Bowett wonders "is the legality of the action to be 
detennined solely by reference to the prior illegal act which brought it about, or by 
reference to the whole context of the relationship between the two states? 750 The 
Security Council has usually favoured retaliation actions being in small and individual 
in scale. 751 The Security Council, when it has condemned reprisal actions, has based its 
747 Norman Menachem. Feder, "Reading the United Nations Charter Connotatively: Toward a new 
Definition of Armed Attack, " p. 415,416. 748 Ibid., p. 415. 
749 Edward Miller, "Self-Defence, International Law, and the Six Day War, " (Israel Lcnv Revieiv 20, 
1985), p. 13. 
750 Bowett, "Reprisal, " p. 4. 
75 1 Here there is a weakness in the Security Council approach, because small conflicts could easily 
escalate into major conflicts. Keeping international peace and security should be the first aim for the 
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disapproval upon their being disproportionate and undertaken as pure revenge. 752 
Bowett concludes that "the Council will not look to the whole context of the action so as 
to ... accept the plea of self-defence in the face of continuing and repeated threats which, 
unless countered, will recur. , 753 The fears of the Security Council and its wish that 
reprisal actions remain small in size may be understandable, but it is hard to accept that 
the Security Council does not consider events in depth and does not study the reasons 
for long conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The 
Council usually resorts to taking decisions, rather than action. This gives a wrong 
message, that exercise of force on a small scale in a conflict, may be acceptable. Many 
times, the Security Council has condemned Israel's policy of military reprisal, as in the 
Qana incident in South Lebanon in 1996, but all the Council's decisions are still 
decisions and nothing has been done. This will reduce the power and prestige of the 
754 Council . Also, it is worth mentioning, that in 1982 when the Lebanese Forces 
[Phalangist Unit] committed the massacre of Shatilla and Sabra Camps, the Israeli help 
to the Lebanese Forces and indirect responsibility were clear, but the Security Council 
did not take any actions against Israel or even establish an international Committee to 
investigate that massacre. 755 
Security Council, whether the conflict is small or huge. It is to some degree the same as the situation in 
Chechnya, where the international legitimacy is absent with thousands of innocent people dying there, and 
that legitimacy was available few months before when NATO used power in Kosovo for humanitarian 
purposes. 
752 In Bowett's understanding, the legitimate response (defence), should take enough time before acting 
against the aggression. "Were this not so, the whole basis of military planning, such as one finds in NATO 
and other military pacts would be suspect. " Bowett, "Reprisal, " p. 7. The same applies the British air 
attacks on Yemeni position in 1964, and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964, both of these incidents were 
questionable as to their legitimacy. 753 Ibid., p. 7. 
754 On Tuesday April 18,1996 Israel shelled UIFIL's Fiji BATT compound in the village of Qana, a few 
kilometres south east of Tyre. Around 800 civilians had taken refuge at the base. Israelis targeted the base 
in retaliation for the Hizballah attack on one of their special forces groups. The result was that over 100 
civilians were killed. 
755 For more information see G. I. A. D Draper, Reflections on Law and Arnied Conflicts: 7he Selected 
Morks on the Laws of Mar by the Late Professor Colonel G. L, 4. D. Draper, OBE, eds. by Michael A. 
Meyer and Hilaire McCoubrey (London: Kluwer International Law, 1998), p. 269-82. 
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"US Strikes Iraqfor Plot to Kill Bush , 756 
"Revenge raids by cruise missiles on targets in Sudan andAfghanistan , 757 
The Gulf War (1990-9 1) left unresolved a number of important differences between the 
United States and Iraq. Iraq viewed the United States as responsible for the death and 
destruction inflicted by the coalition in 1991. Saddam Hussein, who remained in power, 
nursed a great personal hatred for the country that led the coalition that had just defeated 
him in battle. 758 In turn, the United States viewed Hussein as an irrational desPot who 
threatened the security of the entire Gulf region, and it argued in the United Nations for 
the maintenance of economic sanctions, a no-fly zone, and a rigorous weapons 
inspection team. All these were viewed by Iraq as primarily US initiatives, which 
resulted in ftirther deterioration in relations between the two nations. Within this context 
the United States and its (at that time) newly elected president, Bill Clinton, were again 
faced with the question how to respond to Iraqi aggression. In May 1993, just months 
after Clinton had assumed office, reports began to surface that Iraqi agents had plotted 
to assassinate former president George Bush. The Kuwait government arrested sixteen 
individuals, including eleven Iraqi nationals, 759 on charges that they had conspired to 
assassinate Bush with a car bomb during his visit to Kuwait on 14 April 1993.760 
The Kuwaitis also seized two cars with remote-control devices and several hundred 
pounds of explosives. The Kuwaiti government announced that the group of terrorists 
had been made confessed that they worked for the Iraqi intelligence service. 761 Also, at 
756 Headline, (TVashington Post, June 27 June 1993), p. 1 
757 Headline, (17ze Times, August 21 1998), p. 1 
758 See Christine Gray, "After the Cease-fire: Iraq, The Security Council And The Use of Force, " (The 
British Year Book ofInternational Law 65,1994). 
759 See (Keesing's Record of WorldEvents 39), 1993, p. 39487. 
760 See Douglas Jehl, "US Convinced Iraqi Saboteurs Plotted to Kill Bush, " (New York Times, 8 May 
1993), p. 1. 
761 See (Keesing's 1993), p. 39487. 
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this point it was claimed that there was evidence that the bomb to have been used was of 
Iraqi design and origin. 762 Here, facing domestic pressure to take strong action, ' 
President Clinton's options were limited: Saddam Hussein was already isolated, there 
were no diplomatic measures that would punish him meaningfully, and severe economic 
sanctions were already in place. Although the agents who were actually to have carried 
out the plot would be tried by the Kuwaiti courts, there was no legal recourse with 
respect to the Iraqi leadership. Faced with the choice between doing nothing and using 
force, President Clinton approved a retaliatory cruise missile attack against the Iraqi 
intelligence service headquarters. 763 
On June 27 1993 the destroyer USS Peterson (DD969) in the Red Sea and the cruiser 
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) in the Gulf fired a total of twenty-three Tomahawk cruise 
missiles at the headquarters, in downtown Baghdad. Twenty of the missiles hit and 
heavily damaged the headquarters complex; the other three missed the target and struck 
in the neighbourhoods around it, damaging homes and killing many innocent people. 764 
The United States justified the missile attacks on Baghdad as an act of self-defence 
permitted under Article 51 of the United Charter. 765 President Clinton told the American 
people on the evening of the raid that: 
"[T]he Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all 
Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our nation go unanswered. ... A fmn 
and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those 
engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the 
expectation of civilised behaviour among nation. ', 766 
762 Douglas Jehl, "US Cites Evidence in a Plot on Bush, " (New York Times, 9 May 1993), p. I- 
763 Stephen Labaton, "Congressmen Urge Action If Iraq Hatched Plot to Assassinate Bush, " (New York 
Times, 10 May 1993), p. 1. See also Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Tells FBI He Led Attempt to Kill Bush, US 
officials Say, " (New York Times, May 20 1993), p. 1. 
764 See Gwen Ifill, "US Fires Missiles at Baghdad, Citing April Plot to Kill Bush, " New York Times, June 
27 1993), p. 1. 
765 See D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 913-14. 
766 See (7he Times, 28 June 1993), p. 2. See also Louis Henkin, "Notes from The President: The Missile 
Attack on Baghdad And Its Justification, " (7be American Society ofInternational Law Newsletter 3, June- 
August, 1993), p. 12-13. 
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Also, in a gesture aimed at winning international support, the American delegate to the 
United Nations, Madeleine Albright, presented to a special session of the UN Security 
Council the evidence that the United States had been legally justified in conducting the 
767 strike. Albright argued that the US action had been an act of self-defence, permissible 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The decision by the Clinton White House to present 
its case before the UN was a clear attempt to seize the political high ground and to avoid 
international criticism. 768 General Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff, claimed that the action was appropriate, proportional, and consistent with Article 
51 of the Charter. 769 Moreover, Powell emphasised the readiness of Pentagon for any 
reaction by President Saddam Hussein. He said, "We have lots [of missiles] and they 
have lots of targets. "770 There was support from America's European allies for the 
missile strike. There was some criticism from Arab governments, but opposition quickly 
evaporated. The US strike generated little sympathy for Saddam Hussein. 771 It did not 
enhance his standing in the Arab world, nor did it alienate the United States from either 
its European allies or the Arabs. 772 
From his side, the Iraqi foreign minister in a letter to the Security Council demanded an 
immediate condemnation of the American action. He asserted that the US action was a: 
"totally unjustified act of aggression [that] has left a large number of dead and wounded among the 
Iraqi civilian population, including women and children. This was a deliberate terrorist act 
perpetrated by the Government of the United States of America on grounds -which were spurious 
767 See Richard Bernstein, "US Presents Evidence to UN Justifying Its Missile on Iraq, " (New York Times, 
June 28 1993), p. 1 
768 Madeleine Albright indicated that "a direct attack on the United States, an attack that required a direct 
United States response [and to which we] responded directly, as we are entitled to do, under Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter, which provides for the exercise of self-defence in such cases, " cited in Dino 
Kritsiotis, "The Legality of The 1993 US Missile Strike on Iraq And The Right of Self-Defence in 
International Law, "(International and Comparative Laiv Quarterly, vol. 45,1996), p. 163. 
769 See Michael Reisman, "The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and Implications, " 
(European Jounial ofInternational Law 5,1994), p. 12 1. 
770 See The Times (June 28,1993), p. 1. 
771 See (Keesing's, 1993), p. 3953 1. 
772 For more infon-nation concerning the international reaction on the missile strike see Kritsiotis, p. 164- 
65. 
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and unjustified, concocted by the American authorities Nvith the complicity of the leaders of 
KuNvait. ' 773 
The prohibition of the use of force by states became a major principle after 1945, which 
enshrined in the UN Charter, has survived manifest violations during the Cold War 
years. In the Gulf War the UN and coalition powers dedicated themselves to a 
reaffirmation of the Charter and defeated the invasion of Kuwait. The US attack on Iraq 
places this success in jeopardy. Obviously, in this case, there was no UN authorisation 
774 
and the Iraqi population was placed in danger, rather than being protected. The right 
of self-defence which was invoked by the Clinton administration, offers no justification. 
The Charter says the right to self-defence can only be invoked by an anned attack. Even 
if it is admitted that self-defence may be invoked to protect nationals abroad, as was the 
case when Israel rescued mostly Israeli hostages held in Entebbe in 1976, in this case 
there was no actual or imminent threat and remedies other than the use of force are 
available. The plot against President Bush had failed, the alleged conspirators were in 
custody in Kuwait, and it has not been claimed that Iraq was about to launch another 
terrorist attack against America. If self-defence is not applicable, then the only other 
possible justifications might be reprisal and retaliation. Retaliation is merely punitive in 
character. 775 As a result, as long as international law remains in its present state, States 
which perceive themselves as aggrieved will consider armed force the only realistic 
response to States which engage in terrorist activities against them, and will invariably 
rely on their inherent right of self-defence to win the argument in international law. The 
United States did so to general acclaim in June 1993, in what can only be described as 
773 Cited in Kritsiots, p. 163. 
774 See Jill Sherman, "Labour Questions Legality of US Attack, " (77ie Times, 28 June 1993), p. 1. John 
Smith, the Labour leader said the US action it should have been sanctioned by the United Nations Security 
Council. 
775 For more debate see Alexandrov, Setr-Defence Against the Use ofForce in International Lmv, p. 186- 
88. See also, Christopher Walker, "Bitter Iraq Sought Vengeance, " (77ie Tinies, 28 June 1993), p. 2. 
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an unhealthy development for international law generally, because the enterprise of self- 
help represented as an action in self-defence, reared its ugly head once again. Unless and 
until the international community improves the mechanisms for settling such disputes 
satisfactorily, and there is an urgent need to do so, the right of self-defence will continue 
to be a regular point of refuge in the practice of States. 
In the 1990s a new terrorist threat to United States interests emerged, actions sponsored 
by an Islamic extremist, Osama bin Laden. The son of a Saudi billionaire, bin Laden had 
gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets alongside the nnýaheddin. Over 
time, bin Laden had built up a quasi-military organisation that had become militant and 
dedicated to driving Western influences out of the Arab world. The group, which 
became known as "Al Qaida, " the Base 776 , remained in the shadows, but its cells 
operated throughout the Middle East. Although Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi 
Arabia following the war in Afghanistan, he was exiled in 1991 after he began his 
radical campaign against the United States. 777 With his group of guerrilla fighters and 
his considerable wealth, estimated by some at over $300 million, bin Laden quietly 
began a war of terrorism against the West and the United States in particular. Operating 
primarily out of the rural regions of Afghanistan and Sudan, he provided funding, 
support, and training for groups willing to strike out against the United States. He 
allegedly assisted terrorist groups in buying weapons, equipment and computers, and he 
financed terrorist training camps in Sudan. He was also suspected of having provided 
support to the terrorists arrested in the 1993 bombing of New York's World Trade 
Centre and funding the warlords in Somalia that battled US military troops in 1993. 
Bin Laden was different from other state-sponsored terrorists. He was personally 
secretive and seldom seen and his terrorist organisation was not dependent on, or 
776 http: //ivxv%v. ict. oriý. i 
208 
concerned with achieving the aims of, any single state; instead, it was driven by 
fundamentalist religious objectives. A former CIA official wrote that Osama bin 
Laden's group, 
"such as it is, is unlike any other. It has no real headquarters and no fixed address to target. It is a 
coalition of like-minded warriors living in exile from their homes in Egypt, the Sudan, Pakistan and 
other Islamic nations riven by religious and political battles. The bin Laden organisation is global 
and stateless, according to the United States intelligence analyses, more theological than political, 
driven by a millennial vision of destroying the United States, driving all Western influences from 
the Arab Nvorld, abolishing the boundaries of the Islamic nations and making them one, without 
borders. 99778 
In 1996, frustrated by the continued presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden 
called for a holy war against them. He is suspected of having supported the 1995 
bombing of a building in Riyadh used by the American military, killing seven people, 
and the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing in Dhahran, which killed nineteen American 
ainnen. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a fativa, a religious edict, calling on 
Muslims "to kill Americans and their allies - civilians and military. , 
779 During an 
interview with a London-based Arabic newspaper (Al-Hayat), bin Laden was quoted as 
saying, "We had thought that the Riyadh and [Dhahran] blasts were a sufficient signal to 
sensible US decision-makers to avert a real battle between the Islamic nation and US 
forces, but it seems that they did not understand the signal ., 9780 He told ABC News 
in 
June 1998, "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military unifon-ns and 
civilians; they are all targets. , 781 
Despite these threats, Americans were unprepared for the simultaneous bombings of the 
US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Al-Salaam (Tanzania) on 7 August 1998. The 
777 httl2:,. v%v%v. heritaize. org/issues/98/chapl9. html# . 778 Milt Beardon, formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency, quoted in Tim Weiner, "After the Attacks: 
The Outlooks, " (New York- Times, 23 August 1998), p. 3. 
779 For more information about the Fatwa see, http: //NvývNv. or. i!. il 
780 See Raja Mishra, "Osama bin Laden: Terrorists, Rich Backer, " (Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 August 
1998), P. I. 
209 
damage was horrific. In Nairobi, the bomb "brought down half the embassy" and left 
several square blocks of downtown Nairobi in a shambles 782 ; in Dar Al-Salaam, most of 
the embassy building and some adjacent buildings were destroyed. 783 The loss of life 
was substantial; 224 people were killed in the two bombing, including twelve 
Americans. More than 4,800 persons were injured. 784 The Clinton administration 
quickly found evidence that bin Laden was responsible. 785 The details of this evidence 
remain closely held. At the time, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh 
Shelton, would announce only, "as many of you are aware, our intelligence community 
has provided us with convincing information based on a variety of intelligence sources, 
that Osama bin Laden's network of terrorists was involved in the planning, the financing 
and the execution of the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. ', 786 The 
Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, would say only, "There's been a series of reports 
that we have analysed, statements by Osama bin Laden himself, other information 
coming in as recently as yesterday about future attacks being planned against the United 
States. We are satisfied there has been a convincing body of evidence that leads us to 
,, 787 this conclusion. The US President was soon convinced that Osama bin Laden was 
responsible for the bombings and that additional terrorist acts were being planned by his 
organisation. Again, Clinton had few alternatives. Because Osama bin Laden was not a 
head of state, there were no political, diplomatic, or economic resources available. 788 
781 Ibid. 
782 See Madorie Miller and Dean Murphy, "The US Embassy Bombing, " (Los Angeles Pines, 9 August 
1998), p I. 
783 Ibid. See also, (Keesing's Record of World Events 44,1998), p. 42434. 
784 See (New York Tinies, 8 October 1998), p. 1. 
785 h ttp: //usinfo. state. izov/topical/pol/terror/9 9 12 95 02. htm . 786 See the text of Cohen, Shelton briefing on the strikes in http: //pbs. orOnewshour/bb/milita July- 
dec98/cohen 8-20. html, p. 14. 
787 Ibid. 
788 See (77ie Tinies, 22 August 1998), p. 5. 
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Attempts were made to find and arrest bin Laden and members of his organisation, but 
the problem was that those efforts would take time. Finally, the bombings of the 
embassies were seen as direct assaults on US sovereign territory and as therefore 
requiring a strong unilateral response. 789 Ultimately, Clinton decided bin Laden's 
terrorism was a clear threat to US national interests and for the second time in his 
presidency, he decided to use military force to counter a terrorist threat . 
790 The US 
President claimed that "convincing information from our intelligence community 
[which provided him with] high confidence" that the bin Laden terrorist network" had 
been responsible for the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings. 791 On 20 August 1998, less 
than three weeks after the embassy bombings, Operation Infinite Reach was carried out. 
US Navy surface ships and a submarine in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea fired 
approximately seventy Tomahawk cruise missiles against terrorist targets in Khartoum 
(Sudan) and Khost (Afghanistan). The missiles arrived over targets in both countries 
nearly simultaneously. 792 In Afghanistan, they damaged a series of buildings in four 
different complexes that constituted a terrorist training camp and bin Laden's main 
operational base. Reports in the Pakistani press claimed that the camp "had been 
levelled, " and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan reported that twenty-one people had 
been killed and an additional thirty injured. 793 
In Sudan, the missiles struck a pharmaceutical factory, known as El Shifa, in downtown 
Khartoum. 794 Sudan's state-run television broadcast imagcs immediately after the raid 
indicating that the plant had been levelled; it reported that ten people had been injured 
789 See (The Financial Times, 21 August 1998), p. 1. 
790 The US administration, by the use of force, crossed the threshold of threat of use of force, which Nvas 
regarded by Sadursk as a clear message, composed by a decision maker and directed to the target, arguing 
that force Nvill be used if a request or demand is not complied with. See Romana Sadurska, "Threats of 
Force, " p. 242. 791 See (Keesing's, 1998), p. 42435. 792 Ibid. 
793 http: //,. vxviv. pbs. org/newshouribb/militaý/july-dec98/cohen 8-20. html , p. 4-8. 
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but that there had been no deaths. One missile had apparently struck a nearby sweet 
factory, causing light damage. 795 In the aftermath of the raid, White House officials 
justified the attack on the factory in Khartoum by claiming that it had been a secret 
chemical - weapons factory financed by bin Laden. 796 In support they cited soil samples 
taken ftom the plant indicating the presence of Empta, a "precursor" substance used in 
the production of the nerve gas VX. 797 However, in the weeks after the strike, many 
began to question the adequacy of the administration's evidence. 798 Several critics 
argued that the evidence both that bin Laden had been associated with the plant and that 
it had been producing chemical weapons was circumstantial at best. 799 The Sudanese 
government asked the United Nations for an independent investigation to prove or 
disprove the allegations that the factory had been involved in chemical weapons. Even 
the former president Jimmy Carter would called f6r an independent investigation of the 
evidence. 
800 
However, the US Govenunent continued to argue, without releasing details, that the 
evidence had justified the raid, and they were able to convince the UN Security Council 
to shelve discussion of an independent investigation. 801 The strikes generally received 
support from the US people; a few Republican members of Congress questioned the 
timing of the strikes, suggesting that they may have been used as a distraction from the 
president's domestic troubles. Bin Laden's involvement in the embassy bombing has 
hardly been questioned. In November 1998, a grand jury in New York issued a 238- 
count indictment against him for acts of terrorism. Soon after, the US State DePartment 
794 See (The Tinies, August 21 1998), p. 1. 
795 See Russell Watson and John Barry, "Our Target Was Terror, " (Newsweek-, 31 August 1998), p. 3. 
796 See Tim Weiner and James Risen, "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise, " (New York- 
Tinies, 21 September, 1998), p. 1. 
797 See (Keesing's, 1998), p. 42435. See also, (77ie Financial Tinies, 21 August, 1998), p. 1. 
793 See (Keesing's, 1998), p. 42435. 
799 Ibid. 
800 See (The Tinies, 22 August 1998), p. 2. 
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offered a reward of up to five million dollars for bin Laden's capture. 802 The missile 
strikes received strong support from Europe. Most Western European countries, 
including Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain and Austria, issued statements 
upholding the right of the United States to defend itself against terrorism. 803 
Russia, which had strongly criticised the use of US military force against terrorism in 
the past, now sent confused and mixed signals. The former Russian President, Boris 
Yeltsin, criticised the attacks publicly, but a spokesman later downplayed his remarks. 
Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko called the attacks unacceptable but added that 
"international acts of terrorism cannot go unpunished. 55804 In Kabul, protesters 
converged on the US embassy, and large street demonstrations were held in Khartoum. 
Angry protests were voiced in Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya. 805 In contrast, 
most Arab governments remained "silent or equivocal about their views on the missile 
strikes.,, 806 The public condemnation there was quickly faded. By October, less than two 
months after the strike, the Sudanese Government had dropped calls for an investigation 
into the bombings and had initiated high-level talks with Washington in hopes of 
improving relations. In February 1999, US representatives met with the Taliban to 
discuss bin Laden's status in Afghanistan; the Taliban was not willing to extradite bin 
Laden, but it restricted his access to communications and banned him from making 
public statements while in Afghanistan. 807 
8(" See "Carter Urges Inquiry into US Raid on Sudan, " (New York Tinies, September 18 1998), p. 1. 
802 http: //xv,. v%v. usinfo. state. gov/topical/Tol/terror/99129502. btm. 
803 See Edmund L. Andrews, "Baking in Europe, " (Maiv York Times, August 22 1998), p. 2. See also, (The 
Tinies, 21 August 1998), p. 4. 
804 See Michael Wines, "After the Attacks: The Reaction - US Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, " 
(New York Times, 22 August 1998), p. 3. 
805 See (Keesing's, 1998), p. 42435-36. 
806 See Wines, "After the Attacks, " p. 3. 
807 From his side, Mullah Mohammed Rabani, who is considered to be the second in command of the 
Taliban indicated that "We are a free country where Osama is living as a guest. This is reality. And it's up 
to the world to accept it or not, " quoted in http: //xvNv%v. emerizency. com/ennday. ht 
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The use of force on the part of the US Government in this case is completely 
unacceptable, on the ground that the use of force as an option to limit terrorism is that it 
is counterproductive in a strategic sense, undermining US credibility. From this 
perspective, the use of force gives of the United States the image of a "cowboy, " much 
more willing to employ the military than diplomacy to resolve differences. 808 Moreover, 
if the Americans had discovered incriminating evidence at the African embassies' bomb 
sites, they would have made it public. But within the timeline offered by the government 
- between the embassies explosions and the decision to launch the reprisal attacks - no 
such evidence could have been discovered, let alone analysed. The US, in this case, 
acted as the prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner, all in one. This is hardly compatible 
with her status as the only superpower in the world, which bestows on her greater 
responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace and justice for all. This unilateral 
action of the United States, of attacking a sovereign independent states, members of the 
United Nations, has created a bad precedent for others to follow. The United Nations 
was created after the World War 11 to maintain international peace and security. In the 
present case, the UN Charter was ignored and completely sidelined, and the US took the 
law into its own hands. 
808 The allegation of Frederick Kirgis, that the target in Afghanistan was recognised as "an extensive 
terrorism training complex, " and therefore it was a valid target,, which give the US permission to invoked 
the right of self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter), is completely mistakable, on the grounds that self- 
defence, occurs between an attacker and his victim; in this case, the attack was unidentified. No evidence 
was proven or shown; only speculation. See Frederick L. Kirgis, "Cruise Missile Strikes in Afghanistan 
and Sudan, " (. 4nierican Society ofInternational Law 24,1998), p. 1-2. 
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Status Mixtits 
Since 1945, reprisals have generally been conducted by established states against non- 
state guerrUla movements based in third states. Such situations raise a question as to 
what extent a state can be held responsible for activities taking place within its borders, 
or by guerrilla movements launching attacks outside its borders. Unwillingness or 
inability to control such activities may constitute "permissive cause. " 
Another issue arising from the context of reprisals is the typically low-level, irregular 
nature of guerrilla activity, leading to recognition of an intermediate status between war 
and peace, called statits inixtus, in which it may be questionable whether the laws of 
peace or those of war are applicable. An obvious example of the status mixtus has been 
the Middle East, with its ongoing pattern of hostility, insurgency and border disputes, 
falling short of actual war whether technically so-called or as a factual condition of 
international armed conflict even for the purpose of modem international humanitarian 
law 809. This is the sort of situation in which reprisals typically occur. Such situations 
create a problem in relation to self-defence as, at almost any point in time, it is possible 
to say that an attack has recently occurred, or that one may be anticipated. In such a 
situation, can self-defence actions avoid being punitive while still maintaining 
effectiveness? And what is gained by restoring the status quo before the attack, if the 
situation from which the attack was launched was unstable or inequitable? A further 
difficulty, if reprisals are only accepted as defensive when their purpose is to prevent or 
deter further attacks, is how they may be distinguished from preventive defence. 
809 See Greenwood, p. 283. 
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Regular Self-Defence and claims to Defence against HistoricAggression 
The concept of regular self-defence sees the right of self-defence as a continuing right, 
which does not change with the modification of time or circumstances (conditions). Any 
community under attack, usually, has plenty of time to consider the possible harm of the 
first hit, and to prepare a response. 810 It will take time to plan, prepare and organise its 
defence. This is regarded as a fundamental part of response. The time needed for 
response may increase with the gravity of the first hit. A state under attack must have 
time to prepare an effective defensive plan, and even with the passage of time, defence 
in this case is still legal and legitimate. But the victim state should not wait for ever, 
because the result would be to weaken its right of defensive action, as the passing of 
time brings many changes. For example, it is possible that when territory is taken, if it 
continues to be under occupation, this will lead to changes in the political, social and 
economic fonnation. 811 For this reason, some have argued that the right of self-defence 
should have "transitory" borders or limits. Even though unable to determine these 
dimensions, Schachter 812 considered that passing of time should end the right of self- 
defence. He considers the time factor as basic to defensive action, because undue 
extension of the time factor will take the defensive notion "far beyond its basic 
meaning. " Also he recommends that the factor of time be evaluated on the main basis of 
"necessity. " For him the main concern is that the right of self-defence should not be 
used only as an excuse to settle old scores, especially as regards borders. He especially 
criticised the unionist movements, on the basis that they invoke old problems 
8 10 It is important to note here, that appearances of the nuclear weapons has changed that picture, because 
the first nuclear hit will have devastating effects. The discussion here refers to conflicts connected with 
conventional weapons. 
81 1 This was Henry Sidgwick's anxiety about the French rights in Alsace-Lorraine, after the German 
occupation, cited in Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 56. 
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concerning borders, to justify their use of force. Ceadel 813 also considered that the 
passing of time will weaken the defensive justification. He commented by way of 
illustration, that "while France could have claimed a defensive justification had it started 
a war to retrieve Alsace-Lorraine shortlY after losing it in 1870-1, it could not so 
plausibly have done so forty years later. " In 1961 when India took back Goa, its main 
claim depended on the idea of "continuing effects". 814 India indicated that it had been 
prevented from defending Goa when Portugal had seized it 450 years earlier, by the 
intercession of 425 years of British Colonialism. 815 
Generally, there are two kinds of regular defence, both of them Provoked by territorial 
claims, but distinguished on the basis of the outcome of military action. Each of them 
deals with the right of self-defence from a different view. 
Henry Sidgwick managed to distinguish between both kinds of regular defence. He 
referred to the German occupation of the French Alsace-Lorraine areas, emphasising the 
influence of the passage of time, and the stability of occupation, and its effects on the 
political identity of the occupied area. Thus, he regarded the German occupation of the 
French areas as undermining any future French claims with the passing of time. 
"We must ... recognise that 
by this temporary submission of the vanquished ... a new political order is initiated, which, though originally without a moral basis, may in time acquire such a basis from a 
change in the sentiments of the inhabitants of the territory transferred; since it is always possible 
that through the effects of time and habit and mild government ... the majority of the transferred 
population may cease to desire reunion ... 
When this change has taken place, the moral effect of the 
unjust transfer must be regard as obliterated; so that any attempt to recover the transferred territory 
,, 816 becomes itself an aggression ... 
812 Oscar Schachter, "In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force, " (University of Chicago Law 
Review 53,1986), p. 132. 
813 Ceadel, p. 84. 
814 Robert E. Gorelick, "Wars of National Liberation: Just Ad Belluin, " (Case Mestern Resene Journal of 
IntenzationalLaiv 11,1979), p. 77. 
8 15 For more information see the (Yearbook of the United Nations, 196 1), p. 129-32. See also R. P. Rao, 
Portuguese Rule in Goa 1510-1961, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 1-8. 
816 Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 56. This is exactly what the Western governments, especially 
Washington, London and the legitimate government of Kuwait, feared after the Iraqi occupation to Kuwait 
to change the demographic, social and political formation there. 
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The distinction between the two types of regular self-defence depends on the nature of 
the political system which prevails after the military conquest. If deep changes occur in 
the political, economic and social fields, the connection of the occupied part with the 
occupier will be powerful, and this will lead to change in the reality of territorial 
demarcation. 817 There are two types of regular self-defence. The first, is backward self- 
defence. The idea of backward self-defence is built on the ground that the victim 
continues to benefit from the right of self-defence in respect of a prior attack or 
aggression, which happened in the past, when the victim was weak or unable to respond; 
and when the victim becomes able to respond, it will seek to remedy old losses and 
damage and respond to the aggressor's aggression on the basis of legitimate self- 
defence. 818 The second dimension, called remedial self-defence, is the invocation of a 
self-defence right on the ground that an existing political order represented by territorial 
boundaries is sufficiently violent or coercive as to be regarded as equivalent to an armed 
attack. 
In other words, while in the first case, the self-defence right is invoked in respect of a 
particular act of aggression, in the second, it is invoked in respect of the ensuing 
political, social and economic conditions. When remedial action is taken by the victims 
of tyranny, the situation may be classed as an internal or domestic rebellion, but when 
such an action is assisted or carried out by a third party, the question of international 
self-defence is raised. 
Both elements of regular self-defence existed in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 
August, 1990. 
817 To some degree, it is near to what happened to the Palestinians territories in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, when they ivere occupied by Israel in 1967. The Palestinians National Authority endurancing many 
problems to reorganisation of Palestinians areas, because they depended on Israel, whose impact on these 
territories is strong in all domains. 
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"Iraqi invasion angers both East and Mest " 819 
Up to the outbreak of World War I, the area now comprised within the state of Iraq 
formed three provinces of the Ottoman Empire: the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and 
Basra. 820 Each of the three provinces was administered by an appointed governor or 
pasha, responsible to the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople. 
In general, Iraq, like many other parts of the empire, enjoyed relative administrative 
economic and fiscal autonomy for much of the period between the original conquest and 
821 
the mid-nineteenth century. Until 1821, Iraq was ruled by Mamluks, mostly deriving 
from Georgia. 822 These Mamluk rulers were to a considerable degree in practice 
independent of the Ottoman Sultan. 823 During this period, the three provinces become 
united under the Government of Sulaiman the Great. 824 In 1831, the Ottoman army 
defeated the Mamluks, and the Turkish government strengthened its control over the 
tripartite territory. 
"With their strengthened position in Iraq, the Ottomans felt able to assert their influence in the 
Arab shaikdoms of the Gulf - thereby establishing an interest and some territorial claims which the 
independent state of Iraq Nvas to pursue. ', 825 
Kuwait was founded in the early eighteenth century by tribes, which migrated in the late 
17th century from the Arabian peninsula to the Gulf shores. The AI-Sabah family 
818 It was claimed by the Iraqi Government when it invaded Kuwait in 1990, that Kuwait was a part of 
Iraq, and that British imperialism had separated them from each other, when Iraq wasweak and unable to 
respond. 
819 Headline, (The Tinies, 3 August 1990), p. 1. 
820 Niblock T, Iraq: 71e Contemporary Stale, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 2. 
82 1 Farouk-Sluglett Marion, Iraq since 1958: Froin Revolittion to Dictatorship, (London: Tauris, 1990), p. 
2. 
822 Peter Malcolm Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political History, (London: 
Longman, 1966), p. 146. 
823 Peter Mansfield, Kmtait: Vanguard ofthe GuIC, (London: Hutchinson, 1990), p. 18. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Niblock, p. 2. 
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controlled the political power. Kuwait's strategic position on the route to India would 
ultimately lead to the establishment of British dominance in the region. In the late 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman government gave Shaikh Abdullah the title of 
Qaimmagam (governor of a sub-province), abolished the connection of Kuwait with the 
Basra province and allowed it to run its own internal affairs. On January 23,1899, 
Mubarak, the ruler of Kuwait, signed a secret treaty with Great Britain, known as the 
Exclusive Agreement, in which he agreed not to sell, lease, mortgage, or give for 
occupation any territory to any other power without British consent. The treaty also 
stated that Mubarak and his successors were linked to Britain, and it would protect 
them. The Ottomans protested against the treaty and in 1901 they tried to expel Mubarak 
from power, but the arrival of a British naval force prevented them from doing so. In 
1913, Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed the "Convention Respecting The Persian 
Gulf Area. " This agreement resolved their disagreements about Kuwait. There were 
agreements on the borders of Kuwait with Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Iraq. 
During the first World War, the British and the French governments made a secret 
agreement on a post-war settlement for the Middle-East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
which divided the Middle-East into two areas: 
"In one of which British, and in the other French, influence would be predominant, and 
in each of which a part would be reserved for direct British or French administration, 
while the other would be left free for direct Arab administration. "826 The border between 
Iraq and Kuwait was defined in a fhendly agreement in 1923. According to this 
agreement, eight islands including Warba, Bubiyan and Falaka belonged to Kuwait. 
Reaffirmation of this agreement was made after Iraq became independent from the 
826 Iraq later argued that Kuwait had been separated from the motherland by British imperialism. The 
Iraqis were in that period weak, divided and could not respond, and to practise the right of self-defence at 
that time was impossible. 
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British Mandate in 1932. In an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Iraq 
and the ruler of Kuwait, both agreed on the description of the existing frontiers. This 
was along the lines of the frontiers as defined in the 1913 Anglo-Turkish Convention. 
The first attempt of Iraq to exercise remedial self-defence was when King Faisal died in 
1933, and his son, Prince Ghazi, took power after him. The new king was a unionist, 
and it was he who raised the issue of Kuwait's belonging to Iraq. In 1935, King Ghazi 
established an "Association of Arabs of the Gulf, " committed to cultivate links with 
nationalist groups in the Gulf shaikhdoms. 
In order to reduce the British role in Kuwait, the Iraqis supported the nationalist 
elements in the Emirate. Their demands for a share in the ruling family's power and for 
a union with Iraq found support from the Iraqi press, as well as from King Ghazi's 
Qaser AI-Zuhoor radio station. Through his private broadcasting station in the palace, 
King Ghazi demanded Kuwait's annexation, and tried to arouse the Kuwaitis against 
their ruler. The line taken by the broadcast was that the Shaikh (ruler of Kuwait) was an 
out-of-date feudal despot, whose backward rule contrasted with the enlightened regime 
existing in Iraq; Kuwait, it was implied, would be much better off merged with her 
neighbour. The Iraqi claim was based on the assertion that it had inherited the Ottoman 
title to the area. 
"The claim stemmed from both a general growing sense of Arab nationalism and from specific 
,, 827 disputes with Iran over the Shatt Al-Arab, Iraq's channel to the sea. 
It can be concluded that King Ghazi considered that the continuing separation of Kuwait 
from Iraq would allow political, economic and social conditions to prevail in Kuwait, 
which would have harder effects than military aggression. King Ghazi raised the 
possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to incorporate the shaikhdom. But all the Iraqi 
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plans to annex Kuwait came to end when King Ghazi was suddenly killed in a car 
accident in 1939. 
A further attempt to annex Kuwait to Iraq occurred at the end of the monarchy in Iraq, in 
1958, when Jordan and Iraq announced the Arab Federation. Iraq, whose economy was 
very weak, made no secret of seeing Kuwaiti oil revenues as the solution to its economic 
problems. In return for Kuwait's adhesion, the Iraqi government offered the Kuwaiti 
ruler a tripartite compensation. Firstly, Baghdad would be willing to demarcate the 
Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, in accordance with the 1913 Anglo-Turkish agreement. Secondly, 
Iraq would supply its neighbour with piped water from the Shatt Al-Arab; thirdly, the 
existing degree of autonomy enjoyed by the sbaikh was guaranteed by Baghdad to 
continue. But Kuwait refused to join the Hashemite Union in 1958, apparently on 
British advice. 
All ideas of Federation with Iraq disappeared after the overthrow of Iraq's Hashemite 
dynasty in July 1958. In June 1961, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899 was terminated, 
and replaced by one of friendship between both countries. The new agreement 
acknowledged the full independence and sovereignty of Kuwait, and stated the readiness 
of Britain to help Kuwait if the latter requested such assistance. Immediately, the Iraqi 
premier, General Qassim, asked Kuwait for reunion with Iraq. The ruler of Kuwait later 
asked for British military assistance. On 20 July, 1961 Kuwait was given membership of 
the Arab League, despite Iraqi protests. The League accepted the Kuwaiti proposal to 
send Arab contingents as replacement for the British troops. The Arab troops would 
remain in Kuwait until the overthrow of Qassim's regime in 1963. From 1980 and until 
827 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics In the Gztl(- Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 52. 
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1988, Iraq was engaged in war with Iran. This war had a catastrophic impact on Iraq. 828 
Eight years of war and the fall in world oil prices caused Iraq to face an economic crisis. 
In mid-March 1990, different opinions in oil pricing policy within OPEC became clear. 
While Kuwait and the UAE , who had a higher production capacity than their export 
quotas, wished to maintain the existing oil pricing, Iraq wanted a price increase. For this 
reason, Iraq lobbied the Gulf rulers to lower their production and to push the price from 
18 $ to 20 $ per barrel. But Kuwait refused to accept the Iraqi proposal, and this led to 
an escalation of the tension between Iraq and Kuwait. On top of its border dispute with 
Kuwait, Baghdad raised four new demands: that its debt to Kuwait, incurred in the war 
with Iran would be eancelled; the related demand that Kuwait would pay eompensation 
for Iraq's defence of Arab interests in that war; the charge that Kuwait, along with the 
UAE, had deprived Iraq of oil revenues by producing more than its OPEC quota and 
pushing down the price of oil; and the charge that Kuwait had taken oil unfairly from 
the Rumaila field, which straddles both frontiers. Negotiations between both countries 
took place, but failed to bring progress. 
But during the negotiations between both countries on the Iraqi claims, Iraq invaded 
Kuwait on 2 August and annexed it a week later. Iraq, after the war with Iran, felt that it 
had become the major power in the region and could easily achieves territorial 
ambitions and regain its historical claims. The end of the Iran-Iraq war on 8 August 
1988, marked "the beginning of the Gulf crisis of 1990-91". 829 Iraq's main claim in 
invading Kuwait was that it was protecting its rights by practising self-defence, because 
Iraq was now more powerful and could regain Kuwait which had been taken from it in 
828 From this point the Iraqi claims against Kuwait, based on the idea that Kuwait is part of Iraq, were 
invoked not necessarily as a matter of conviction, but as a rationalisation for Iraqi desires to use Kuwait's 
wealth to solve Iraq's economic problems. 
829 Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda behind the Gut( Mar, (London: 
Penguin Books, 199 1), p. 1-2 
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the past, when it was weak. Iraq's main concern was the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and 
Bubiyan which would give access to the Gulf, but Iraq discovered that during 1980-88, 
Kuwait had not only established a permanent military presence on Warba and Bubiyan 
but begun to implement plans physically to assert sovereignty over the islands and the 
northern frontier zone. Agricultural settlements set up at Abdaly on the north border 
were of greater value strategically than economically. A bridge was constructed across 
the Khor Sabiya to Bubiyan Island. 830 Iraq considered this as a change in the 
demographic, social and political formation of the frontiers areas, over which Iraq had 
long claims. In reality, the Iraqi President's main concern was to keep his one-million 
army fully occupied to prevent the possibility of it turning against him. He intended to 
use it to fulfil the following aims: firstly, to realise Iraq's long-standing claim to Kuwait; 
secondly, to gain direct access to the Gulf through the acquisition of Warba and 
Bubiyan; thirdly, to occupy the land opposite the high-yielding Rumaila oil field situated 
in the disputed frontier zone; fourthly, to create a situation in which he could not have to 
repay the huge sums borrowed from the Gulf states during the war with Iran; and finally, 
to help fashion himself as the leader of the Arab world. 831 
The Iraqi claim to Kuwait on the basis that they were united and had been separated by 
the British appears to be weak for many reasons: first, the shift of the Iraqi claim from a 
dispute over frontiers to a bid for sovereignty on the grounds that Kuwait was part of the 
province of Basra under Ottoman rule altered the nature of the dispute from a legal to a 
historical claim. History, however, has never been regarded under international IaNv as 
valid evidence for legal rights. For this reason, the Iraqi action was considered a 
violation of Kuwait's territorial sovereignty and independence, contrary to the principles 
830 Richard Neill Schofield, Kitivait and Iraq: Historical claims and Territorial Disputes, (London: The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 126. 
831 Salinger and Laurent, p. 11. 
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of international law and the United Nations charter as Iraq and Kuwait are members of 
the United Nations, which prohibits resort to force for the settlement of disputes. 
Second, Iraq's claims to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan are today important to Iraq 
for security and geopolitical reasons. Iraq wanted Warba island in particular, because 
Saddarn regarded it as essential for the security of Umm Qaser port, as Iraq possesses a 
narrow Gulf coast. Third, Iraq has also raised economic issues concerning OPEC quotas 
for production, and the drilling of oil in the south Rumaila field without any agreement. 
These matters could be resolved peaceftilly via the apparatus of OPEC, through the 
Judicial Committee of OPEC. As a result, the Iraqi invocation of the right of self- 
defence to correct old and past situations in its conflict with Kuwait in 1990-91, was 
subject to considerable doubts and fogginess. 
In general, the practice of the use of force under the umbrella of the right of self-defence 
should always connect with the fundamental concept of Article 51, which indicates that 
this right should come as a reaction to an armed attack. In all reprisal actions which the 
US undertook against Libya, Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan, the main claim of the US 
administration was that they acted under the right of self-defence, and the Americans in 
all these military activities they insisted that they had top quality information, which 
proved that the states which the Americans attacked, were guilty of international 
terrorism. However, the US Government did not reveal enough information to support 
their claims. What is important, in my view, is that Article 51 should not be transformed 
to an instrument to use force - because the purpose of the drafters of the UN Charter in 
that article was to make the world more secure for small nations after the destruction of 
World Wars 1, and II. This leads us to reject the new tendency from powerful states, 
such as the United States, to bypass the authority of the Security Council, because the 
Security Council is the main body responsible for protecting international peace and 
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security. On nearly all the occasions that the US administration used force, the Security 
Council was powerless - unable to take any decision, in the basis that the US would veto 
any decision that condemned its actions. 
From the other side, the idea of the right of self-defence as a continuing right, which 
does not change with the modification of times or circumstances, and also the 
connecting of this right with historic aggression, are also completely rejected. As I 
mentioned before, the right of self-defence should come as a reaction to an armed 
aggression; any other interpretation of this right goes beyond this domain, which Article 
51 regulated, and will turn this right into an instrument of aggression. The Iraqi 
president, Saddarn Hussein claimed that Kuwait was part of Iraq, and his country, when 
it invaded Kuwait, was only correcting an old historic aggression, which had been 
imposed by the British imperialism; but this claim is not in the spirit of the right of self- 
defence. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Objects and Limitations of Self-Defence 
This chapter explores the basic objects that states claim to be protecting Nvhen they 
resort to force in self-defence. The first part discusses the defence of population; The 
second part, the defence of territory; and the final part, the defence of the state; each 
illustrated with reference to particular conflicts. In the process, these sections examine 
the logic that indicates these values or interests as defensible. Section one will look at 
how to apply the right of self-defence in population. Therefore, it is useful here to 
discuss rescue operations and their legitimacy in international law. Later this will take 
us to deal with humanitarian intervention, which many attempt to put in practice as a 
new exception to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In this connection, it is important to 
review the Kosovo Crisis, and to see if NATO's air campaign was in harmony with the 
international law, especially if the use of force occurred without Security Council 
authorisation. Moreover, in this section I will deal with the relationship between self- 
defence and self-determination. 
Section two is concerned with terfitory as a subject to defence, since, in these days, the 
notion of statehood is unthinkable without a physical, territorial base. In connection with 
territory it important to consider border defence; forward defence and border problems. 
The final section looks at the state as an object of defence. It deals with matters, such as 
state and domain; separated state; dispute states; imperial states; and regimes' right in 
collective self-defence. At the end of this section, the Nicaraguan case will be reviewed 
on the basis that the International Court of Justice expressed an important opinion 
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concerning anned attack on the one hand, and the relation between anned attack and 
collective self-defence on the other. 
Population 
In this chapter it is important to consider people as an object of self-defence. To protect 
people is one of the main objects of the right of self-defence. The protection of a state's 
nationals is one of its a main responsibilities, and a source of its legitimacy. The right of 
protection of a state's nationals inside its territorial borders, it is undisputed. The matter 
of protection of people in general, however, is difficult for many reasons. First, human 
beings move from one place to another. Nationals of a state may move from their state 
of origin to live temporally or permanently in another state. Here, in general, the state 
inside whose territorial borders they live is responsible for their defence, but if the host 
state is unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protection, the state of origin may 
intervene to provide that protection. 
Rescite Operations 
There immediately comes to mind the question, can the right of self-defence be enlarged 
to a right to protect state's nationals when they are under danger in another state? For 
example, if a group of nationals is being held hostage, is a military operation to rescue 
them legitimate on self-defence grounds? The United Nations Charter did not mention a 
right of rescue at all. Nor does states' practice can give us a clear indication in this 
respect, because their response concerning such operation is ambiguous. Akehurst 
makes clear that "virtually every example of the use of force for this purpose has 
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provoked protests f5 832 rom other States that such use of force is illegal' . In general, 
rescue operations have been criticised on grounds unlinked to their aim of defending 
nationals. In reality, the condemnation usually comes from hidden motives. In 1956 in 
the Suez Crisis, United Kingdom claimed that there was immediate danger to its 
nationals in Egypt, but its claim was empty, because at that time, it was clear that the 
British Government had another motive (political), in the absence of any established 
proof that its nationals were in danger. 833 Also in 1965, when the United States 
intervened in Dominica, the legitimacy of its intervention to protect its nationals became 
weak, when the US troops stayed there more than sixteen months. 834 Nevertheless, 
without denying that there are some motives in the rescue operations, which may 
sometimes go beyond the main sphere of humanitarian consideration, there is in some 
sense "strong moral ground" which supports operations for the protection of 
nationals. 835 
The Restrictionist View 
This school has been represented by Brownlie,, %vho refuse completely the legitimacy of 
rescue operation totally. His idea was that the United Nations has been established to 
protect international peace and security and not to pursue a broader humanitarian 
agenda. Because of this, the United Nations has kept a monopoly over the legitimate 
recourse to international armed force. Broivnlie and the other "restrictionists" consider 
832 Michael Akehurst, "The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, " (International Relations 5,1977), 
p. 16. 
833 Robert R Bowie, Suez 1956. - International Crises and the Role of Lcnv Series, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), p. 18-25. 
834 D. W. Bowett, "The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, " In: 771e Current Legal Regulation of 
the Use ofForce, ed, A. Cassese, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 45. See also Stanimir 
A. Alexandrov, Set(-Defence Against the Use offorce In International Law, p. 192-93. 
835 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict, p. 12 1. 
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that the only permissible justification for the unilateral use of force remains self-defence 
as strictly mentioned by Article 51. On that basis, when a country is not a target for 
military attack, and use of force outside its borders, this action can be considered a 
violation of international law. 836 
Generally, rescue operations, in which no anned attack has been occurred, has to be 
regarded as a type of "humanitarian intervention" which should be banned. Farer made 
this clear, on the occasion of the 1989 American intervention in Panama: 
"Nothing in the United Nations Charter- the seminal textual source of the post-war paradigm of 
international order- or in any interpretative declaration of the General Assembly, or in any widely 
ratified international agreement recognised defence of nationals as a justification for armed 
interventioif 
. 
837 
Even where issues of human interest arise, the territorial integrity of another state must 
remain paramount. "That is particularly true of the use of force to protect nationals 
abroad and humanitarian intervention", said Akehurst, noting that these have been 
widely abused in the past. 838 The main tendency after the establishment of the United 
Nations and until this time, is that states give the priority to the non-use of force over 
humanitarian needs. Also, from state statements and votes in the General Assembly, 
most states' approach is that the only exception to Article 2 (4) ban on force is 
individual or collective self-defence and when the Security Council, after having 
detennined that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has 
occurred, may if necessary, take military enforcement action involving the armed forces 
of the member states. For example, in 1970 the French ambassador to the United 
Nations emphasised that "there was no ambiguity in the Charter", and "the only 
exception to the prohibition of the use of armed force was the case of self-defence 
836 John R. D'Angelo, "Resort to Force by States to Protect National: The US Rescue Mission to Iran and 
its Legality under International Law, " (Virginia Journal ofInternational Law 21,198 1), p. 488. 
837 Tom J Farer in "Agora: US Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activities? " 
(American Journal ofInternational Law 84,1990), p. 505. 
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referred to in Article 5 l". 839 The "ovenvhelming majority' of state members in the 
United Nations preferred a restrict and limited interpretation of Article 51, which would 
require a "military attack" to take place before any defensive action became 
acceptable. 840 Only "a very small number" of states have regarded intervention on behalf 
of nationals as lawful. 841 In some cases, the total rejection of rescue operations can be 
weakened. For example, in the US intervention in Panama in 1989, the main criticism 
was not directed against the alleged aim of the action, but the disproportion with which 
was carried out. Although Akehurst in general has the same attitude as Brownlie, he 
argues that the 1976 Israeli rescue action at Entrbbe was "morally irresistible' ). 842 
McCoubrey and White do not accept that rescue operations are legal, though they admit 
that there are "strong moral grounds" in their favour; their compromise tries to balance 
between full condemnation of such actions, and at the same time not encouraging other 
states from aiding the effort. 843 
"Hýjackedjet Flies with 70 Israeli to Uganda"844 
At the end of June 1976, a group from Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) hijacked an Air France plane on its way from Tel Aviv to Paris. The aeroplane 
stopped at Libya for refuelling, and later it continued its way to Uganda and landed at 
Entebbe airport. The Palestinian group demanded that Israel should, in exchange for the 
hostages, release fifty-three of their comrades who were in Israeli jails by I July, later 
838 Akehurst, "The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad", p. 18. 
839 UN, GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Aggression, 25th Year (1970), paragraph, 36. 
840 Ibid, paragraph, 2 10. 
'341 Ibid, paragraphs, 209,211,216. 
842 In Akehurst view, that the Israeli rescue action was an extraordinary, in the basis that the Air France 
passengers were brought to Uganda without their approval. 
843 McCoubrey and White, p. 12 1. 
844 Headline, The Times, June 28,1976. 
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extended to 4 July. Non-Israeli passengers were permitted to leave the plane. The 
Ugandan President Idi Amin and his government wished to see the hostages released, 
but on condition that Israel first release the Palestinian prisoners. 845 In general, Israel has 
a policy that it should not under any circumstances negotiate with terrorists, but 
expressed willingness to explore every possible way of freeing the passengers, including 
French mediation. This Israeli policy against terrorists was based on the experiences 
early of thel970s, when hijackings and terrorist attacks were at their height. Also, Israel 
at that time faced a problem of how to reconcile its responsibilities under Article 2(4), to 
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Uganda, inside whose borders the 
Israeli nationals were hold hostage, with its desire to help and rescue its nationals. But 
this problem from the Israeli side was settled by military action. On 3 July three Israeli 
planes landed at Entebbe, occupied the control tower, attacked the terminal building, 
destroyed several Ugandan MiG's, and freed all but three hostageskvho were killed. The 
Entebbe raid was a model example of a rescue operation. The Israeli citizens had been 
under great danger; and the Ugandan authorities was unable or unwilling to assist or 
help them, and it was clear that Israel at that time, have no hidden agenda or motives 
against Uganda. Not only was there an immediate danger against the Israeli nationals, 
but also they had been taken to Uganda against their will. From its side, Uganda not 
only did not help the hostages, but also had been aiding the hijackers. Although Israeli 
raid violated Ugandan sovereignty, it limited its violation to the actions necessary for 
rescue. 846 
815 Leslie C. Green, "Rescue at Entebbe: Legal Aspects", (Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 6,1976), P. 
313-315. 
846 Mitchell Knisbacher, "The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Actioný', (Journal 
of International Law and Economics 12,1977), p. 68-70. See also, Alexandrov, p. 195-97; D. J. Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 909-11. 
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The Realist Concept 
This School, in contrast to the previous one, offers strong support for rescue operation, 
by considering them as a subset of self-defence, especially under conditions such as 
Entebbe. This position is expressed by Bowett and many other scholars, who hold the 
view that a country's nationals can be seen as an extension of the state, making an attack 
on one equal to an attack on the other. "It is perfectly possible, " said Bowett, "to treat an 
attack on a State's nationals as an attack on the State, since population is an essential 
ingredient of the State. , 847 Rescue effectively becomes an instance of self-defence. 
Some critics admit the connection: acknowledged Farer, "[T]he protection of nationals 
can be assimilated without great strain to the right of self-defence explicitly conceded in 
the text of the Charter, " given "[p]eople being a necessary condition M8 ne for a state. 
Bowett School limits rescue operations to those on behalf of nationals only. Bowett 
made a strong distinction between rescuing nationals, which is inherently defensive, and 
operations of a humanitarian nature. He argues that the protection of nationals is not an 
instance of humanitarian intervention. The main motive of rescue is self-defence: 
"desire to protect a State's own security and essential interests, " and not " the desire to 
protect human rights. " On the other hand, humanitarian intervention treats "the 
nationality of the person to be rescued .... as essentially irrelevant, " which means that 
"whatever the legal basis of such intervention might be, it is not self-defence. , 849 
For example, the United States claimed the right of self-defence under Article 51 as a 
justification for its 1975 air raid against Cambodia after the Mayaguez seizure; for its 
support for the Israeli raid at Entebbe; and also to support its rescue action when 
847 Bowett in Cassese, p. 4 1. 
848 Farer, "Agora, " p. 505. 
849 BoNvett in Cassese, p. 49. 
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American nationals held hostage in Tehran in 1980.850 It only increases the harmony of 
rescue with self-defence that, historically the legal traits of one were seen to be 
analogous to those of the other. Before the United Nations Charter, states maintained 
and exercised a right to intervene abroad to protect their nationals and property, a right 
which was considered to follow from the more general right to self-defence. Both 
actions, in general, had in common conditions of imminent existing threat, exhaustion 
851 
of peaceable alternatives, and judicious use of military force. In the 1970s, the clear 
increase in hijackings and hostage actions, strengthened this idea that an attack on 
nationals could be seen as an attack upon the state itself, and on that ground, rescue 
operations could be seen as a variant of self-defence. In the Entebbe raid, the 
representative of the United States, declaring his government's support for Israel, stated 
that: 
"... there is a Nvell established right to use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals 
from imminent threat of injury or death where the state in whose territory they are located is either 
unwilling or unable to protect them. The right, flowingfrom the right of sel6defence, is limited to 
such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury. ', 852 
Definitely, if any incident fits Bowett's consideration, it is the Israeli raid at Entebbe, 
and along the same line the American attempt to rescue its hostages in Tehran comes a 
close second. To some extent, Bowett's critics have the weight of the literal behind 
them when they rebuke the conflation of nationals with states, but here, Bowett, can 
reply with a strong argument in favour of conflation, especially where Israel is 
concerned. 853 From its side Israel had been depended upon demography as a source for 
850 For example, Connaughto considered "the rescue of own-nationals as a form of self-defence. " See 
Richard Connaughto, Military Interi-ention In 77ie 1990's: A New Logic of Mar, (London: Routledge, 
1992) p. 67. 
85 1 D'Angelo, p. 501. 
852 UN Document, S/PV, 1941 of July 12,1976, p. 31-32. Reprinted in (International Legal Materials 15, 
1976), p. 1232-34. 
853 For example Akehurst refuses this approach. He believes that "nationals cannot be identified Nvith the 
State for all purposes" and Article 51 applies as composed, only to Member States", see Akehurst, p. 17. 
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legitimacy and viability. Also, Israel have been facing adversaries, who claimed the 
wish to extinguish Israel from the map through wars of small-scale attacks on its 
nationals. While the seizure of hostages does not fit the mould of conventional acts of 
inter-state war or anned attack, it did confonn perfectly to the experience of the 
protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israeli hostages may not have looked "state-like" to 
many observers; but they are were indeed looked like that to Israel's adversaries. 
Certainly, they only became targets because they were treated as such. 
Equally, imposing was the US attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran. 
Whereas demography did not render these hostages state-like, as at Entebbe, their work 
roles did. The Iranian students seized the hostages because they were US Embassy 
employees. It was as representatives of the United States that they were targets; and it 
was performance of that role that made them the object of a rescue operation. In both 
events also, the range of the mission was clearly limited to the removal of the hostages, 
thereby encroaching minimally upon the sovereignty of the state in which they were 
held. Moreover, the governments of both Uganda and Iran could be held partly 
responsible for the dilemma of the hostages; sufficiently so that their right against 
intervention was arguably diminished, at the least to the degree required to liberate the 
respective captives. The circumstances of Entebbe, as well as Tehran, render both 
incidents powerful evidence for the subsumPtion of rescue beneath self-defence. 
To these kinds of particulars, Bowett adds several more general arguments. He stands 
with liberal readers of the United Nations Charter. The use of the word "inherent" in 
Article 51, for example, indicates to him that the Charter meant to recall a prior right of 
self-defence which conventionally included a right of rescue. That this prior right was 
highly flexible further proves to Bowett his supposition that "armed attack" merely 
illustrates one among many possible grounds for self-defence, rather than excluding all 
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others. Self-defence and aggression are not mirror images, in his view, meaning that 
self-defence can be claimed against a range of lesser, or different, wrongs than 
aggression as it is traditionally defined. 854 If one rejects this diminishment of armed 
attack, Bowett can still turn to his equation between nationals and the state, so that an 
attack on foreign nationals becomes "armed attack", regardless. That the Charter avoids 
all mention of rescue, while the combination of post-Charter law has singled out for 
condemnation actions like reprisal yields further evidence to Bowett that a right of 
national rescue is fully consonant with the Charter and its framers' intent. Bowett's 
arguments however, is vulnerable to substantial criticism. Claims of a pre-1945 right of 
self-defence, even should one accept Bowett's reading of Article 51 in theory, neglect 
the emptiness of self-defence prior to the Charter. 855 
His extensive interpretation of armed attack somehow misses what Franck has called the 
"across-the-border" implication that has always been linked with international 
aggression. 856 Many authors admit that both legal scholarship and state practice treat 
self-defence as requiring some violation that takes place within the territory of the 
defending state itself In turn, neglect to rescue in Charter law, especially in comparison 
to reprisal, may simply reflect the relative infrequency of one compared to the 
promiscuity of the latter. Here, naturally, one returns to the central assertion: that 
nationals can be construed as state-like when endangered behind the borders of another 
state. Specially, because other elements of Bowett's position are so contentious, he 
needs to elaborate his basic assertion that nationals are an "essential ingredient" of 
viable statehood, whose "essential" quality they retain when they live in other countries. 
854 B owett in Cassese, p. 4 1. 
855 De Arechaga said that: "The so-called customary law of self-defence, supposedly pre-existing the 
Char-ter, and dependent on this single word [ inherent ] ... simply did not exist. " Quoted from Theodore 
Schweisfurth, "Operations to Rescue Nationals In Third States Involving the Use of Force on Relation to 
the Protection of Human Rights, " (German Yearbook ofIntenzational Law 23,1980), p. 165. 
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The Humanitarian View 
Some of those Nvho accept a right to rescue nationals abroad reject Bowett's linkage of 
rescue with self-defence. Instead, scholars like Lillich, Moore, Reisman, and D'Amato 
treat rescue as a subset of humanitarian intervention. Supporters of humanitarian goals 
vary in their suPport for intervention. Some allow great licence, construing as 
"humanitarian" such values as self-determination and economic development. D'Amato, 
for instance, proposes that the American intervention in Grenada was an instance of 
humanitarian intervention and that its 1989 intervention in Panama was "not only 
legally justified but morally required. 35857 Others insist that only extreme inhumanity 
justifies action. The memory of the Second World War alone makes it difficult to deny 
that extraordinarily barbarous situations exist in which "the right to life and the right to 
physical and mental integrity are violated on such a massive scale that non-intervention 
by other States might be so immoral as to undermine the most basic principles, if not the 
very idea of laxv. ', 858 In general, supporters of humanitarian intervention "studiously 
avoid" any mention of self-defence. 859 They prefer to free humanitarian efforts from the 
legal requirements imposed upon self-defence of reporting to the Security Council. As a 
result, they see military intervention in support of human rights and needs as legitimate. 
The humanitarian perspective concentrates on three factors. First, it defines a set of 
values which are maintained to be humane rather than political and therefore universal 
rather than partisan. The most common view is that humanitarian values contain a right 
856 Thomas M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 2 (4)? Or: Changing Nonus Governing the Use of Force by 
States, " p. 809. 
857 D'Amato, "Agora, " p. 519. 
858 Wil D. Ver%vey, "Humanitarian Intervention, " In: 7be Current Legal Regulation ofthe Use ofForce, p. 
71. 
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to life, freedom, and some fortu of legality. 860 One sees these values reflected in 
references to massacre and enslavement as the circumstances in which humanitarian 
intervention would be called for. Second, the humanitarian view maintains that these 
values can outbalance the host state's general right to non-intervention. Therefore, if the 
latter state is unable to provide for the security of residents, another state may intervene, 
or take action and sufficiently take the host state's place to ensure people's safety. Here, 
this kind. of exchange in duties can described as a "substitution. " Consequently, as the 
host state is unwilling, or even actively involved in putting people at risk, an assumed 
intervenor has additional grounds for overriding the host state's right to non- 
intervention. 
Third, the importance of humanitarian values is increased by the affirmation that 
humanitarian efforts, by their nature, do not violate territorial integrity and political 
independence. Supporters of humanitarian rescue argue that intervention to protect or 
rescue nationals does not intrude upon territorial integrity or political independence. 
Rescue and humanitarian missions are both directed entirely at human safety. 
Traditionally, they are said to take no interest in either territory or politics. Article 2 (4), 
they note, only forbids that military force which is ordered against the "territorial 
integrity and political independence" of another Member state. They suggest that any 
resort to force which does not injure territorial integrity or political independence is 
therefore lawful. Provided that humanitarian operations abide by additional criteria of 
necessity and proportionality, and that they limit themselves to the aims of rescue and 
859 Yoram Dinstein, 'WarAggression andSeIC-Defence, " p. 89. 
860 Rougier in Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the United Nations Charter, " (California Mestern International 
Law Journal 4,1974), p. 230-32. 
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help, there is no reason to treat them as illegal . 
86 1 Rather, remarks Reisman, 
humanitarian rescues ought to be seen as a form of lesser trespass: a true rescuer, after 
all, only "uses" the territory of another state to travel through in its mission to rescue 
citizens, and it need not affect political independence at all. 862 As a result, the other 
state's politics can continue on their independent way, and territory remains with its 
"integrity" technically intact. 
In general, a new reading of Bowett's views, reveals a hannony with the humanitarian 
concept. He embraces a similar rule that gives priority to the needs of People, in 
Bowett's case nationals, against the general right of states to non-intervention. Bowett 
further increases the claims of nationals with the same willingness to disaggregate 
territorial integrity and political independence from sovereignty as it is usually 
considered. By implication, his argument depends upon promoting human values over 
those held most intimately by states. Most telling, he flirts seriously with treating the 
defence of foreign nationals as a humanitarian goal. He notes, that "the values protected 
by the right of protection are the same values as are inherent in the promotion of human 
rights. 5863 Bowett's principal concern appears to be the obligation of a state to protect its 
nationals and the relative importance of this duty against that which it has to other states 
to abstain from intervening in their affairs. Such a concern is clear, especially when one 
considers the number of British emigrants who continued to live abroad in its former 
colonies at the time of Bowett's main writings. Foreign nationals can hardly be deemed 
essential to state survival; rather, intervention by their state of origin appears to be 
essential to theirs. This seems to be what Bowett actually has in mind when he says that 
"People have expectations of protection from their goverm-nent when abroad, and no 
861 See Michael Reisman, "Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Charter Article 2 (4), " (American 
Journal ofInternational Law 78,1984), p. 64245. 862 Ibid. 
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government can lightly refuse such protection when it lies within its powers to afford 
it.,, 864 
In the Kosovo crisis, nobody can deny the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo, prior to NATO's intervention. As a result of the tragic events there, the 
international community sought to fulfil its responsibilities to protect international peace 
and security. This was clear from the Security Council's efforts to find a solution for 
that crisis.. Based on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, 
issued, in March 1998, resolution 1160 (1998), which requested the FRY and the 
Kosovar Albanians to work towards a political settlement. Also, in the same resolution, 
the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on both sides in the criSiS. 
865 What is 
important in that resolution, is that it left the door open for the Security Council to take 
further measures in the case of continuing deterioration, when it mentioned "that failure 
to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo 
,, 866 will lead to the consideration of additional measures. 
But the situation deteriorated rapidly: fighting intensified and the Serbian security forces 
as well as the Yugoslav Army, used force in an excessive and indiscriminate manner, 
thus causing numerous civilian casualties, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
innocent persons from their homes, and a massive flow of refugees into neighbouring 
countries. During that time, the UN Secretary-General made it clear to NATO, that 
Security Council approval would be needed before use of force in Kosovo. 867 Later, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1199 (1998), which referred to the "recent intense 
fighting in Kosovo" and "in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by 
863 Boxvett in Cassese, p. 45. 
864 Ibid. 
865 See Antonio Cassese, "A Folloxv-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis, " (European Jounial ofInteniational Law 10,1999), p. 791-99. 
866 See SC Res. 1160 of 31 March 1998. 
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Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which had resulted in numerous civilian 
casualties and, according to the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 
persons from their homes. "868 The Security Council also determined that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted "a threat to peace and security in the 
region .,, 
869 The Council called on both parties in the conflict to stop hostilities and to 
take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation in Kosovo. It also "decided, 
should concrete measures demanded in resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider 
further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and security in the 
region. , 
870 
Meanwhile, preparation was underway inside NATO for military intervention against 
FRY, if Belgrade did not compliance with the Security Council's resolutions. The legal 
basis which NATO depended on, was that the humanitarian situation was increasely 
serious, and it sought to link this humanitarian interest as much as possible with the 
previous resolutions of the Security Council, in order to gain more grounds of 
legitimacy. The NATO Secretary-General Solana on 9 October 1998 declared that: 
"The FRY has not yet complied with the urgent demands of the International Community, despite 
UNSC Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 followed by UNSC Resolution 1199 of 23 September 
1998, both acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The very stringent report of the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations pursuant to both resolutions warned inter alia of the danger of an 
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. The continuation of a humanitarian catastrophe, because no 
concrete measures towards a peaceful solution of the crisis have been taken by the FRY. The fact 
that another UNSC Resolution containing a clear enforcement action with regard to Kosovo cannot 
be expected in the foreseeable future. The deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and its 
magnitude constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the region as explicitly referred to in 
the UNSC Resolution 1199. On the basis of this discussion, I conclude that the Allies believe that 
in the particular circumstances with respect to the present crisis in Kosovo as described in UNSC 
Resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use 
force. , 871 
867 See Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, " p. 6. 
868 See SC Res. 1199 of 23 Sept. 1998. 869 
Ibid. 
870 Ibid. 
871 Cited in Sinuna, p. 7. 
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In a sense, that statement laid the grounds for the air strikes against FRY. This harsh 
stance on the part of NATO was fruitful. It pushed the FRY towards further negotiation 
and also intensive diplomatic efforts were made. The result was two agreements. The 
first one, dated 16 October 1998, between the FRY and the OSCE, allowed the latter to 
establish an inspection commission in Kosovo, and promised the compliance of FRY 
with all Security Council resolutions in connection with the conflict. The second 
agreement was directed to the establishment an air inspection commission over Kosovo 
in order to complement the OSCE mission. 872 Acting under Chapter VII, the Security 
Council ratified and supported the two agreements concerning the inspection of 
compliance by the FRY and all others concerned in Kosovo with the requirements of its 
Resolution 1199, and demanded full and prompt implementation of these agreements by 
the FRY. Later, the Council condemned the FRY for its failure "to execute the arrest 
warrants issued by the ICTY" in September 1998 and demanded "the immediate and 
unconditional execution of those arrest warrants, including the transfer to the custody of 
the Tribunal of those individualS.,, 873 
At the same time, NATO leaders begin to mobilise public opinion to support any use of 
force by NATO in Kosovo. The British Prime Minster, Tony Blair, indicated that the 
main aim of NATO was "to prevent [President] Milosevic from continuing to perpetuate 
,, 874 his vile oppression against civilians. The British Secretary of State for Defence 
pointed that NATO acting in full hannony with the international law and for 
humanitarian consideration. He declared that the aim of the NATO campaign was: 
"Our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme 
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those circunistances clearly existed in Kosovo. 
The use of force in such circumstances can be justified as an exceptional measure in support of 
purposes laid down by the [United Nations] Security Council, but without the Council's express 
872 Ibid, p. 7-8. 
873 See SC Res. 1207 of 17 Nov. (1998). 
874 Cited in Dino Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, " (International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49, April 2000), p. 34 1. 
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authorisation, Nvhen that is the only means to avert an immediate and ovenvIielming humanitarian 
CataStro , Phe. 
i, 875 
Meanwhile, in the US, President Clinton regarded the aim of the NATO campaign as 
being to "prevent a wider war, to deftise a powder-keg at the heart of Europe that has 
exploded before in this century with catastrophic resultS.,, 
876 The US, at that stage of the 
crisis, was convinced that a military solution to the conflict was the only option, since 
the FRY had blocked all possible peaceftil ways. 877 This was obvious from the US oral 
proceeding before the International Court of Justice, when the US offered many excuses 
and claims as legal grounds for NATO action in Kosovo: 
"The humanitarian catastrophe that has engulfed the people of Kosovo as a brutal and unlawful 
campaign of ethnic cleansing has forced many hundreds of thousands to flee their homes and has 
severely endangered their lives and well-being; the acute threat of the actions of the [FRY] to the 
security of neighbouring States, including the threat posed by extremely heavy flows of refugees 
and armed incursions into their territories; the serious violation of international humanitarian law 
and human rights obligations by forces under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
including widespread murder, disappearances, rape, theft and destruction of property; and finally 
the resolutions of the Security Council, which have determined that the actions of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and, pursuant to 
,, 878 Chapter VII of the Charter, demanded a halt to such actions. 
The main point, which should be mentioned here, is that before the use of force on the 
part of NATO, and with the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation and 
the increase of violence, the logical direction events would have been a return to the 
Security Council, for it to review and consider the situation again and to give pen-nission 
for the use of force in that crisis, although it can be admitted that if that had been done, 
the Russians would have used the veto to prevent any resolution that would authorise 
the use of force in that crisis. Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing 
campaign violated the United Nations Charter and International Law. In general, the use 
875 Ibid, p. 34142. 
876 Ibid. 
877 For more information about the bombing campaign, see James Ciment, Encyclopaedia of Conflicts 
Since Morld Mar II, Vol. (2), (Chicago, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers), p. 1134-35. 
878 Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force Against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, " p. 34243. 
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of force since 1945, has been linked with Article 2 (4), which asked Member states to 
refrain from threat or use of force. There are only two exceptions to this article: Article 
51 (individual and collective self-defence) of the Charter, or collective use of force 
under the authority of the Security Council. This means that any threat or use of force 
that is neither considered as self-defence against an armed attack nor authorised by the 
Security Council should be regarded as a violation of the UN Charter. Moreover, under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, no regional arrangement can practise the use of force 
without the Security Council's permission [Article 53 (1)]. As a result, if we consider 
that NATO depended on Chapter VIII for its intervention in Kosovo, this would be not 
only a violation of the UN Charter, since it was undertaken without permission, but also 
a violation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which limited NATO activities to 
the geographic area of Member states of the treaty. 
Only the Security Council can decide that there are violations of human rights happen 
inside a state, which constitute a threat to international peace and security; on that basis 
the Council can give permission to take an enforcement action. The NATO claims, even 
with its noble intents, cannot provide justification for the NATO air strikes against FRY, 
since, that violation of human rights did not go beyond Kosovo's borders and so did not 
amount to an armed attack against another state. Here, the recourse to Article 51 is not 
available. Even the influx of refugees from Kosovo did not constitute an armed attack. 
The tendency from NATO to adopt a new exception to Article 2(4) under the umbrella 
of humanitarian intervention is completely unacceptable. NATO was in origin a 
defensive organisation, whose role is to protect Member states from any aggression; not 
to place itself on the same footing as the Security Council and to take its place in 
exercising its responsibilities to protect international peace and security. 
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overall, the air strikes have been regarded by many as unlawful. The British Attorney 
General, John Morris, considered the NATO campaign as illegitimate. 879 Professor 
Bruno Simma. emphasised that, 
"[flf the Security Council determines that massive violations of human rights occurring within a 
country constitute a threat to the peace, and then calls for or authorises an enforcement action to 
put an end to these violations, a "humanitarian interventioW' by military means is permissible. In 
the absence of such authorisation, military coercion ... constitutes a breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Further, as long as humanitarian crises do not transcend borders ... and lead to armed 
attacks against other states, recourse to Article 51 [self-defence] is not available". 880 
He concluded that NATO's air strikes were in breach of international law . 
88 1 Also, the 
House of Commons' foreign affairs committee was of the opinion that NATO, as a 
defensive organisation, is not authorised to use military actions in other countries 
without the Security Council's authority. 882 The NATO actions constitute an unfortunate 
precedent for states to use force to suppress the commission of international crimes in 
other states; on grounds that easily can be and have been abused to justify intervention 
for less laudable objectives. As now instituted, the so-called principle of humanitarian 
intervention can lead to an escalation of international violence, discord and disorder, and 
diminish protections of human rights world-wide. If current international law and 
organisations are insufficient to solve problems like the Kosovo crisis, better rules of 
law and improved organisations might be developed to avoid these terrible risks and 
properly protect human rights. 
President Clinton and others have argued that when a nation is committing gross human 
rights violations against its citizens, other nations or multilateral coalitions have the 
right to intervene militarily, without the authority of the United Nations Security 
Council, to end those abuses. In the aftermath of the Kosovo War, US administration 
879 See The Current Digest ofthe Post-Soviet Press 52 (July 12,2000), p. 23. 
880 Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, " p. 1; 5. 
881 Ibid, p. 6. 
882 The Current Digest ofthe Post-Soviet Press, p. 23. 
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officials have invented a Clinton doctrine that proclaims that the United States will 
forcefully intervene to prevent human rights abuses when it can do so without suffering 
substantial casualties. 883 This doctrine rhetorically suggests a new, assertive, US 
approach to promoting and defending human rights abroad. However, the Clinton 
doctrine is highly selective, as indicated by Washington's decision to intervene in 
Kosovo - where, over the preceding year, an estimated two thousand had been killed - 
though ignoring the 1994 Rwandan genocide of over one million civilians within the 
span of a few weeks. 884 The US failed to act in Rwanda, a country of little strategic or 
economic importance. Similarly, although the State Department recognises that Turkey, 
a close ally, has committed flagrant human rights violations against the Kurdish 
minority, the administration not only fails to intervene to protect the Kurds but actually 
continues to export anns to Turkey. During his October 1999 visit to Turkey, President 
Clinton went so far as to praise Turkey's progress on establishing democracy and to 
promote its entry into the European Union. If human rights were of serious concern to 
the US, Washington would at least stop selling guns and helicopters to Turkey. 885 
Another close US ally, Indonesia, which invaded and annexed East Timor, causing the 
death of over 200,000 Timorese, is one of the world's worst human rights violators. Yet, 
throughout the incursions into East Timor, the US continued to arm and train the 
Indonesian military. When, in 1999, East Timor voted peacefully and ovenvhelmingly 
for independence, the US opposed the rapid creation of an anned UN peacekeeping 
force that could have stopped the forced exile of hundreds of thousands and the 
slaughter of Timorese civilians by Indonesian-controlled paramilitaries. Today, the US 
883 http: //wxvxv. ndu. edu/inss/strforum/foruml 66. html, p. 1-3. 
884 For more information about the genocide in R%vanda and the international reaction, see James Ciment, 
Encyclopaedia of Conflicts Since World WarlI, Vol. 11, p. 1134-35. 
885 http: //Nv%v%v. vanderbilt. edu/Laxv/ioumal/32-5-I. htmi, p. 3; 7-8. 
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is giving only limited support to the Australian/LJN force; it refuses to supply combat 
troops but is giving some logistical help and a few helicopters. 886 
The purported good that might come from allowing countries to intervene unilaterally 
based upon humanitarian intervention argument is, however, outweighed by the dangers 
that arise from weakening the international restraints on the use of force. 887 In addition, 
the UN charter requires that the use of force be a last resort, taken only after all peaceful 
alternatives have failed. The UN's primary goal is to "save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war. " The Kosovo Crisis illustrates the danger of bypassing the Security 
Council and lends credence to those who argue that intervention was not for 
humanitarian purposes. Had the United States gone to the Security Council, it is 
possible that a settlement similar to the one that ended the air war could have been 
achieved without the use of force. The Security Council might have insisted on more 
negotiations, a more flexible approach to the Ranibouillet proposal, or a less prominent 
role for NATO and the United States. Moreover, the destructiveness of the war and its 
aftermath undermine Washington's humanitarian claims and reemphasis the reasons 
why the Charter's framers chose peace as its central tenet. 888 
Special Associations 
For the purposes of rescue, the national or nonnational separate becomes arguably, like 
nationality itself, a product output of the "specific" association between an intervening 
state and a certain group of people. Nationality is one especially durable type of special 
886 http: //,, v%v%v. unac. org/canada/bowles98/inter. htmi, p. 1-2. 
887 Louis Henkin, "Editorial Conunents: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of 
"Humanitarian Intervention, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 93,1999), p. 824-25. 
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association, but it is not the only one; nor is it inelastic. In the Congo in both 1960 and 
1964, after all, Belgium and France rescued "nationals" who were defined not by 
citizenship but by white skin and Euro-American origins. Also, for example, the US 
intervention in the Dominican Republic, likewise, supposed that "a plea can be made 
that where it is legal to intervene to protect one's own nationals, it is an extension of this 
legality to protect the nationals of others. The so-called principle of nationality is not 
inflexibl P.,, 889 The implication is that the defence of persons beyond a states' borders, 
whether nationals or not, is best defined along a continuum, along which the boundaries 
of "membership", and consequently responsibility, are drawn and redrawn, expanded 
and contracted, according to the situation. In general, special associations come from a 
perception of proximity; and their emblematic form is the family or clan. In common 
social and ethical codes, it is considered acceptable to have special obligations to those 
related or near to us - families, friends, compatriots. These special associations are based 
on principle, not practice, in much of traditional political theory. Therefore, a person 
legitimately claims a greater duty to her own child than to children generally, even to the 
degree that these might conflict. 
When a state claims a right to take action abroad in defence of its nationals, it maintains 
the special obligation it has to its own nationals. Historically, the practice of 
humanitarian intervention began with a selective view of humanity based on religious, 
cultural, and political affinities. The first humanitarian action so-called was the joint 
intervention of Britain, France and Russia in Turkey on behalf of Greek Orthodox in 
1827. That operation was followed by others, among them French intervention in Syria 
888 Consequently, the intervention risked destabilising the international rule of law that prohibits a state or 
group of states from intervening by the use of force in another state, absent authorisation by the United 
Nations Security Council or a situation of self-defence. 
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890 on behalf of Moronite, Christians in 1860 and American intervention in Cuba in 1898. 
In contemporary international politics, special associations of many sorts are widely 
acknowledged; they also appear important when states justify the resort to armed 
force. 891 One encounters ethnic and cultural affinities that cross legal borders; 
Yugoslavia trying to justify its support for rebels in Greece in 1947 on the basis of 
Slavo-Macedonian kinship, for example; 892 and Greece and the Netherlands arguing 
during the 1954 debate over "definition of aggression" that humanitarian intervention 
should be allowed when ties existed between intervening states and ethnic minorities. 893 
One hears appeals to imperial obligation and affections: the Dutch confronting 
Indonesia over the status of West Irian comes to mind, as does Britain responding to the 
call of duty during the Falklands War. One also thinks of hemispheric spheres of 
influence such as the US intervention in Grenada and to some extent Panama, and the 
USSR in Afghanistan in 1979. Also invoked are ideology, as in the case of the USSR's 
intervention in Czechoslovakia and religious- racial connection, like the Jordanian 
Army's intervention in Palestine in 1948, and the Irani an-Jordanian military support for 
the Omani Government against Marxist rebels in the early seventies. 
At a minimum, this suggests that some attention might be profitably redirected from 
state-to-state relations toward state-person and state-community relations. As a 
corollary, one could set aside certain preoccupations of international relations theory in 
order to make room for others derived from political theory, philosophy, and critical 
sociology, such as the nature of agency, identity, and community. Even when one begins 
from a traditional international perspective, rescue operations urge one in this direction. 
889 A. J. Thomas and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, 7he Dondnican Republic Crisis 1965, Background Paper 
and Proceedings of the Ninth Hammarskjold Forum, ed. by John Carey, (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana 
Publications, 1967), p. 20. 
890 For more information see Fonteyne "Humanitarian Intervention", p. 219. 
891 Ibid, p. 224. 
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Think of the considerations that are seen to enhance or diminish a state's right to 
intervene on behalf of nationals. When nationals are taken as hostages, one notes their 
innocence in having been deprived of all choice or agency. When a host state itself is the 
source of threat, one holds it accountable because one credits it with effective agency. 
When an intervenor has hidden motives, one censures it for intruding in the state-person 
relationships of another polity while having no such relationships of its own at stake. As 
a result, it is worth noting here, that opening the discussion of international politics to 
the substance and methods of political theory does not settle one way or the other 
whether the locus of rights and duties is properly the individual or the group. 
Sel(-defence and Set(-determination 
It is difficult to broach special associations and state-person commitments with out 
mentioning self-deten-nination. On the surface, self-defence and self-deten-nination 
appear contradictory. In fonn, self-defence is a negative claim, indicating the 
conservation of existing values. Self-determination, by contrast, seems a positive one, 
implying an aspiration to potential but as yet unpossessed values. In practice, self- 
defence has been the governing norm of already-established states, despite some 
attempts during decolonisation to apply it to national liberation movements. Meanwhile, 
self-determination was the leitmotif of anti-colonialism. 894 Moreover, self-defence is 
treated, both in the Charter and in public debate, as a right held by states against other 
states. It addresses the external relations between acknowledged states, and more 
892 This was rejected by a United Nations Commission of Investigation. See Akehurst, p. 10. 
893 Ibid. 
894 The term, self-determination is used broadly in many other situations, such as the Soviet interventions 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the US interventions in Vietnam and Grenada, and Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia. 
250 
specifically, Members of the UN, whereas self-determination is predominantly 
associated with internal struggles, addressing the relationship between popular 
communities and the states which govern them. Self-defence and self-determination 
become more compatible if one sees them as referring to different stages in the 
emergence of political community and statehood. Generally, it is the acquisition of 
sovereign statehood, that permits a community to claim rights vis-A-vis other states. The 
right of self-defence in particular, along with the injunction against the resort to anned 
force, has been seen as applying nearly exclusively to states, despite ongoing efforts to 
incorporate individuals and non-state organisations into the framework of international 
laws and norms. As a consequence, new states, especially previously colonial states, 
placed great emphasis or their independent statehood when justifying their engagement 
in armed attack conflicts. Here, one could note Indonesia's position during its protracted 
conflict with the Dutch (1947-49), while the latter claimed merely to be "policing" 
internal security; and Israel's justification for pushing back Arab forces past its fon-nal 
borders, while the latter argued that their sole aim was restoration of internal order. 895 
At the same time, states are ideally only acknowledged as such, and granted 
Membership in the United Nations, when they evince a reasonable fit between a 
government and its citizenry. New states have generally been inducted into the society 
of nations with a presumption of internal legitimacy. Upon their arrival, they then 
become entitled to such rights of membership as self-defence. These issues may be 
illustrated by the conflict between India and Pakistan over possession of the "princely 
states" whose autonomy was left unresolved at the time of British India's independence. 
These principalities (362 in total) had been semi-autonomous under British rule and so 
were not part of the negotiations for British departure in 1947. The status of most of 
895 Kjell Goldmann, International Norms and War Between States, (Stockolm: Laromedelsforlagen, 
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them was rapidly settled by geography. A few, however, posed a greater challenge 
because of size, contiguity to both India and Pakistan, uneasy fit between their rulers 
and ruled, or all three, as in the case of Kashmir. Continued semi-autonomy was not 
really considered an option: the choice for these entities was between respective 
accessions, to India or to Pakistan. Neither of these states, in turn, appeared to relinquish 
claims to the princely states; each argued that the regions were properly theirs on the 
basis of "natural" national unity that would become theirs legitimately to defend. 
"Kashmir Joins India ... Rebels Repulsed , 
896 
Demography can be cruelly idiosyncratic; and all of the former British India confronted 
the question of where people belonged, with whom they belonged, and why. 
Independence in 1947 provoked massive migrations and bloodshed as people tried to 
conform to the new borders of Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. 897 By the late summer 
of 1947, the status of Kashmir was engendering substantial unrest. In July, Muslims in 
the south-west had revolted in favour of accession to Pakistan. In central Kashmir, 
deserters from the state Army had formed their own army of independence (the Asad 
Kashmir Army). When, in October, the south-western rebellion proclaimed a 
provisional government, it was rapidly joined by thousands of sympathetic Pathan 
tribesmen who had been armed by Pakistan. These began an increasingly formidable 
march on Kashmir's capital. India accused Pakistan at the time of sending its reguler 
1971), p. 150-51. 
896 Headline, (7he Times, October, 28 1947), p. 4. 
897 According to some estimates' more than 400,000 persons were killed during that period. 
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troops in the guise of civilians, but the charge was denied by Pakistan and remains an 
unproved allegation. 
898 
When Muslims rebels got to within thirty miles of the capital, Kashmir's Hindu 
Mahajah announced that Kashmir would accede to India. He wrote to Lord 
Mountbaten, that "with the conditions obtaining at present in my State, ... I have no 
option but to ask help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help 
asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. " Lord Mountbaten 
replied that: 
"In the special circumstances my Government has decided to accept the assession of Kashmir to 
the Dominion Government of India. ... Meanwhile, in response to the appeal for military aid, action 
was taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces defend your 
territory and protect lives and property and the honour of your people. "899 
Indian troops entered Kashmir in opposition to the rebel Muslims, and fighting rapidly 
escalated. 900 By May 1948, the Pakistan anny officially joined the conflict. Several 
months later, in December 1948, the UN brokered a cease-fire. That cease-fire remains 
the effective boundary between India and Pakistan, although the status of Kashmir has 
been persistently tontested. At that time, India justified its involvement as a 
straightforward act of self-defence under Article 51. It had a right, after all, to enter its 
own territory, especially in response to "a situation ... whose continuance 
is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international Peace and security ... owing to the aid which 
invaders ... are drawing from Pakistan. " Pakistan, while denying that its troops had 
entered the fray prior to India's, nonetheless insisted that they should have been allowed 
to do so as a fonn. of "preventive defence" before India could annex Kashmir 
898 The circumstances on the ground wcre unclear. The Times corespondent recognised that "it is difficult 
to draw a clear picture on what is happening. " For more information see (77ie Times, October 28 1947), p. 
4. 
899 See (7he Tinies, 27 October, 1947), p. 4. See also, Erik Goldstein, Mars and Peace Treaties 1816- 
1991, (London: Routlcdge, 1992), p. 86. 
900 See (The Times, 31 October, 1947), p. 4. 
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successfully. 901 The conflict over Kashmir essentially pitted territorial and 
administrative claims against popular, demographic ones, the former winning the day, 
although not without great cost. 
The fight over Kashmir was replicated in other Indian regions. In Hyderabad and 
Jungadh, for example, the issues remained the same, despite an ironic role reversal. In 
contrast to Kashmir, both of these principalities were ruled by Muslim governments 
while populated mostly by Hindus. Hyderabad's Nizam, for instance, preferred an 
independent arrangement with India to formal accession. Ostensibly to enhance his 
prospects, he made threatening noises to the Indian government that Hyderabad would 
accede to Pakistan. India responded with an economic blockade of his region. The 
Hyderabad government appealed to the United Nations [although being neither a state 
nor a member]. Before the United Nations could reply, Indian troops advanced inside 
Hyderabad. Within five days, Hyderabad had joined the Indian Dominion, and later the 
same thing happened in Jungadh. In general, both India and Pakistan can easily be seen 
to have alleged claims to go to the defence of Kashmir, as they would have defended 
themselves. In order to evaluate their particular claims, though, one needs to consider 
the particular values accorded to territory and state authority versus popular sentiment. 
The right of self-defence cannot deal with the probability that existing [selves] may 
grow in directions countered by the rival growth of another, or that they may splinter 
into different entities, each claiming a defensive right against the other. It is true that 
when established states [enlarge], they often do so at the cost of other states. 
Traditionally, this is labelled as an aggression, and self-defence should be appropriate to 
represent the right of its victim. Nevertheless, it is still the case, that current legal and 
customary norms dispute the right of self-defence to non-state groups. 
901 The Indian representative to the United Nations, in United Nations Repertoire, 1946-195 1, p. 405-6. 
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Territory 
The essence of defence is keeping the other side out of your territory. 
Robert Jervis 
The second part of chapter eight, considers territory as an object of defence. Possibly, 
even more than population, territory and its associated borders are fundamental to the 
issue of self-defence. In these days, states are unthinkable without a physical, territorial 
base. 902 That is why, for example, when France was deprived of its territory during 
World War 11, the Free French Government sought to reclaim it. When a non-state 
community seeks statehood - as in the case of the Palestinians, for example, their main 
would is for land, since it is only authority over a specific territory that can give the 
,, 903 modem state its complete "physical expression. Traditionally, territoriality underpins 
the realist view of international politics which deems the most important actors in 
international politics to be states, and these to be considered particularly as "territorially 
,, 904 organised entities. 
Among the characteristics that define contemporary states; a characteristic particularly 
lacking among pre-modem states, is inclination for making precise and more or less 
fixed claims to specific as exclusively their own. 905 This is a relatively recent 
902 Historically, the modem state is identified as such by being territorially bounded. 
903 See Barry Buszan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies In Yhe 
Post-Cold Mar Era, 2nd ed, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 199 1), p. 64. 
904 See Robert 0. Keohane, Neorealisin and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 
163. 
905 The first official boundary in this sense was established in the Treaty of the Pyrenees between Spain 
and France in 1659, which approved a joint commission to settle the exact border line. See Frederick V. 
Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich, and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on 
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development in the grand project of political history. In the medieval world, political 
jurisdiction was mainly personal rather than territorial. Such boundaries of feudatory 
and churchly authority as existed often overlapped territorially and "had none of the 
connotations of possessiveness and exclusiveness conveyed by the modem concept of 
sovereignty. , 906 Over the period in which states acquired the surroundings that we 
identify today, land, "unlike other natural elements [such as air] ... became a private 
good, not. a public one; its use and enjoyment ... open only to its owner. "907 The core of 
the modem state became "its territoriality"; this in turn, was defined as exclusive right 
of possession, 'the functional equivalent of property rights. " Just as territoriality is 
common to all states, so too is territorial vulnerability. Indeed, territorial security is 
arguably the single concern that unites all states, in kind if not in degree. 908 Territory, 
afler all, is the strong-box of most socially understood values. It is the source of natural 
resources, from oil to agricultural land; it also houses establishment resources, from 
markets to desirable labour; it affords sheer space on which to live; and it provide the 
means for communities to develop within set boundaries. Particular territory also 
contains value unique to particular people, when families and tribes dwell in a region for 
generations, and when cultural integrity seems therefore inseparable from it. It is 
difficult to disagree with a generalisation that "humankind has always had a special 
relationship to the land on which it lives and which sustains it. "909 Territorial security is 
not really about preservation of land and its offerings themselves, absolutely, but about 
Conflict over Territory, (Columbia University Institute of War and Peace Studies, Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1985), p. 11. 
906 See John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis, " (Morld Politics 35), p. 263. 
907 See Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, Studies in 
International Conflict Vol. 5, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1. 
908 Buzan said that "although population and territory vary enormously among states in terms of extent, 
configuration, level of development and resources, the threats to the state's physical base are common in 
type to all states because of the similar physical quality of the objects involved. " See Buzan, People, 
States and Fear, p. 9 1. 
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the boundaries that separate them. When groups come to blows over territory, they are 
not concerned with territory itself, but with its ownership and the contribution of its 
various resources; in short, with the legitimate separation of "ours" from "theirs". 
Territory seems the most basic value around which actual lines can be demarcated, 
making violations of it more tangible and objective than breaches of other sorts of 
boundaries; ethnic, ideological, psychological, economic. The problem is not that well 
fixed borders are not worthy of defence, but that many modem or recent borders are not 
very well fixed; and that in the process of becoming established, struggling parties can 
usually make claims of defence that are either equally strong or equally weak. For 
example, when fighting remains confined to a frontier area as in the Chinese assault of 
Vietnamese territory in 1979 and their continuing hostilities for the next ten years it 
suggests that the frontier itself is the matter of rivalry. In that conflict, both sides 
inclined to describe their actions in such terms. The Chinese representative to the United 
Nations considered his country actions as "limited counter-attack, in defence of our 
frontier. "910 Moreover, territory is valued for a wide variety of reasons; from the 
strategic and economic to the historical and cultural, from each of which it is usually 
treated as inseparable; so that one is wary of trying to isolate it as a value in and of itself. 
Borders Defence 
That a states has a right to protect its territory from any danger or threat seems by many 
beyond argument. "Territorial integrity" is the corollary of "political independence". 
Together, they form the framework of state sovereignty and define the essential values 
of the post-1945 world order. When a state governs a clearly-bounded area, over which 
909 Goertz and Diehl, p. I 
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it has both legal title and effective control, and especially when it has done so far a long 
period of time, its territorial claims are generally considered indisputable. When, in 
addition, it can command the willing loyalty of the residents of that territory, its 
territorial claims harmonise with political legitimacy, and its territorial belongings 
become the foundations on which its population make their "common life. "911 To use 
force to guard such territory is to protect the prospect of civil life within it; in a sense it 
is a model example of "self-defence". It is more a element of historical certainty than 
one of interpretation or much controversy that South Korea was legitimately engaged in 
a defensive war against North Korea. Most would also accept that Israel had a right to 
self-defence after the surprise attack by Syria and Egypt on October 1973; and that Great 
Britain could claim a defensive right to reply to Argentina's attack of the Falkland 
Islands in 1982. In each of these events, boundaries existed that were legal and 
recognised. These boundaries were also effective in the sense that the groups living 
within them approved the authority and legitimacy of the state under which they lived. 
Also, in each it was apparent who struck the first blow. These three cases are the easiest 
to designate as self-defence. 
It is disturbing, though, to note how deep ran disputes over the legitimacy of the other 
boundaries in question. Fonnally speaking, each was legal, even if the result of annistice 
rather than a full peace settlement, as in Korea, Vietnam, Israel, and Cyprus. South 
Korea, South Vietnam, Israel and Turkish Cyprus, however, had each been a source of 
struggle from the beginning of its legally bounded existence; also, none had been in 
existence very long. For example, Chad, like other ex-colonial states, retained borders 
that meant more to its previous administrators, in this case, France and Britain, than to 
itself and its neighbouring states. Chad northern border with Libya had never been 
910 In United Nations Repertoire, 1975-1980, p. 341. 
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completely defined, and their common frontier had a contradictory record of colonial 
ownership. Moreover, the border area was inhabited by contending groups of Arabs, 
who tended toward Libya, and Afficans, who leaned toward Chad. Still, the region of 
combat in Korea, Vietnam, Cyprus and Chad could be described as civil war, as much 
as international. To note the ambiguity or contentiousness of even legally fixed 
boundaries is not to advocate challenging them by force of arms, as did North Korea in 
(1950), Syria and Egypt (1973), Libya (1978), Argentina (1982) and Iraq (1990), to 
name those whose first military moves were the most clear and exciting. Nor is it to 
deny that the governments of their particular targets had a right to resist militarily. It 
does suggest, though, that the brightness with which Article 51 describes self-defence is 
too simple, as is the image of a peaceful community under outside attack that is most 
associated with it. It also indicates a need for greater attention to the circumstances in 
which states emerge and become viable as entities deserving a right to defence. 
Fonvard Defence 
Forward defence refers to a method in which "a state decides to take a stand not at its 
, 912 own frontier ... but at the frontiers of another state fonvard of this. The motivation of 
forward defence is still a real threat to home territory; the reasoning behind it is that 
one's country may be better secured before an enemy actually reaches one's borders. 
When fonvard territories stay non-specific, until a matter of dispute arises, fonvard 
defence matches an actively preserved balance of power; when they are established, 
forward defence is expressed through coalitions and guarantees. During times of crisis, 
fonvard preservation tactics may drive states to promise the security of distant states, 
911 This was Walzer expression, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 57. 
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exactly, as the United Kingdom in early 1939 did with Poland; or to occupy neutral 
states, as the Soviet Union did with both of Denmark and Norway in 1940. For example, 
China's claim that the United Nations forces in Korea posed a threat to its national 
security, was honestly convincing, especially when those forces crossed the 38th parallel 
toward the Chinese border. Forward defence includes elements beyond the spatial, in 
general. Especially during the Cold War, forward defence was seen psychological tenns. 
In the relations between the United States and the USSR, the capacity of each to threaten 
the other was believed to reside prominently in their credibility and reputation, along 
with the hearts and minds of other nations whom they sought to win over. In forward 
defence, the territory at stake does not matter because of any intrinsic value, but because 
of the greater capacity it might give an adversary to become more directly and 
immediately threatening. 
The US Secretary of State, Dulles, defended the US support and help given to Taiwan to 
defend the islands of Quemony and Matsu, on the grounds that these islands were not 
"just some square miles of real estate" but the locus of confidence in the United States' 
determination to resist aggression. And if the United States failed in this challenge, it 
would only face a greater one after "our fiiends become disheartened and our enemies 
overconfident and miscalculating. "9 13 
912 Ceadel, 7hink-ing about Peace and Mar, p. 79. 
913 See the Speech of Dulles before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry at New 
York, 25 September 1958, in Department ofState Bulletin, XY_XIX: 1007 (October 13,1958), p. 565. 
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"US Naval Units Put to Sea Over Red Blow at Quenzoys , 914 
"Bombing Raids on China , 915 
During the 1950s the United States on several occasions considered using atomic 
missiles against China. 916 Each time, the immediate provocation was contention 
between China and Taiwan over a number of small islands located between them in the 
Straits of Taiwan. The most important from a strategic point of view were Quemoy and 
Matsu. When the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan in 1949, they retained control of the 
islands from which they were able to harass the Chinese and their shipping. Both China 
and Taiwan claimed that the islands belonged exclusively to them. From late 1954 to 
April, 1955, and again in mid-1958, they became the focus of international crises that 
brought the US and China close to war. On both occasions, each of the parties involved 
declared the islands to be "foeward defensive" positions critical to their basic security. 
The first crisis began with the heavy shelling of Quemoy from China in early 
September, 1954.9 17 Hostilities quickly escalated between the Communist and 
Nationalist troops; within months, the northernmost group of islands had fallen to the 
Chinese troops. By early 1955 "from Washington's vantage point all-out war for the 
offshore islands and perhaps Taiwan itself seemed to loom. " The Eisenhower 
administration's first priority was the continued defence of Taiwan, to which the US 
was bound by treaty. The situation regarding these islands led the Americans to consider 
that the defence of Taiwan would be more effective if a line were drawn further 
foeward. Some northern islands that had been lost early in the fight were negotiable, but 
for the US, the defence of Quemoy and Matsu appeared essential as "outposts for the 
914 See (New York- Tinies, 5 September, 1954), p. 2. 
915 See (71ze Times, 8 September, 1954), p. 6. 
916 For more information see Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enendes: Yhe United States, China, and the 
Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, Caffornia: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
917 Ibid, p. 120. 
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defence of Formosa. "918 For the US, that line was needed, for psychological more than 
territorial reasons. Both Quenmoy and Matsu were too near the Chinese ports; as 
Eisenhower described them, within "wading distance" of the mainland. 919 These islands 
had been under Taiwanese control since 1945, however and had been heavily fortified 
by Nationalist forces, with considerable financial help from the United States. From the 
United States' perspective, their loss would do irreparable damage to the Nationalists' 
morale, thereby threatening their hold on Taiwan. The loss of Taiwan, of course, would 
be "humiliating and devastating to American credibility.,, 
920 However, this crisis 
subsided by the Spring of 1955, when the Communist government backed away from 
hostilities and ceased fire. 
The second crisis began in late August, 1958, when China initiated another shelling 
campaign against Nationalist garrisons on the islands. The United States immediately, 
assembled a counterforce in the area, which was described as "the most powerful 
armada the world had ever seen .,, 
92 1 At this time, the United States was more vociferous 
in her commitment to the islands. In an address to the nation, Eisenhower emPhasised 
the importance of Quemoy to the United States: 
"Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy. Would that be the end of the 
story? ... 
It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese Communists started on 
August 23d had as its purpose not just the taking of the island of Quemoy. It is part of what is 
indeed an ambitions plan of an-ned conquest ... 
[determining tol liquidate all the free-Nvorld 
,, 922 positions in the Western Pacific area and bring them under captive governments. 
From his side, Dulles described to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, the 
consequences of a loss of these islands. Taiwan would be underniined, leaving it, 
"exposed to subversive and military action which would probably bring about a government that 
would eventually advocate union with Communist China; ... if this occurred 
it would seriously 
918 Ibid, p. 122-23. 
919 Ibid, p. 117. 
920 lbid, p. 125. 
921 lbid, p. 185. 
922 President Eisenhower, Public address, II September 1958, Deparinzent of State Bulletin, XXXIX 
(29 September 1958), p. 482. 
262 
jeopardise the anti-Communist barrier, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of 
China, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; that other governments in Southeast 
Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos and Burma would gradually come fillly 
under Communist influence; that Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within 
the Sino-Soviet orbit, and Australia and New Zealandwould become strategically isolated. ', 923 
Meanwhile both sides, China and Taiwan regarded themselves as engaged in a defensive 
war against the other. The Chinese Government accused the United States of intervening 
in a dispute that was properly internal to China, and questioned whether the United 
States wanted "China [to] give up its right of exercising sovereignty over its own 
territory and recognise the right of 'self-defence' for the United States on China's 
territory9i, 924 
Also, the Chinese claimed that the United States supported the Taiwanese for the 
purpose of conducting "all sorts of harassing and disruptive activities against the 
mainland. " For that reason, they argued, "the Chinese people cannot tolerate the 
presence in their inland waters along the mainland of an immediate threat posed by such 
,, 925 coastal islands as Quemoy and Matsu. In the dispute over these islands, one sees the 
interplay of two major themes that underpin the legitimacy of forward defence. The first 
operates in the realm of psychology and symbol, and the second in that of physical 
geography: both are asserted as causal to future aggression. The American concern 
during this crisis was predominantly with morale and credibility, which were always 
causally linked to ultimate territorial consequences, as communist regimes spread from 
state to contiguous state. As Dulles warned, the loss of Quemoy and Matsu would 
enable the Communists "to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, 
right back to Hawaii, and even to the United States. " 926 In many Cold War expressions 
923 In Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, p. 185- 
86. 
924 In Documents on International Affairs, 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 175. 
925 Ibid, p. 180. 
926 See New York Times, 23 April 1956. 
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of forward defence, these two strains coexist: the call to take early to take early and firm 
stands for the sake of credible deterrence of aggression, alongside the more tangible 
claim that military threats must be stopped in their geographical tracks. The United 
States usually depicted its opposition to communism in distant parts of the globe as a 
"first line of defence against the threat to its own shores. Each of its efforts to keep 
communist regimes from gaining a foothold have their parallel in Soviet attempts to 
keep "counter-revolutionary" regimes from gaining ground in places like Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. 
Examples of forward defence can be encountered elsewhere. At the outset of the 
Kashmir dispute in 1948 between Pakistan and India, for example, Pakistan alleged that 
India's occupation of Kashmir was the first move in an effort to destroy Pakistan and 
rule the whole subcontinent; while India argued that Pakistan was the invader and that if 
Pakistan succeeded in controlling Kaslunir, India itself would be the next target. 927 
Moreover, the Chinese defended their intervention in the Korean Crisis, on the grounds 
that they feared the US was "copying the old trick of the Japanese bandits ... first 
invading Korea and then invading China. " The Chinese claimed that "any aggressor 
who invades Korea today invariably invades China tomorrow"; which can interpreted as 
,, 928 meaning that "to save our neighbour is to save ourselves. The US President warned 
in mid-1959 that a communist victory in South Vietnam "would bring their power 
several hundred miles into a hitherto free region, " leaving the remaining countries 
"menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be 
lost immediately and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously 
927 See Goldmann, International Nonns and Mar Between States, p. 133. 
928 lbid, p. 113-14. 
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endangered . 55929 The US administration justified its 1965 intervention in Dominica as "a 
,, 930 matter of preventing Marxist revolution from spreading to all the islands. 
Forward defence must be seen as a tenuous extension of the right of self-defence. its 
weakness does not reside in the value it aims to secure, namely, home territory, but in its 
assertion that these are threatened by conflicts distant in either space or time. The first 
normative hurdle that forward defence must clear is that of showing that one's own 
integrity is genuinely at risk. To maintain a legitimately defensive presence in the Straits 
of Taiwan, for instance, the US would have to show that China had ultimate designs 
upon the United States and that its capture of Quemoy and Matsu would significantly 
affect its capacity to achieve these. Fonvard defence actions thus bears a heavy burden 
of proof about both the intentions and the capacity of their presumed enemy. Here, 
forward defence roughly corresponds to the notion of preventive defence. In its purely 
territorial form, forward defence also contains an inner contradiction. Think of the 
Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir; in theory, proximity should strengthen the case 
of forward defence. The closer to home territory the forward line is, the more plausible 
it is that one is genuinely threatened. For India and Pakistan, Kashmir was very 
plausibly an important first line of defence for both, particularly in the context 
immediately following their tortured independence. Kashmir could equally credibly be 
claimed necessary to the fonvard defence of both India and Pakistan, because here, 
proximity enhances the claim that fonvard defence action is defensive. But, when a 
forward defensive stand is taken far from home territory, it ceases to look very 
defensive. Only powerful states can practise military force far beyond their borders; but 
weaker states can usually do so with the help and assistance of stronger friends. Forward 
929 Ibid, p. 118. 
930 See Venvey, "Humanitarian Intervention, " In: the Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, " p. 
70. 
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defence performance, in reality, has lost some legitimacy on the grounds that many 
fonvard defence performances took the appearance of interventions in internal conflicts 
or crises. Such was the case in China, Hungary, Vietnam, the Dominican, 
Czechoslovakia, Grenada, and Afghanistan. 
Border Problems 
"Nearly all available territory is already claimed by states nearly all of which recognise 
each other, " said Buzan. 931 While most states may recognise each other, many do not 
accept the precise borders that divide them. Many border conflicts are as dormant as 
they are persistent; others flare but only into "frontier incidents" smaller than full-scale 
war. 932 Yet, even quiescent border disputes have a capacity to explode into armed 
confrontation under the right conditions. Border conflict, do not challenge fundamental 
territorial integrity. As Holsti indicated, both disputing states share "a pre-existing 
acknowledgement of and legitimacy for a territorial distribution of the past. , 933 
However, they dispute the precise allocation of territory at their common frontier. When 
a border area possesses great natural resources, in some cases, slight variations in 
demarcation can have substantial distributive consequences. When borders and physical 
features are associated with a state's historical identity, or what is claimed as such, 
disputes can become especially intractable. Most of the border disputes after 1945 
followed in the wake of decolonisation and faced some kind of ambiguity. In many 
formerly colonial, developing countries, territory had never comprehensively been 
93 1 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 9 1. 
932 For more information see Bowett, Sel(Idefence in International Law, p. 257-8; and Dinstein, Mar, 
Aggression and Self-defence, p. 181-82. 
933 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and Mar: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, Cambridge 
Studies In International Law, no. 14, (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 279. 
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mapped, let alone its borders fully demarcated. Moreover, the history of colonial 
possession was often complicated, with territorial ownership trading hands and borders 
frequently shifting. The principle ovenvhelmingly used to decide borders during 
decolonisation was that post-colonial states should retain the title to all territories 
possessed by the fon-ner colony. This rule of itti possidetis was generally supported by 
both retreating imperial governments and their former colonies and seemed the most 
likely formula to ensure a stable transfer of Properties and authority. It could not remedy 
inadequately mapped borders, however, nor a contradictory record of colonial 
possession. Either feature rendered newly independent states vulnerable to border 
conflicts. These tended to flare into active confrontation, as people moved into areas 
that were previously under-populated, forcing the question of where territorial lines 
were to be drawn. 
"10,000 Red Troops Moving in Key Areas , 934 
"Nehrit Speaks of 'Invasion of Ozole Country , 935 
China and India shared roughly twenty-five hundred miles of border. This broke down 
into three sections: in the east, south-eastern Tibet abutted Indian Assam; in the centre, 
the borders of Tibet, Indian Sikkim, and the autonomous states Nepal and Bhutan all 
come together; in the west, Xinjiang and Tibet bordered Kahmir, itself divided between 
India and Pakistan. The official boundary had been established in 1913-14 under an 
agreement negotiated between Tibet and Great Britain. The resulting "McMahon Line" 
was the basis for all of India's claims to disputed territory. From its inception, China had 
rejected the McMahon division outright. Of the three conflicts stretches of border, the 
934 Headline, (New York- Times, 27 October, 1962), p. 1. 
935 See (Vie Times, 27 October, 1962), p. 8. 
267 
most serious was that in the west. 936 The frontier there had never been well-defined; it 
had not surveyed until 1864 and remained only vaguely mapped in the mid-twentieth 
century. Historically, the region extending roughly east of the Ladakh mountains 
through a plateau called Aksai Chin had been an independent province fronting Jammu 
and Kashmir to the west and Xinjiang and Tibet to the east. When in 1948, India 
acquired Jammu and Kashmir, and Tibet was controlled by China, both of them, China 
and India found themselves proximate. 937 For a long time, the borders between China 
and India were safe without any problems. In 1950, China controlled Aksai Chin, and at 
that time, India did not care about this area, which Nehru described as "a barren and 
,, 938 uninhabited region, 17,000 feet high and without a vestige of grass. 
Later, however, India published a new map, which showed the mountain boundary to be 
further north; which mean suggests India was trying to indicate that Aksai Chin might 
properly belong to India. But, it is fair to mention here that India tried not to enter in a 
direct conflict with China. For its part, China was building a nearly 1200 kilometre road 
across the middle of Aksai Chin. This area was very important for the Chinese 
authorities, on the grounds that it offered the only transit across the mountains between 
Xinjiang and Tibet. The border problems began to be heat up by the mid- I 950s, leading 
India to be more cautious in relation to borders matters concerning China; especially as 
China completely controlled Tibet, and had dissolved the government there. In this new 
situation, China was at the Indian border. Tension escalated when China made clear in 
spring 1960 that it would no longer recognise the McMahon line; fierce fighting began 
936 In the eastern conflict area, the contention to some degree developed from the nature of the region, 
which was sparsely inhabited and mountainous. Consequently, Great Britain had little authority around the 
area there. India strengthened its control over the eastern areas, which incited the beginning of the 
conflict. This part of the Sino-Indian conflict was resolved, when, in 1972 India, decided to gave that area 
autonomy from Assam, for more information see John B. Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes, 3d ed, 
(Harlow: Longman, 1992), p. 431-2. 937 Ibid, p. 433. 
938 Quoted in Allcock, p. 434. 
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between the two sides in June 1960; India from this time embarked on a "forward" 
policy, when it invaded Goa in 1961, and installed of thirty border posts along the 
McMahon line in early 1962. In October 1962, Chinese troops invaded India, and the 
military operation was prolonged until the end of November, when China suddenly 
ceased its military operations. The borders problem between the two sides remains the 
subject of ongoing negotiations. 939 
To some degree, India has a reasonable claim to maintain the McMahon line as its 
border with China, on the grounds of the rule of uti possidefis. That doctrine alone, 
however, cannot settle the problems of boundaries which were not fully demarcated. 
And the problem, which should mentioned here, is that the McMahon line negotiations 
were originally conducted with Tibet, and not China, which in this case increased the 
difficulty. One writer noted that "Chinese incursions against India are shocking to India 
and Europe ... because they violate Indian and European maps. ', 
940 Therefore, the 
absence of explicit boundaries makes it virtually impossible to determine who is the 
legitimate defender. Both parties had plausible claims to self-defence, however 
recklessly provocative their behaviour with their borders . 
941 The Indian side has a right 
to strengthen its frontier with additional border posts; and at the same time China has a 
right to build a road through its own territory. As a comparison, it is worth considering 
in this respect, Ecuador and Peru. For 150 years, Ecuador has laid claim to a northern 
region of the Amazon River basin which has been located within the borders of Peru 
since a protocol signed in 1942. Their dispute developed as a consequence of the many 
territorial reorganisations enacted by Spain during its rule, Nvbich leaves ittiposseditis an 
939 See Nehru's letter to J. F. Kennedy (US President), (Vie Times, 27 October, 1962), p. 8. 
940 Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study of the Principle of 
International Order, 2d, revised (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 89-90. 
94 1 For discussion see Hidemi Suganami, "Bringing Order to the Causes of War Debates, " (Millennium: 
Journal ofInternational Studies 19,1990). 
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unlikely ground for settlement. When hostility flared into a short border war in 198 1, the 
disputed area of approximately 125,000 square miles included two major river systems 
(the Amazon and the Maranon), substantial oil reserves and production facilities, a 
rapidly growing population, and at least fifty miles of common frontier completely 
942 uncharted . 
Another interesting case is that of the Aozou strip between Chad and Libya, which was a 
source of disagreement between the two sides; Libya claimed that strip as its southern 
part, and Chad regarded it as its northern part. 943 The problem was that , there had been 
many contradictory agreements between the ex-colonial powers (Italy, England and 
France), concerning that area. The strip under contention was rich in uranium reserves. 
There was also inter-communal fighting between Arabs and Africans in that zone. But, 
after years of confrontation, Libya and Chad eventually ended their war and submitted 
the problem of possession of the strip to arbitration. None of these conflicts are 
exceptional. While the scale of fighting varies widely, the issues do not: poorly 
demarcated frontiers, scarce yet desirable resources, and borders appearing more 
arbitrary than legitimate, especially in relation to local populations. In such cases, self- 
defence might apply to persons; but it is challenging to associate it with property rights. 
942 Allcock, p. 589. 943 lbid, p. 232. 
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The State 
In this part of the chapter, looks at the state as an object of defence: especially, the 
state's right and ability to govern. One might anticipate that defending the state is close 
to the essence of international self-defence. The right to self-defence has been accorded 
exclusively to states; and state survival can legitimately demand the sacrifice of 
substantial portions of population and territory, not to mention the death of particular 
regimes. A state's right to exist can be fundamentally challenged. The threat is to an 
existing state's survival in its present form, beyond the loss of substantial elements of 
population and territory. In addition to armed attack, a state may face a non-native 
assault on its legitimacy. At issue is the principle or idea that justifies a particular set of 
boundaries as legitimately the state's own. But, this not mean to revisit the narrower 
question of precise territorial demarcation or the proper allocation of frontier areas. 
Rather, an adversary challenges the legitimate reach of state authority over a society, or 
what could be labelled its proper domain. 
Three types of conflict immediately suggest themselves: wars to unify currently divided 
states; secessionist efforts to create two or more states where there is currently one; and 
struggles of national liberation movements against distant empires. Each type of conflict 
disputes the existing boundary between domestic and international, or what is internal to 
the state and what is external to it. In general, the clarity and resilience of this boundary 
has been a defining feature of statehood. In such disputes, it becomes the object of 
contention. 
Also, states can be threatened by collapse even without this sort of fundamental 
challenge to their domain. Here, states are sufficiently incapable of maintaining order 
that they have requested outside military intervention to sustain themselves. In some 
271 
cases, the newly decolonised states have, after their independence, invited assistance 
from their former rulers to maintain order and basic stability. In some situations, 
assistance to these new states was of short duration such as the deployment of British 
troops to Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in 1964, for example; in other events it 
congealed into a substantial relationship e. g. French intervention in Chad, intermittently 
from 1960 until 1978. While the respective regimes in these states were simultaneously 
under assault, the more acute perspective is that of the state, which appeared vulnerable 
to collapse into internal war and disorder without the infusion of foreign troops. Also, 
Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 aimed to restore an order, which could no 
longer be provided by the disintegrated Lebanese government. 
Moreover, conflicts arise over the legitimacy of particular regimes. Regimes have 
radically divergent lifespans; they can last for generations such as the Soviet-type 
communism in the USSR; or for years such as Sandinista regime in Nicaragua; or 
change overnight, as in the case of Portugal's revolution after the death of Salazar, and 
in Spain's transition to democratic rule after the death of Franco. They also derive 
internal legitimacy from various sources. When the legitimacy of a regime is in 
fundamental doubt, change usually arrives via a coup, revolution, or civil war. In theory, 
of course, these instruments are the stuff of domestic, if violent, politics. They should 
not even be pertinent to international relations or an international right to self-defence. 
In practice, however, many such conflicts have raised the question of international 
defence when parties to them invited outside military intervention to help decide the 
dispute. Frequently, these interventions were justified as "collective self-defence" 
according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In some conflicts, the integrity of 
an existing state was in complete jeopardy, as in the case of UK support to the Omani 
government against the rebels in 1956-58; US support to the Lebanese President 
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Chamoun against the political intervention of UAR and Syria in 1958; Saudia Arabian 
and Egyptian intervention in Yemen between 1962-67; UK intervention in Federation of 
South Arabia in 1964; UK and Iranian intervention to support the Sultan of Oman 
against rebels in 1968-76; France and Mauritania against Algeria in Western Sahara in 
1977-79; France and Belfium against Angola (the Shaba revolution) in Zaire in 1978; 
US and El Salvador against Nicaragua and FMLN in 1984-86; the Western military 
coalition to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in 1990-91. In these cases, either 
the state as a whole or a critical element was essentially contested. By implication, any 
appeal to self-defence will be nearly as credible from one side as from another since the 
conflict does not revolve around protecting an existing entity, but deciding the shape 
and nature of that entity. In each conflict, the link between state and society was 
disputed or fragile or both; such boundaries as existed were deeply contested, painfully 
negotiated, explicitly permeated. In all the contexts, the contours of international selves 
were matters ofjudgement, debate and conflict rather than fact. This does not mean that 
were no grounds for normative judgement between contending sides, or assessment of 
the justness of either their cause or their methods. It does, however, suggest that self- 
defence affords minimal terrain on which to do so; and that a more fruitful arena might 
be that which pennits discussion of the relationship between states and citizens rather 
than that between states alone. 
State and Domain 
Any organisation or group may resort to armed force if it has the military capacity to do 
so. When a state deploys military force against its own population, we call it policing; 
when a group uses force against its own state, we call it revolt; when states use force 
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against other states we generally call it either aggression or self-defence. Traditionally, 
states may request military support from friendly states. They may seek outside help to 
suppress an internal revolt or insurgency; in which case the outside assistance is treated 
as a matter under domestic jurisdiction; or they may invite intervention to counter what 
they perceive as intervention, including indirect or subversive intrusion, by another 
state, in which case the external assistance has often been proclaimed an act of 
collective self-defence. Such intervention has always had its risks, of course, like 
extensive engagement in an escalating political conflict; and ffiendly states have often 
shown some reluctance to intervene. Should an insurgency become serious enough to be 
recognised as a belligerent with a claim to rights like neutral treatment, for example, it 
would be wiser to have remained neutral from the start. 944 
Still, a state which goes in the other direction and provides military assistance to any 
non-state group is considered instantly guilty of intervention or subversion against 
another state. The entire globe is divided among existing states, each of which claims 
absolute authority over the people and territory in their jurisdiction. Non-intervention in 
each of their claimed areas of power is the cardinal rule of conduct in a contemporary 
world which views states as the only sovereign actors in international politics. Now that 
territory has become fully claimed among states, a potential source of ambiguity arises 
over the distinction between state and aspirant-state actors. In particular, questions about 
the nature of boundaries across and within states become newly salient and not so easily 
confined to the realm of interstate politics. The prominence, as well as the difficulty, of 
such questions is evident in conflict over the legitimate domain of existing states. 
944 For instance, J. E. S. Fawcett quoting the advice by Law Officers to the British Government over the 
suitable reply to unapproved armed excursions into Mexico: "In all cases of revolt or civil war or of 
unauthorised enterprises or attacks by foreigners, a friendly state will be justified in ordering its officers to 
render all the good offices and aid in their power to the constituted authorities ... but (as a general rule) the Military or Naval forces of friendly states not immediately concerned should not ... actually and directly 
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Separated States 
On many occasions, states have resorted to force to defend the partition of a formerly 
unified state. Among these events, South Korea possesses probably the strongest claim 
of self-defence and the US-led international alliance intervening on its behalf therefore 
the strongest claim of collective self-defence. Korea had been divided clearly, if 
contentiously, at the 38th parallel from 1945. Between then and the outbreak of the war, 
the tkvo sides proceeded to establish completely separate and incompatible governments. 
In 1948, the South held elections that were supervised by United Nations monitors, who 
were simultaneously refused entrance to the North. Shortly after the South announced 
the election of a new government, the North announced its own goverment. The United 
Nations and most other states recognised the government of South Korea; and the USSR 
recognised the North government. Both North and South, at the same time, considered 
themselves the legitimate govemment of Korea. 
The strength of South Korea's claim to self-defence was from many sides. First, its 
border with the North was unambiguous, making any breach of it evident; second, the 
breach was dramatic and initiated by the North in its escalation beyond border attacks to 
what appeared to be full-scale invasion; third, the impression was reasonable that the 
people of the South accepted the legitimacy of South Korea's govemment. 
From another perspective, however, South Korea's claim to self-defence was insecure; 
while the border was clearly demarcated, its very existence had been continuously 
contested by the South and the North. Also, the border between the two sides was newly 
demarcated and an outcome of a armistice rather than a well-established settlement. 
Demonstrably, the division also resulted more from conflict between the USSR and the 
attack or engage any but Pirates or Banditti"; See J. E. S. Fawcett, "Intervention in International Law: A 
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US, treating Korea as a field, than from a conflict between two political groups inside 
Korea that necessitated division. In addition, there had been skirmishing at the border 
since its inception, along with threats from both North and South to take the other by 
force. While the North's invasion stood in extreme disproportion to these earlier 
incidents, it could be interpreted as an escalation of an unfinished conflict. Most 
damaging to the claim of self-defence is that the Korean War occurred in the context of 
a dispute. over legitimate sovereignty. On the other hand, the South had elected a new 
government. Without the involvement of the Soviet Union in the North and the US-led 
intervention with its allies to help the South, the Korean War might look more like a 
bloody but civil war. 
The same is even more true of the war in Vietnam and the US use of force against the 
Chinese fighting over possession of islands in the Taiwan Strait. These conflicts erupted 
in countries that were unified in every way but the ideological. This is not to say that 
ideology alone is not a sufficient principle on which to base a claim for statehood; only 
that it must win out over other, usually very powerful, sources of political community 
such as historic unity and ethnicity. The division between Greek and Turkish 
communities on Cyprus is unique in its history of ethnic and linguistic difference. 
However, the presence of inter-communal antagonism is not enough to consider either 
side of the island as equivalent to a state with a right to seek external intervention in 
self-defence. The island had been under the control of imperial powers; the Turkish for 
centuries, and the British for decades. 945 The Turkish community in Cyprus claimed the 
need for Turkish protection, indicating their vulnerability and asserting their rights as a 
minority population inhabiting an enclave of Cyprus. If one seeks to grant them a right 
Study of Some Recent Cases, " (Hague Reciteil 103,196141), p. 367. 
945 After 1974, as a result of the Turkish immigration, the demographic balance in the island have been 
change. 
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to self-defence and collective self-defence, one must consider the implication of 
granting similar rights to other minorities residing within what often appear arbitrary 
administrative boundaries. This leads us to consider the adherence and legitimacy of 
each part of a divided state, as sincerely as we need to inspect the solidarity and 
legitimacy of one likely to be reunified. It is in the nature of states that they justify their 
existence in some fashion to the community that they rule; they must prove, as 
Brilmayer emphasises that "both ... their right to exist and exercise power and ... their 
right to do particular things with the power they have. ', 946 The trouble with each party 
these particula conflicts is that neither could show an "entitlement to exercise power" 
that was sufficient to represent legitimate and viable statehood. 947 
Dispute States 
By the time that a state becomes host to a major secession movement, the extent of its 
legitimacy comes under serious questioning. Either it is incapable of meeting the needs 
of an organised political community within existing institutions, which casts substantial 
doubt on its capacity to exercise its authority; or it rules over a distinct group - or several 
groups of people - sufficiently united and committed to secession that it is useful to 
examine the legitimacy of a single state to continue to dominate. Secession struggles 
indicate the limitation of self-defence to an acute degree. Secessionists explicitly claim 
that their fundamental political rights can only be met outside of the existing state; 
more, that these can only be guaranteed inside a state of their own. They seek 
separation; possibly most detrimental to compromise, they seek territory; and, 
importantly, they seek sovereign equality with the state from which they seek freedom. 
Among many minority groups which reside within the boundaries of a multifarious 
946 See Brilmayer, p. 26. 
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state, the impulse to separate is latent, though it often remains at the level of political 
conflict or only erupts into violence sporadically. Basque and Corsican activities come 
to mind, in this place. In other circumstances multinational states have resorted to 
extreme repression in order to quash a substantial secessionist movement. For instance, 
the Bengalis in East Pakistan, could not attained their independence until 1971 as 
Bangladesh; and in the Congo, Belgium acknowledged its apathy to Katangan secession 
but was accused by many of actually having activated it. Bangladesh became a state 
thanks largely to the Indo-Pakistani power struggle. Many other secession movements 
received no external support, and remained domestic conflicts to be handled, often 
brutally, by their respective states. 948 Listed below, are the largest of these: 
Major unassisted Separation Disputes, 1945-1999 
1. Burma: Karens & others hill peoples, 1948 
2. India: Nagas & others in Assam for Nagaland, 1955-74 
3. Sudan: Southern Aya NYAS, 1955-72,1983-88 
4. China: Tibetans, 1959 
5. Iraq: Kurds, 1961-70,1974-75 
6. Ethiopia: Eritreans, 1962-91 
7. India: Mizos in Assam, for (Mizoram), 1966-68 
8. Nigeria: lbos, (for Biafra), 1967-70 
9. Philippines: Moro rebellion (Muslims separationist), 1972- 
10. Bangladesh: Chittagong hill peoples, 1975 
11. Indonesia: Aceh rebels in N. Sumatra, 1975 
12. Congo: Shaba Wars, 1977,1978 
13. Iran: Kurds, 1979 
14. India: Sikhs (for Khalistan), occasional 
15. Sri Lanka: Tamils, 1985,1987 
16. Turkey: Kurds, occasional 
17. Israeli West Bank & Gaza: Palestinians' Infifada, 1987-93 
18. Azerbaijan: Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1988,1995 
19. Yemen: North and South merged to become the republic of Yemen, 1990 
19. Russia: Chechnya, 1994-96,1999 
947 Luard set up a relevant argument, see Conflict and Peace, p. 61-67 
94s Here it is important to indicate that I intend to mention the traditional secession conflicts, which have 
not received any help and assistance from the international community. The separation conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzeqovina; Croatia and Kosovo; and in East Timor freedom was achieved 
largely by the help of the international community. 
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Even without examining the details of each particular conflict, it is easy to recognise 
situations in which the boundaries of political community are under assault. 949 By 
definition, sovereignty is fundamentally contested in each. The outcome of these 
conflicts decides whether or not rights such as political independence, territorial 
integrity, and individual and collective self-defence become available to both parties. In 
every case, military force has been used to achieve this outcome. The state deploys this 
force against the aspiring secessionists, along with the absence of military intervention 
on behalf of secessionists. Walzer makes a case for non-intervention in such cases that 
is most persuasive in being grounded in his respect for self-determination. What the 
international community must support, he argues, is self-determination among groups 
who are effectively capable of self-government. When such groups cannot demonstrate 
an ability to hold their own, there is good reason to doubt the wisdom of supporting 
their aspirations for statehood. The "mere appeal to the principle of self-determination 
isn't enough, " Walzer writes; "evidence must be provided that a community actually 
exists whose members are committed to independence and ready and able to determine 
the conditions of their own existence. "950 At the same time, one must remain sensitive to 
the possibility that such a community might exist within an already-established state. As 
Walzer sees it, one of the primary purposes of non-intervention is to protect the process 
of self-determination and allow communities to develop on terms as free as possible 
from outside interference. 
Even though generally reluctant to qualify the rule of non-intervention, Walzer does 
admit a few circumstances is which non-intervention can be overridden. One of the few 
949 Environments such as these, where the definition of societies and their bases of communication are 
equivocal, also distinguish states without active separation movements at all. Burundi and Rwanda are two 
examples. 
950 Walzer, Just and Unjust [Vars, p. 93. 
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good reasons for doing so, he proposes, is the presence of two or more communities 
within one state, when one is engaged in armed struggle for independence: 
"in part because of the arbitrary and accidental character of state boundaries, in part because of the 
ambiguous relation of the political community or communities within those boundaries to the 
government that defends them ... it isn't always clear when a community is in fact self- determination, when it qualifies, so to speck, for non-intervention. ', 951 
Walzer considered that the difficulty with a secession movement "is that one cannot be 
sure that it in fact represents a distinct community until it has rallied its own people and 
,, 952 made some headway in the 'arduous struggle' for freedom. Once having done so, a 
secession movement can be seen as an effective belligerent, thereby qualifying for 
belligerent rights and moving closer to attaining sovereign rights. 953 Even when a 
secession movement does not make sufficient advance in its struggle that belligerent 
rights or statehood appears on the horizon, members of the international community 
may be tempted tcý intervene, particularly when their struggle has been suppressed with 
an obvious and massive violation of human rights. Many called for some form of 
international response to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Ibos by Nigeria, for 
instance; India at first characterised its 1971 war with Pakistan as humanitarian 
intervention. Indeed, extravagant abuse of human rights is the second of Walzer's three 
conditions that qualify the rule of non-intervention. Something jars between Walzer's 
almost romantic depiction of a community engaged in "arduous struggle for freedom, " 
and the millions of Bengalis who cut down by the Pakistani troops before India 
intervened in their behalf (India first claimed its intervention on the basis of 
humanitarian grounds, but later claimed that its action was justified based on self- 
defence, claiming that Pakistan had violated Indian territory). 
951 Ibid, p. 89. 
952 lbid, p. 93. 
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On the one hand, we are shown a picture of war for political independence which should 
only garner international support after arduous but unassisted struggle. On the other, we 
become aware of a struggle that amounted to more of a one-sided bloodbath which 
might never have acquired sovereign independence without a well-armed India as its 
champion. Whatever is disconcerting between these two images has something do with 
the contemporary view of sovereignty. Sovereign states occupy the highest pedestal in 
international relations by definition, since any entity that is sovereign is beholden to no 
higher authority. In international politics, the first rule of sovereignty is non- 
intervention; its corollary is self-defence. Both are premised upon primary respect for 
the autonomous state. "Sovereignty, " as Onuf indicates, "makes the state indivisible"; it . 
acts as "a protective shell for the state. ', 954 In the case of Pakistan, India gained a 
strategic edge in weakening Pakistan; it had a compelling political interest in staunching 
the flow of Bengali refugees; and it undoubtedly was also shocked at the brutality with 
which Pakistan tried to stamp out Bengali separatists. Indian motives for intervention do 
not afford clearer understanding of what sovereignty entails, however, or why the 
international community respects it in certain forms and not others. One hears no 
lingering complaints that Bangladesh is undeserving of statehood 955 ; nor that Pakistan 
suffered unduly in relinquishing it. 
953 McCoubrey and White take this approach on non-state groups, in addition to anti-colonial liberation 
movements. They support a right to insurgency, which prevents insurgents and the government they 
confront from receiving outside help. 
954 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History, "( Alternatives 16,199 1), p. 
432. 
955 Bangladesh obtained the United Nations Membership in 1974. 
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Imperial States 
Many of the armed conflicts that took place after 1945 and up to the present, arose over 
the gradual withdrawal of European states from their overseas colonies. Technically, 
none of the confrontations between colonial states and national liberation movements in 
their territories could be considered an international dispute, or inter-state dispute, 
which is why they are not included among the conflicts considered germane to this 
thesis. National liberation struggles and resistance to them occurred within the confines 
of a single, ostensibly sovereign state. When European states began to acquire overseas 
possessions they simply extended over these the roof of sovereignty, which they had 
recently achieved internally. Confrontations over decolonisation, from this perspective, 
are more appropriately viewed as insurrection against one state rather than war between 
two 
The United Nations Charter, reflecting the mood after World War II, affin-ned both the 
inviolability of sovereignty and entitlement to national self-determination. "' Most 
overseas territories experienced some form of confrontation during their transitions to 
independence, their violence varying with the balance of commitments among urban 
settlers and native parties. The main decolonisation conflicts are listed below. 
Major Decolonisation Conflicts 
1. United Kingdom- JeNvish Settlers in Palestine 193648 
2. US-Philippines 194546 
3. France and Syria 1945 (troops withdraw in 1946) 
4. Netherlands-Indonesia, 194547,1947-49 
5. France-Vietminh 1946-54 
956 Luard describes the end of World War II as having "unloosed a log jam that could not be hatted. ... On 
the iniquity of colonialism, Washington and Moscow, Catholic dictators of Latin America and Muslim 
demagogues of the Middle East, all, however diverse their opinions on other matters, could reach 
agreement" (Conflict and Peace), p. 95 
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6. United Kingdom-Burma 194648 
7. France-Madagascar, 1947 (repression of the public liberation activities) 
8. United Kingdom-Malaysia 1948-57 
9. France-Tunisia 1952-56 
10. United Kingdom-Kenya 1952-56 
11. France-Morocco 1953-56 
12. France-Algeria, 1954-62 
13. United Kingdom-Cyprus 1954-59; (continuing conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) 
14. United Kingdom- South Yemen (Aden) 1955-67 
15. France-Cameroon 1955-60 
16. Spain and France-Western Sahara, 1957-58; (continuing conflict between Morocco, Polisario 
front and Algeria, 1975-88) 
17. Portugal-Angola 1961-74 
18. Portugal-Guinea Bissau, 1963-74 
19. Portugal-Mozambique, 1965-74 
20. South Africa-Namibia 1967-89 
In many of these conflicts, imperial states argued that they should be free from outside 
scrutiny or interference, including by the United Nation. The rationale was that any 
unrest within the existing boundaries of colonies had to be considered a concern for 
domestic authorities only. As Article 2 (7) makes explicit: 
"Nothing contained in present Char-ter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter. " 
Together with Article 2 (4), which forbids the use or threat of force against Member 
states, and Article 51 which reserves to existing states alone the right to resort to force 
in self-defence, Article 2 (7) powerfully supports the claim that decolonisation battles 
should be consigned to the realm of domestic politics. 957 In this spirit, the Dutch called 
their counterinsurgency operations in Indonesia "police actions"; also the French 
bombed the Tunisian border town of Sakiet Sidi-Youssef, accusing the Tunisian 
government of aiding the Algerian rebels; Portugal engaged in retaliatory raids in 
Senegal, Congo and Zambia, alleging that these had similarly violated Portuguese 
domestic jurisdiction. There are two points deserve note. The first is partisan and 
957 Here, it is important to mention that national liberation movements have the option to transfer the 
dispute to the United Nations as a "threat to the peace. " 
283 
express frustration over the exclusive application of United Nations nonns to states, and 
to existing, even if disintegrating states at that. This issue relates to earlier remarks 
about the association between self-defence and a status quo, independent of justness or 
sustainability. 
The second point should generate wider concern; it is the rigidity of a concept like self- 
defence when attached to the outward appearance of states, without attention to the 
relations within them. The likely result is normative dissonance in transitional periods, 
like post-war decolonisation, when ideas about legitimate conduct between states 
remains constant while ideas about their legitimate constitution are changing. During 
decolonisation one wants to assess the validity of claims to self-defence or a right of 
non-interference at least partly on the basis of the legitimacy of the aspirant state in 
question. That this was not possible forced the sort of nonnative acrobatics one 
witnesses in attempts to develop a concept of "permanent aggression, " which appeared 
the only way to fit national liberation movements into the framework established by 
Articles 2 (4), (7) and 51. One alternative was to describe decolonisation as a domestic 
disorder or exclusively civil war, as did many a metropole upon the initial stirrings of 
national liberation movements. However unsatisfactory, that option naturally followed 
from an unwillingness to incorporate considerations of internal legitimacy and social 
experience into any discussion of external relations. At the very least, this gap 
contributes to the widespread impression that international laws and norms are out of 
touch with actual political experience. 
On the other hand, a related issues attends states which, for whatever reason, cannot 
exercise effective control over their ostensible domain. An inability to maintain 
minimum order can reflect various troubles; frail institutions, partisan conflict, social 
disorder, civil war. Some of these are more easily repaired than others; each involves the 
284 
social and political dimensions of political community; most have, to a degree beset 
every new state to emerge after 1945. This work is not the place to discuss sociological 
and institutional intricacies of states and their stable development. 958 Instead, it is 
appropriate to appeal for greater inclusion of such subjects in international security 
analysis. For example, Lebanon appeared at the time of the Syrian intervention 1976, to 
be case unto itself. Also, in these days, the civil wars in Sierra Leone, and Somalia 
suffer from an absence of effective government. The post-Cold War era gave birth to 
many additional new states which are no less river in their efforts to establish the 
boundaries of effective communities and states. In each instance, prior boundaries, 
whether popular, territorial, or administrative; appeared sufficiently arbitrary and are 
sufficiently fragile as to open wide the question of where people belong, why, and how 
peacefully they will be allowed to stay. The domain of the state, and its capacity to 
govem, are up for grabs. 
Governments and Collective Sel(Idefence 
When one state requests military intervention by another, it frequently asks it in the 
name of collective self-defence. The precise definition of collective self-defence is 
controversial. Fawcett considered it as "at the worst self-contradictory and at best 
clumsy and ambiguous. "959 It is generally agreed is that collective self-defence involves 
one state coming to the aid of another who has been the victim of armed attack, for 
instance, the United States rallying to defend South Korea. Setting aside uncertainty 
over the content of an-ned attack, the main area of disagreement occurs over whether the 
aiding state must itself be endangered by the an-ned attack. Kunz takes a conservative 
958 Buzan gives a good conceptual framework for doing so in People, States and Fear. 
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position, arguing that collective self-defence is a null set that self-defence is a right 
possessed only by the state under attack. For his part, Bowett does not add much by 
defining it as the collective response of two or more states, each of whom is individually 
an object of attack. The purpose of the provision of collective self-defence, was to allow 
regional security arrangements to develop free of United Nations obligation or 
interference; and it was designed less to pennit the actual resort to force than to approve 
muitilateral preparation for mutual defence. Here, the collective element of Article 51 
was intended as a barricade against the United Nations' interference. 
Collective self-defence bears some resemblance to collective security, which Baehr and 
Gordenker describe as "broadening the notion of individual self-defence to include the . 
entire community. ', 960 The idea of collective security may be traced in an early form in 
the 1815 Quadripartite Alliance Treaty, although this element swiftly faded from its 
agenda. More substantially it can be traced to the League of Nations system and 
specifically to Articles 10-15 of the League Covenant. It involves an idea of collective 
security response to aggression by one member of an international community against 
another on the part of all other members (or at least those practically able to respond). 
Claude Inis remarks that, 
"It [collective security] Nvas conceived as a systematic arrangement that should serve ... to confront 
Nvould-be aggressors ... with an ovenvhelming collection of restraining poNver assembled 
by the 
mass of states in accordance Nvith clear and firm obligations accepted and proclaimed. , 961 
This idea also informs Articles 39-42 of the United Nations Charter. Collective self- 
defence, in contrast, involves a mutual commitment by states to defend any member 
against aggression by a state outside the group. A clear example may be seen in Article 
5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the constitutional document of the NATO Alliance. 
959 Fawcett, "Intervention in International Law: A Study of Some Recent Cases, " p. 368. 
960 Baehr and Gordenker, p. 73. 
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The distinction between collective self-defence and collective security has been 
expressed by McCoubrey and White, thus: 
"A State acting in collective self-defence of another usually does so out of national-interest, 
whereas a collective security system requires a state to act for the benefit of all states to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. ', 962 
When the United States backed an invasion into Guatemala or the Soviet Union 
marched into Hungary, it is credible that each believed its security to be yoked to that of 
the smaller states and thus compromised by the proximity of a socialist goverm-nent, in 
one case, and a liberalising one, in the other. Collective defence can also be seen as a 
fonn of counter-intervention, which Walzer considered to be the third reason for lifting 
the ban on intervention. The first, for Walzer, is based on a primary respect for 
community autonomy and self-determination. Once an intervention has taken place, the 
logic goes, that autonomy has been violated; under certain circumstances, counter- 
intervention may help restore a measure of autonomy by offsetting the weight of the 
fonner intruder. The second is that counter-intervention, along with collective self- 
defence, functions, as law-enforccment. Both actions are generally treated as lawful acts 
that counter a prior criminal one. Both are imbued with the spirit of Kelsen, who argued 
that the distinction between war and counter war was "indispensable, " standing in "the 
same reciprocal relation as murder and capital punishment. , 963 
Walzer seems to agree, echoing Mill's 1859 words on the subject, that "intervention to 
enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent. ', 964 
Importantly, both collective self-defence and counter-intervention depend upon the 
961 Inis Lothair Claude, Sivords Into Plowshares: Vie Problems and Progress of International 
Organisation, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1984), p. 247. 
962 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Anned Conflicts, p. 126. For more 
discussion see David J. Scheffer, "Use of Force After The Cold War: Panama, Iraq, And The New World 
Order, " In: Louis Henkin, Right v. Miglit: International Laiv And The Use ofForce, 2nd ed, (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 199 1), p. 126-34. 
963 Han Kelsen, Principles ofInternational Laiv, p. 25. 
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existence of external threat. Community autonomy is violated by the presence of outside 
influence and coercion. 
"Allies launch massive air attack against Baghdad and Kinvait , 965 
Immediately after the Iraqi forces occupied the state of Kuwait, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution condemning that invasion. 966 The resolution expressed that there 
had been a grave infiingement of international peace and security and requested from 
Iraq an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. 967 Here it is important to 
mention that the Security Council did not condemn the Iraqi invasion as a violation of 
Article 2 (4) or aggression. 968 On August 6,1990, the Security Council adopted a new 
Resolution 661, which emphasised "the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defence, in response to the anned attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter. , 
969 
Ipso facto, from the early hours of the conflict in the Gulf, there was a reliance on the 
idea of collective self-defence, especially after the letter from the Amir of Kuwait 
requesting help and assistance against the Iraqi invasion from the United States and 
other Western states. The latter, in turn, grounded their help to Kuwait on Article 5 1.970 
964 Cited in Walzer, Just and Unjust Mars, p. 88. 
965 See (The Times, 17 January, 1991), p. 1. 
966 See Security Council Resolution 660 (August 2,1990), reprinted in (Infernalional Legal Materials 29 
1990), p. 1325. 
967 Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 660, "demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and 
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on I August 1990. " 
968 See Bums H. Weston, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: 
Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy. " (American 
Journal ofInternational Law 85,199 1), p. 516-17. 
969 See Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6,1990), reprinted in (International Legal Materials 29, 
1990), 1325-26. 
970 The Amir of Kuwait said in his letter to President George Bush that: "I request on behalf of my 
Government and in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as 
recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that the United States Government take such 
military or other steps as are necessary to ensure that economic measures designed to fully restore our 
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When the Iraqi forces begin to be a real danger to the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia, 
which is rich in oil, the Saudi Government asked the United States to send its troops to 
deter any possibility of an Iraqi invasion. The Americans, from their side, characterised 
their help to Saudi Arabia as assistance "to deter further Iraqi aggression ... [the duty of 
the troops] is wholly defensive... They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend 
themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other fiiends in the Gulf. "97 
1 The 
Security Council Resolution 661, was an important step, because it stated that the right 
of collective self-defence existed, and at the same time the Security Council made clear 
that it would be legitimate for third states to use force against Iraq if necessary to 
compel its withdrawal, well before the adoption of Resolution 678, which explicitly 
authorised the use of force. 972 
Later, when the Security Council imposed full economic sanctions against Iraq under 
Article 42 of the Charter, the legitimacy of collective self-defence came under question, 
since Article 51 states that the right of self-defence is active and can be exercised "until 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. " Thus, the requirement of taking measures under self-defence is terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to protect international 
peace and security. It could be argued that the Council had been "taken the necessary 
measures, " by imposing sanctions against Iraq, and that there was therefore no longer 
any necessity to use force in self-defence. 973 But, in fact, this view was weak, since the 
right of self-defence as an "inherent right, " does not need any authorisation from the 
rights are effectively implemented, " cited in Thomas K. Plofchan, "Article 5 1: Limits on Self-Defence? " 
(Michigan Journal of International Law 13,1992), p. 336. See also Security Council Resolution 662 
(August 9 1990), reprinted in (29 International Legal Materials 1990), p. 1327. 
971 Cited in Abraham Chayes, "The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, " In: Lori Fisler Damrosch and David 
J. Scheffer, Law andForce in the New International Order (Boulder: West Press, 1991), p. 4. 
972 See Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29 1990), reprinted in (International Legal Materials 
29,1990), p. 1565. 
973 Chayes, p. 5-6. 
289 
Security Council to be exercised; if the actions of a state are in exercise of that right 
(self-defence), in accordance with Article 5 1, that right cannot be withheld. 
It is true that the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51 is subject to the 
authority of the Security Council, but the Gulf crisis presented a new situation, whereby 
a complete state was to be wiped off the map. In a such a situation, the request to stop 
exercising the right of self-defence, would be ridiculous, at least up to the point where 
immediately effective Security Council action was taken. As Gardner pointed out, one 
could hardly say to the Kuwaiti freedom fighters, "Oh, you can't do that. You're 
violating international law; you have to lay down your anns; you have no right of self- 
defence any longer. ý)974 Generally, the request for a state to stop exercising the right of 
self-defence requires full support from the permanent members in the Security 
975 Council. It is simple here to understand that even if the Security Council resolution 
678, which permitted use force "all necessary measures" against Iraq had been vetoed, 
the collective self-defence right not have been affected. 976 
From another point of view, it can be said that the Council's resolution was clear, 
because it did not mention that the right of self-defence expired, when the Council had 
imposed an embargo and full economic sanctions. Rather, the reverse is true, since 
Resolution 661, which imposed the economic sanctions, at the same time affirmed the 
right in individual or collective self-defence. 977 Also, it is wrong to believe that the 
974 See Richard N. Gardner, "Commentary on the Law of Self-defence, " In: Lori Fisler Danirosch and 
David J. Scheffer, Law and Force in the New Intenzational Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 199 1), p. 
50. 
975 Waldock supported that tendency, Nvhen he said that: "once action in self-defence is in motion, it 
requires an affirmative decision of the Council, including the concurring votes of the Permanent members, 
to order the cessation of the defensive action. " See Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by 
Individual States in International Law, " p. 495-96. 
976 See generally Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, " (Anierican Jounial of 
InternationalLaiv 85,1991), p. 457-61. 
977 Resolution 661 reads that: "Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in 
response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter ... . Decides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial 
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Security Council had achieved its function when the council imposed the sanctions, 
because the main purpose of the sanctions, namely, to repulse the aggression, to drive 
back the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait, had 
not yet been achieved. Rostow expressed this situation when he remarked that the right 
of self-defence "remains intact until the Security Council has successfully dealt with the 
controversy before it.,, 978 In any case, the imposition of the embargo against Iraq sent a 
clear message to the Iraqi leadership, that the occupation of Kuwait was a grave and 
serious matter, and they should sooner or later leave Kuwait. At the same time, the 
Western states decided to make clear that the economic sanctions were a first step and a 
preliminary action to the use of force, if economic sanctions failed, which would make 
necessary a resort to am-led force under Article 51.979 
It can be said that there was a mutual assistance relationship between the collective self- 
defence and the economic sanctions, because both of them had the same purpose, which 
was to liberate the State of Kuwait. Therefore, the economic sanctions became more 
stringent, and the Security Council adopted a gradual approach, strengthening the 
sanctions and authorising limited use of force in their implementation. When the 
Council found that Iraq vessels were still being used to export oil, the Council adopted a 
new resolution, calling on demanding all states in "co-operation with the Government Of 
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area" to use such measures as might 
be necessary "to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and 
or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any ftinds or any other fmancial or economic resources ... 
." See also, Plofchan, p. 343. 978 See Eugene V. Rostoxv, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law", 
Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence? (American Journal of 
International Law 85,199 1), p. 511. 
979 Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, " p. 459. 
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verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation" of the 
sanctions. 
980 
Consequently, the embargo against Iraq was confinned and advanced when resolution 
670 was issued. 981 This handling of the Iraqi invasion, supports an argument that the 
economic sanctions to some extent delayed or weakened the process of the use of force 
to liberate Kuwait, invoking the right of self-defence. This was clear, when the Secretary 
General at that time, Javier Perez de Cuellar, suggested that "Article 5 I's validity had 
expired and that Iraq would have to launch another military attack before it could again 
apply. 9)982 But the situation was changed when the Security Council adopted Resolution 
678, which emphasised that the economic sanctions which the Council had adopted in 
no way prohibited or removed the right of self-defence. The new resolution gave the 
right to states to co-operate with Kuwait to use "all necessary means to uphold and 
implement" the previous Council resolutions "unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 " 
withdraw from Kuwait. 
983 
It was clear that "necessary means" involved the use of military force to compel Iraq to 
withdraw and comply with the twelve resolutions adopted between August 2 and 
November 29,1990. Resolution 678 indicated that the Security Council was "acting 
under Chapter Vll of the Charter" but did not determine which Article of Chapter VII 
was invoked. 984 The prevailing view was that Resolution 678 fell within the scope of 
Article 51, because it called upon states which were co-operating with the Government 
of Kuwait to take the necessary means to implement the Security Council's previous 
980 See Security Council Resolution 665 (August 25,1990), reprinted in (International Legal Materials 
29,1990), paragraph 1. 
981 See Security Council Resolution 670 (September 25,1990), reprinted in (International Legal 
Materials 29,1990), 1334. 
982 Cited in Plofchan, "Article 51: Limits on Self-Defence? ", p. 340. 
983 Security Council Resolution (678). For more argument concerning the authorisation to use force in the 
Gulf Crisis 19 90-9 1, see Nigel D. White and Hilaire McCoubrey, "International Law and the Use of Force 
in the Gulf, " (International Relations 10,199 1), p. 354-59. 
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resolutions. Also, that resolution did not ask states to use force, but at the same time did 
not prohibit them from doing So. 985 The right in collective self-defence was confirmed 
by resolutions 678 and 661 and other previous resolutions which "reflected a consensus 
about the continued existence of an inherent right of self-defence ... in accordance with 
,, 986 Article 51. It may, however, be argued that the authorising of "all necessary 
means" actually terminated the effect of Article 51 and made the coalition action 
implicitly dependent on Article 42. 
Some, however, considered that Resolution 678 went too far and was too wide, because 
that resolution was adopted to restore international peace and security in the Gulf area, 
which means that the aim went beyond the collective right of self-defence and even that 
of necessary collective security action. Even Weston argued that Resolution 678 was 
"shaped more by a desire to go to war rather than by a desire to prevent one. " This 
criticism has some justification, because the Security Council should receive full and 
complete reports about self-defence measures; as Schachter stated, "such reports should 
be timely and should give enough information concerning necessity, proportionality and 
the ends sought to enable the Council to make an informed judgement as to the legality 
of the actions taken. " The war against Iraq illustrated that collective self-defence 
measures and measures to restore international peace and security, may overlap and, in 
effect, could mean that collective security can be achieved by collective self-defence 
under Article 5 1.987 
984 Ibid. 
985 See Michael J. Glennon, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law: The 
Constitutions and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, " (American Journal of International Law 
85,1991), p. 74; 88. 
986 David J. Scheffer, "Commentary on Collective Security, " In: Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. 
Scheffer, Law and Force in the New International Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 199 1), p. 10 1. See 
also, Weston, "Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations law, " p. 520. 
987 In Concern for more discussion about Resolution 687, see Serge Sur, Security Council Resoltition 687 
of 3 April 1991 in the GuIrAffair. - Problenis of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace, Research Paper 12, 
(New York: United Nations, 1992). 
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The important result of Gulf Crisis, is that the right of self-defence generally and 
collective self-defence in particular can be resorted to, without any pennission or 
authority from the Security Council, as indeed appears from the face of Article 51 itself 
Also, the Gulf war confinned the proportionality standard, when the allied forces did not 
continue the military advance to Baghdad, but were satisfied with the liberation of the 
State of Kuwait, and establishment of safe zones in the North and South of Iraq to 
protect Kurdish and Shi'ah people from the tyranny and oppression of the Iraqi 
leadership. 
Schachter stated that "while collective self-defence may well be the legal basis for 
future collective security actions, it becomes important to remind states that the 
conditions for collective self-defence ... are 
imposed by international law. "9s8 It may 
also be noted that this statement reflects an agenda of down-sizing the role of the United 
Nations, which implicitly conflicts with the United Nations Charter. In particular, it 
should not be forgotten that Article 51 applies only until the Security Council has acted. 
The US President, Eisenhower explained his country's dispatch of Marines to Lebanon 
as an effort, 
"By their presence there to encourage Lebanese Government in defence of Lebanese sovereignty 
and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act of war. ... As the United Nations Charter 
recognises there is an inherent right of collective self-defence. In conformity with the spirit of the 
Charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council. "989 
Eisenhower described the threat to Lebanon as planned, focused, and emphatically 
extemal 
"In Iraq a highly organised military blow struck down the duly constituted Government. ... At 
about the same time there was discovered a highly organised plot to overthrow the lawful 
Government of Jordan. ... [Meanwhilej substantial amounts of arms, money, and personnel 
988 Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, " (American Journal ofInternational Law 
85,1991), 471-72. 
989 Statement of President Eisenhower, 15 July 1958,7lie Department of State Bulletin XXXIX: 997 (4 
August 1958), p. 18 1. 
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infiltrated into Lebanon across the Syrian border. ... These events demonstrate a scope of 
aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon could not combat. "990 
When the Secretary of State elaborated on Lebanon's vulnerability, he explained that 
"We do not think that the words 'anned attack' preclude treating as much an armed 
revolution which is fomented from abroad, aided and assisted from abroad. "991 Almost 
identically, the United States justified its 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic 
as a response to Cuba's "vicarious indirect armed aggression. " The American policy 
makers at that time estimated that the Dominican Republic faced " clear and present 
danger of the forcible seizure of power by the Communists" whose "act could be 
considered an anned attack against the territorial integrity, the sovereignty, and the 
political independence of the Dominican RepubliC.,, 
992 The above examples, clearly 
demonstrated "that if Communists had successfully infiltrated the rebellion, their 
activities could be considered an anned attack. , 993 Even absent hard evidence of 
infiltration, botb the US and USSR were committed to the belief that the other's 
worldviexv was incompatible with free self-determination; and that the other could only 
win converts through trickery, seduction or coercion. 
Here, three points need to be highlighted in connection with the appeal to collective 
self-defence. First, the dominant mode of intervention since 1945 has been subversive, 
covert, and incremental. When attack appeared in the form of subversion, there was 
rarely much evidence; when it assumed a more concrete shape, it tended to be covert or 
990 Ibid, p. 183-84. Lebanon, in its complaint to the Security Council, claimed that the U. A. R. had 
intentionally threatened the Lebanese internal security by "the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into 
Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participation of U. A. R. 
nationals acts of terrorism and rebellion against the establishment authorities in Lebanon, the supply of 
arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities. " See 
UN Doe. S/4007 (22 May 1958). Reprinted in United Nations Resohitions, ed. Dusan J. Djonovich 
(Series 11, Security Council, Vol. III), p. 615. 
991 See "News Conference of Secretary Dulles", Department ofState Bulletin XXIX: 995 (21 July 1958), 
p. 105. 
992 See Thomas Mann, "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, " Department of State 
Bulletin LIII: 1376 (8 November 1965), p. 736. 
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incremental. The clear intervention in all of these eases has tended to be the counter- 
intervention which, in the cases of the United States and the USSR, occurred in the forrn 
of large-scale invasions. External support for opposition movements, by contrast, has 
generally been established by degrees. To counter this more ambiguous form of 
intervention with an overt military response requires that one "fix the point at which a 
direct and open use of force can plausibly be called a counter-intervention. , 994 
Second, collective self-defence has invariably occurred in a context of domestic 
instability or war. Defenders have often bolstered their rationale for intervention by 
pointing to the express "invitation, " or consent, of the existing government. Yet, 
invitations have their own frailties. In part, it can be hard to detennine how "freely 
given" is the consent of the government. More problematic is that the consent of an 
existing government, under the circumstance in which it needs external intervention, 
maybe inadequate. Lebanon in 1958 offers an example. 
President Chamoun sought US help; he had requested US help three times before the 
Americans agreed to help his country. When a government is sufficiently frail,, 
however, that it cannot sustain itself without foreign assistance, one must question the 
depth of its legitimacy, let alone its future effectiveness. Walzer stated that, "the request 
,, 995 for foreign help is an admission of domestic weakness. When a regime's adversaries 
are truly the instrument of outside interests, the case for intervention in collective self- 
defence may remain strong. Should there be any possibility that outside interest 
represents a far smaller component of an opposition movement than its local 
contribution, the case for collective self-defence crumbles. In this climate, it it near 
993 Ibid. 
994 Walzer, Just and Uiliust Mars, p. 96. 
995 Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, " In: International Ethics, 
eds., by Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and John Simmons, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), p. 228. 
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impossible for a collective self-defence operation to avoid infringing upon basic 
political independence. On several occasions, for example, defenders did not support the 
existing authorities at all but brought in an alternative; such as Kadar in Hungary, Cabral 
in the Dominican Republic and Karmal in Afghanistan. Each time, the claim was that 
these individuals and their supporters would govern the state more legitimately than 
their predecessors. Nevertheless, evidence of their legitimacy was sufficiently 
unpersuasive that they had major internal rivals, often with substantial popular support. 
In each case, if in various ways, at least one external state became a central part of the 
local political process, sometimes changing that irrevocably. In none of these particular 
cases was there an entity that was stable and sustainable but for unprovoked anned 
attack. Instead, there was a climate of internal dissent, factionalism, rivalry for popular 
political loyalties, frequently the resort to force. However arbitrary and violent such 
contestation appears, it would be wise to be cautious in assuming that military 
intervention by another state will render the process less arbitrary or less violent. 996 The 
third point, is that claims of collective self-defence imprint conflicts with a division 
between internal and external politics that is misleading. The extravagance of Cold War 
accusations about "alien" infiltration of domestic opposition movements should not 
distract us from the more subtle confusion exemplified in the record of these 
interventions. More serious is that such episodes forced complex situations into an 
extremely simple and mutually exclusive dichotomy between domestic politics and 
international relations. Every instance of collective self-defence gave us a portrait of 
streotyped rivalries and discouraged any appreciation of complex motivation or 
behaviour. In a way, collective self-defence can be seen as analogous to the practice of 
996 Ibid, p. 230. He at the same time argues the potential benefits of a government coming to power 
principally through its oxvn efforts; a long struggle for independence, he proposes, may force contending 
parties to regroup, negotiate, more fully anticipate a regime to come, and so on. See p. 227-28. 
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international recognition. While their mode is radically different, both have the effort of 
"naming" and bounding those entities deserving of state status. A political community 
attains international legitimacy and authority when relevant members of the 
international community recognise them as having it and then begin to act upon the 
basis of that recognition. In that one moment, such a community acquires the correlative 
rights and duties of statehood. Both practices deserve caution. Like collective self- 
defence during the Cold War, recognition of new states and regimes, especially if 
premature, can mark a dramatic intrusion into local relationships. Arguably, these are 
more sustainable and at lower military cost, if left to resolve themselves at a principally 
local level. 
Finally, the implication is that the study, and sometimes the practice, of international 
relations pays insufficient heed to domestic processes, considerations of legitimacy, and 
dynamics of community; all of which must ground any persuasive claim to individual or 
collective self-defence. A plea to incorporate legitimacy, and the relationship between 
citizens and state, as central components of the study of international security is not 
terribly radical. To begin with, ideas about legitimacy are already present, if mostly in 
the form of assumptions. Moreover, in public rhetoric, claims about legitimacy are 
already made. Thus, the United States was drawn into a Grenada where "to protect the 
lives of the 1,000 Americans living on the island. " Consequently the operation came on 
the basis of a need to "forestall further chaos" and "to assist in the restoration of 
conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions. ', 997 The alternative was to 
leave as afait accompli the "vacuum of governmental responsibility" created when "a 
brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three 
997 See (The Times, 26 October 1983), p. 1. 
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Cabinet Ministers, two labour leaders and other civilians, including children. "998 In such 
an eventually, Grenada would be given over to regime that could "not purport to be a 
government with any legitimacy or even control. "999 
The Nicaraguan Case 
On April 1984, the Nicaraguan Government instituted an application in the Registry of 
the International Court of Justice beginning legal proceedings against the United States 
in respect of accountability for military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua. Nicaragua maintained that the United States was using military force against 
it and disrupting its internal affairs, in infringement of Nicaragua's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence. Also, it emphasised that the United 
States had sponsored an army of more than 10,000 mercenaries, located them in more 
than ten base camps in Honduras along the border with Nicaragua, trained them, 
supplied them with arms, ammunition, food and medical needs, and directed their 
attacks against Nicaraguan political and economic interests, with the main aim of 
destabilising the government of Nicaragua so that in the end it would be eliminated, a 
new government installed, loyal to the United States. 1000 
The importance of the Court's decisions is symbolised by decision (3), where the Court: 
"Decides that the United States of America, by training, anning, equipping, financing and 
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in 
breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another 
State. "'c'01 
998 Ibid, p. 6. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 See D. J. Harris, Cases and Material on International Law, p. 866-67. 
1001 See Case ConcerningAfilitary And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) (Merits: Judgement of 27 June 1986), paragraph 3. See also, John Lawrence 
Hargove, "The Nicaragua Judgement and The Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defence, " (American 
Journal ofInternational Law 81,1987), p. 137. 
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Also the Court made it clear that the United States had infringed principles of customary 
international law forbidding the use of force against another state; 1002 and that by 
directing and allowing over-flights of Nicaraguan territory and by other acts, the United 
States was in breach of its duty under customary international law not to infringe the 
sovereignty of another state; 1003 and by placing mines 1004 and failing to make known 
their location, 1005 the United States had infhnged its obligations under customary 
international law not to use force, not to intervene, and not to infringe the sovereignty of 
another state. Moreover, the Court found that the United States was in breach of duties 
under the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United 
States and Nicaragua. 1006 The Court also went further and decided "that the United 
States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts 
as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligation. " 1007 It took the view that 
the United States was under a duty to make reparation for "all injury caused to 
Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law',, 1008 and 
violations of the 1956 Treaty;, 009 failing agreement between the parties, the amount of 
reparation was to be settled by the Court. "1010 
The United States had violated in particular, Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, 
which requests that "All Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of 
force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, ... ." 
Similarly, Article 18 
of the Charter of the Organisation of American States also recommended that: 
1002 Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Nicaragua, paragraph 4. 
1003 Ibid, paragraph 5. 
1004 Ibid, paragraph 6. 1005 Ibid, paragraph 8. 1006 lbid, paragraph, 7,10, and 11. 1007 lbid, paragraph, 12. 
1008 Ibid, paragraph, 13. 
1009 Ibid, paragraph, 14. 
300 
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly, or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not 
only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality 
of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements. " 
The Court emphasised that when it gave its Judgement upholding its jurisdiction and the 
admissibility of the Nicaraguan claim in 1984, it was fully aware "that the United States 
regarded the law of the two Charters as applicable to the dispute; and furthermore, that 
the United States was "asserting collective self-defence in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter [Article 51] as justification for its activities vis-a-vis Nicaragua. ", 011 
During the case, the Court was concerned with the fact that the main basis of much of 
the United States argument was its assertion of a right of collective self-defence. This, 
said the Court, was "the principal justification announced by the United States for its 
conduct" towards Nicaragua. 1012 The Court noted that the United States "claim[ed] to be 
acting in reliance on the inherent right of self-defence 'guaranteed ... by Article 51 of the 
Charter' of the United Nations, that is to say the right of collective self-defence. " 1013 
With reference to this claim, the Court first held that "in the circumstances of the 
present case, the issues raised of collective self-defence are issues which it has 
competence, and is equipped, to determine, " without having any need to detennine a 
state's felt "necessity" of resorting to self-defence or "any evaluation of military 
.,, 
1014 
-def considerations Moreover, the Court-found that the right of self ence - whether 
individual or collective - was recognised by both parties to the case and was firmly 
established in customary international law; the Court held that for collective self- 
defence, as well as for individual self-defence, its legal basis "is subject to the State 
1010 lbid, paragraph, 15. 
1011 lbid, paragraph, 46. 
1012 lbid, paragraph, 13 1. 
1013 Ibid, paragraph, 24. See also, B. S. Chimni, "The International Court and the Maintenance of Peace 
and Security: The Nicaragua Decision and the United States Response, " (International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 35,1986), p. 962. 
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concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. " 1015 The Court indicated that "the 
plea of collective self-defence against an alleged anned. attack on El Salvador, Honduras 
or Costa Rica, advanced by the United States to justify its conduct toward Nicaragua, 
cannot be upheld, "10 16 therefore, the Court rejected the alleged justification. In relation 
to "anned attack, " the Court observed that: 
"[T]he Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes not only acts by armed 
bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded as threat or 
use of f6rce, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other State; "10 17 
but it is not armed attack'018, and in reference to the relation between "armed attack" 
and collective self-defence, the Court added: 
"It is also clear that it is the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and 
declare the view that it has been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law 
permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own 
assessment of the situation; " 1019 
as the United States had done prior to any determination or request by El Salvador. 1020 
On the customary international law principle of non-intervention, the Court indicated 
that: 
"[T]he principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal 
or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. 
One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such 
choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms 
the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention 
which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect fon-n of support for 
subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. "1021 
1014 Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary In And Against Nicaragua, paragraph, 35. 
10's Ibid, paragraph, 195. 
1016 Ibid, paragraph, 238. 
1017 Ibid, paragraph, 195. 
, 018 Hargove, "The Nicaragua Judgement and the Future of the Law of Force And Self-Defence, " p. 137- 
38. 
1019 See Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In AndAgainst Nicaragua, paragraph, 195. 
See also, D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Laiv, p. 867-68. 
1020 See Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua, paragraphs, 
233-36. 
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The Court noted that no new right of intervention had been established in customary 
international law. 1022 The Court therefore found that no such general right of 
intervention, in support of an opposition within another State, existed in contemporary 
intemational law. 1023 
Whatever the objects of the right of self-defence, the main aim is still to protect the 
state's territorial integrity and political independence. The connection between any state 
with its people, its land, and its territory will still play the main role as a deep-rooted 
relationship, and the right to defend them cannot be denied. Indeed, many regard it as a 
clear demonstration of the state's legitimacy. The right of self-defence should not, 
however, be transformed into an excuse to use force under the umbrella of self-defence. 
What happened in the Kosovo Crisis gives a great lesson, that bypassing the role of the 
Security Council will have adverse consequences for international peace and security. 
Admittedly, during the time of the Cold War, the performance of the Security Council 
was to some extent weakened, but at least at that time there were two superpower states, 
so some checks on behaviour were provided by the balance of power between them. 
Now there is only one superpower, the potential danger involved in any by-passing of 
Security Council authority is greatly increased. 
1021 Ibid, paragraph, 205. 
1022 Ibid, paragraph 207 reads: "Reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the 
principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary 
international law. In fact however the Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by reference 
to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition. " 
1023 Ibid, paragraph, 209. 
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Chapter Nine 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Throughout human history, international relations have been characterised by a tension 
between the inclination to pursue desired objectives by military means, and the desire, at 
the same time, to limit the horrors and destruetiveness of war. In medieval Europe, the 
accommodation between those objectives found expression in the concept of the "Just 
War", waged by duly constituted authority for legitimate purposes and with reasonable 
prospect of success. In Islam, it was expressed in the basically defensive concept of 
Jihad, fought to safeguard the Muslims' freedom of religion and to overcome 
oppression. In the early modem period, the use of force and its limitation became 
associated with the concept of the sovereign state. More recently, the desire to limit 
recourse to warfare, while at the same time leaving open a route for states to use force to 
secure certain national interests, has found expression in the United Nations Charter in a 
general prohibition against the use of force, with an exception made for the right of self- 
defence. Subsequently, self-defence has been widely invoked by states to justify their 
recourse to the use of armed force against each other. 
This thesis has been concerned to examine the development of the concept of individual 
and collective self-defence as it is enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter. It is plain 
from the investigations undertaken that this article has developed in a number of ways 
that were not necessarily contemplated by those who drafted the Charter. In the first 
place article 51 was clearly intended as a short term 'emergency' self-help response to 
armed attack pending effective international response and/or intervention. As a result of 
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the Cold War, the mixed collective security and balance of (super)power system became 
the order of the day. This resulted in the reliance upon the Chapter VII provisions for 
collective security that is to say articles 39-42 in recent cases of crisis which in turn 
became unsafe in many cases. As a result, article 51 was compelled to assume a burden 
of significance far beyond that which seems originally to have been intended. This has 
opened the door also to misuse of the provision. Many claims have been made to 'article 
51' justifications for actions which might objectively be categorised simply as 
'aggession'. For example the United States' attack on Iraq in 1993; and its attacks on 
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, were clear reprisal actions, which bore no relation to 
Article 51 of the Charter. Also, in the Kosovo Crisis, the use of force by NATO was 
apparently a breach of international law, especially since it involved bypassing the role 
and authority of the Security Council, which is the body with the primary responsibility 
to protect international peace and security. 
Exploration of the meaning, scope and implementation of Article 51 inevitably raises 
fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of international relations and the 
law that seeks to regulate them. Who are the "selves" that have a right to defence? And 
what is it that they wish (or are entitled) to defend? The answers may at first sight 
appear simple: the "selves" with which the UN system is basically concemed are 
sovereign states and what they are defending is their very existence; the aim of self- 
defence is to restore the status quo that existed before an attack which threatens the 
survival of the victim. In reality, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, matters 
are rarely so simple. The notion of self-defence can be considered to have two basic 
dimensions, temporal and spatial. Temporally, it can be viewed in terms of its 
relationship to an act (characterised in Article 51 as an "anned attack') which provokes 
it. As many examples explored in this thesis demonstrate, however, aggression and 
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threat often occur in forms other than the armed attack as traditionally conceived. 
Attacks may begin sporadically and gradually grow in intensity, or there may be an on- 
going state of low-level conflict falling short of armed attack or war. Modem weapons 
of mass destruction can be delivered to their target almost instantaneously, without 
troops ever crossing a border. A state may feel threatened economically or ideologically, 
without having been subjected to military attack as such. And as history shows, in many 
cases, a victim is not always in a position to exercise its right of self-defence at the time 
of an attack. In these circumstances, questions have inevitably arisen, in legal debate and 
state practice, regarding the extension of the self-defence right, both fonvards and 
backwards in time. However attractive such nations may be in particular cases, the 
dangers inherent in such a temporally elastic view of self-defence have been clearly 
demonstrated. 
The spatial dimension of self-defence, is concerned with the "objects" being defended: 
population, territory, and the very identity and legitimacy of the state itself. Examination 
of each of these "objects" in turn, revealed sufficient variety and ambiguity to call 
further into question the notion of a peaceful, united, recognisable community, residing 
on clearly defined territory and legitimately governed, which is suddenly required to 
defend itself against external threat. Population, for example, could take the form of 
individual persons at risk (prompting actions of rescue and/or humanitarian 
intervention); to people as members of a common society (prompting intervention in the 
name of "special association") to people as citizens of a state, giving to an equation 
between them, so that a threat to the former is regarded as tantamount to a threat to the 
latter. These different perspectives involve different rights and duties for the states 
concerned. To add to the confusion, many communities are in flux and not clearly 
identified. Their formations, movements and regroupings, because they have crossed 
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states lines, have brought humanitarian considerations into conflict with state-based 
nations of defence. 
Equally ambiguous is the concept of territory. Territory is regarded as a basic 
prerequisite of statehood and defended on that ground, but territoriality and claims of 
defence based on it are also blurred by uncertain boundaries, competition for scarce 
resources, and contradictory claims. Questions also rise in regard to the legitimacy of the 
status quo that self-defence is intended to restore. In periods or regions witnessing 
fundamental transition, such as decolonisation or the current adaptation to the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union bloc, issues of power and authority, 
boundaries and membership became open for negotiation. In such circumstances, the 
viability of the traditional notion of self-defence is questionable. 
The UN formulation of the self-defence right in Article 51 of its Charter increasingly 
challenged by the realities of the post-colonial, post-Cold War era, and state' response 
has been to attempts to expand that right, both temporally and spatially, in a manner 
never envisaged by the framers of the Charter. Additionally, it may be wondered 
whether the role of the Security Council has been permanently unden-nined by the 
paralysing effect of the veto during the Cold War era. In these circumstances, the 
question arises as to the future usefulness and applicability of Article 51. 
Even leaving aside the general question of the possibly dangerous proliferation of 
claimed new exceptions to article 2(4) of the Charter, we are still forced to face the 
problems of the continuing use and abuse of article 51 itself It may be argued that, as it 
has developed since 1945, the article does not sufficiently address the question of state 
sovereignty. As it has become increasingly clear, the codification of Article 51 in the 
United Nations Charter on rules of intervention is a further testimony to the fact that 
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although there was unanimity on the part of the international community in presenting 
such a provision as a means of crisis management, there has been little agreement upon 
its later use.. Although the spirit contained within the Article 51 is noble, from time to 
time there have emerged great differences among the parties using it. As yet, there have 
been few occasions when the members of the Security Council were able to find 
consensus in taking certain measures, after state action within the scope of Article 
51.1024 It goes without saying that there exists a razor thin line between justified and 
unjustified use of force. From a holistic point of view one can legitimately ask whether 
Article 51 should not be used to deal with security crises arising from poverty, 
malnutrition, economic and political mismanagement, and other forms of injustice and 
inequality, as well as overt military aggression. It may be noted that in many of the 
possible or argued cases of 'humanitarian intervention', as in the Tanzanian intervention 
in Uganda and in the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea/Cambodia the intervening 
states actually categorised their action as self-defence under article 51. Although it is 
difficult not to sympathise with the actions referred to, it must be wondered to what 
extent the wording of article 51 will actually sustain such broad interpretations. It is 
further the case that the use of article 51 in a uni-polar world has made it easy for major 
Powers or Power-blocs to adopt their own interpretations of article 51 without much 
opposition or protest. However, this status quo is subject to alteration in respect of both 
article 51 and the broader spectrum of security provision. A multi-polar world involving 
both western and non-western influences involves significantly wider perspectives. In 
such a context the International community's failure to intervene in Kashmir (India), 
1024 In recent times the first such consensus could be arrived at during the Gulf Crisis. Baghdad's 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a clear breach of international law. Therefore the Security 
Council could find it easy to invoke the provisions contained within Article 51 to a military operation. 
Yet, critics have always pointed that the Western interest in Kuwait's oil and the comatose Russian 
politics of the time allowed the American- led multinational force to engage in such an intervention. For a 
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Tibet (China), and Chechnya (Russia) raises serious questions about the general future 
of Chaýpter VII of the Charter. The attempts to use the idea of humanitarian intervention, 
as in the case of Kosovo, poses new dangers to the Charter system. While the Charter 
permits the use of force under narrowly defined conditions in exercise of the right of 
self-defence, arguments based on humanitarian intervention tend to undermine both the 
general prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) and the safeguard built around 
the right of self-defence under Article 51. Such a situation is likely to give rise to 
various excuses to use force for all sorts of politically motivated reasons. Therefore, in 
order to strengthen the Charter based system of managing international relations 
provisions like Article 51 should be respected as central principles from which no 
deviation should be permissible. 
To conclude, the UN Charter is necessarily a flexible instrument. If it is to deal with 
changing international relations through the Cold War and beyond, article 51 must 
clearly change from its original 1945 conception, the important issue being whether it 
can change within the spirit of its nature as an 'emergency' response with value 
especially to weaker and third world nations which may be under threat. 
The way forward for the international order is the approach taken by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Case rather than the one taken by the members of NATO during the Kosovo 
Crisis. The approach taken by the allied powers during the crisis not only undermined 
the UN authority but also the right of self-defence. This is because the allied powers 
tried to use the alleged right of humanitarian intervention as an additional exception to 
the principle of the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter. This is not a 
discussion how the UN Security Council could take the joint decision, see Gro Skaaren-Fystro, .4 Victory for Collective Security: Vie UN and the Gul(Crisis, (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1994). 
309 
1ý 
healthy development for the maintenance of international law and order as envisaged 
under the Charter of the UN in general and Article 51 in particular. 
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